What key factors in StoreKIng’s Business model

W20662

Sanal Kumar Velayudhan wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The author does not intend to illustrate either

effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The author may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.

Save your time - order a paper!

Get your paper written from scratch within the tight deadline. Our service is a reliable solution to all your troubles. Place an order on any task and we will take care of it. You won’t have to worry about the quality and deadlines

Order Paper Now

This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western

University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) cases@ivey.ca; www.iveycases.com. Our goal is to publish materials of the highest quality; submit any errata to publishcases@ivey.ca. i1v2e5y5pubs

STOREKING: REACHING RURAL CONSUMERS WITH ASSISTED E- COMMERCE

In June 2019, Sridhar Gundaiah, the founder and chief executive officer (CEO) of StoreKing, faced the challenge of meeting his target of recruiting 100,000 retailers in India by 2020.1 StoreKing was an assisted e-commerce

rural distribution company that sold consumer products across rural India through designated retailers. These

retailers were supplied with tablet computers (tablets), which they used to help rural consumers buy goods on the StoreKing platform (see Exhibits 1 and 2). As of June 2019, StoreKing had only 39,000 active retail

franchisees. Gundaiah knew that increasing participation to 100,000 retailers would be a difficult task for two

reasons: the emerging competition from similar businesses and the fact that the current level of retail coverage had taken six years to attain. Gundaiah was keen to find a way to achieve his goal for 2020 and also to secure a

long-term competitive advantage in relation to mainstream e-commerce platforms.

STOREKING

StoreKing launched its operations in 2012 with the aim of becoming India’s largest retail company by

reaching 70 per cent of India’s population. StoreKing sought to be the digital touchpoint for rural India as well as to enable rural Indians to access technology. According to Gundaiah, “I come from a rural

background myself and being a technologist, I wanted to simplify the existing e-commerce model and cash

in on the rural market potential. We in fact are not an e-commerce company but rather the carriers, and aim to be the biggest rural distributors in the world, in the years to come.”2 The founder and CEO of StoreKing

had an entrepreneurial spirit that enabled him to action the challenging idea of bringing assisted e-commerce

to rural markets (see Exhibit 3).

Growth Strategy

StoreKing grew at a rapid pace, and by 2018, it had entered nine states in India. It started with 200 stores in Karnataka. In 2013, StoreKing launched its operations in Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh,

entering 500 towns and villages. In 2015, stores were launched in Goa, Maharashtra, and Telangana, and in

2016, stores were added in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh. The states that StoreKing operated in included approximately 180,000 villages (see Exhibit 4). StoreKing also increased the number of stores it operated

within the geographical area. In 2012, it had 200 retailers, although the number increased to 800 by the Do N

ot C

op y

or P

os t

This document is authorized for educator review use only by Emmanuel Opara, Prairie View A&M University until Oct 2021. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp.harvard.edu or 617.783.7860

Page 2 9B20A066

following year. In 2014, it had 2,000 stores, while by 2015, this number had increased to 8,000 stores.3

StoreKing operated 25,000 stores in 2016, 40,000 stores in 2017,4 and 50,000 stores in 2018 (see Exhibit

5). However, approximately 20 per cent of the retailers were inactive retail franchisees. These retailers did

not use the StoreKing platform for their retail business.

StoreKing grew not only with regard to its geographical expansion and enhanced retail coverage but also

in terms of its range of products and services, which was accomplished through partnerships with e- commerce retailers such as Clues Network Pvt. Ltd, GFOI Retail Pvt. Ltd., and BrainBees Solutions Pvt.

Ltd; fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) manufacturers such as Labhaya Impex Private Limited; and

digital service providers such as One97 Communications Ltd. Amazon India had also signed a partnership agreement with StoreKing concerning the opening of exclusive StoreKing-Amazon stores (see Exhibit 6)

in small towns in India. As of 2018, these retailers were making ₹30,0005 in net revenue.6 One MobiKwik

Systems Private Limited, a firm offering a digital financial services platform that enabled payments,

partnered with StoreKing to expand its cashless and cardless payment facility, offering rural users access to electronic payments using the MobiKwik mobile wallet.7 State Bank of India, Indian Oil Corporation

