Response Paper For 4 International Affairs Articles

Strong State and Strong Civil Society in Contemporary South Korea: Challenges to Democratic Governance Author(s): Jennifer S. Oh Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 52, No. 3 (May/June 2012), pp. 528-549 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2012.52.3.528 . Accessed: 28/11/2012 13:08

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Asian Survey, Vol. 52, Number 3, pp. 528–549. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2012 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis- sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2012.52.3.528.

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J E N N I F E R S . O H

Strong State and Strong Civil Society in Contemporary South Korea

Challenges to Democratic Governance

A B S T R AC T

This article examines the impact of Korean civil society on politics since democratization. Weak mediating institutions prevent the systematic inclusion of societal actors in the policymaking process, pitting an increasingly strengthened civil society against the state. Consequently, Korean state-society relations continue to remain contentious, posing challenges to democratic governance.

KEYWORDS: Korea, civil society, interest groups, political parties, U.S. beef imports

Korean civil society has made remarkable progress in the past two decades. One only needs to look at the recent public outcry against U.S. beef imports to observe the robustness of Korean civil society. In the summer of 2008, more than 1,800 civic groups participated in a series of candlelight vigils protesting prospective imports of U.S. beef. At their peak, the vigils gathered about one million people from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, with even more people engaging in various online discussion forums.1 And collectively, a coalition of progressive political parties, civic groups, and online discussion groups called the “People’s Action for Countermeasures against Mad Cow Disease” pressured the government into renegotiating the issue of beef im- ports with the U.S. government. The popular protest over U.S. beef reflects

1. Sung-tae Hong, “Chotbul Jiphwaewa Minjujuui” [The candlelight assemblies and democracy], Kyungjaewa Sahoi [Economy and Society] 80 (Winter 2008), p. 35; and Yong Cheol Kim and June Woo Kim, “South Korean Democracy in the Digital Age: The Candlelight Protests and the Internet,” Korea Observer 40:1 (Spring 2009), pp. 63 –66.

Jennifer S. Oh is a full-time lecturer in the Graduate School of International Studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul. She wishes to thank Hwang Jung-min and an anonymous reviewer for their help in preparing this article. The work was supported by the Ewha Global Top 5 Grant 2011 of Ewha Womans University. Email: <jenn.oh@ewha.ac.kr>.

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an increasingly active civil society that has emerged since democratization in 1987.

Korea’s robust civil society is generally perceived as a driving force for democ- ratization and democratic consolidation. In the late 1980s, it played a critical role in bringing down the authoritarian regime and introducing democratic elections.2 More recently, Korean civil society has attempted to enhance the voice of the people, and thereby deepen democracy, by engaging in various political activities aimed at reforming existing policies and political practices. Examples of such activities include promotion of fair elections, minority shareholder rights, healthcare reform, labor rights, and environmental protection.3

Given the widespread recognition of civil society’s role in shaping Korea’s post-democratization political experience, there is a need to accurately assess the extent to which civil society has influenced Korean politics over this time. What exactly has changed because civil society is stronger? Contrary to prevailing views, this paper argues that a stronger civil society has not funda- mentally altered the nature of state-society relations in Korea. One defining feature of current Korean society is the absence of established institutions linking a strong state and a strong civil society. Despite democratization and the strengthening of civil society, political parties and interest groups have been inadequate channels through which ordinary citizens participate in and shape politics. Instead, rich forms of associational life in Korean society have perpetuated the prevalence of mass mobilization4 against government policies. As a result, Korean state-society relations continue to be marked by contention, popular protest, and the absence of systematic inclusion of societal actors in the policymaking process.

The broader implication of such an argument is that the emergence of a robust civil society does not necessarily guarantee improved linkages between

2. Charles K. Armstrong, ed., Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy, and the State (New York: Routledge, 2007); and Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000).

3. Thomas Kalinowski, “State-Civil Society Synergy and Cooptation: The Case of the Minor- ity Shareholder Movement in Korea,” Korea Observer 39:3 (Autumn 2008), pp. 339–67; Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea, pp. 117–29; Timothy Lim, “Racing from the Bottom in South Korea? The Nexus between Civil Society and Transnational Migrants,” Asian Survey 43:3 (May/June 2003), pp. 323–42; and Joseph Wong, “Adapting to Democracy: Societal Mobilization and Social Policy in Taiwan and South Korea,” Studies in Comparative International Development 40:3 (Fall 2005), pp. 88–111.

