Tragedy Of The Commons

Why is Pollution from U.S. Manufacturing Declining? The Roles of Trade, Regulation, Productivity, and Preferences∗

Joseph S. Shapiro Yale University and NBER

joseph.shapiro@yale.edu

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Reed Walker University of California, Berkeley

IZA and NBER rwalker@berkeley.edu

September 2015

Abstract

Between 1990 and 2008, air pollution emissions from U.S. manufacturing fell by 60 percent despite a substantial increase in manufacturing output. We show that these emissions reductions are primarily driven by within-product changes in emissions intensity rather than changes in output or in the compo- sition of products produced. We then develop and estimate a quantitative model linking trade with the environment to better understand the economic forces driving these changes. Our estimates suggest that the implicit pollution tax that manufacturers face doubled between 1990 and 2008. These changes in environmental regulation, rather than changes in trade, productivity, or preferences, explain most of the emissions reductions. JEL: F18, F64, H23, Q56

∗We thank Joe Altonji, Costas Arkolakis, Randy Becker, Jared Carbone, Brian Copeland, Arnaud Costinot, Sharat Ganapati, Michael Greenstone, Sam Kortum, Arik Levinson, Bill Nordhaus, Noam Yuchtman, and numerous seminar participants for useful comments and discussions. We also thank Adrian Fernandez, Vivek Sampathkumar, David Silver, and Yusuf Mercan for excellent research assistance. Shapiro acknowledges support from the Yale MacMillan Center and the Yale Program on Applied Economics and Policy Research. Walker acknowledges additional support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the UC office of the President through the University of California Center for Energy and Environmental Economics. All results have been reviewed by the U.S. Census Bureau to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed.

 

 

1 Introduction

Between 1990 and 2008, emissions of the most common air pollutants from U.S. manufacturing fell by 60

percent, even as real U.S. manufacturing output grew substantially. Figure 1 shows just how stark these

environmental improvements have been. Between 1990 and 2000, the real value of U.S. manufacturing output

grew by a third even as manufacturing’s emissions of major regulated air pollutants like nitrogen oxides,

particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, and volatile organic compounds fell on average by 35 percent. After 2000,

growth in real manufacturing output slowed, even while manufacturing pollution emissions fell another 25

percentage points relative to 1990 levels.

Research suggests at least four possible explanations of these substantial improvements in U.S. air qual-

ity. First, U.S. manufacturing trade has grown substantially (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013; Pierce and

Schott, 2012). When dirty industries like steel or cement move abroad, total U.S. pollution emissions may

fall. Second, federal and state agencies require firms to install increasingly stringent pollution abatement

technologies. Some research directly attributes national changes in air quality to the Clean Air Act and to

other environmental regulations (Henderson, 1996; Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Correia, III, Dockery, Wang,

Ezzati, and Dominici, 2013). The third explanation for these emissions changes stems from non-homothetic

tastes or secular change; Americans may gradually choose to spend less on heavy manufactured goods and

more on services and cleaner goods (Levinson and O’Brien, 2013). Finally, if manufacturers use fewer dirty

inputs each year to produce the same outputs, then annual productivity growth could improve air quality. In

support of this final explanation, Figure A1 shows a clear negative relationship between plant-level pollution

per unit of output and total factor productivity in the U.S. manufacturing sector; as total factor productivity

rises, pollution per unit of output falls.1

The goal of this paper is to better understand the underlying forces that have caused changes in pollu-

tion emissions from U.S. manufacturing. We do this in two complementary ways. We begin by decomposing

changes in total manufacturing emissions into changes that can be explained by the total scale of manufac-

turing output, the composition of products produced, and the pollution intensity of a given set of products.

This data driven exercise exploits newly available, administrative data on product-level emissions intensities

that affords additional granularity relative to the existing literature. While the statistical decomposition

delivers clear conclusions, it lacks the ability to uncover the primitive economic forces driving emissions

reductions.

We complement this decomposition with a quantitative model of pollution emissions in the U.S. manu-

facturing industry. The model consists of firms endogenously choosing investments in pollution abatement

to avoid a per-unit tax on pollution emissions. Production and pollution abatement choices depend on

trade costs, pollution taxes, productivity, and consumer preferences. The model weaves together elements of

workhorse models from the international (Melitz, 2003) and environmental literatures,(Copeland and Taylor,

2003). While the model is highly stylized, it has several attractive features — it has explicit and simple

theoretical microfoundations from which all the analysis is derived; it accounts for imperfect competition

and can accommodate various market structures; it incorporates firm entry, exit, and cross-firm realloca-

1See Appendix C.1 for further details on Figure A1.

