The Role Of Collective Bargaining

Rethinkins the Role oi Collective By DALE YODER and PAUL D. STAUIX5HAR

Dale Yoder is Professor Emeritus at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. Paul Staudohar is Professor of Business Administration, California State University, Hayv/ard.

COLLECTIVE BARQAINING is the key feature of industrial rela-tions systems in democratic countries, wheTe it is provided for and encouraged by law. In collective bargaining, representatives of labor and management negotiate the wages, hours, and working conditions for designated groups of employees. Conventional approaches to negotia- tion regard it as an adversary proceeding, with each side contending for a greater share of the economic pie. Models explaining the role of collective bargaining have therefore concentrated on this conflict of interests.

The purpose of this article is to suggest a model for T«vising the traditional bargaining role in the United States.^ First, the adversary and cooperative approaches to negotiations are outlined to illustrate their differing emphasis. Second, the environmental setting of collec- tive bargaining, which influences the appropriateness of negotiating model and potential outcomes, is examined. Next, the adversary and cooperative approaches are reviewed in terms of their impact on results to the society and economic system. And, last, a synthesis, based on a suggested modification of existing practice, toward creating a more rational approach to collective bargaining for the future is presented.

The environmental setting influences the two principal approaches to collective bargaining—adversary and cooperative. The adversary relationship, geared toward conflict, prescribes the acquisition, pres- ervation, and protection of wage and nonwage objectives through negotiations. The stance in negotiations is effectuated through offensive tactics calculated to force the adversary to grant concessions and defensive tactics to prevent the adversary from gaining concessions.

In contrast, the cooi>erativ€ model focuses on measures designed to increase employee morale and productivity. This approach invites the parties to go beyond the usual provisions of the negotiated agree-

‘ Portions of this article are based on ideas found in the authors’ recent book. Personnel Management and Industrial Relations, 7th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982), which also includes references to other discussions of each of these models and their strengths and weaknesses.

© 1983 by Date Yoder and Pout D. Staudohar

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ment to establish policies, programs, and procedures to solve problems of mutual interest. Instead of conducting negotia- tions in an atmosphere of crisis confron- tation, the parties recognize and accept eacb other as partners in a cooperative venture. Rather than view negotiations as a contest in which the “smart player” wins, the parties pool their creative resources to devise new arrangements for work in which both parties share in financial rewards.

Tbe adversary and cooperative ap- proaches can produce similar results in negotiations. For example, eitber form may end in financial gains for employees. But often tbe results are contrary in that tbe adversary approacb is more apt to end in strikes and bitter feelings among tbe participants. Througb application of pressure, unions may achieve generous wage increments. But they may jeopardize future growth and ability of management to compete in domestic and foreign markets. In these situations botb sides can wind up losing in tbe longer term.

Specific tactics and results of tbe ad- versary and cooperative approacbes will be examined in greater detail below. Prior to tbis examination, it is useful to explore the cbanged environmental setting because this is the key to deter- mining the propriety of choices between the two models. It appears that revi- sions in this environmental setting can make strict application of eitber tbe pure adversary or cooperative approacbes inappropriate. This suggests tbe need for a revised model tbat fits the needs of the environmental setting more closely.

Environmental Setting

Major components of the environ- mental setting include factors such as the law, industrial context (e.g., private or public employment), labor force trends.

worker attitudes, union and manage- ment philosophies, past relationships of the parties, and profit/budget status. Tbe legal framework for collective bar- gaining rests largely on statutory law. Under the National Labor Relations Act workers in private industry have the right to join unions, negotiate contracts, and engage in pressure tactics. Separate statutes apply to government workers, who often have the same bargaining rigbts as private employees except for tbe rigbt to strike. Otber statutes, specifying conditions such as minimum wages, equal employment opportunity, and employee safety, may exert a sig- nificant impact on collective bargaining. These statutes are generally interpreted and enforced by administrative bodies, sucb as tbe National Labor Relations Board for private industry, and tbe courts.

Although the legal framework is an important determinant of the structure and practice of collective bargaining, it is generally consistent with application of either the adversary or cooperative models. However, other aspects of the environmental setting, which have changed in recent years, indicate that application of the adversary model in pure form is untenable.

For instance, the shift in private industry to greater emphasis on white- collar and service jobs and away from blue-collar employment bas taken large portions of workers out of tbe orbit of union influence.^ Stagnation of em- ployment in tbe beavily unionized public sector, after years of rapid growtb, bas also caused union influence to diminish. Reliance on the adversary model in the face of this tilting of the power scale in management’s favor does little to provide these industries with the vitality needed to survive and regain momentum.