4. Mass mobilization refers to public gatherings of ordinary people, such as street demonstrations and candlelight vigils, for the purpose of confronting authority figures or opponents.

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the state and society. Weak linkages, in turn, imply that the ability of civil society to shape politics is much more limited than one would expect. Apart from mass mobilization and voting, there are few means through which civil society or ordinary citizens can systematically participate in politics to shape policies. As a result, in Korea civil society facilitates placing controversial and sensitive issues on the public agenda but lacks the capacity to monitor and influence the process of drafting, revising, and implementing specific policies. Ultimately, if one believes that mediating institutions are critical in the functioning of representative democracies, Korea’s condition of strong state, strong civil society, and weak political parties and interest groups does not bode well for effective democratic governance in the future.

The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section one examines the core features of Korean civil society since democratization, in particular the lack of strong interest groups and the persistence of mass mobilization and protests. Section two explores the implications of Korean civil society for Korean politics and then proceeds to discuss state-society relations in current-day Korea. Because mediating institutions between state and society are weak, the rich associational life in Korea has not led to visible improvements in the political empowerment of ordinary citizens. Section three illustrates the limitations of Korean civil society through an assessment of the 2008 U.S. beef imports issue. Section four discusses future prospects for civil society under incumbent President Lee Myung-bak’s administration. Section five concludes.

C I V I L S O C I E T Y I N P O S T- D E M O C R AT I Z AT I O N K O R E A

Two distinguishing features characterize Korean civil society today. First, de- spite the dramatic increase in the number of civic groups, interest groups have failed to gain a strong hold on society. As analyzed below, civic groups mainly focus on instituting macro-structural changes in Korean society and politics; they are facing an organizational crisis. Second, large-scale mass mobilization and protests continue to be popular modes of voicing political interests and demands. From a societal perspective, these two features reflect the current lack of systematic interaction between the state and society in Korea.

Vibrant Associational Life, Weak Interest Groups

The past 10 years saw a remarkable rise in the number of civic groups. In Korea, “non-profit civic group” is the “most inclusive term that refers to

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all organizations that are neither governmental nor for-profit.”5 Officially registered non-profit civic groups alone increased from 2,193 in June 2000 to 10,362 by March 2012.6 These figures account for a small percentage of existing non-profit civic groups because most do not register with the central or local governments. While there are no official data on the total number of non-profit civic groups in Korea, one study estimates that less than 20% of them register and puts the total number at 60,000 or more.7 The dramatic rise in the number of civic groups has generally been viewed as a powerful source of political influence for Korean citizens.

Civic groups in Korea are often strong advocates of political and social reform. Hundreds, even thousands, of civic groups participated in the massive candlelight vigils that occurred throughout the 2000s, including the Misun- Hyosun vigil in 2002 commemorating the deaths of two middle school students, the anti-impeachment vigil in 2004 protesting impeachment measures against President Roh Moo-hyun, and the 2008 anti-U.S. beef imports candlelight vigil. An interesting feature of the civic groups participating in these candlelight vigils is that they come from an extremely diverse background. Religious groups, labor groups, environmental groups, entertainment industry groups, pharmacist groups, and farm groups all take part. A strong desire for political and social reform seems to be a common link among the large number of civic groups that have emerged since democratization.

In particular, citizen’s movement organizations are reflective of the type of civic groups that have gained visibility in Korean politics and society since democratization. The two best-known organizations are the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), founded in 1989 and 1994, respectively. Citizens’ movement organizations focus on broad economic, political, and social reforms aimed at redressing unjust practices from the past and enhancing the voices and livelihoods of ordinary citizens. Such groups exhibit the following three traits. First, they

5. Inchoon Kim and Changsoon Hwang, “Defining the Nonprofit Sector: South Korea,” Work- ing Papers of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, no. 41 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 2002), p. 5.

6. Author correspondence with Ministry of Public Administration and Security [Republic of Ko- rea], Local Administration Bureau, Civil Society Cooperation Division, July 7, 2010, via the ministry’s Q&A portal website. Data since 2005 are available at <http://www.mopas.go.kr/gpms/ns/mogaha/ user/userlayout/bulletin/bonbu/admi/userBtList.action?userBtBean.ctxCd=1055&userBtBean.ctx- Type=21010002>, accessed May 5, 2012. Because of revisions in the “law of supporting non-profit civic groups,” figures prior to 2000 are not comparable to figures after 2000.