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tion; it requires few parameters that can be estimated using reduced-form regressions; it can analyze a wide

variety of counterfactuals; and it can account for many general equilibrium forces in settings where partial

equilibrium, program evaluation methods may be able to deliver less insight.

We then combine the model with administrative plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau and EPA

with two main objectives. First, we use intermediate results from the model, combined with actual pollution

abatement and emissions decisions, to back out the implicit tax per unit of pollution emissions that firms

face. U.S. federal, state, and local environmental regulations take many overlapping forms: command-and-

control technology standards, cap-and-trade programs, and many others.2 Our quantitative exercise yields a

closed form expression for the overall regulatory burden from these disparate and overlapping environmental

policies, allowing us to observe how this measure has changed over time. The second main objective of the

quantitative exercise is to evaluate a range of counterfactuals, such as how pollution emissions would have

evolved if air pollution regulation had remained unchanged after 1990. Many researchers in environmental

economics and international trade use quantitative models to forecast the future — they study untested

policies such as a global 10 percent decrease in all trade barriers or a national carbon tax. Unlike such

work, this paper uses a model to interpret the past — we quantify how different kinds of economic shocks

(e.g., trade costs, environmental regulation, productivity, and preferences) led to observed changes in actual

pollution emissions. Similar general equilibrium decompositions have been used to understand the causes of

the collapse of trade around the Great Recession and the changes in between-group wage inequality (Eaton,

Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis, 2011; Burstein, Morales, and Vogel, 2013).

Our results suggest that changes in the scale of manufacturing output or changes to the composition of

products produced cannot explain trends in pollution emissions from U.S. manufacturing between 1990 and

2008. Instead, decreases in pollution per unit of output within narrowly defined product categories explain

almost all of the changes in emissions over this time. We then show that the model-driven measure of the

pollution tax rate that rationalizes observed pollution emissions and abatement decisions – a scalar measure

of the stringency of environmental regulation – more than doubled between 1990 and 2008. We find similar

patterns in regulation across all the main pollutants the Clean Air Act regulates (“criteria pollutants”), but

we find no changes in unregulated pollutants, such as CO2 over this time period. Lastly, we find that this

increasing stringency of environmental regulation explains 75 percent or more of the 1990-to-2008 decrease

in pollution emissions from U.S. manufacturing. Despite the plant-level relationship between pollution and

productivity documented in Figure A1, and similar relationships found in related literature (Bloom, Genakos,

Martin, and Sadun, 2010; Holladay, 2011; Martin, 2011), we find that changes in U.S. productivity have had

small effects on U.S. pollution emissions at the economy-wide level.

This paper departs from the literature in four primary ways. First, we provide new evidence on why

pollution from U.S. manufacturing is declining. Some research relates national changes in pollution emissions

to three channels: changes in the aggregate level of manufacturing output, changes in the composition of

2Berman and Bui (2001a,b) describe the entire menu of local air quality regulations facing manufacturing firms around Los Angeles, finding 11 local air quality regulations for petroleum refining and 46 for manufacturing (a count which excludes state and federal regulations). Most of the manufacturing policies apply to only a few industries each. The analysis includes the years 1979 to 1993. Los Angeles has among the most stringent air quality regulations in the country. We thank Eli Berman and Linda Bui for sharing details of these regulations.

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output across manufacturing industries, and changes in the pollution emitted per unit output within an

industry (Levinson, 2009). Research describes these channels as scale, composition, and technique. The

methodology behind our statistical decomposition resembles this work, but detailed administrative data

allow us to extend previous analyses to look within physical products and not merely within industries.

This added granularity helps to address previous concerns regarding the inability of industry level data to

distinguish between changes in the within-industry reallocation of production towards cleaner products and

industry-level reductions in emissions intensity (Koo, 1974; Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; Ederington, Levinson,

and Minier, 2008; Levinson, 2009). More importantly, the conclusion of previous research that pollution per

unit output within industries is falling (i.e., pollution is declining due to the ”technique” effect) is silent on

deeper economic causes. Pollution per unit output is an endogenous outcome of the global economy and

can be explained by numerous possible forces. We use a quantitative model to relate changes in pollution

to policy-relevant choices like trade costs and environmental regulation. Our analysis of this quantitative

model suggests that environmental regulation, rather than trade, productivity, or other forces, explains most

of the decline in pollution.