Limited, and Oxigen Services India Pvt. Ltd., also partnered with StoreKing.8 StoreKing’s growth was

further reflected in the number of transactions processed by the platform, which had increased from 100– 150 transactions per day in 2014 to 50,000 transactions per day in 2016.9 To finance its growth strategy,

the company raised multiple rounds of funding, including US$5 million from Mangrove Capital Partners,

a Luxembourg-based venture capital firm, and US$16 million from Malaysia’s Axiata Digital.10

Product Offerings and Service Level

StoreKing’s product and service offerings included beauty products and cosmetics, apparel, footwear, kitchen appliances, home appliances, jewellery, food and nutrition, sports and fitness, mobile phones and accessories,

and electronics. The company also offered digital services, such as the payment of utility bills, travel bookings,

mobile wallets, and mobile phone recharges. Its financial services offerings included microfinance and insurance.11 Approximately 30 per cent of the StoreKing catalogue comprised FMCG, 30 per cent comprised

electronics, while 20 per cent comprised home appliances, and the balance was other products.12 The most

popular items were face creams, mobile phones, kitchen appliances, and home accessories.13

StoreKing sought to offer a service level that allowed for a viable operation. The company’s distribution

was performed through the retailer, which had the advantage of creating trust and reducing the cost of

reaching the customer. Trust was created due to the involvement of a local retailer, and the customer could always return the product to the retailer, if required. In the case of StoreKing, less than 1 per cent of the

products sold were returned. Viability was ensured through the introduction of a minimum order size of

₹500. As of 2015, the average order size was ₹1,200.14

Performance

Toward the end of 2018, StoreKing processed approximately 70,000 transactions per day.15 According to

Gundaiah, as of 2018, the company had a positive cash flow, although it was not expected to become

profitable until 2020. The company’s revenue for the year ending March 2018 was ₹12 billion, while the revenue for the year ending March 2019 was estimated to be ₹25 billion (see Exhibit 7).16

Do N

ot C

op y

or P

os t

Page 3 9B20A066

SERVING AS A RETAIL TOUCHPOINT

By 2018, StoreKing reached 150,000 villages across 10 states throughout India.17 According to Ram G.K.

StoreKing’s business manager (growth and incubation), the company focused on Tier 3 and smaller towns.

It utilized the existing network of distributors and retailers that served the FMCG companies.18 StoreKing had created a network of rural master franchise partners, who were typically the big local distributors

involved in the FMCG industry and courier companies. The entire franchise network was run on the

technology-enabled StoreKing platform. “Everything has been insured and responsibility has been equally shared,” said Gundaiah. He claimed that the rate of lost shipments was only 0.2–0.3 per cent.19

The average rural master franchisee (RMF) served approximately 15–20 retail franchisees, although a

highly experienced RMF could service up to 30 retail franchisees. The RMF trained the retail franchisees, helped them to understand and scale up their businesses, and performed last-mile distribution to the retail

franchisees. The RMF was supported by a rural sales officer (RSO) as well as by a StoreKing back-office

team, the rural engagement team. An RSO served approximately five RMFs. Each RSO had a region with at least 80 retailers but more commonly 150 retailers. An RSO generally covered one district, although a

very experienced RSO could cover two districts.

The logistics required to support the network included a warehouse operated by StoreKing in each state in

which it had a presence. The products were transported from the warehouse to the various distribution

centres, with each one usually handling the distribution for a single district. The products were then

delivered from the distribution centre to the RMF within 24–48 hours, which was the service level guaranteed by StoreKing. Upon delivery of the products to the RMF, information was provided to the retail

franchisee regarding the delivery. The RMF delivered the products to the retailer, or the retailer picked up

the products from the RMF. The product movement was tracked with the help of product item tags. Product returns required dispatch by the retail franchisee directly to StoreKing. Damaged or incorrect products were

photographed, and the photographs were mailed to StoreKing. After verifying the correctness of a claim,

the retailer engagement team offered advice on the process for returning the product.

