Union Leadership

124

Unions: Member and Leader Attitudes, Behaviors, and Political Activities Chapter 4 examined the structure of the labor movement, detailing its com- ponents, offices, and activities. With unionization, wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment are determined on a bilateral basis, and ongoing workplace governance is shared by the employer and the union.

In unionized environments, individuals are simultaneously employ- ees and union members. Regardless of unionization status, employ- ers have explicit expectations about employee effort and performance within their jobs. Employees ultimately are responsible for operating their union and bargaining with their employer. Member commit- ment and participation may vary substantially depending on the local employment environment and the governance structure of the union. This chapter examines union member participation and commitment and the role of national unions in influencing the external environment through political action. As you study this chapter, consider the follow- ing questions:

1. What factors influence the willingness of union members to participate in local union activities?

2. Can an employee be simultaneously committed to both employer and union goals?

3. What effect does union political action have on outcomes important to organized labor?

4. What factors influence the participation of women and minorities in local and national unions?

Chapter Five

 

 

Chapter 5 Unions: Member and Leader Attitudes, Behaviors, and Political Activities 125

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE LOCAL UNION

Most people who are union members joined after being hired by a union- ized employer. As Chapter 10 will describe in more detail, unions usually negotiate union security clauses into collective bargaining agreements, requiring that represented employees join the union or pay an agency fee for representation services. In states with right-to-work laws, federal employment, and most state and local public employment, employees cannot be required to join unions if they are represented, and most often they are not required to pay agency fees.

In some occupations, unions are a major labor supply source. Where employment is transient (as in the construction and maritime industries), and when the union takes a leading role in occupational skill training (as in the building trades), entry to employment is most often through the union. In these unions, membership is not usually required to be employed by a unionized employer, but it is a prerequisite for being referred to many opportunities.

Joining, Socialization, and Leaving Employers usually orient new employees to their workplaces. Most often new employees start work at the beginning of a pay period. They usually attend a group meeting at which they receive information about the com- pany and its policies and procedures, enroll in benefit programs, and the like. Then they go to their work areas, meet their supervisors, are assigned workstations, meet their fellow employees, and begin on-the-job training. Sometimes there may be a formal training period before beginning the job. New employees are often hired in a probationary capacity, making the transition to so-called permanent employment after a training and adaptation period. While new employees in a unionized bargaining unit are covered by the labor contract from the outset, most contracts usually reserve the company’s right to terminate a probationary employee for any reason without recourse to the grievance procedure.

Most collective bargaining agreements exempt probationary employees from union representation or payment of union agency fees. If there is a union shop agreement in the contract, new employees will be required to join immediately after the probationary period. At this point, they must pay an initiation fee and begin to pay monthly dues.

Generally, stewards enroll new members in a work unit. They explain to employees how the union represents them and how the collective bargain- ing agreement benefits them. Stewards make employees aware of union activities and try to get new members involved. Since the union must dem- onstrate majority support to represent employees, it is important for union representatives to be able to spell out to present and potential members the gains the union has previously negotiated. Aspects of the contract related to protection from unilateral discipline and rationalizing job opportunities

 

 

126 Labor Relations

through seniority clauses reflect the operationalization of union values. 1 Personal contact by the steward in socializing new members to the union appears to be much more important than formal programs. Socialization positively influences new members’ attitudes toward the union and their later commitment to the union’s programs and activities. 2

Where there is no union shop or required agency fee, employees do not need to pay dues to the union to receive contractual benefits. This is free riding. Employees who are socialized into the union or who develop feelings of union solidarity avoid free riding. Employees who are less attached to their occupations or who have less fear of arbitrary employer actions may be more willing to free-ride. Those who do not believe the benefits gained through collective bargaining exceed the costs of dues and other efforts would also be less likely to join. An adversarial relationship between the union and the employer will be more likely to create a perceived need for union protec- tion. 3 But unionized employees who perceive the labor relations in their workplaces to be adversarial are likely to decrease commitment to both the employer and the union. 4 Factors associated with higher rates of free riding (holding other factors constant) include employment in the private sector in a right-to-work state; lower earnings; employment in a white-collar occupa- tion; higher education levels; and being younger, white, or a woman. 5

As the economy shifts the predominance of employment increasingly toward services and there is increased diversity in the workforce, iden- tification with traditional union goals and tactics has decreased among members in a union shop environment. Union democracy increases the perceptions of union relevance. 6

Free riding in federal employee unions is particularly common. Federal law prohibits the inclusion of union shop or agency shop requirements in negotiated agreements. In unions that have relatively broad representation,

1 P. F. Clark, C. Fullager, D. G. Gallagher, and M. E. Gordon, “Building Union Commitment among New Members: The Role of Formal and Informal Socialization,” Labor Studies Journal, 18, no. 3 (1993), pp. 3–16. 2 C. J. A. Fullager, D. G. Gallagher, M. E. Gordon, and P. F. Clark, “Impact of Early Socialization on Union Commitment and Participation: A Longitudinal Study, Journal of Applied Psychology, 80 (1995), pp. 147–157. 3 S. J. Deery, R. D. Iverson, and P. J. Erwin, “Predicting Organizational and Union Commitment: The Effect of Industrial Relations Climate,” British Journal of Industrial Relations, 32 (1994), pp. 581–598. 4 J. B. Fuller and K. Hester, “The Effect of Labor Relations Climate on the Union Participation Process,” Journal of Labor Research, 19 (1994), pp. 173–188. 5 G. N. Chaison and D. G. Dhavale, “The Choice between Union Membership and Free-Rider Status,” Journal of Labor Research, 13 (1992), pp. 355–369, although “true” free riding, where the value of benefits exceeds the costs, appears to be equal in both right-to-work and non-right-to-work states; see R. S. Sobel, “Empirical Evidence on the Union Free-Rider Problem: Do Right to Work Laws Matter?” Journal of Labor Research, 16 (1995), pp. 346–365. 6 C. Lévesque, G. Murray, and S. Le Queux, “Union Dissatisfaction and Social Identity: Democracy as a Source of Union Revitalization,” Work and Occupations, 32 (2005), pp. 400–422.

 

 

Chapter 5 Unions: Member and Leader Attitudes, Behaviors, and Political Activities 127

fewer than half of the bargaining-unit members belong to the union. Only among air traffic controllers is membership greater than two-thirds of those represented. 7 Free riding diminishes the resources the union has to provide services to the employees it represents. Table 5.1 provides recent data on the extent of free riding among employees represented by major federal employee unions.

In a study of the reasons that workers left their unions in situations where the bargaining relationship permitted doing so, most workers left for reasons associated with a change in job status (retired, laid off, or changed jobs), while about one-quarter left because of dissatisfaction with their union. Primary reasons for dissatisfaction had to do with a perceived lack of success in bargaining, a lack of contact from the union, and not enough effort on behalf of members. Dissatisfaction that led to the deci- sion to leave one’s present union seemed to influence attitudes of leavers toward unions in general. 8

Member Participation Union member participation involves taking part in administrative activi- ties; attending meetings; and voting in elections, strike authorizations, and contract ratifications. One set of activities relates to the local union as an organization (e.g., attending meetings, voting in officer elections, running for office), while other activities involve the union’s role as bargaining agent (e.g., voting on contract ratifications, picketing). The steward’s role involves both sets of activities when enrolling union members and encour- aging involvement in ongoing union activities and when processing griev- ances and preparing for contract negotiations.