A second contribution of this study is to quantify the change in the overall regulatory burden, or shadow

price of pollution, that manufacturing firms face due to local and national air pollution regulations. We find

that this price more than doubled between 1990 and 2008 for all air pollutants we study except CO2, which

had a nearly-constant shadow price. While analyzing the overall regulatory burden affecting firms does not

prescribe an single law or policy lever, it does explain what all the hundreds of regulations have added up

to, which is a question of central importance.

Third, this paper estimates, for the first time, a parameter that has played a central role in environmental

economics models for at least 30 years – the elasticity governing a firm’s tradeoff between production and

pollution abatement (Siebert, Eichberger, Gronych, and Pethig, 1980; Copeland and Taylor, 2003). This

parameter has equivalent interpretations as the Cobb-Douglas cost share of pollution taxes in production

or, alternatively, as the elasticity of pollution emissions with respect to productivity.

Lastly, this paper develops a flexible and tractable approach to analyzing economy-wide changes in

pollution. Research studying changes in pollution typically uses quasi-experimental regressions, industrial

organization models, or macro-trade models (Deschenes, Greenstone, and Shapiro, 2013; Isen, Rossin-Slater,

and Walker, 2014; Fabra and Reguant, 2014; Copeland and Taylor, 1994).3 Quasi-experimental studies can

isolate the effect of individual policies one-at-a-time, but regulators have implemented dozens of overlapping

pollution regulations over the last 20 years, many of which have not been analyzed with policy evaluation

tools and have no natural comparison group. Industrial organization models have rich industry-specific detail

but typically do not study an entire industrial sector or account for general equilibrium forces. Theoretical,

macro-trade models have provided considerable insight but have generally resisted estimation. Our method-

ology builds on tools from a recent trade literature sometimes described as “structural gravity” (Costinot

and Rodriguez-Clare, 2014), which has become standard in the trade literature, though its application to

environment questions is nascent (Shapiro, 2013). We study the specific counterfactual of explaining his-

3Some research describes a model of the environment and trade and then estimates linear regressions where the explanatory variables proxy for important variables in the theory (Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor, 2001). We take a literal interpretation of the model by estimating its primitive parameters and then solving for equilibrium outcomes given a vector of inputs.

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toric changes in pollution. However, our approach is versatile enough to evaluate prospective environmental

policies or design optimal environmental policy. One of our goals is to make clear how similar approaches

could be used to study a range of environmental questions.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a statistical decomposition in order to

break down aggregate emissions trends in our data, while also highlighting the frontier of what we are able

to say with the data alone. Section 3 outlines our trade-environment model. Section 4 discusses the data,

and Section 5 discusses how we estimate the parameters. Section 6 presents the main results, and Section 7

discusses alternative explanations and additional robustness concerns. Section 8 concludes.

2 A Statistical Decomposition of U.S. Emissions 1990-2008

Much economic research interprets national changes in industrial air pollution via three pathways (Copeland

and Taylor, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995). One is a change in the scale of real output. The second

is a change in the composition of production from relatively clean products like “household furniture” to

relatively dirty products like “carbon black.” The third is a change in the production technique used to

produce a single product, which could decrease a product’s pollution emissions per unit of output.

We begin by presenting a statistical decomposition of manufacturing pollution emissions using newly

developed administrative data on manufacturing plant-product-year production from 1990 to 2008. The

Census of Manufacturers and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers collect sub-industry, product-level output

data, at the plant-product-year level. We use this information to illustrate whether changes in the total scale

of output and/or changes in the composition of products produced is able to explain the observed reductions

in ambient air emissions. Our focus on products rather than industries is unique to the literature and is

meant to capture the fact that even within a fairly narrow industry code (e.g., 4-digit Standard Industrial

Classification (SIC) code), many products differ significantly in their emissions intensities. Previous research

has explored trends in manufacturing pollution emissions using industry level data. The previous literature

has acknowledged that a limitation of industry level production data is the inability to distinguish changes in

the reallocation of production towards cleaner products from industry-level “technique” based reductions in

emissions intensity (Koo, 1974; Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; Ederington, Levinson, and Minier, 2008; Levinson,

2009). For example, while the U.S. manufacturing sector contains 455 4-digit SIC codes, the product trailer

from the Census and Annual Survey of Manufacturers allows us to perform this decomposition using 1,440

products. This granularity allows us to quantify by how much the scale of output versus the types of products

produced can explain the observed reductions in manufacturing air emissions.