The retailers received an 8–10 per cent commission on every transaction. Most products sold by the retailers

were items they had not previously stocked, so these sales represented added revenue.20 On average, the

retailers earned a commission of ₹6,000 per month, although some earned ₹32,000 per month.21 To meet the credit demand in the rural market, StoreKing partnered with the digital lending platform Capital Float,

which provided working capital loans to small retailers. As Gundaiah commented, “With Capital Float on-

board, we have disbursed loans of ₹40 million to retailers in rural India, which has impacted the business and brought immense joy to our customers. The current potential of the financial inclusion market within

StoreKing’s reach is about ₹5 billion.”22

The retailers were initially skeptical about depositing money in advance for e-commerce transactions with StoreKing. As it was important for StoreKing to persuade potential retail franchisees of the viability of the

concept, the company employed 250 RSOs to visit the retailers in an effort to convince them to accept the

concept of assisted e-commerce.23 The RSOs explored the availability of multi-product distributors to identify suitable locations for servicing. According to Ram, in addition to the development efforts of the

RSOs, the other major sources of recruitment were referrals from other retailers and contact from potential

retail franchisees who expressed an interest in becoming franchisees. For the latter, an RSO was given the lead and tasked with verifying that the candidate had all of the proper documents, including a licence to

operate a shop, a permanent account number issued by the income tax department, and an identification

card issued by the Unique Identification Authority of India (known as Aadhaar). The RSO not only recruited

the retail franchisee but also trained the retail franchisee with the assistance of the RMF. The RSO also familiarized the retailer with the use of a tablet for sales. In addition to the RSO, the retailer engagement Do

N ot

C op

y or

P os

Page 4 9B20A066

team also supported the retail franchisee. The retailer engagement team handled queries from retailers,

responding to mailed-in questions or telephone queries within 24–48 hours.

CONTEXT THAT ENABLED THE IDEA

The Indian rural market was important for e-commerce companies. It could not be ignored because India’s

semi-urban and rural areas were expected to contribute the majority of new Internet users.24 StoreKing developed a unique model that was influenced by the characteristics of rural consumers as well as by the

infrastructure in rural areas. For e-commerce companies, reaching people and building a brand in rural India

posed a challenge due to poor Internet connections, language barriers, and a general lack of trust toward an

unfamiliar and distant company that was only accessible through a website. A few organizations, such as ITC Limited (ITC), an Indian conglomerate, had experimented with assisted e-commerce in rural areas.

ITC developed Internet kiosks (known as e-Choupal) to conduct transactions over the Internet with farmers.

Each e-Choupal kiosk provided Internet coverage for an average of five villages.25

Consumers

Many potential consumers in rural areas who had the capacity and willingness to purchase items online

were not in a position to do so.26 In rural areas, literacy levels were low. Even those who were literate usually only had knowledge of their local language and so were incapable of providing their address in

English.27 Additionally, rural consumers did not generally trust e-commerce transactions, as they usually

carried out transactions based on familiarity and their prior relationship with the seller. They needed to transact with someone they could trust, but trust was absent when performing a transaction in a virtual

environment. As e-commerce represented a transaction in which the purchaser did not touch or feel the

product prior to purchase, the lack of physical contact with the product also contributed to rural consumers’ hesitancy in relation to making online transactions. In the words of Gundaiah, “In rural India, people will

be very scared if you say, ‘I’m not showing you the exact product, but I’m only showing you the image.’

This was a very big challenge.”28 Most rural consumers did not have access to the Internet, and those who

did have access often needed help to complete a transaction. More than 85 per cent of the rural population also had no access to debit or credit cards.29

The rural consumers were sensitive to prices but sought variety and access to products, as the availability of products and services was a big issue in rural markets. StoreKing had the advantage of capturing

information on rural consumers and their purchase behaviours because the transactions were performed on

a digital platform. As Gundaiah noted:

We are like a data company for rural India. We can tell a brand where they should launch a product

just by looking at data. Rural India takes time to get used to technology, but when it does, they buy

in high volumes. In January 2018, 46% of smartphones sold in India were sold in Tier 3 and below towns. Rural consumption is all about replicating products. They don’t care about choices. They

want what the others have. Now we have the ability to understand rural consumption.30