It is to the union’s benefit if employees develop pro-union attitudes because these predict greater involvement in union activities and commit- ment to union goals. All else being equal, greater commitment increases the union’s economic and political effectiveness. A study of members of a large general trade union in Ireland found that member orientation toward the union could be divided into five categories and that involvement in union activities was systematically related to which category a union member fell into. 9 Table 5.2 displays the union orientation found in the study. Less than half of the members are union activists. Table 5.3 shows the difference in participation rates associated with membership in various categories of orientation to the union. More positive attitudes toward the union increase willingness to participate and, in turn, union power.

7 M. F. Masters, “Federal Sector Unions: Current Status and Future Directions,” Journal of Labor Research, 25 (2004), pp. 55–82. 8 J. Waddington, “Why Do Members Leave? The Importance of Retention to Trade Union Growth,” Labor Studies Journal, 31, no. 3 (2006), pp. 15–38. 9 P. Flood, T. Turner, and P. Willman, “A Segmented Model of Union Participation,” Industrial Relations, 39 (2000), pp. 108–114.

 

 

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Chapter 5 Unions: Member and Leader Attitudes, Behaviors, and Political Activities 129

Another study found that union participation was predicted by willing- ness to work for the union and leadership of the member’s shop steward. Willingness to work for the union was predicted by loyalty and feelings of responsibility to the union. Responsibility was predicted by union loyalty and Marxist work beliefs, while union loyalty was predicted by subjective norms about unions, the perceived instrumentality of the union in gain- ing important outcomes, first-year socialization into the union, and shop steward leadership. Subjective norms are the individual’s beliefs about how important referents, such as friends and family, feel about unions.

Reluctant members “I would only be a member because I have to be. 22% I would not be in the union otherwise.”

Card carriers “I don’t mind being a member, but I don’t have any 30% interest in union activities.”

Selective activists “Most of the time I don’t get involved with the union, 26% but I am more active on special issues.”

Apolitical stalwarts “I am a loyal and active member, but I am not” 15% interested in the socialist aspects of the labor movement.”

Ideological activists “I am an active member and see my involvement in the 7% union as an extension of my political ideological beliefs.”

TABLE 5.2 Union Orientation Categories and Proportions within Each

Source: P. Flood, T. Turner, and P. Willman, “A Segmented Model of Union Participation,” Industrial Relations, 39 (2000), p. 110. Reprinted with permission from Blackwell Publishing.

TABLE 5.3 Membership Participation by Category and Activity

Source: P. Flood, T. Turner, and P. Willman, “A Segmented Model of Union Participation,” Industrial Relations, 39 (2000), p. 111. Reprinted with permission from Blackwell Publishing.

Proportion of Each Category Involved

Overall % of Union Reluctant Card Selective Apolitical Ideological Members Activities Members Carriers Activists Stalwarts Activists Involved

Vote (on contracts) 71% 75% 80% 92% 88% 81%

Attend workplace 13 18 25 36 46 24 meetings

Participate in electing 48 55 68 69 73 62 steward

Raise grievance 22 13 20 35 49 24 more than three times with steward

Speak at meetings 2 3 9 19 27 9 more than three times

Attend a union annual 7 13 15 44 41 20 general meeting

Canvass for the union 7 11 17 42 61 21

Mean participation* 17 19 26 41 50

*Mean participation for all activities, excluding voting in pay ballots, for each participation category.

 

 

130 Labor Relations

Participation in union activities, in turn, was associated with lower intrin- sic and extrinsic job satisfaction. Marxist work beliefs also independently contributed to lower feelings of satisfaction. 10 Figure 5.1 displays the model and the relationships between components. Later research suggests that low job satisfaction predicts participation only in adversarial labor relations climates. 11 As we will discuss in Chapter 6, some components predicting participation in the union also predict a willingness to vote for the union in representation elections.

It’s important to note the negative relationship between union par- ticipation and job satisfaction measures as moderated by labor relations climate. Union activists tend to be less satisfied with their employment. A poor work climate is often necessary to trigger organizing activity. Those who are most dissatisfied with their employer can be expected to put in the most effort to change the situation if quitting is not a viable option. One study of unionized schoolteachers found those who were satisfied with their jobs and participated in union activities were less likely to quit.

10 E. K. Kelloway and J. Barling, “Members’ Participation in Local Union Activities: Measurement, Prediction, and Replication,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 78 (1993), pp. 262–279. 11 Fuller and Hester, “The Effects of Labor Relations Climate on the Union Participation Process.”

FIGURE 5.1 Predictors of Union Participation

Source: Adapted from E. K. Kelloway and J. Barling, “Members’ Participation in Local Union Activities: Measurement, Prediction, and Replication,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 78 (1993), p. 274.

Subjective Norms

Perceived Instrumentality

Marxist Work Beliefs

First-Year Socialization

Shop Steward Leadership

Union Loyalty

Willingness to Work for Union

Intrinsic Job Satisfaction

Participation in Union Activities

Responsibility to the Union

Extrinsic Job Satisfaction

 

 

Chapter 5 Unions: Member and Leader Attitudes, Behaviors, and Political Activities 131

Teachers who had low job satisfaction but who were strong participants in their union were also less likely to leave. 12 Even with low job satisfaction, continued employment is necessary to engage in local union activities; thus it’s rational for a dissatisfied employee who is strongly interested in union participation not to quit. Activism is usually greater among employees who perceive that the union will be highly instrumental in helping them gain job outcomes they believe the employer is unwilling to unilaterally grant.

Participation in Administration The likelihood that union members will serve on a committee or as an officer in a local union is predicted primarily by interest in union busi- ness, educational level, seniority, beliefs in the value of unions, and low intrinsic involvement in their jobs. 13 A member’s race does not appear to be associated with administrative participation, 14 and increasing propor- tions of minorities in a unit do not decrease worker solidarity. 15 Women often participate at lower rates because of duties at home, underestima- tion of abilities, and beliefs that men would make better union officers. 16

However, a greater proportion of women in union leadership positions is associated with higher levels of participation by women in all union activities. 17 Where work does not require decision making, the union is an alternate vehicle for developing and demonstrating leadership. Strong participation in union activities often stems from being raised in a union tradition and having a liberal political orientation.

Participation and Satisfaction There is likely a U-shaped relationship between satisfaction with the union and participation in union activities, with participation being higher among members who express dissatisfaction but also higher among mem- bers who indicate their union is effective in achieving member goals and

12 R. D. Iverson and D. B. Currivan, “Union Participation, Job Satisfaction, and Employee Turnover: An Event-History Analysis of the Exit-Voice Hypothesis,” Industrial Relations, 42 (2003), pp. 101–105. 13 S. L. McShane, “The Multidimensionality of Union Participation,” Journal of Occupational Psychology, 59 (1986), pp. 177–187. 14 M. M. Hoyman and L. Stallworth, “Participation in Local Unions: A Comparison of Black and White Members,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 40 (1987), pp. 323–335. 15 R. Hodson, “Do Racially Mixed Work Forces Undermine Worker Solidarity and Resistance?” Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association, 46 (1994), pp. 239–246. 16 G. N. Chaison and P. Andiappan, “An Analysis of the Barriers to Women Becoming Local Union Officers,” Journal of Labor Research, 10 (1989), pp. 149–162. 17 S. Mellor, “Gender Composition and Gender Representation in Local Unions: Relationships between Women’s Participation in Local Office and Women’s Participation in Local Activities,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 80 (1995), pp. 706–720.