Consider the following representation of total manufacturing pollution, denoted Z:

Z = ∑ s

zs = ∑ s

xses = X ∑ s

κses (1)

Total manufacturing pollution Z equals the sum of pollution from each manufacturing product s, zs. A

manufacturing product in our setting can be thought of as a sub-industry classification, where for example,

SIC 3312 (blast furnaces and steel mills) is subdivided into 24 different products ranging from steel wire

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(33125) to cold rolled sheets and strip (excluding metallic coated and electrical) (33127).4 Alternatively,

we can write manufacturing pollution as equal to the total output of a product xs multiplied by a product-

specific emissions factor es. We can also represent manufacturing pollution emissions as the total output

shipped by all manufacturing industries, X, multiplied by the sum of each product’s share of total output,

κs ≡ xs/X, times an emissions coefficient reflecting pollution per dollar of output shipped of that product (es ≡ zs/xs). In vector notation, we have

Z = Xκ′e

where κ and e are S × 1 vectors containing the market shares of each of the S products and their pollution intensities, respectively. Totally differentiating then dividing through by Z yields three terms representing

the scale, composition, and technique effects:

dZ

Z =

dX

X︸︷︷︸ scale

+ dκ

κ︸︷︷︸ composition

+ de

e︸︷︷︸ technique

(2)

Taking the decomposition in equation (2) to the data requires annual data on total pollution, total output,

each product’s contribution to output, and each product’s emissions intensity. Pollution and total output

come from the EPA’s National Emissions Inventory (NEI) and the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry

Database, respectively. We construct product-level output shares in each year using the product trailer from

the Census and Annual Survey of Manufacturers. In order to construct product-level emissions factors we

match the National Emissions Inventory to the Annual Survey of Manufacturers in 1990 via name and address

string matching. Appendix C.2 describes the string matching process in more detail. Since the NEI reports

emissions at the plant-level and the Census product trailer reports output at the product level, we apportion

plant-level emissions to a plant-product-year using product shares produced at the plant in 1990.5,6 We take

the total emissions attributable to each product in 1990 and divide by the total product shipments in 1990

to construct emissions intensities.7 We then use these 1990 product-level emissions intensities to project the

scale and composition effects forward in time, holding technology (i.e. our emissions intensities) constant at

1990 emissions rates. The decomposition allows us to observe what emissions would have looked like in 2005

if firms still produced products with 1990 emissions intensities. Appendix C.3 provides additional details

about both the underlying data and the decomposition.

Figure 2 illustrates the resulting statistical decomposition for nitrogen oxide emissions (NOx). Appendix

Figure A2 presents results from other pollutants, which show similar patterns. Appendix Table shows

the numbers corresponding to these graphs. The top solid line in Figure 2 depicts the total real value of

manufacturing shipments, where each industry’s output is deflated by the NBER-CES industry specific price

4Output at the five-digit SIC level is the most disaggregate data available for all plants in the Census and Annual Survey of Manufacturers.

5We have also created emissions intensities by simply dividing total plant emissions by product shipments for each product produced at a plant. Conclusions are not sensitive to either method of constructing product-level emissions intensities.

6Previous research has used the World Bank’s Industrial Pollution Projection System (IPPS) for emissions intensities. The IPPS data provides a list of emissions intensities by four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes (Hettige, Martin, Singh, Wheeler, and Mundial, 1995; Levinson, 2009). Levinson (2014) constructs industry-level emissions intensities using the NBER-CES productivity database combined with raw NEI data.

7We deflated total product output by industry-year specific price indices, from the NBER-CES database, where 2008=1.

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index and then totaled. We scale total output so it equals 100 in 1990. This line summarizes what emissions

would have been if we had kept the same emissions rates and the same product composition as in 1990. The

middle dashed line plots NOx emissions that would have occurred if emissions intensities had remained fixed

at 1990 levels but the composition of output across manufacturing products had equaled observed, historical

values. The bottom dotted line plots actual NOx emissions from manufacturing, as reported by the NEI.

The bottom line implicitly summarizes the joint result of changing the scale, composition, and technique of

manufacturing production over this time period.