Support Infrastructure

One of the challenges faced by e-commerce companies with regard to serving rural India was the undeveloped last-mile logistics system, including the lack of couriers to reach many rural areas.31 Rural India also had a

unique problem in terms of online shopping: not every village had a postal code, which made it difficult to

deliver parcels directly to rural consumers.32 The poor smartphone penetration and erratic mobile Internet in Do N

ot C

op y

or P

os t

Page 5 9B20A066

rural India added to the problems. According to Gundaiah, even in urban areas, the point-of-sale terminals did

not work properly, as they needed a good Internet connection to complete a transaction.33 However, a well-

established network of distributors and small retailers for FMCG goods was available, and StoreKing utilized

this channel to reach its retailers with products.34

A UNIQUE MODEL TAILORED TO THE CONTEXT

StoreKing was an assisted e-commerce platform with a catalogue of its various products. It followed a hybrid

model in the sense that it used both a digital platform and a brick-and-mortar infrastructure. The digital

platform was the website, while the brick-and-mortar infrastructure involved a local retailer who used a tablet

and assisted rural customers with making purchases on the StoreKing website. The entire user interface was available in common Indian languages, including Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, Malayalam, and Konkani.

StoreKing’s business model did away with last-mile delivery to customers, as the customers collected their purchases from the retailer. “We piggyback on [the] existing logistical distribution network. We don’t use

[a] courier network at all as we don’t need anyone to knock on your door,” said Gundaiah. As part of the

transportation-distribution model followed by StoreKing, the distributors’ vans were used to transport the goods. This arrangement had the advantage of reducing costs, since the cost of a courier firm delivering a

product to a customer’s doorstep represented 60 per cent of the total cost that the customer incurred.35

StoreKing promoted its concept to retailers in rural areas and convinced them to buy and install a StoreKing tablet. In 2016, participating retail stores paid ₹15,000 as a one-time payment for installing a kiosk. The

retailer typically recovered the initial investment within two months.36 The StoreKing business model

complemented the villages’ traditional transactional system. The only new element involved familiarizing customers with technology.37 “We find a trusted retailer who is known in the village so that people come

to him to buy the things they want to and are willing to pay in full toward the product,” said Gundaiah.38

The retailer took the customer through the online shopping experience and helped with the checkout

process. When a consumer requested a product, the retailer searched for that product at the kiosk and then helped the customer to buy it. Once the order was confirmed, the customer paid the retailer in full and

received a confirmation SMS (short messaging service, or text message) from StoreKing. “The only thing

we need from the customer to identify them is a phone number. We send all delivery communications to his mobile after that,” added Gundaiah.39

The retailers maintained a certain deposit amount with StoreKing. Whenever an order was placed, StoreKing debited the particular retailer’s float and shipped the product to that retailer.40 StoreKing used

the FMCG distribution channel to deliver the goods. Further, StoreKing communicated the delivery status

to the customer.41 The retailers did not carry inventory, as the system followed a demand model.42 While StoreKing did not sell products at a premium, unlike other e-commerce companies, it did not attempt to

attract customers by offering heavy discounts.43 The StoreKing retailers ensured that customers received

assistance when placing their order and when requesting a return, replacement, or refund.44

COMPETITION

StoreKing faced competition from mainstream retail e-commerce companies as well as from at least one other

assisted e-commerce company. In 2014, the mainstream e-commerce company Amazon.com, Inc. launched its assisted e-commerce venture, which was known as Udaan, in areas where the Internet connections were poor—

mostly in small towns. Amazon sold mobile phones, apparel, and other products through local partners in these

locations. These partners had their own outlets, and they assisted consumers with placing orders on the Amazon

platform. The products were delivered to the outlets, and the consumers picked them up from there. Do N

ot C

op y

or P

os t

Page 6 9B20A066

Kishore Thota, the head of consumer marketing at Amazon India, commented:

With first-time Internet users, there is a lot of anxiety about online shopping and whether they will

be able to successfully finish transactions. With Udaan, we build trust with first-time shoppers who

will then hopefully come back and shop on Amazon by themselves. We have seen that happen with quite a few of the users who have shopped via Udaan.”45

Competition also came from an assisted e-commerce company that had a business model similar to that of

StoreKing: IPay Tech India Pvt. Ltd. (IPay Tech), which announced the launch of its assisted e-commerce

services across Andhra Pradesh in April 2014. As IPay Tech’s CEO Krishna Lakamsani explained:

We have been operational for almost a year and have 500 plus hi-tech retailers on board who have

completed over 1.7 million transactions. We are targeting the rural markets where people want to

buy specific goods that are not available. We are looking at bridging the gap between retailers,

merchants and customers. . . . There is no time wasted on training and the model works through a tablet which will be provided to retailers to carry [out] transactions such as booking tickets or

ordering products online by connecting the customer to our call center.