7. Kim and Hwang, “Defining the Nonprofit Sector: South Korea,” p. 6.

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generally take on a watchdog function, serving as a powerful oppositional force to the government. Second, they are often perceived as representing the interests of the people. Third, citizen’s movement organizations can be traced to the democratization movement, reflecting the struggle between state and society.8

Although the number of civic groups has been on the rise, survey results on individual membership in various types of civic groups offer a different story. According to the World Values Survey results on South Korea, the percentage of respondents who acknowledged membership (active and inactive) in voluntary associations decreased between 1996 and 2005 (see Table 1).9 When comparing the state of active membership, only the category

8. Kim Dong-Chan, “Growth and Crisis of the Korean Citizens’ Movement,” Korea Journal (Summer 2006), p. 104.

9. The World Values Survey investigates political and sociocultural changes in 97 societies, covering nearly 90% of the world’s population. The survey is conducted by the World Values Survey Association, a non-profit based in Stockholm. Social scientists from all over the world conduct surveys using local funding. Survey results are available at World Values Survey, Online Data Analysis.

table1. Membership in Voluntary Associations, South Korea (% out of Total Respondents)

1982 1996 2005

Art/music/educational org. Active member 2.3 7.2 7.4 Inactive member 2.0 29.7 15.3 Total (active/inactive) 4.3 36.9 22.7

Environmental org. Active member 2.3 6.2 1.6 Inactive member 0.7 18.8 5.9 Total 3.0 25 7.5

Church/religious org. Active member 10.6 15.5 17.5 Inactive member 13.8 31.3 26.1 Total 24.4 46.8 43.6

Charitable/humanitarian org. Active member 2.8 6.2 1.4 Inactive member 1.6 26.1 7.7 Total 4.4 32.3 9.1

Sports/recreation org. Active member n/a 14.5 13.8 Inactive member n/a 35.2 20.9 Total n/a 49.7 34.7

Professional org. Active member 2.2 6.1 1.6 Inactive member 4.7 7.6 7.0 Total 6.9 13.7 8.6

source: World Values Survey, Online Data Analysis, 1982, 1996, 2005, <http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/ WVSAnalize.jsp?Idioma=I>, accessed April 13, 2010.

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of church/ religious organization showed a marginal increase between 1996 and 2005. Inactive membership also declined in all six categories of voluntary associations. This decreasing trend in voluntary association membership is a striking departure from the membership trend between 1982 and 1996, when substantial increases probably reflected Korea’s democratization in 1987.

Low membership in civic groups among the general population is even reflected in citizens’ movement organizations. Historically, their membership primarily consisted of intellectual elites with strong ties to the political opposition movement during Korea’s authoritarian regime. As a result, the general population did not actively participate in citizens’ movement organizations, a trend that continues until now. Participation of the broader population is weak despite the groups’ claim to represent the interests of ordinary citizens.10 While one should not extrapolate too much from three surveys, these results point to the possibility that the increase in the number of civic groups has not been accompanied by widespread participation by the population.

Another notable observation is the steep membership fall in environmental, charity/humanitarian, and professional organizations in 2005. Individual mem- bership in professional organizations only accounted for 13.7% (1996) and 8.6% (2005) of the respondents (see Table 1). Likewise, the percentage of respondents acknowledging membership in environmental or charity organizations declined between 1996 and 2005. Membership in environmental organizations fell from 25% (1996) to 7.5% (2005), and membership in charity organizations fell from 32.3% (1996) to 9.1% (2005). When looking only at active members in 2005, the total falls below 2% for all three types of organizations. In contrast, in all three survey periods a large percentage of respondents claimed membership in religious, sports/recreation, and art/music/educational organizations. For example, 24.4% (1982), 46.8% (1996), and 43.6% (2005) of the respondents identified themselves as active or inactive members in church or religious organizations.