The statistical decomposition leads to several conclusions. First, the dotted line shows that actual NOx

emissions fell by almost 50 percent. Second, the proximity of the solid and dashed lines shows that the

composition between clean and dirty manufacturing products has not changed much over time, although

between 2000 and 2007, manufacturing shifted to slightly cleaner products. Third, the solid and dashed

lines each show that if the pollution intensity of industries had not changed, NOx emissions would have risen

by about 30 percent. Finally, the gap between the solid line on top and dotted line at bottom shows that

changes in the pollution intensity of individual products (i.e. “technique) explains why NOx emissions fell

by 50 percent rather than rising by 30 percent.

This relatively clear conclusion, that most reductions in emissions are driven by within-product changes

in emissions intensity, echoes previous findings in the literature, albeit with more granular data. The data,

however, are relatively silent on what might be causing these changes. The rest of the paper investigates the

underlying economic forces driving these patterns in the data. If more productive plants emit less pollution

per unit output, then product-level productivity growth could explain these patterns. Alternatively, changes

in trade costs like the introduction of NAFTA or China’s WTO ascension may have caused a reallocation of

production away from unproductive and dirty firms toward more productive and perhaps cleaner firms that

produce the same product. Lastly, increases in environmental regulatory stringency may also explain these

reductions.

The quantitative model, which fills the remainder of this paper, makes different and arguably stronger

assumptions than this statistical decomposition. The advantage of these stronger assumptions is an ability to

explain how trade, regulation, productivity, and preferences contribute to the environmental improvements

documented in Figures 1 and 2. The disadvantage is that these assumptions only roughly approximate

reality. We discuss ways in which these assumptions can be relaxed in future research. The reader interested

in additional detail on specific assumptions of this model is referred to Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014),

Melitz and Redding (2014), and to Copeland and Taylor (2003).

3 Model of Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Pollution Abatement

We describe a model of firm entry, production, trade, and pollution abatement, which is designed to reflect

a stylized description of polluting industries. In the model, firms differ in their productivity level, which

leads these firms to differ in their pollution abatement investments and ultimately pollution emissions. The

model accounts for endogenous changes in firm entry, exit, production, and export decisions in a tractable

way that yields analytical solutions and allow us to analyze counterfactuals. The model fits a variety of

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key stylized facts—dirty industries invest more in pollution abatement than clean industries; productive

plants emit less pollution per unit output than unproductive plants; productive plants produce more than

unproductive plants; and only the most productive plants export. Like all models, this approach seeks

to reflect systematic patterns across firms while recognizing that some strict assumptions which enhance

tractability, like monopolistic competition and constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility, are not

literally accurate descriptions of firms and consumers.

The model has a straightforward economic environment. We analyze a world of two countries (US and

Foreign), each with a representative agent. Each country has one productive factor, which we call labor,

and which is inelastically supplied. We present the model’s main results here and intermediate derivations

in Appendix B. This section explains the model’s four assumptions, shows how we use the model to analyze

counterfactuals, then discusses how we obtain empirical counterparts to the economic objects in the model.

3.1 Model Assumptions

A1. Preferences. The representative agent in destination country d has the following utility function:

Ud = ∏ s

 [∑

o

∫ ω∈Ωo,s

qod,s (ω) σs−1 σs dω

] σs σs−1

 βd,s Z−δd (3)

Equation (3) describes CES utility across product varieties within a sector, Cobb-Douglas preferences across

sectors, and multiplicative damages from pollution. The representative agent allocates expenditure across

varieties of goods ω from the measure Ωo,s of goods produced by industry s in origin county o. The parameter

βd,s represents the share of country d’s expenditure devoted to industry s, where ∑

s βd,s = 1. We refer to

βd,s as consumer preferences. The variable qod,s (ω) represents the quantity of variety ω goods in industry s

which are exported from origin country o to destination country d. The industry-specific parameter σs > 1

represents the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The parameter δ governs the disutility of pollution

Zd. We assume that pollution is a pure externality, so the representative agent ignores the term Z −δ d in

making expenditure choices.8

The assumption of CES utility, which is common in trade and macroeconomic research, implies that

consumers experience decreasing marginal utility from consuming a given variety and increasing utility in

the total measure of varieties. We assume this utility function because it provides a simple way to account

for different varieties within a sector while leading to parsimonious aggregate descriptions of production and

trade flows across countries and industries.9

A2. Firms and Market Structure.

8Because the empirical analysis of the paper does not use information on the marginal damages of air pollution, the choice of functional form for pollution damages does not affect the empirical section of the paper. The empirical results would be numerically equivalent if pollution damages were assumed to be multiplicative, additive, or any other form.