 

 

132 Labor Relations

is interested in both intrinsic and extrinsic goals of members. 18 Local union leaders have lower job satisfaction than nonparticipating members. They also report more stress and higher ambiguity and conflict due to their union roles. 19

Participation and Other Factors Participation depends on a variety of environmental factors. The union’s willingness to encourage democracy appears to be greater when it is not faced with a hostile employer. Political processes may be more active in larger unions, but rank-and-file participation declines for many activities. The reduction in participation in larger unions may not be due to reduced member satisfaction, since participation and satisfaction do not appear to be linked in good labor relations climates. 20

As we noted in Chapter 4, local union member participation in activi- ties tends to be greater for contract and other employment issues than for union administration. Over time, participation may be decreased by bureaucratization of union activities through the administration of the contract. The contract spells out how most disputes will be handled. Negotiation committees are established within the local to decide how to deal with disputes that aren’t immediately resolved. Unless committees fail to operate to the satisfaction of the rank and file, there is little need for members to be involved, because the union is fulfilling its role as the employee’s bargaining agent. If significant numbers of present members are replaced by new employees with different value systems, and there is no strong effort to orient them to the union, then increased participation is likely and bureaucratic structures would be deinstitutionalized. 21

Commitment to the Union Commitment to the union involves a psychological investment in its goals. Commitment is behaviorally reflected in participating, espousing union goals, and persuading others to join and work toward those goals. Com- mitment is reflected not only in the pursuit of specific local goals but also in the overall goals of the union movement.

18 T. I. Chacko, “Member Participation in Union Activities: Perceptions of Union Priorities, Performance, and Satisfaction,” Journal of Labor Research, 6 (1985), pp. 363–373. See also D. G. Gallagher and G. Strauss, “Union Membership Attitudes and Participation,” in G. Strauss, D. G. Gallagher, and J. Fiorito, eds., The State of the Unions (Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1991), pp. 139–174. 19 E. K. Kelloway and J. Barling, “Industrial Relations Stress and Union Activism: Costs and Benefits of Participation,” Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association, 46 (1994), pp. 442–451. 20 McShane, “Multidimensionality in Union Participation.” 21 V. G. Devinatz, “A Study in the Development of Trade Union Bureaucratization: The Case of UAW Local 6, 1941–1981,” Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association, 44 (1992), pp. 450–457.

 

 

Chapter 5 Unions: Member and Leader Attitudes, Behaviors, and Political Activities 133

Where membership is voluntary, commitment to the union is facilitated by early involvement and socialization in union activities, such as new- member orientation programs, communications to members, and continued participation by members. 22 Pro-union attitudes are a strong predictor of union commitment, which, in turn, predicts participation, but less strongly. Job satisfaction predicts commitment to the employer, which, all else being equal, predicts union commitment as well. Union instrumentality percep- tions are a predictor of pro-union attitudes. Thus attitudes predict commit- ment and participation, and how effective the union is in accomplishing important worker goals reinforces this commitment. 23 Interactional justice perceptions—that is, how the member sees the relationships between lead- ers and members and how fairly “in” and “out” groups are dealt with—the effectiveness of the grievance procedure, and communications from the national union predict union support and, in turn, union commitment. 24 Figure 5.2 portrays an empirically based model of commitment.

22 S. Kuruvilla, D. G. Gallagher, and K. Wetzel, “The Development of Members’ Attitudes toward Their Unions: Sweden and Canada,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 46 (1993), pp. 499–514. 23 P. A. Bamberger, A. N. Kluger, and R. Suchard, “The Antecedents and Consequences of Union Commitment: A Meta Analysis,” Academy of Management Journal, 42 (1999), pp. 304–318. 24 J. B. Fuller, Jr., and K. Hester, “A Closer Look at the Relationship between Justice Perceptions and Union Participation,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 86 (2001), pp. 1096–1105; and P. C. Morrow and J. C. McElroy, “Union Loyalty Antecedents: A Justice Perspective,” Journal of Labor Research, 27 (2006), pp. 75–87.

FIGURE 5.2 A Model of Union Commitment Antecedents and Consequences

Source: Adapted from P. A. Bamberger, A. N. Kluger, and R. Suchard, “The Antecedents and Consequences of Union Commitment: A Meta-Analysis,” Academy of Management Journal, 42 (1999), p. 307.

Union Participation

Union Commitment

Pro-union Attitudes

Union Instrumentality Perception

Organizational Commitment

Job Satisfaction

 

 

134 Labor Relations

While correlated, commitment and satisfaction are not the same con- struct. In the 1980s, many local unions faced major crises as plants closed or large layoffs took place. Commitment to the union was positively related to the severity of job loss, indicating an increase in cohesion dur- ing a crisis. At the same time, satisfaction with both the company and the union declined more in situations where severe job loss occurred. 25

In employment, one might think of the employer and the union com- peting for employee commitment to goals and objectives. Over the last 20 years, employers have increasingly designed and implemented employee involvement programs (EIPs, covered in detail in Chapter 13) that increase employee participation in decision making in the workplace. Does work- place participation negatively affect member commitment to the union? One study indicated that attitudes toward participation did not affect union commitment. Experience with participation appeared to be associ- ated with increased union commitment, but organizational and union commitment were negatively related. 26 A study of British workers across a number of employers found that the desire for unionization decreases in firms that have implemented EIPs. 27

Dual Commitment In unionized employment, an individual is simultaneously an employee and a union member. To which does the person owe his or her allegiance? Or can a person serve two masters? Commitment to the union and the employer has been found to be independent. 28 The suggested anteced- ents of dual commitment are shown in Figure 5.3 . Dual commitment appears to be related both to individual differences 29 and to a positive labor relations climate. 30 Involvement in union activities is related to higher commitment to both union and employer. 31 Commitment is also higher where employees perceive they have greater job influence and where

25 S. Mellor, “The Relationship between Membership Decline and Union Commitment: A Field Study of Local Unions in Crisis,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 75 (1990), pp. 258–267. 26 R. C. Hoell, “How Employee Involvement Affects Union Commitment,” Journal of Labor Research, 25 (2004), pp. 267–278. 27 C. R. Belfield and J. S. Heywood, “Do HRM Practices Influence the Desire for Unionization? Evidence across Workers, Workplaces, and Co-Workers for Great Britain,” Journal of Labor Research, 25 (2004), pp. 279–299. 28 B. Bemmels, “Dual Commitment: Unique Construct or Epiphenomenon?” Journal of Labor Research, 16 (1995), pp. 401–422. 29 C. V. Fukami and E. W. Larson, “Commitment to Company and Union: Parallel Models,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 69 (1984), pp. 367–371. 30 H. L. Angle and J. L. Perry, “Dual Commitment and Labor-Management Climates,” Academy of Management Journal, 29 (1986), pp. 31–50. 31 C. Fullager and J. Barling, “Predictors and Outcomes of Different Patterns of Organizational and Union Loyalty,” Journal of Occupational Psychology, 64 (1991), pp. 129–144.

 

 

Chapter 5 Unions: Member and Leader Attitudes, Behaviors, and Political Activities 135

an active, cooperative labor-management program is operating. 32 Higher commitment to employers among involved local union members should be expected, since their local union activities depend on continued local membership, which most often depends on continued employment with the represented employer.