Additional surveys conducted by the Social Statistics Planning Division of Statistics Korea, the government’s central organization for statistics under the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, exhibit results similar to the World Value Surveys. People over 15 years of age were asked whether they had participated in community group activities in the past year (see Table 2). The percentage

10. Ibid., pp. 103–04.

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who answered positively increased from 23.1% in 1999 to 44.8% in 2003 but declined afterward to 39.8% in 2009. Among the participants, an overwhelm- ing majority participated in social groups such as alumni associations and fraternities. Participation in religious organizations ranked second, followed by hobby and leisure groups. Yet, the percentage of respondents who were engaged in professional groups (e.g., labor unions, pharmacist associations, lawyer associations) and issue-focused groups (e.g., citizens’ movement organizations, housewives’ clubs, the YMCA, and environmental groups) were only 1% and 6.2%, respectively, in 2009.

These survey results illustrate that with the exception of a few well- known citizens’ movement organizations, Korean civil society activities are mainly concentrated in fostering ties and interaction among people. The fact that participation in religious, leisure, and recreational groups dominates associational life shows that ordinary people are regularly interacting with one another in their communities. However, participation in groups that could potentially impact policies, such as professional or issue-focused groups— what we conventionally view as interest groups—is still fairly low. Korea’s vibrant associational life has not necessarily created groups that can systemati- cally engage with the government to promote specific causes.

Let’s take a look at labor unions, a classic example of a working-class interest group. Union membership in Korea has been consistently low throughout the post-democratization period, falling from 19.8% in 1989 to 10.1% in 2009.11 Low unionization rates have persisted despite the presence

11. Korea International Labor Federation, Current Research and Statistics, July 1, 2010, <http:// www.koilaf.org/KFeng/engStatistics/bbs_read_dis.php?board_no=248&page=2&keyField=&keyW ord=&keyBranch=>, accessed September 29, 2011.

table2. Social Group Participation Rate, South Korea (% out of Participant)

Participant a Social Religious Hobby/Leisure Issue-focused Professional Other

1999 23.1 54.1 19.0 15.7 7.5 1.6 2.1 2003 44.8 68.6 13.4 11.2 4.2 1.1 1.5 2006 38.8 64.0 15.0 12.2 5.5 1.3 2.0 2009 39.8 58.4 19.7 12.3 6.2 1.0 2.4

source: Korean Statistical Information Service, Bogun, Sahoe, Bokji [Health, society, and welfare], Sahoe [Society], Sahoe Chosa [Investigation of society], 1999, 2003, 2006, 2009, <http://www.kosis.kr/abroad/ abroad_01List.jsp>, accessed March 7, 2011. a Percent out of total respondents.

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of two encompassing labor organizations, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU). Korean labor unions do not actively participate in deciding national labor policies despite several government attempts to create a tripartite labor policy committee with both labor and business representatives.12

In Korea, the emergence of a vibrant civil society contributed to the growth of civic groups. The country has also witnessed the emergence of civic groups such as citizens’ movement organizations that focus largely on political and social reform. Yet, much of the growth in civil society and civic groups has been concentrated on religion, hobbies, recreation, or social activities (via alumni associations). Because interest groups play a rather weak role, civil society continues to interact with the state through popular protests and mass mobilization.

Popular Protest and Mass Mobilization

Popular protest remains a dominant feature of Korean politics, a heritage from pre-democratic regimes. In a 2009 study of popular protest, Sunhyuk Kim notes that the level of popular protest remained consistently high from 1988 to 2007.13 On average, Korea recorded 372 protests annually, exhibiting a polarizing trend toward either small (less than 200 participants) or massive protests (over 2,000). Kim also notes that the proportion of street demon- strations out of total protests has increased noticeably since 2002, averaging 75.2% during President Roh Moo-hyun’s government (2003–07). Within the 20 years under study, protests have mainly targeted the state and political society 14 while becoming more violent and disruptive.

Mobilization is a fairly common form of political engagement in Korea. The annual aggregate number of mobilizations by citizens (that is, all forms of public gathering including protests) ranged from 34,100 in 2002 to 28,600

12. Ideological differences between the two encompassing labor organizations, the FKTU and KCTU, and internal divisions between the radical and moderate members of the KCTU have undermined labor cohesion at the national level. More important, given Korea’s history of hostile state-labor relations, labor unions are reluctant to work within the existing political system. See Jae- jin Yang, “Korean Social Concertation at the Crossroads: Consolidation or Deterioration?” Asian Survey 50:3 (May/June 2010), pp. 449–73.