9Research finds that non-CES utility functions, such as the linear demand system, translog utility, and certain generalizations which can allow for endogenous markups, are all part of the same “gravity” family of models. While this implies that their measures of the gains from trade are closely related, these structures do not always obtain the kind of tractable closed-form relationships we use here (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Feenstra and Weinstein, 2010; Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodriguez-Clare, 2012).

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A competitive fringe of entrepreneurs may choose to pay the sunk entry cost feo,s to draw a productivity

ϕ. The productivity is drawn from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter θs and location parameter

bo,s. We make the standard assumption that θs > σs − 1 so the entrants have finite expected profits.10

After observing the productivity draw, an entrepreneur who decides to produce must pay a separate fixed

cost. Firms engage in monopolistic competition so that, conditional on choosing to operate, an entrepreneur

chooses prices pod,s and abatement investments ξ to maximize profits:

πo,s (ϕ) = ∑ d

πod,s (ϕ) −wofeo,s, (4)

where πod,s (ϕ) = pod,s (ϕ) qod,s (ϕ) −wolod,s (ϕ) τod,s − to,szod,s (ϕ) τod,s −wdfod,s

The firm sells qod,s = (1 −ξ)lod,sϕ units. The profit function involves several terms. For simplicity, we drop the variety notation ω and index a firm by its productivity ϕ. A consumer in destination d pays price pod,s (ϕ)

for goods from firm ϕ. Each firm receives revenue pod,s (ϕ) qod,s (ϕ) and requires lod,s (ϕ) units of productive

labor at wage wo to produce goods for sending to destination d. A fraction of this labor 1 − ξ is used to produce output and the remaining fraction ξ to abating pollution. Each firm pays the pollution tax to,s per

ton of pollution emitted on zod,s (ϕ) tons of pollution emitted for producing goods shipped to destination

d. Firms face iceberg trade costs, so τod,s ≥ 1 units must be shipped for one unit to arrive (hence, the firm must produce τod,sqod,s in order to sell qod,s). A firm that chooses to enter the destination market d must pay

the fixed cost fod,s. 11 Domestic trade costs are normalized so τoo,s = foo,s = 1. We assume that pollution

tax revenues are lost to rent-seeking. While this is assumption is made for simplicity, the considerable sums

that corporations spend to lobby politicians on energy and environmental legislations gives one basis for this

assumption. Here bo,s describes a country’s productivity while θs describes the dispersion of productivity

draws within an industry s.

We assume this market structure for several reasons. Many dirty industries like cement and steel are

concentrated and have barriers to entry. By accounting for fixed entry costs and industry-specific markups,

our assumptions reflect a stylized version of polluting industries. At the same time, this formulation lets us

account for firm entry and exit and for reallocation of productive factors and output across firms. Finally, the

Pareto technology distribution has plausible theoretical microfoundations (Gabaix, 1999; Luttmer, 2007) and

provides a good fit to the empirical firm distribution, at least in the upper tail (Axtell, 2001; Eaton, Kortum,

and Kramarz, 2011). 12 While many model-based analyses do not need or use closed-form descriptions of

equilibrium, closed-forms are more important in our setting in order to “invert out” the changes in technology,

regulation, productivity, and preferences that will constrain the model to exactly match the data (allowing

10In this setting, the strict criterion for entrants to have finite expected profits is actually slightly weaker: θs > (σs−1)(1−α), where α is described below but remains between 0 and 1.

11The assumption that this fixed cost is paid in destination- and not origin-country labor simplifies counterfactual analysis. Related work makes the same assumption that fixed market entry costs are paid in destination labor (Hsieh and Ossa, 2011; Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz, 2011). The equivalence between welfare calculations in some perfect and monopolistic competition models in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) requires fixed exporting costs to be paid in destination country labor.

12 Most of the literature following Melitz (2003) and using parametric distributions assumes that technology has a Pareto distribution. A few studies explore other productivity distributions, including the lognormal Head, Mayer, and Thoenig (2013) and bounded Pareto Feenstra (2014). Some research suggests that the Pareto distribution provides a more accurate fit to the distribution of U.S. firms than the lognormal does (Axtell, 2001).

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us to decompose historical trends).

An important implication of monopolistic competition is that markups are fixed by the elasticity of

substitution and do not change in response to market condition. This approach follows a long line of

macroeconomics and trade papers, though rules out potentially interesting analysis of how market power

affects pollution, which is a question we leave for future work.