Local Union Effectiveness and Member Behavior Unions are effective if they are able to attain goals salient to their mem- bers. One study of public sector local unions identified five dimensions of union activities assumed to be associated with effectiveness: (1) member participation, (2) preparations for future negotiations, (3) involvement in political and civil activities, (4) a union mentality, and (5) the union’s

32 P. D. Sherer and M. Morishima, “Roads and Roadblocks to Dual Commitment: Similar and Dissimilar Antecedents of Union and Company Commitment,” Journal of Labor Research, 10 (1989), pp. 311–330.

FIGURE 5.3 Antecedents of Dual Commitment

Source: Adapted from B. Bemmels, “Dual Commitment: Unique Construct or Epiphenomenon?” Journal of Labor Research, 16 (1995), p. 405.

• L-M Relations • Management Leadership • Union Leadership • Grievance Procedure

Employer Commitment

Union Commitment

Dual Commitment OutcomesBehaviors

 

 

136 Labor Relations

leadership. Holding other factors constant, political involvement in the union was related to the relative percentage of employees organized and the size of wage increases. 33

THE INDIVIDUAL AS A UNION OFFICER

In the local union, an individual might hold an executive office such as president or secretary-treasurer, be a member of a standing committee such as the negotiating committee, or be a steward in a work unit.

Stewards In most locals stewards are either appointed or elected. There are more stewards than any other officer position. Stewards are directly responsible for advocating positions of work-group members and also are respon- sible to higher union officers for communicating information and leaders’ positions to work-unit members. Turnover is relatively high. If either the work-unit members or the leadership is dissatisfied with the steward’s performance, he or she is likely to be replaced.

Stewards reduce stress in the work unit by acting as buffers between management and workers. 34 Unresolved stress is related to dissatisfaction with the union. 35 Stewards gain power by solving problems with work- unit supervisors, not from formal rights in the contract. Private sector stewards often have more power than those in the public sector because managers have more latitude to make decisions. 36

Stewards who are interested in co-workers and committed to union goals have less role conflict between their positions as employees and union representatives than do individuals who are stewards for personal reasons. 37 Stewards in the former category are probably less worried that internal union politics will affect their future leadership opportunities in the union.

The local is interested in the steward’s ability to adjust grievances with management, to communicate with work-unit members, and to enhance members’ commitment and participation. Grassroots training for

33 T. H. Hammer and D. L. Wazeter, “Dimensions of Local Union Effectiveness,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 46 (1993), pp. 302–319. 34 Y. Fried and R. B. Tiegs, “The Main Effect Model versus Buffering Model of Shop Steward Social Support: A Study of Rank-and-File Auto Workers in the U.S.A.,” Journal of Organizational Behavior, 14 (1993), pp. 481–494. 35 G. S. Lowe and H. C. Northcott, “Stressful Working Conditions and Union Dissatisfaction,” Relations Industrielles, 50 (1995), pp. 420–442. 36 P. A. Simpson, “A Preliminary Investigation of Determinants of Local Union Steward Power,” Labor Studies Journal, 18, no. 2 (1993), pp. 51–68. 37 J. E. Martin and R. D. Berthiaume, “Stress and the Union Steward’s Role,” Journal of Occupational Behavior, 14 (1993), pp. 433–446.

 

 

Chapter 5 Unions: Member and Leader Attitudes, Behaviors, and Political Activities 137

stewards influences interaction with and transmission of information to rank-and-file employees. 38 Stewards who receive training on organiza- tional citizenship are more supportive of the union as an organization and are better able to address and support the needs of co-workers. 39

Successfully recruiting minorities and women into steward positions in predominantly white, male-majority locals appears to require one-on-one contact, persuasion, and mentoring. 40 In turn, successful recruiting should lead to more integrated rank-and-file involvement.

Dual Commitment of Stewards The steward’s dual situation as both a full-time company employee and the work unit’s employee representative for grievances against the employer is paradoxical. Is the steward committed to the union, the employer, or both? A study of about 200 stewards at one employer found that about 80 percent were committed to the union, 36 percent were com- mitted to the employer, and 12 percent were committed to neither. Union commitment was related to a perceived lack of job opportunities, a belief that the union should use grievances to punish the employer, involve- ment in union activities and decision making, and employment in larger establishments. Unilateral commitment to the union was predicted by low economic outcomes, perceived involvement in the union, and lack of support from the employer. Commitment to the employer was predicted by tenure; perceptions of a lack of outside job opportunities; supervisor support, promotion opportunities, and influence on the employer; and employment in smaller establishments.

Almost 30 percent of stewards were committed to the union and the employer simultaneously. Dual commitment was related to stewards’ positive perceptions about the employer’s supervisors, promotional opportunities, and the union’s influence on the employer; positive beliefs about the union’s decision-making process; a perceived lack of outside job opportunities; and beliefs that the grievance procedure is not a tool to punish supervisors. High dual commitment was predicted by involvement in union decision making, perceived lack of outside job opportunities, influence on the employer, being a woman, and being unskilled. 41

38 J. W. Thacker and M. W. Fields, “An Evaluation of Steward Training,” Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association, 44 (1992), pp. 432–439. 39 D. P. Skarlicki and G. P. Latham, “Increasing Citizenship Behavior within a Labor Union: A Test of Organizational Justice Theory,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 81 (1996), pp. 161–169. 40 P. A. Roby, “Becoming Shop Stewards: Perspectives on Gender and Race in Ten Trade Unions,” Labor Studies Journal, 20, no. 3 (1995), pp. 65–82. 41 J. E. Martin, J. M. Magenau, and M. F. Peterson, “Variables Related to Patterns of Union Stewards’ Commitment,” Journal of Labor Research, 7 (1986), pp. 323–336.

 

 

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Local Offi cers Local officers are elected by local union members. In locals with a single bargaining unit, elections are often strongly affected by collective bargain- ing issues. One study concludes that an incumbent local president is more likely to be reelected the higher the loyalty of local union members, the higher the confidence in the grievance procedure, the greater the satisfac- tion with the contract, and the better perceived the labor-management relations climate. 42 Dissatisfaction with bargaining outcomes is related to the election of insurgent candidates. Union politics are more complicated when the local negotiates several contracts. This often occurs in Railway Labor Act jurisdictions since the act requires bargaining units based on occupation. If the local represents several occupations, the numerically dominant occupation is likely to elect the officers. Where no occupation constitutes a majority, coalitions will develop depending on their percep- tions of how local officers are achieving important outcomes for them.

Another situation occurs when the local union has contracts with sev- eral employers. As in the single-employer situation, if the employees of one employer constitute a majority, they are likely to elect officers from their group. On the other hand, if there are a number of bargaining units, to avoid the possibility of shifting coalitions, union officers would prob- ably attempt to negotiate a multiemployer agreement to reduce internal political pressures, among other reasons. (We will cover multiemployer bargaining in Chapter 8.)

Differences also exist between occupational categories. Members with lower skills often form a majority. If they dominate the leadership and the negotiating committee, then the interests of skilled employees may not be addressed thoroughly. This creates internal pressure and may lead to ten- sions in the administration of the bargaining agreement (see the discussion of fractional bargaining in Chapter 14). Education and expertise help union members obtain leadership roles. 43 Thus, skilled employees may be overrepresented among the leadership relative to their numbers in the local as long as they pay attention to the bargaining interests of the majority.

Women and Minorities As with the differences among bargaining units, identifiable subgroups within a local also may have interests in officer positions and may influ- ence election results. In Chapter 6 we will discuss how minority group members are more interested in and likely to vote for representation. However, minorities in a local union may be underrepresented in officer positions if elections are on an at-large basis.