13. Sunhyuk Kim, “Civic Engagement and Democracy in South Korea,” Korea Observer 40:1 (Spring 2009), pp. 13–16.

14. In Kim’s study, the state includes central and local governments, the president, and the National Assembly. Political society refers to political parties. Ibid., p. 14.

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in 2009.15 The number of instances when the police mobilized in response to a large gathering increased between 2001 and 2009 from 11,750 to 14,384, respectively, then dropped to 7,762 in 2011.16 During the candlelight vigils that occurred throughout the 2000s, hundreds of thousands, even a million pro- testors gathered to protest government action and policies. The candlelight vigils were a powerful demonstration of public opposition and dissatisfaction with government decisions and policies.

Clearly, there exists tension between mass mobilization and protest as the main venues for citizen engagement in Korea, and a certain stagna- tion in the means of approaching the state. While civil society has gained increasing visibility since democratization thanks to a liberalized political environment, the methods by which people participate in politics have not changed significantly. Importantly, mass mobilizations are increas- ingly occurring in a context of a politically informed population. Studies of candlelight vigils show that participants actively share information over the Internet and are knowledgeable about the issue in contention.17 Election turnout continues to be substantial—the 2007 presidential polls had a 63% participation rate—but is still declining over time. Even the 2010 local assembly elections had a majority turnout rate of 54.4%.18 In short, contemporary Korean civil society consists of highly mobilized and politically informed citizens.

S T R O N G S TAT E , S T R O N G C I V I L S O C I E T Y

Korean civil society’s relationship with the state continues to be conflictual and contentious. The key question is the following: why have high levels of

15. Republic of Korea, National Police Agency, “Byunyabyul Jiphuishiwui Gaechae Hyunhwang” [Mobilization and protest by sector division], <http://www.police.go.kr/infodata/informpdsView. do?idx=95523>, accessed May 5, 2012.

16. Idem, “Bulbup, Gwagyuk, Pokryuk Shiwui Hyunghwang” [Illegal, excessive, violent protest], <http://www.police.go.kr/infodata/pds_07_totalpds_06_01.jsp>, accessed May 5, 2012.

17. Kim and Kim, “South Korean Democracy in the Digital Age,” pp. 53–83; and Hyeon-Woo Lee, “Political Implications of the Candlelight Protests in South Korea,” Korea Observer 40:3 (Au- tumn 2009), pp. 495–526.

18. Republic of Korea, National Election Commission, “Jae17dae Daetongryung sungeo Toopyo- ryul Boonsuk” [Analysis of the 17th presidential election turnout rate] (2008), <http://www.nec. go.kr/nec_new2009/nec_html/info_election/election02.jsp?bcSeq=58>; and National Election Com- mission, “Jae5hui Jungukdongshijibang sungeo Toopyoyul Boonsuk” [Analysis of the 5th Local As- sembly election turnout rate] (2008), <http://www.nec.go.kr/nec_new2009/nec_html/info_election/ election02.jsp?bcSeq=104>, accessed February 11, 2011.

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popular political awareness, political liberalization, and vibrant associational life in Korea not propelled systematic and institutionalized interactions between the state and society? Weak interest group politics and under- institutionalized political parties explain the lack of linkage between these two sectors. Although civil society has increased its voice and visibility, ultimately, the absence of adequate mediating institutions raises concerns for democratic governance.

Continuity in Korean State-Society Relations: Past and Present

Korean civil society has a long history of contentious relations with the state, dating back to Japanese colonial rule in the first half of the 1900s. While colonized, elements of Korean civil society were increasingly mobilized in anti-Japanese struggles. The colonial state, for its part, was only weakly linked to its alienated civil society, preferring to rely on coercion.19 State repression of civil society, and dissident efforts to oppose the state via movements, continued in post-Independence Korea. The population was subjected to harsh state surveillance and control under the three authoritarian regimes of Presidents Rhee Syng-man (1948–60), Park Chung-hee (1963–79), and Chun Doo-hwan (1980–87). Yet, state repression was not sufficient to stifle growing anti-government sentiments among students, intellectuals, laborers, teachers, and, more broadly, citizens. Eventually an aroused and mobilized civil society took to the streets and forced Chun out of office, kindling democratization in 1987.20 Throughout Korea’s authoritarian regimes, violent street demonstra- tions and dissident movements characterized civil society’s interaction with the state.