° Se« Dale Yoder amd Paul D. Staudohar, “Assessing the Decline of Unions in the U. S.,”

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The Personnel Administrator, Vol. 27, No. 10 (October 1982), pp. 12-16.

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Heavy doses of cooperation between labor and management are called for.

The slowdown in rates of productivity growth among U. S. workers points to a need for greater expenditures to modernize industry, train employees, and take advantage of technical inno- vation. Cooperation today by labor and management toward achieving this bal- ance could help restore the American edge in production that will justify greater economic benefits to all in the future. Training programs to increase employee output can be encouraged and made more effective through co- operation rather than opposition in the adversary mold.

Worker attitudes, especially among the young, have changed. They sug- gest increased emphasis on improve- ments in the qualitv of work life. Work must be more meaningful to allow people to discover and develop their potential as human beings. Labor-management cooperation promotes opportunities for individual growth and development and thus accommodates revised worker at- titudes.

Philosophies of union and management practitioners have a significant influence on collective bargaining. Union leaders

in the United States have long had a “business unionism” philosophy in which bargaining focus concentrated on the bread and butter issues of increasing wages, shortening hours, and improv- ing working conditions. Management practitioners have gone along with this philosophy, provided it did not cut too deeply into profits. It does not appear necessary for the philosophy of labor and management in the U. S. to change radically, except that economic gains in the future should be expected to come more from accommodation than confrontation.

Historic relationships of the parties in bargaining influence their stance in con- temporary negotiations. If confiict and strikes have typified their past dealings, agreement on contract terms may be more difficult to reach. Parties whose backgrounds are not so characterized can more readily move toward the cooper- ative model.

Approaches Tactics relied on by the parties in

an adversary relationship are calculated either to increase the ability to inflict damage on the opponent (offensive factors) or to enhance one’s own ability to withstand pressure from the other

FIGURE 1 OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FACTORS IN

THE ADVERSARY APPROACH

Union OFFENSIVE

Strike Slowdown—mostly public employees Sickout—^mostly public employees Picketing Secondary boycott

Management Lockout Layoff Disciplinary suspension Withholding benefits Fines

Union DEFENSIVE

Management Strike fund Financial aid from other unions Welfare, e.g., food stamps Arranging loans for strikers Helping striker* find temporary jobs

Collective Bargaining

Strike insurance Mutual aid Stockpiling Use of supervisors to perform work Hire strikebreakers

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side (defensive factors). Figure 1 illus- trates offensive and defensive tactics for labor and management.

The result of using an adversary ap- proach to collective bargaining often involves economic loss to both sides. In the event of a work stoppage or lock- out, wages are lost by workers and sales and profits by firms. In government employment, the public experiences loss of services, inconvenience, and perhaps even hazards to health and safety. De- fensive tactics rarely provide adequate protection for employees or employers. While one party may come out ahead

of the other in a “win-lose” situation, both sides as well as society usually suffer if there is prolonged conflict.

When a cooperative approach to col- lective bargaining is taken, the parties seek to create mutually beneficial solu- tions to common problems. Negative tactics are replaced by accommodation, cooperation, trust, and resjjeet. In con- trast to an adversary proceeding, a different set of objectives emerges. In particular, focus is on ways to improve employee morale and productivity, as illustrated in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2 THE COOPERATIVE APPROACH—IMPROVED

MORALE AND PRODUCTIVITY JOINT LABOR-MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

Morale Job enrichment Better quality of work life Promotion from within Improved communication channels Employee participation in decisions

For the individual employee, improve- ments in morale can enhance personal satisfaction with work, relations with other workers, and sense of self-worth. For groups of employees, improvements in morale promote feelings of cohesive- ness, group interest, and identification with the mission of the group. The benefits of higher productivity enable increases in wages. They provide firms with an edge in competitive markets and govemment employers with an opportu- nity to cut costs or improve levels of public service. In short, emphasis on the cooperative approach can produce a “win-win” outcome to collective bar- gaining.

Productivity Reduced turnover Reduced absenteeism Elimination of restrictive work rules No-strike clause Grievance arbitration

Synthesis for the Future In the past, management has pre-

ferred the adversary approach because of fears that collaboration with unions would reduce management authority and impair efficiency. Unions have viewed the adversary approach as consistent with their role as bargaining organi- zation and defender of their constitu- ency.* These perceptions and their ac- companying strategies are deeply rooted in the American tradition of collective bargaining. Therefore, no matter how appealing a pure cooperation model may seem in theory, it can rarely be accepted in toto from a practical standpoint.