42 J. E. Martin and M. P. Sherman, “Voting in a Union Officer Election: Testing a Model in a Multi-Site Local,” Journal of Labor Research, 26 (2005), pp. 281–297. 43 See G. Strauss, “Union Democracy,” in G. Strauss, D. G. Gallagher, and J. Fiorito, eds., The State of the Unions (Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1991), pp. 201–236.

 

 

Chapter 5 Unions: Member and Leader Attitudes, Behaviors, and Political Activities 139

A study of Massachusetts local unions found that women were repre- sented in officer positions at about the same rate as their proportion in the overall membership but that they were underrepresented as presidents or members of negotiation committees. 44 To the extent the negotiation committee influences the types of grievances pursued and decides on the issues of greatest importance in contract negotiations, women are concerned that they may not be receiving the degree of attention com- mensurate with their numbers in the local. 45

Officer Commitment to the Labor Movement Higher-level local union officers are generally granted leaves of absence from work in larger units, but they still remain attached to their employ- ers, and they also bear responsibility to their national unions as well as to their local memberships. Local officers are committed strongly to the labor movement but are less positive about the fairness of national union elec- tions than that of local elections. They are willing to advocate issues their national union favors, but they are more closely wedded to the traditional goals of the labor movement than to new approaches. 46

NATIONAL UNIONS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT

National unions are particularly interested in the environment for orga- nizing, including the laws and regulations governing permissible activi- ties for unions and employers; employment laws applying generally to workplaces and the administration and enforcement of those laws; and the state of the economy and the effect it has on the organizing and bar- gaining power of unions. One of the major vehicles for influencing all of these areas is political action, including lobbying, financial support for candidates, and assistance in election campaigns.

Employment Law and Administration Since the founding of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the core of the American labor movement has taken a consistently business-oriented approach. As we noted in Chapter 1, its primary objectives have been to enhance the economic outcomes of its members and to create and maintain a mechanism for redressing grievances in the workplace.

44 D. Melcher, J. L. Eichstedt, S. Eriksen, and D. Clawson, “Women’s Participation in Local Union Leadership: The Massachusetts Experience,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 45 (1992), pp. 267–280. 45 See also A. H. Cook, “Women and Minorities,” in G. Strauss, D. G. Gallagher, and J. Fiorito, eds., The State of the Unions (Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1991), pp. 237–258. 46 M. F. Masters, R. S. Atkin, and G. Schoenfeld, “A Survey of USWA Local Officers’ Commitment-Support Attitudes,” Labor Studies Journal, 15, no. 3 (1990), pp. 51–80.

 

 

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The historic bargain between labor and management and the resulting laws and regulations have basically created a system in which unions have agreed to allow employers to make innovations in production while work- ing to enhance economic outcomes for represented employees. 47 From a regulatory perspective, this means unions have been interested in creating an environment that facilitates the collectivization of labor to accomplish workplace goals. It has not intruded on the property rights of owners and managers and would be vigorously opposed by management if it did so.

Regulating Employer Decisions in the Workplace Employers make hiring decisions without union involvement except when the union supplies workers, as in the building trades. Most unions have favored civil rights legislation requiring that employers make employment decisions without regard to race, gender, age, and national origin. At the same time, tensions may occur within national unions as the composition of the workforce changes. The leadership of national unions and the AFL-CIO tends to reflect the majority of members within each of the unions but not the proportion of members in various subgroups. For example, except in female-dominated unions, there are no women national union presidents. Except in unions dominated by racial minori- ties, there are no minority presidents. Exhibit 5.1 is an indication of the problems that underrepresented groups feel they encounter.

Unions have also strongly favored legislation regulating health and safety conditions, worker compensation for injuries incurred in the line of work, and unemployment insurance to compensate employees when they are involuntarily laid off. Extending these laws to all employers removes their cost from competition between employers within a given industry to some extent. However, a reduction in worker compensation and unem- ployment insurance costs for individual employers would require lower incidences of injuries and layoffs.

The Economy As we noted in Chapter 2, the state of the economy has historically influenced union outcomes. With the exception of the Great Depression, unions have traditionally had difficulty during economic downturns. Organizing has depended on the ability of unions to demonstrate the economic advantages they could provide to potential members. As we will note in Chapter 9, substantial evidence exists that unionization posi- tively affects wages, but the radical restructuring that has occurred in the contemporary economy has reduced beliefs about its long-term ability to enhance job security.

47 D. Brody, “Labor’s Crisis in Historical Perspective,” in G. Strauss, D. G. Gallagher, and J. Fiorito, eds., The State of the Unions (Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1991), pp. 277–312.

 

 

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To secure economic gains, either employee productivity must increase faster than wages and competitive labor costs or employers must be able to pass labor cost increases on to consumers. With the advent of global com- petition, the latter is becoming increasingly difficult. Industries in which the largest wage premiums exist, relative to productivity, are potentially the most vulnerable. In addition, if workers in other locations (or coun- tries) can immediately be made more productive by investing in more modern equipment that costs less than the future costs of expected union wages, then rational employers will send work to other locations as long as free trade is available.

Globalization and Organized Labor One of the most important changes in the economic environment that labor unions have had to deal with is the increasing globalization of the production of goods and services. Globalization has been facilitated by a number of trade treaties [e.g., the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)], the creation and operation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to police the imposition of tariffs higher than agreed to and the

PROBLEMS OF UNDERREPRESENTATION IN THE UNION LEADERSHIP Although the ranks of women in the nation’s trade unions have more than doubled in recent decades, organized labor’s national leadership ranks remain largely the political preserve of white males.

A new study by the International Labor Orga- nization, an arm of the United Nations, shows that while women now account for 37 percent of all trade union members in the United States, only two of the 95 unions in the AFL-CIO have women presidents, and that the number of women in top national leadership positions has increased very little in the last decade.

. . . At the local and regional levels, women are taking more of a leadership role, accord- ing to the study. But even here, it said, the numbers are deceiving because the leadership jobs women are filling “are not at the cen- ter of union activities, such as bargaining and grievances.”

“Unions are reflecting the problems of women in the workplace,” said the study’s author, Susan C. Eaton, who examined the role of women in trade unions in both the United States and Can- ada. . . . “I see this as a big lost opportunity for the unions,” she said.

. . . 14.8 percent of all working women in the United States are union members, while 21.3 percent of the men belong to unions. In the past decade, however, overall trade union member- ship has been a relatively static 20 million.

As a result, Eaton said, U.S. unions need to begin paying attention to the voices of the growing numbers of women in their ranks, if for no other reason than to guarantee the survival of the trade union movement.

“Unions have to take on some of these nontra- ditional issues to make themselves more attrac- tive to women,” Eaton said.

Source: F. Swoboda, “Women Aspiring to Union Leadership Roles Find Limits There Too,” Washington Post, February 14, 1993, sec. M, p. 2.

Exhibit 5.1

 

 

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subsidization of goods and services to either maintain marginal produc- ers or confer an export advantage, common currencies (e.g., the euro) or highly liquid currency trading markets, and the development and use of information technology to transmit data cheaply and securely.

In general, globalization is based on the premise that the prices of goods and services will fall if they are produced in the countries that have the resources to manufacture them at the highest productivity level (taking wage differences into account). So, for example, the cost of apparel and textiles has fallen in both real and nominal amounts for several years as cloth and wearing apparel have increasingly been manufactured in China, Africa, and the West Indies. Producers in these countries benefit by hav- ing access to broader markets that would like to take advantage of the lower prices they offer. At the same time, a large share of the U.S. textile industry has been forced out of business because it no longer can compete effectively.