A3. Pollution. Firms produce pollution emissions with the following technology:

zod,s = (1 − ξ) 1/αs ϕlod,s (5)

We assume pollution regulations are stringent enough that all firms engage in some abatement. Equation (5)

states that pollution is an increasing function of output and a decreasing function of pollution abatement

expenditures. In addition, this formulation also implies that more productive firms emit less pollution per

unit output produced. Equation (5) is essentially the pollution production technology adopted in Copeland

and Taylor (2003). Modeling emissions in this way is appealing because many sensible and seemingly different

ways of modeling pollution turn out to be equivalent to equation (5). As we show later, α represents the

elasticity of pollution emissions intensity with respect to pollution abatement intensity. Pollution emissions

intensity is measured as units of pollution emitted per unit of output, and pollution abatement intensity is

measured as abatement expenditures divided by total factor costs. We will also show that pollution emissions

in this model can be described as another factor of production in a Cobb-Douglas production technology,

and in this interpretation α is the Cobb-Douglas share for pollution emissions. Copeland and Taylor (2003)

discuss other equivalent interpretations of this model of abatement.

It may be useful to explain conceptually how firm and consumer decisions determine pollution and

abatement in this model. Equation (5) shows that for an operating firm, pollution emissions decline when

the firm reallocates productive factors to abatement investments. Those abatement investments affect profits

because they decrease required pollution tax payments but increase abatement costs. The endogenous

decisions in the model like firm entry, exit, production, and trade all respond to environmental regulations,

and all of these forces interact to determine pollution emissions. A firm that is not operating produces no

pollution; a firm that begins exporting increases its output and also its pollution emissions. So although

equation (5) only literally describes pollution abatement as a decision for operating firms, the model more

broadly accounts for a variety of ways in which firm and consumer behavior affects pollution emissions.

The pollution technology assumption implies constant returns to scale in pollution abatement. A model

with increasing returns to scale in abatement would have different structure (see e.g., Forslid, Okubo, and

Ultveit-Moe (2011)). We considered the implications of such a model but chose not to pursue it for two

reasons. First, the importance of fixed costs for abatement technologies is empirically unknown. Scale

economies could be positive for capital investments like scrubbers, zero for fuel-switching like low-sulfur

coal, and negative due to principal-agent issues for management innovations. Second, prices in such a model

depend directly on market size, and market size appears in the equilibrium conditions in ways that prevent

the expression of these conditions in terms of purely exogenous variables and shocks, and hence prevent us

from backing out shocks and undertaking the decomposition this paper reports.13

13An alternative approach to the paper would be to construct a synthetic dataset of firms obeying the model’s assumptions

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A4. Competitive Equilibrium. Consumers maximize utility; firms maximize profits; and in each country,

labor supply equals labor demand:

Lo = L e o + L

m o + L

p o (6)

A country’s labor supply Lo is allocated to three activities: paying the fixed entry cost f e o,s for drawing

a productivity (Leo); paying country-specific entry costs fod,s, which can be interpreted as marketing costs

(Lmo ); and engaging in production, including pollution abatement (L p o).

Utility maximization implies that the share λod,s of country d’s expenditure on goods from industry s in

country o has the following “gravity” structure:14

λod,s = Meo,s

( wo bo,s

)−θs (τod,s)

− θs 1−αs (fod,s)

1− θs (σs−1)(1−αs) (to,s)

− αsθs 1−αs∑

i M e i,s

( wi bi,s

)−θs (τid,s)

− θs 1−αs (fid,s)

1− θs (1−αs)(σs−1) (ti,s)

− αsθs 1−αs

(7)

where Mo,s represents the mass of entrepreneurs who attempt entry into production in country o and sector

s. Ignoring some terms which cancel, the numerator of equation (7) represents the value of imports and

the denominator represents total expenditure, where the denominator is the sum over countries i of total

imports from each country.

The gravity equation (7) is an intermediate result of the model, but it summarizes nicely how environ-

mental regulation affects economic activity. It shows that a country with a high pollution tax to,s will have

lower exports and less production, particularly in dirty industries with high values of the pollution parame-

ter αs. An empirical literature measures how environmental regulation affects plant openings, employment,

shipments, and other outcomes (see discussion of literature in Walker (2013)). A voluminous trade literature

derives gravity equations expressing trade flows in a way that approximate actual bilateral trade patterns

(see discussion of literature in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)). Equation (7) provides an appealing

link between these two literatures. In addition, equation (7) allows empirical tests of the hypothesis that

industry reallocates production to countries with weaker environmental regulation (known as the “pollution

havens hypothesis”; see Levinson and Taylor (2008)).

