Islam and the Modern World

112 Islam and the Modern World

Introduction

Muslims have long debated the proper relationship between Islam and the state. Although it is argued that Islam is a totalizing religion – one that rightfully governs all facets of human life, including the political – in practice this has not always been the case. On the contrary, there have been long-standing tensions between religious authorities on the one hand and their political counterparts on the other. Although the early caliphates merged religious and political leadership in a single person, subsequent Islamic history saw a division of labor – and often a competition – between religious scholars and Muslim rulers. Political actors, for example, regularly sought to limit, co-opt or otherwise regulate religion in public life. At times they even tried to eradicate it. Similarly, Islamic scholars struggled to maintain their independence from political manipulation and debated the relative merits of a close association of religion and political authority. While many argued that a truly Muslim society needs government to enforce Islamic law, others have been concerned about the corrupting influence of politics on religion.

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Although these debates are not new, the context in which they have taken place has changed dramatically over the past century. Gone are the early caliphates, as well as the empires and sultanates of the Middle Ages. In their place, the nation-state has emerged as the dominant form of political organization. While it is commonly assumed that modern states are, by definition, secular, in practice this is clearly not the case. On the contrary, modern nation-states have taken a variety of forms: democratic and authoritarian, religious and secular. The assumption that such states would be secular reflects the dominant trends of the early to mid-20th century. At that time there was a conscious effort to create secular political structures to govern – and modernize – societies in the Middle East, in South Asia, and elsewhere. This was particularly evident in the 1950s and 1960s, when many government leaders believed that economic and political development required the elimination of religion from public life. This trend has been, however, reversed in recent years, as calls for a more overtly religious state have found new support.

The following two chapters examine these issues and look at the debates during the past century surrounding the role of religion in public life. More specifically, these chapters will focus on the differing ways in which governments (and government leaders) have understood the proper relationship between Islam and the modern state. In the present chapter we examine the secular tradition within the Islamic world and we look at a variety of states where conscious efforts were made by government authorities to constrain or otherwise control the influence of Islam in public life. A central feature of this entire section is an examination of the historical debates about whether or not Islamic societies require a close association between religious and political authority. The next chapter will review other cases where religious and political authority are closely intertwined and where Islam is more explicitly embedded in the institutions of the modern nation-state.

It is important to note from the outset that these two examples – a “religious” (or “traditionalist”) state and a “secular” one – represent poles on a spectrum

An Introduction to Islam in the 21st Century, edited by Aminah Beverly McCloud, et al., John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uaz/detail.action?docID=1120608. Created from uaz on 2020-11-07 18:42:43.

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Islam and the State: Part I 113

rather than distinct models of governance. Since most states seek some form of religious or cultural legitimacy, Islam has always been a central part of political discourse. Moreover, the relationship between Islam and the state is different from the relationship between Islam and politics. If the first deals with the formal structures of government – and with the relationship between religious authority and political authority – the second concerns the interaction between people, political parties, and other organized social actors. In this latter and broader sense, politics is more than just government; it includes the efforts of diverse actors to define collectively (though often in competition) a vision and a direction for society. These two issues are of course related, but they are also distinct. The purpose of this and the next chapter is to focus only on the first – the relationship of religion and state; other chapters in this volume will examine the broader issue of Islam and politics.

The Historical Context

The End of Empire and the Rise of Nation-States

The original sources of the Islamic tradition provide little guidance on what form of government is required for a truly Islamic state. The Qurʾan, the example of the Prophet (the sunna), and his sayings (hadith) are all relatively silent on the issue and do not call for a particular form of government, be that a monarchy, a democracy, or an oligarchy. Nonetheless, early Muslim society was both a religious and a political community, and issues of governance and succession (who should rule and under what conditions) were extremely important for both religious and political reasons. The question of Muslim governance was subsequently clarified through the contributions of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) in the early centuries of Islam. As discussed in Chapter 3, this body of Islamic law (sharia) was derived from the sources of the tradition – the Qurʾan and the sunna – but it was also informed by analogous reasoning (qiyās), textual analysis, and human improvisation. The development of large-scale political organizations during the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates was also influenced by other factors, including Arab tradition and Persian and Byzantine practices. As the early Muslim community conquered new lands, it adopted many of the mechanisms and practices of imperial rule that defined earlier empires.

It was during the Umayyad period that separate centers of religious and political power began to develop. This trend continued under the Abbasid Dynasty, where the interpreters of religious tradition were growing increasingly distinct from the political elite that managed the temporal affairs of the community. The division between these two sources of authority was particularly evident after the fall of Baghdad in 1258. In the aftermath of the Mongol invasion, the Abbasid caliph (the spiritual leader of the Muslim community) was installed in Cairo, but he had only ceremonial functions. Real political power remained in the hands of the Mamluk sultanate.