Because industries tend to be concentrated where specific skills or resources are readily available, the effects of globalization are not distrib- uted uniformly around the country. From an employment standpoint, some regions benefit and others suffer. Most of the U.S. textile industry has been located in the Carolinas and New England. The New England mills closed during the 1950s and 1960s as they became obsolete. The Carolina closings have been more recent, accompanied by frequent lever- aged buyouts, wage cuts, and later bankruptcies as the price of imports continued to fall. The same scenario took place for steel workers in the rust belt (Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin). On the other hand, employment opportunities in information technology, pharmaceu- ticals, finance and insurance, and entertainment increased more rapidly as export opportunities grew.

The declining industries happened to be primarily manufacturers that also were heavily unionized. The plant closings and layoffs had major effects on unionized employees. To the extent that skills were industry- specific, the closing of those industries meant that comparable job oppor- tunities were unavailable, and workers did not have skills that matched existing employer needs. Pay levels in unionized employment are usually higher than those in comparable nonunion firms (see Chapter 9). Thus, workers were unlikely to secure a job earning nearly as much as they did before. Finally, since the industries tended to be concentrated in specific geographic regions, unemployment in those areas soared, housing values declined, and tax revenues for local infrastructure eroded.

Unions are also particularly concerned with so-called dumping by foreign manufacturers. Dumping occurs when goods are sold below their production costs. This happens most frequently in industries where there are high fixed costs, such as steel. Assume, for example, that the debt pay- ments on a steel plant are $10 million per month. These costs are incurred whether it is operating or not. Assume further that for another $5 million

 

 

Chapter 5 Unions: Member and Leader Attitudes, Behaviors, and Political Activities 143

in labor costs and $5 million for raw materials, the plant could produce steel that it could sell for $15 million in a given month. It would be operat- ing at a $5 million loss, but this would be less than the $10 million loss it would incur if it shut down. Dumping increases the supply available in what is likely an already depressed market, further driving down prices and increasing the likelihood that domestic producers will not be able to survive. Where dumping is proved, tariffs are added to the price of dumped products to discourage the practice and even the playing field.

Another concern that unions have relates to labor standards. Over many decades, unions have fought for improved working conditions, par- ticularly as they relate to health, safety, and hours of work. Foreign manu- facturers in developing economies do not have these same requirements. Unions oppose the importation of goods and services that were produced in sweatshop conditions.

The labor movement has generally opposed the liberalization of trade policies, particularly where negotiated labor standards are not included in trade agreements. It has lobbied against ratification of trade treaties and directed financial resources and volunteer effort toward defeating mem- bers of Congress who support free trade initiatives. The labor movement has been largely unsuccessful to this point. The ratification and imple- mentation of NAFTA provides a good example against which to examine union objections and efforts.

NAFTA and Organized Labor Canada, Mexico, and the United States ratified NAFTA in 1993, substan- tially reducing tariffs on imports between them. NAFTA was negotiated by representatives of the three nations during the George H. W. Bush presidency and was placed on a fast-track process before he left office. President Salinas of Mexico was a strong supporter of NAFTA. Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada had earlier secured passage of a joint U.S. and Canadian pact and supported NAFTA as well. President Clinton also supported NAFTA during the 1992 campaign and after his inauguration.

Organized labor strongly opposed NAFTA. The congressional vote, in late summer 1993, was very close, with labor indicating that votes on the treaty would be considered “a litmus test” for continued labor endorsement and support. Political risks were great since Prime Minister Mulroney had resigned after the Conservative party had been over- whelmingly defeated in Canadian elections, but NAFTA had been rati- fied. Labor’s position is reflected in Exhibit 5.2.

Labor opposed NAFTA because of a perceived lack of environmental and employment safeguards in Mexico. Concerns were raised that a coun- try’s competitive advantage could be gained through lower costs resulting from not attending to worker welfare or implementing pollution controls. Fears regarding workers’ abilities to unionize and to gain a voice in the workplace were also expressed.

 

 

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A more fundamental concern had to do with the large gaps between U.S. and Canadian wages and Mexican wages. In 1990, using the United States as a base, Mexican hourly manufacturing compensation costs were only 12.5 percent of U.S. wages while Canadian wages were 7.5 per- cent above. 48 In labor-intensive industries, the substantial wage premium earned by U.S. and Canadian workers was seen by labor as likely to lead to a wholesale movement of jobs to Mexico. Thus, NAFTA put wages back into competition in industrial sectors where substantial success had been achieved in reducing differentials between employers. 49

Political Action Political action is very important to unions. As we noted in Chapter 3, unions receive more favorable treatment from the National Labor Rela- tions Board (NLRB) during Democratic administrations. Democrats in

48 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers in Manufacturing, Report 803 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991). 49 For positions of proponents and opponents of the treaty, and an appraisal of likely effects, see M. F. Bognanno and K. J. Ready, eds., The North American Free Trade Agreement: Labor, Industry, and Government Perspectives (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993).

LABOR’S POSITION ON NAFTA Leaders of American labor unions, who are [in San Francisco] to set goals for the next two years, say that nothing—not health care, not the long erosion of blue-collar wages, not even the Reagan and Bush Presidencies—has stirred worker passions as has the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement.

The prospect of deregulated trade with Mexico so angers some unions that they are vowing to take the unusual step of making the vote of a member of Congress on the agreement a single-issue test of loyalty to labor. The unions say they will use their money and skills to drive from office those who support the agreement.

“We see this as a life-and-death issue,” said Jay Mazur, president of the Ladies Garment Workers’ Union. “We won’t support people who vote for NAFTA.”

William H. Bywater, president of the electrical workers and organized labor’s most outspoken

foe of the agreement, said, “We’re going to go out and defeat every congressman who votes for NAFTA.”

Leaders of the big teamsters and machinists unions are saying much the same. George J. Kour- pias, president of the machinists union, said he had not yet issued ultimatums against lawmakers who vote for NAFTA. “But,” he added, “I can tell you, we will get no requests from our members back home to support them. They’re steamed up about this.” George Poulin, a machinists vice president in the Northeast who is also here, said: “Knock them off. That’s our position.”

Source: P. T. Kilborn, “Unions Gird for War over Trade Pact,” New York Times, October 4, 1993, p. A14. © 1993 The New York Times. All rights reserved. Used by permission and protected by the Copyright Laws of the United States. The printing, copying, redistribution, or retransmission of the Material without express written permission is prohibited.

Exhibit 5.2

 

 

Chapter 5 Unions: Member and Leader Attitudes, Behaviors, and Political Activities 145

Congress are also more likely to promote legislation favored by labor unions and to appropriate funds for activities that unions support. Often, these positions are opposed by various segments of the business com- munity. Both sides are vigorously involved in both electoral politics and lobbying.

Since 1907 corporations have been prohibited from directly donating to federal election campaigns. This ban was extended to labor unions in 1943. Unions responded to this restriction in 1947 by developing political action committees (PACs) to serve as conduits for member donations to the cam- paign funds of candidates endorsed by labor. Soon after, corporations also created PACs to direct funds to candidates of their choice. In 2000, PACs raised and disbursed almost $500 billion in support of candidates and issues, about evenly divided between Republicans and Democrats. The scope of their activities during the 2000 campaign cycle was the catalyst for the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (McCain-Feingold) passed in 2002.