The call centre mediated the transactions, and the customers paid cash to the retailers. The products were then shipped to the customers in a week’s time.46

ISSUES

The short-term challenge for StoreKing was to double the number of its retail franchisees in less than two

years in order to meet the goal set by Gundaiah. The task was not an easy one, as there were many hurdles to overcome, including the poor quality of the Internet infrastructure, which restricted the reach of StoreKing’s

service to interior villages. StoreKing also needed to persuade potential retailers in new locations to buy into

its concept. While these tasks represented an immediate challenge to growth, the issue in the long run was

different: with increased Internet access and greater familiarity with e-commerce, consumers were likely to shift their purchasing to dominant e-commerce companies such as Amazon and Flipkart.

According to Jessie Paul, founder of Paul Writer, a marketing advisory firm, in most situations the use of

“assisted commerce” (or an agent) was only temporary. Typically, as consumers became more comfortable with the channel, or as accessibility improved, they would want to transact directly. He referred to the

example of people who once relied on agents or younger relatives to go online to book them a bus or cab.

“Now,” said Paul, “they are doing it themselves.”47 For his part, Gundaiah believed that assisted e-

commerce represented the future in a country that was still grappling with Internet speeds and logistics. “You need to give consumers enough confidence to go cashless,” he remarked.48

StoreKing needed to contend with a major issue—the competition posed by mainstream e-commerce firms

such as Amazon and Flipkart. While these e-commerce companies were not yet present in rural markets,

they could establish a presence over time, thereby rendering StoreKing redundant. StoreKing would have higher transaction costs than the large e-commerce companies due to both its smaller volumes and the

additional layer in its distribution channel. These reasons explained why venture capital firms that invested

in India’s e-commerce companies did not consider investing in StoreKing.49

In the short term, StoreKing also needed to consider the challenge posed by competitors that operated according

to similar business models, such as IPay and even Amazon’s Udaan. As of 2018, Amazon had partnered with

StoreKing in those locations where StoreKing had a presence. It was possible, however, that Udaan would

become stronger than StoreKing and so Amazon might not need to partner with StoreKing in the future. Do N

ot C

op y

or P

os t

Page 7 9B20A066

EXHIBIT 1: EXAMPLES OF STOREKING RETAIL FRANCHISEES

Source: Company files.

EXHIBIT 2: SRIDHAR GUNDAIAH, THE ENTREPRENEUR Gundaiah grew up in suburban Banashankari, and graduated in computer science from BNM Institute of Technology, while working part-time as a programmer at ProInt Software in Bengaluru. After graduation, he . . . went to the University of Greenwich, London, for a master’s degree in internet technology and ecommerce. . . . he had also worked as a programmer at Yellowtag in London. In early 2007, he returned to India and got a contract job with IT services company Mphasis.

“After my master’s degree, I was very sure that connecting people by using internet as a technology layer was very important,” he [Gundaiah] says. With this in mind, Gundaiah founded his first startup Yulop WebSense in mid-2007. The startup, of which 65 percent was owned by angel investors, provided local content to Navteq, a US-based company (which had been acquired by Nokia), that provided geographic information system data and electronic navigation maps. With 260 employees, Yulop, using mobile technology and GPS [Global Positioning System] navigation systems, collected photographic data as well as the latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of places in India. He exited Yulop in 2010, but continues to hold a small stake in it.

It was during these years that Gundaiah’s connect with rural India began to get stronger, aided by his frequent visits to Hanchipura. “I clubbed my understanding of what is rural and my experience with small tech startups, and I said, ‘Why don’t I solve problems for rural India?’” says Gundaiah. “In StoreKing, that’s the bottomline: How do you take technology to rural India.”

Source: Anshul Dhamija, “StoreKing: The Friendly, Neighborhood Etailman,” Forbes India, July 7, 2016, accessed January 1, 2019, www.forbesindia.com/article/startups-special/storeking-the-friendly-neighbourhood-etailman/43663/1.