3.2 Comparative Statics

One key motivation for using a model of heterogeneous firms is the finding that more productive plants

emit less pollution per unit of output. This relationship is not immediately apparent from the pollution

technology assumption in equation (5). However, the first-order conditions of the firm’s problem show that

more productive firms invest a greater share of productive factors in pollution abatement (see equation (19)

and matching moments of the data we observe, then adding trade or regulation shocks to those firms and observing their change in emissions. We found the decomposition pursued in this paper with actual data more direct since it lets us write down and describe equations for equilibrium, shocks, and counterfactuals rather than reporting these numerically; however, it comes at the cost of needing analytical expressions.

14The “gravity” description reflects the fact that bilateral trade in this and many other models is proportional to two countries’ incomes (in an analogy to gravity in physics, their mass) and inversely proportional to their trade cost (analogously to physics, their distance). Most trade models with constant elasticity of substitution preferences and iceberg trade costs produce a gravity equation. This relationship also has empirical support—Leamer and Levinsohn (1995, p. 1384), for example, describe empirical estimates of gravity equations as “some of the clearest and most robust empirical findings in economics.”

10

 

 

in Appendix B). Substituting that first-order condition into the firm’s choice of pollution emissions gives the

following firm-level relationship:

zod,s(ϕ)

qod,s(ϕ) =

1

ϕ1−αs

( wo to,s

αs 1 −αs

)1−αs (8)

Because αs ∈ (0, 1) can be interpreted as the cost share of pollution taxes, this expression implies that more productive firms (greater ϕ) emit less pollution zod,s per unit of output qod,s. Because more productive firms

are larger, this also implies that larger firms emit relatively less pollution per unit of output. It also implies

that a regression of log(zod,s/qod,s) on log(ϕ) will give a coefficient of αs − 1. Since α is likely to be a small number, it is notable that the slopes of the trendlines depicted in Figure A1 are around minus one.

3.3 Equilibrium in Changes

By combining assumptions A1 through A4 in specific ways, we can use this model to analyze counter-

factuals. We first combine the model’s assumptions into two equilibrium conditions that summarize firm

behavior. One equilibrium condition is the labor market clearing assumption (6). This condition says that

any counterfactual must have total labor demanded equal total labor supplied in each country.

The other equilibrium condition combines two facts. First, the expected profit from operating a firm must

equal the fixed cost of forming a firm. Second, a cutoff productivity for each destination market determines

whether the expected profit from entering that market exceeds the fixed marketing cost required to sell

there (i.e., a free entry condition and zero cutoff profit). Equation (21) of Appendix B formally describes

the second equilibrium condition. These are equilibrium conditions because if a set of data satisfies these

conditions, then those data represent a competitive equilibrium in the sense of Assumption A4. We use

these conditions to analyze how counterfactuals affect welfare.

The two equilibrium conditions include numerous variables that are difficult to measure. Rather than

attempt to measure these variables, we rewrite each variable as a proportional change from a base year, as in

Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008). The benefit of writing the model in changes is that we do not need data

on difficult-to-observe variables because many of them do not appear in changes. For example, constructing

an empirical analogue to the model’s equilibrium conditions in levels (equation (6) and equation (21)) would

require data on productivity levels for each country and industry, the fixed costs of entering each market,

and the measure of firms operating in each country and industry. But in changes these variables will not

appear in the equilibrium conditions, and so we do not need to measure them.

Our formal use of this technique to analyze the model proceeds as follows. Let x denote some variable

from the model, let x′ denote the value under a counterfactual scenario, and let x̂ ≡ x′/x denote the proportional change in x due to the counterfactual. Written in changes, the two equilibrium equations (6)

and (21) become the following:

1 = ψo

(∑ s M̂

e o,sRo,s

(σs−1)(θs−αs+1) σsθs

+ η′o∑ s Ro,s

(σs−1)(θs−αs+1) σsθs

+ ηo

) (9)

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ŵo = ∑ d

ζod,s

( ŵo b̂o,s

)−θs (τ̂od,s)

− θs 1−αs

( f̂od,s

)1− θs (σs−1)(1−αs) (

t̂o,s )− αsθs

1−αs

∑ i λid,sM̂

e i,s

( ŵo b̂o,s

)−θs (τ̂od,s)

− θs 1−αs

( f̂od,s

)1− θs (σs−1)(1−αs) (

t̂o,s )− αsθs

1−αs

β̂d,sŵd (10)