McCain-Feingold regulates the amount of permissible donations to candidates and the timing of special-issue advertising in federal elections. It distinguishes between “hard” and “soft” money, with hard money directed at advocating specific federal candidates while soft money can be used for get-out-the-vote drives, transfers to state candidates, and other permissible activities. 50 However, during the 2004 campaign, 527 funds and other methods raised and distributed even more money with the specter of special-interest politics being present as usual in perhaps an even stronger form.

Union political action takes four basic forms: (1) financial support to candidates favoring union positions, (2) volunteer work by union mem- bers in campaigns, (3) endorsement of candidates and get-out-the-vote efforts, (4) and lobbying. Between August 2000 and August 2004, the largest union-associated 527 organization expenditures were $49 million by AFSCME, $32 million by the Service Employees, $18 million by the AFL-CIO, $12 million by the Communications Workers, $9 million by the Electrical Workers, and $7 million by the Laborers. The National Educa- tion Association spent $6 million, which is only a little more than $2 per member over the four-year period. This compares with a little more than $36 per member by AFSCME. 51

Labor’s success in mobilizing voting for endorsed candidates has increased recently. Between 1992 and 2004, union coverage in house- holds declined from 17.7 to 14.9 percent, but the proportion of union voting households increased from 19 to 22 percent as a percentage of total voters. 52 Given that the 2004 presidential popular vote was split

50 For more details, see http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9105.pdf. 51 See www.publicintegrity.org/527/search. 52 R. Zullo, “Labor Council Outreach and Union Voter Turnout: A Microanalysis from the 2000 Election,” Industrial Relations, 43 (2004), pp. 324–338.

 

 

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50.7 percent for Bush and 48.3 percent for Kerry, and that union house- holds voted 64 percent 53 for Kerry, this would mean that about 28 percent of Kerry’s votes came from union households. In 1992, 68 percent of union households voted for Bill Clinton, but with the lower voting turnout, they contributed only slightly more than one-fourth of his votes.

In general, union members are more politically conservative than their leaders, and a substantial minority (between 20 and 40 percent) believes that unions should not be overtly involved in politics. While more politi- cally conservative, union members also believe that their unions should have the right to use union-generated funds to support chosen political positions. 54 Given the increase in single-issue politics, labor’s position is weakened by a variety of internal factions organized around these issues. 55 However, political action by public sector unions, particularly at the state and local levels, has been effective. Evidence indicates that greater political activity by public sector unions is positively related to higher public sector salary levels and more public employment jobs. 56

Financial Support for Candidates Union Characteristics Unions make choices about how to best deploy resources. National union political activities increased markedly in the 1980s, particularly among unions representing public employers and those in which executive boards are democratically chosen. 57 One study found that medium-size unions spend more per capita on political action than smaller or larger unions, and spending increases as dues increase. The proportion of women in a national is also related to political activity expenditures, although evidence suggests there is less political activity than members desire. 58 In general, political contributions are between $1 and $3 per mem- ber, with a small number of exceptions. Local union officers contribute substantially more, with donations from officers with longer tenure, more education, higher income, greater willingness to support the union, and residence in a non–right-to-work law state predicting the magnitude. 59

53 http://www.electionstudies.org. 54 P. F. Clark, “Using Members’ Dues for Political Purposes: The ‘Paycheck Protection’ Movement,” Journal of Labor Research, 20 (1999), pp. 329–342. 55 J. T. Delaney, “The Future of Unions as Political Organizations,” Journal of Labor Research, 12 (1991), pp. 373–387. 56 K. M. O’Brien, “Compensation, Employment, and the Political Activity of Public Employee Unions,” Journal of Labor Research, 13 (1992), pp. 189–203. 57 M. F. Masters and J. T. Delaney, “The Causes of Union Political Involvement,” Journal of Labor Research, 6 (1985), pp. 341–362. 58 J. T. Delaney, J. Fiorito, and M. F. Masters, “The Effects of Union Organizational and Environmental Characteristics on Union Political Action,”American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), pp. 616–642. 59 M. F. Masters and R. S. Atkin, “Local Officers’ Donations to a Political Action Committee,” Relations Industrielles, 51 (1996), pp. 40–61.

 

 

Chapter 5 Unions: Member and Leader Attitudes, Behaviors, and Political Activities 147

Candidate Characteristics Union PAC and 527 contributions are not evenly distributed across candidates, even when endorsements are taken into account. One factor that strongly influences the level of support is the committee assignment of Congress members. Those who are on commit- tees with jurisdiction over labor matters receive higher contributions. 60

Support for candidates for reelection is related directly to roll-call vot- ing records. 61 Support appears to depend on the willingness of the orga- nization to give, the compatibility of the candidate’s ideology with that of the supporting union, the probability of the candidate’s winning (with more given when the race is close), and the magnitude of the vote margin the candidate had in the last election (if an incumbent). 62 Support is related to the closeness of an incumbent’s committee assignment to interests of labor, voting record, and electoral security. 63

Endorsements and Get-Out-the-Vote Drives Political endorsements and get-out-the-vote campaigns are valuable to candidates. Union members vote more often in general elections than do nonmembers (or their own family members), and they vote for endorsed candidates about 15 to 20 percent more often than nonmembers do. But union members do not vote more often in primaries, and about half split their votes between endorsed and unendorsed candidates. 64 When endorsements are given, organized labor almost always supports Demo- cratic party candidates. Some commentators argue that because of the almost exclusive endorsement and funding of Democratic candidates, unions have no leverage to demand support for their most important issues. But labor can use its power in regard to which candidates are cho- sen to run through its work in primary elections and party caucuses. In addition, get-out-the-vote drives depend on labor support to be effective. Labor’s willingness and enthusiasm to work on these drives varies with its beliefs that the candidate will actually forward its agenda. 65

60 J. W. Endersby and M. C. Munger, “The Impact of Legislator Attributes on Union PAC Campaign Contributions,” Journal of Labor Research, 13 (1992), pp. 79–97. 61 G. M. Saltzman, “Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACs,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 40 (1987), pp. 163–179. 62 A. Wilhite and J. Theilmann, “Unions, Corporations, and Political Campaign Contributions: The 1982 House Elections,” Journal of Labor Research, 7 (1986), pp. 175–186. 63 K. B. Grier and M. C. Munger, “The Impact of Legislator Attributes on Interest-Group Campaign Contributions,” Journal of Labor Research, 7 (1986), pp. 349–359. 64 J. T. Delaney, M. F. Masters, and S. Schwochau, “Unionism and Voter Turnout,” Journal of Labor Research, 9 (1988), pp. 221–236; and J. T. Delaney, M. F. Masters, and S. Schwochau, “Union Membership and Voting for COPE-Endorsed Candidates,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43 (1990), pp. 621–635. 65 T. E. Dark, III, “To Reward and Punish: A Classification of Union Political Strategies,” Journal of Labor Research, 24 (2003), pp. 457–472.

 

 

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In the 2000 presidential campaign, several local central bodies inten- sively worked on increasing voting in their congressional districts. Evi- dence indicated that the effort had some effectiveness in increasing turnout, especially in increasing voting rates among minorities and those describing themselves as members of the working class. Persons who believe there are real differences between the positions of the Democratic and Republican parties are much more likely to vote. 66

The AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE) endorses can- didates for congressional elections. COPE does not endorse a candidate in every contest, but since 1980, a majority of all candidates elected were COPE-endorsed. A larger proportion of COPE-endorsed candidates were elected to the House of Representatives than to the Senate. 67

Unions have put in a substantially increased amount of volunteer and financial resources since 1995, following the election of a Republican majority in Congress in 1994. Thus far, the results are mixed. Voter turn- outs among union households have increased, but the membership base has declined during the same period. Spending for political activity has increased substantially, but in the overall amounts spent on campaign accounts the increase has been slightly less than 10 percent, which is, in turn, slightly less than the organized proportion of the labor force. 68 Unless union political advocacy simultaneously appeals to and energizes a sub- stantial fraction of nonunion households, it is unlikely to have significant effects on electoral outcomes.