EXHIBIT 3: NUMBER OF VILLAGES IN THE INDIAN STATES WHERE STOREKING OPERATES States Villages

Andhra Pradesh* 26,286

Goa 320

Gujarat 17,843

Karnataka 27,397

Kerala 1,017

Maharashtra 40,959

Madhya Pradesh 51,929

Tamil Nadu 15,049

Total 180,800

Note: *According to the 2011 census, Andhra Pradesh includes the state of Telangana. Source: “A-1 Number of Villages, Towns, Households, Population and Area,” Office of the Registrar General & Census

Commissioner, India, 2011, accessed December 10, 2018, www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/population_enumeration.html. Do N

ot C

op y

or P

os t

Page 8 9B20A066

EXHIBIT 4: RETAIL STORE GROWTH ACROSS INDIA’S STATES, 2012–2018

Year Number of Retailers States 2012 200 Karnataka

2013 800 + Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh

2014 2,000 No additions

2015 8,000 + Goa, Maharashtra, Telangana

2016 25,000 + Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh

2017 40,000 No additions

2018 50,000 No additions

Note: The number of retailers reflects the cumulative number. The states listed were added for that year and do not include the states added in previous years. No state was dropped after inclusion. Source: StoreKing, Our Journey, 2020, accessed July 7, 2020, https://storeking.in/index.php/site/page/about; Pratik Bhakta, “Capital Float Partners with StoreKing to Extend Credit to Rural India,” Economic Times, November 28, 2017, accessed December 10, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/capital-float-partners-with-storeking-to-extend-credit- to-rural-india/articleshow/61833580.cms.

EXHIBIT 5: A STOREKING-AMAZON STORE

Source: Company files.

EXHIBIT 6: STOREKING REVENUE, 2014–15 TO 2018–19 Year (April–March) Revenue (in billion ₹)

2014–15 1

2015–16 3

2016–17 6

2017–18 12

2018–19 25

Note: The revenue for 2018–19 is an estimate. ₹ = INR = Indian rupee; ₹1 = US$0.0139 as of November 1, 2019. Source: Rosemary Marandi, “StoreKing Lures Amazon by Connecting the Dots of Rural India,” Nikkei Asian Review, January 18, 2019, accessed May 23, 2020. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Startups-in-Asia/StoreKing-lures-Amazon-by-connecting- the-dots-of-rural-India.

Do N

ot C

op y

or P

os t

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Startups-in-Asia/StoreKing-lures-Amazon-by-connecting-the-dots-of-rural-India

Page 9 9B20A066

ENDNOTES

1 Pratik Bhakta, “Capital Float Partners with StoreKing to Extend Credit to Rural India,” Economic Times, November 28, 2017,

accessed December 10, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/capital-float-partners-with- storeking-to-extend-credit-to-rural-india/articleshow/61833580.cms. 2 Agamoni Ghosh, “How This Entrepreneur Aims to Create the World’s Largest Rural Distribution Network,” Entrepreneur India, October 12, 2017, accessed January 1, 2018, www.entrepreneur.com/article/302562. 3 StoreKing, Our Journey, accessed July 7, 2020, https://storeking.in/index.php/site/page/about. 4 Bhakta, op. cit. 5 ₹ = INR = Indian rupee; all currency amounts are in ₹ unless otherwise specified; ₹1 = US$0.0139 as of November 1, 2019. 6 Shalina Pillai, “Global Practices Won’t Work, Jugaad Required in India: Sridhar Gundaiah, founder, StoreKing,” TNN, May