Instead, what appears to be emerging in some industries is a new model that

‘ J a c k Barbash, “The American Ideology of Industrial Relations,” Proceedings of the 1979 Annual Spring Meeting, Industrial Rela-

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tions Research Association, ed. by Barbara D. Dennis (Madison, Wis.: IRRA, 1979), pp. 4S3-4S4.

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combines elements of the adversary and cooperative approaches. This syn- thesis recognizes the essential competi- tion between labor and management for shares of the economic pie but maintains an attitudinal structure and commitment to cooperation in creative programs that increase the overall size of the pie. Instead of not being consid- ered at all or being very much in the background, joint labor-management programs to raise employee morale and productive efficiency are made a center- piece of negotiations.

A key challenge of current collective bargaining is to adjust to, one, the adversary approach of management seeking “givebacks” or “takeaways,” where benefits gained in previous con- tracts are removed or reduced through negotiation of a new contract, and, two, the cooperative approach of seeking ac- commodation, trust, and mutual respect toward joint labor-management efforts to increase morale, productivity, and quality of work life. These two areas are not mutually exclusive or irrecon- cilable.

Givebacks, or at least a substantial reduction in the rate of increase in financial benefits, are necessary in several industries. Wage freezes or reductions have already occurred in segments of the automobile, airline, meatpacking, rubber, textile, and trucking industries. More restraint may be needed. Wages plus benefits in the automobile industry av- erage close to 20 dollars per hour, and about 22 dollars in the steel industry. These rates, according to various esti- mates, are seven to eight dollars more than the average hourly pay of Japanese workers in these industries. In the past a wage differential in favor of American manufacturing workers has been justi- fied by higher productivity rates, but the Japanese have caught up on output per worker.

Collective Bargaining

Cooperation goes with the changed social values and higher educational levels of today’s labor force. People want work that is more meaningful with greater opportunities to think and par- ticipate toward improving the quality of their work life. Increased dialogue on these issues between unions and manage- ment can provide new work methods that improve productivity.

In the automobile industry new agree- ments were reached in 1982 to reduce the employers’ labor costs. The automo- bile companies and the United Automo- bile Workers Union have established joint committees for quality circles, job safety and health, and quality control. New arrangements, combining adver- sary and cooperative approaches, are also emerging in the steel industry and parts of public employment.

Conclusion Union-management cooperation is still

distinctly experimental. Skepticism and cynicism represent a major hazard to all such plans. Among employers’ represen- tatives and within unions, numerous participants refuse to believe that the other party will consistently cooperate. They feel sure that the program is a subterfuge that obscures other objec- tives.

Some managers fear that such pro- grams will be regarded as attempts to undermine the union and that union demands will become more difficult. This is not, however, a necessary or inevitable result. Both parties can join in planning such a program. Both man- agement and unions may be expected to recognize the multiple nature of loyalties in employment and hence avoid any ex- clusive loyalty to management or union.

Although some spokespersons for both management and unions express their suspicions of any trend toward more cooperative collective bargaining, Ameri- can experience with adversary bargain-

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ing, es,pecially since the early 1970s, strongly suggests that the traditional system is scarred by built-in flaws that require critical review and revision. Adversary bargaining and the labor- management policies it has fostered have gained a worldwide reputation for falling productivity, shrinking prof- its, and rising unemployment. It may

well be time to realize that collective bargaining is much more than a game or sport. For a brighter future, we need more managements and unions with a “will to work together,” who implement a coof)erative spirit to achieve common objectives, mutual trust, and enhanced benefits for society.

[The End]

EMPLOYER CAN RECOGNIZE RIVAL UNION

An employer lawfully recognized a union and entered into a contract with it despite the presence of rival unions seeking recognition. None of the unions had filed a valid representation petition with the NLRB. It is the filing of such a petition which imposes the duty of strict neutrality on an employer. The Board held that there was no violation of Section 8(a) (2) of the NLRA where an employer recognizes a union representing an uncoerced, unassisted majority before an election petition has been filed {Great Southern Construction, Inc., 1983 CCH NLRB jf 15,641).

In this case, the employer had refused to recognize a union which had obtained authorization cards from 51 of 65 employees. The employer advised all the unions involved to petition for a Board-conducted election, but none of them did. Subsequently, the employer recognized another union on the basis of authorization cards and entered into a contract.

In the past, the Board has advised employers faced with rival claims of majority support to refuse recognition. The employer still runs the risk of a violation if it recognizes a union that does not, in fact, have majority support. However, there was no evidence of that in this case, nor of any unlawful coercion or assistance by the employer with regard to the union recognized.

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