Table 5.4 details voting of union members and nonmembers from 1952 through 2004. The data in this table indicate that union members are significantly more active than nonmembers in both presidential election years and off-year elections, with higher votes in 21 of 24 elections and an average difference of about 5 percent. Union members are more likely than nonmembers to vote for Democratic presidential candidates. Voting in off-year elections is low by both union members and nonmembers. While the proportion of the workforce that is unionized has dropped, giving the union less voting power, the proportion of nonmembers who vote for Democratic presidential candidates has increased to somewhat offset the decline.

66 R. Zullo, “Union Cities and Voter Turnout,” Proceedings of the Labor and Employment Relations Association, 58 (2006), pp. 193–205. 67 Delaney and Masters, “Unions and Political Action.” 68 See M. F. Masters, “Unions in the 2000 Election: A Strategic-Choice Perspective,” Journal of Labor Research, 25 (2004), pp. 139–182, for a comprehensive review and appraisal of the union movement’s political strategy and tactics; and M. F. Masters and J. T. Delaney, “Organized Labor’s Political Scorecard,” Journal of Labor Research, 26 (2005), pp. 365–392, for a review of the relative success of the union movement in the national legislative arena.

 

 

Chapter 5 Unions: Member and Leader Attitudes, Behaviors, and Political Activities 149

Lobbying The AFL-CIO takes political positions on important employment issues such as civil rights, worker safety, and collective bargaining rights. 69 Busi- ness groups such as the Chamber of Commerce often oppose organized labor’s positions. 70 Other politically oriented organizations such as the American Conservative Union and the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) establish comprehensive agendas on a wide range of issues.

69 For a comprehensive examination of these and other political representation issues, see J. Delaney and S. Schwochau, “Employee Representation through the Political Process,” in B. E. Kaufman and M. M. Kleiner, eds., Employee Representation: Alternatives and Future Directions (Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1993), pp. 265–304. 70 D. Jacobs, “Labor and Social Legislation in the United States: Business Obstructionism and Accommodation,” Labor Studies Journal, 23, no. 2 (1998), pp. 3–20.

TABLE 5.4 Union and Nonunion Household Voting Behavior

Union Households Nonunion Households

Year Registered Voted % Democrat Registered Voted % Democrat

1952 81 76 56 81 73 36 1954 1956 84 76 53 81 72 36 1958 67 57 1960 82 77 64 85 80 44 1962 1964 88 83 83 86 76 62 1966 69 62 1968 85 76 48 85 76 39 1970 60 59 1972 92 75 43 90 72 33 1974 50 54 1976 86 77 64 79 70 47 1978 76 57 71 54 1980 82 75 51 78 71 36 1982 80 65 76 59 1984 85 79 57 81 72 37 1986 76 55 73 52 1988 82 75 59 80 69 44 1990 76 53 69 46 1992 88 85 54 81 73 47 1994 86 65 74 54 1996 90 82 68 85 71 50 1998 86 66 79 49 2000 90 77 61 84 72 50 2002 90 62 86 63 2004 95 90 64 88 77 46

 

 

150 Labor Relations

Effectiveness of Activities While unions are heavily involved in PAC and 527 activities, union mem- bers’ attitudes are not monolithic and, in most cases, seem less liberal than the positions taken by their unions. Union political action appears to be more successful in influencing legislation in peripheral areas of interest (e.g., edu- cation) than in central areas of interest (e.g., labor law reform). 71 However, a study found that PAC contributions are related to votes for COPE-oriented legislation. This study found other factors positively influencing pro-labor votes, including the percentage of the U.S. labor force that is unionized and the ADA rating of the senator. Factors negatively related included corporate PAC donations to the incumbent’s election opponent, the percentage of the populace voting Republican in the most recent presidential election, the proportion of the labor force that is women, and being a Republican senator. Over time, increasing PAC contributions have more than offset the effect of the loss of union membership in influencing votes on legislation. 72

Use of Union Dues for Political Activity Since the union acquires the exclusive right to represent employees and to negotiate contracts that include mandatory dues payment, members who hold political views different from those of union leaders may object to the union’s allocating part of collected dues toward political activity. The Supreme Court has ruled that union members can request that their union dues be limited to the amount necessary to provide representational activities. 73 The federal government’s enthusiasm for enforcing this ruling has waxed and waned depending on which party’s administration was in power. Legislation, under the label “paycheck protection,” has also been introduced to codify and extend this ruling, but it has not passed.

Summary Union attention to new-member socialization leads to higher participa- tion and commitment. Participation involves activities such as attending meetings; voting in union elections, strike authorizations, and contracting ratifications; and being a union officer. Loyalty to the union, Marxist work beliefs, and the perceived leadership of the steward influence participa- tion. Persons who participate at higher rates are less satisfied with intrinsic and extrinsic factors of their job.

Commitment to the union is predicted by many of the same factors that influence participation. Evidence exists that members can be simultane- ously committed to their unions and their employers. Studies of stewards

71 M. F. Masters and J. T. Delaney, “Union Political Activities: A Review of the Empirical Literature,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 40 (1987), pp. 336–353. 72 W. J. Moore, D. R. Chachere, T. D. Curtis, and D. Gordon, “The Political Influence of Unions and Corporations on COPE Votes in the U.S. Senate, 1979–1988,” Journal of Labor Research, 16 (1995), pp. 203–221. 73 Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).

 

 

Chapter 5 Unions: Member and Leader Attitudes, Behaviors, and Political Activities 151

have found that dual commitment is high when the steward had a good working relationship with the employer and believed that his or her career was strongly linked to a present employer.

Women and minorities participate at the same rate in union activities as do men and majority employees, but women are less likely found in high leadership positions.

National unions are strongly involved in political activity, especially those representing employees in the public sector. While per capita sup- port is relatively modest, legislators who are friendly to labor and who are on key committees likely to influence labor outcomes receive financial assistance. Since 1980, a majority of candidates elected to Congress have had AFL-CIO COPE endorsement. Union members vote at higher rates in general elections than does the public at large. They also are more likely to vote for Democratic candidates.

Discussion Questions

1. Do the predictors of union participation suggest that union leaders will likely be involved in an adversarial relationship with management?

2. How can the inclusion of women in top leadership positions in local and national unions be increased?

3. How can the facts that a majority of members of Congress are endorsed by COPE and that no significant labor law reform has been passed be reconciled?

4. Since unions represent all employees in bargaining units they have organized, should they be allowed to endorse particular candidates for office?

Agency fee, 125 Fractional bargaining, 138 Committee on Political Union shop, 125 Political action committees Education (COPE), 148 Free riding, 126 (PACs), 145 Dual commitment, 134

Key Terms

Selected Web Sites of Ongoing Political Action Groups

www.aflcio.org www.brtable.org www.changetowin.org www.nam.org www.npa1.org www.nrtw.org www.uschamber.com Also try state AFL-CIO and central labor union Web sites.