20, 2018, accessed December 10, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/global-practices-wont- work-jugaad-required-in-india-sridhar-gundaiah-founder-storeking/articleshow/64242666.cms. 7 Press Trust of India “MobiKwik, StoreKing Tie-Up for Cashless Payment in Rural Areas,” Economic Times, August 18, 2015, accessed December 11, 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/mobikwik-storeking-tie-up-for- cashless-payment-in-rural-areas/articleshow/48527150.cms. 8 Rajiv Singh, “Demonetization: How StoreKing Is Proving Itself the Amazon of Rural India,” Economic Times, December 8, 2016, accessed December 10, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/demonetisation-how-storeking- is-proving-itself-the-amazon-of-rural-india/articleshow/55862551.cms. 9 Rashmi Pratap, “Taking e-tail to Bharat,” Hindu, January 9, 2017, accessed January 1, 2018, http://m.thehindubusinessline.com/specials/emerging-entrepreneurs/taking-etail-to-bharat/article9468848.ece. 10 Ghosh, op. cit. 11 StoreKing, op. cit. 12 Pratap, op. cit. 13 Singh, op. cit. 14 Soumonty Kanungo, “Assisted e-Commerce Best Way to Crack Rural Market: Sridhar Gundaiah,” DNA, July 15, 2015, accessed December 10, 2018, www.dnaindia.com/money/interview-assisted-e-commerce-best-way-to-crack-rural-market- sridhar-gundaiah-2104700. 15 Anjuli Bhargava, “StoreKing: A Tech-Enabled Distribution Platform for Rural Kirana Stores,” Business Standard, November

11, 2018, accessed May 23, 2020, www.business-standard.com/article/companies/storeking-a-tech-enabled-distribution- platform-for-rural-kirana-stores-118111000883_1.html. 16 Rosemary Marandi, “StoreKing Lures Amazon by Connecting the Dots of Rural India,” Nikkei Asian Review, January 18, 2019, accessed May 23, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Startups-in-Asia/StoreKing-lures-Amazon-by-connecting-the- dots-of-rural-India. 17 Pillai, op. cit. 18 Anshul Dhamija, “StoreKing: The Friendly, Neighborhood Etailman,” Forbes India, July 7, 2016, accessed January 1, 2019, www.forbesindia.com/article/startups-special/storeking-the-friendly-neighbourhood-etailman/43663/1. 19 Ibid. 20 Pillai, op. cit. 21 Dhamija, op. cit. 22 Bhakta, op. cit. 23 Bhargava, op. cit. 24 Nandita Mathur, “India’s internet base crosses 500 million mark, driven by Rural India,” Livemint, March 1, 2019, accessed August 12, 2020, www.livemint.com/industry/telecom/internet-users-exceed-500-million-rural-india-driving-growth-report- 1552300847307.html. 25 David M. Upton and Virginia A. Fuller, ITC eChoupal Initiative (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Publishing, 2003). Available

from Ivey Publishing, product no. 604016. 26 Dhamija, op. cit. 27 Kanungo, op. cit. 28 Ibid. 29 Singh, op. cit. 30 Pillai, op. cit. 31 Singh, op. cit. 32 Dhamija, op. cit. 33 Singh, op. cit. 34 Dhamija, op. cit. 35 Pratap, op. cit. 36 Kanungo, op. cit. 37 Singh, op. cit. 38 Aparna Ghosh, “StoreKing—A Rs 100 Crore e-Commerce Company That Million South Indian Villagers Buy From,” YourStory, May 28, 2015, accessed December 10, 2018, https://yourstory.com/2015/05/storeking-e-commerce-company/. 39 Ibid. 40 Pillai, op. cit. 41 Ghosh, op. cit.

Do N

ot C

op y

or P

os t

Page 10 9B20A066

42 Singh, op. cit. 43 Ghosh, op. cit. 44 “ShopClues Eyes Tier-II and Tier-III Markets with StoreKing Partnership,” Times of India, July 13, 2016, accessed January 22, 2018, www.gadgetsnow.com/tech-news/ShopClues-eyes-tier-II-and-tier-III-markets-with-StoreKing-partnership/articleshow/53170906.cms. 45 Mihir Dalal, “Amazon Ties Up with StoreKing for Offline Push,” LiveMint, June 7, 2016, accessed January 17, 2019, www.livemint.com/Industry/EsxSVEr4DK9wsmZNIonfWO/Amazon-ties-up-with-Storeking-for-offline-push.html. 46 Payal Ganguly, “IPay Tech Counts on Early Mover Advantage in Hybrid Online Offline Market,” Economic Times, April 19, 2014, accessed January 17, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/ipay-tech-counts-on-early-mover- advantage-in-hybrid-online-offline-market/articleshow/33960260.cms. 47 Singh, op. cit. 48 Ibid. 49 Dhamija, op. cit.

Do N

ot C

op y

or P

os t

What key factors in StoreKIng’s Business model

Save your time - order a paper!

Experience

Our mission

Latest Posts

Talk to us...