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MOROCCO (1956)

ALGERIA (1962)

TUNISIA (1956)

LIBYA (1951)

TURKEY (1923)

IRAN (1979*)

EGYPT (1922)

SUDAN (1956)

SAUDI ARABIA

(1932)

IRAQ (1930)

SYRIA (1946)

JORDAN (1946)

YEMEN (1967)

OMAN (1970)

CYPRUS (1960) LEBANON (1946)

ISRAEL (1948**)

KUWAIT (1961)

QATAR (1971)

U.A.E. (1971)

Mediterranean Sea

Indian Ocean

Black Sea

R ed

Se aUnited Kingdom

France

Italy

Spain

Independent of European control

** Israel was carved out of the 1922 British-brokered “Mandate of Palestine”

* 1979 marks Iran’s independence from the Pahlavi dynasty

(1930) Date of independence

0 1000

0 1000Miles

Kilometers

Caspian Sea

BAHRAIN (1971)

Map 6.1 The modern Middle East as it emerged from European colonial rule.

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Islam and the State: Part I 115

The argument, then, that there has never been a separation between religion and politics in Islam (and, consequently, between Islam and the state) is somewhat misleading. Rather, this period in Islamic history witnessed the evolution of separate centers of religious and political power and a system of dual authority that was replicated throughout the Islamic world. Of course, there was a high degree of cooperation: political rulers required moral legitimacy, while religious leaders needed the state to uphold Islamic law. Nonetheless, the relationship was difficult. Political elites sought to dominate religious figures – as well as the doctrines of Islam – in order to pursue their own ends more ably, and they were often willing to use force to attain compliance. On the other hand, the community of religious scholars (the ulamā), jurists, and philosophers struggled to maintain its independence and integrity, recognizing the corrupting influence of political power, both upon themselves and upon Islamic doctrine. Imam al-Ghazali, the 12th-century Sunni scholar, summed up the suspicion many jurists had of political rulers:

Three kinds of relations are possible with princes, governors, and oppressors. The first and worst is that you visit them. Somewhat better is the second, whereby they visit you; but best of all is the third, in which you keep your distance so that neither you see them nor they see you.”1

If the premodern era was characterized by a system of dual authority – each trying to gain the upper hand – the early modern era was defined by the dominance of the political. With the growing influence of European political power in the 19th century and the corresponding decline of the Ottoman Empire, Islamic societies throughout the world were exposed to the modernizing influences of European political, economic, and ideological thought. The internal transformations that this trend inspired pit traditional religious elites against an emerging, Western-oriented political elite. These early modernizing elites used the state to create a more secular society and to gain greater control over social life. By reforming the economic and political basis of social life, the emerging elites sought to separate the ulamā from its traditional source of economic livelihood – tax farms and religiously endowed properties (awqāf ); the intention was to make the ulamā dependent upon the state. Other reforms sought to minimize the control of the ulamā over education and the law. The corresponding social revolution helped to establish the dominance of a political elite in areas traditionally controlled by religious scholars and left to the latter a very limited – and re-conceived – realm of religion.

Religion and State-Led Secularization

During the early modern era religion remained a dominant feature of Islamic society, but debates about the proper relationship between religion and government continued. These debates were central to the Islamic reform movement of the late 19th and early 20th century. What drove the reform movement – and the debates – was the challenge of European colonial rule (see Map 6.1). At issue was the question

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116 Islam and the Modern World

of how to explain the relative decline of the Islamic world vis-à-vis Christian Europe. There were various interpretations, both of the nature of the problem and of the proper response to it. One perspective, articulated by Islamic reformers Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad ʿAbduh, was that Islam had become mired in medieval scholasticism and this did not allow for the innovation and dynamism demanded by the modern age. Muslim societies, in short, could not compete with the West because intellectually they remained trapped in the past. Consequently, these early reformers saw the reformation of Islamic thought and practice as a necessary means for revitalizing their communities and challenging the West.

A central part of the argument for reform was that Islam is entirely compatible with the modern world. What was needed, however, was to break away from literal interpretations of the religious tradition and to abandon the “unquestioning imitation” (taqlīd) perpetuated by earlier scholars. The “modernist” reformers also brought a distinctly critical and liberal approach to the Islamic tradition. They advocated ijtihād (interpretation) as a means of changing Islamic thought and institutions. With their emphasis upon individual conscience and reason, they also saw enlightenment norms as being entirely compatible with the Islamic tradition.

A related concern of these early reformers was the persistence of political autocracy and the support it received from religious sources. By political autocracy we mean a system of government where the ruler remains unaccountable to the population over which he (or she) rules. From the reformers’ perspective there were two dimensions to this problem. The first was the unjust (and hence un-Islamic) nature of the sultanate – or autocratic state. The second and related dimension was in the fact that religion had been too commonly used to legitimize tyranny. This was perceived as an abuse of religion, and it undermined the integrity of both religion and society. A truly Islamic system, from the reformers’ perspective, would entail constraints on the ruler and a greater degree of justice in the exercise of power. Hence the constitutional reforms carried out during the late 19th century in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere were seen as consistent with Islamic teaching. The success of such reforms, however, required a greater degree of individual freedom. It would also require divesting political authority of any claim over religious belief and liberating “the creed from the act of political exploitation” (Belkeziz 2009: 34). From a reformist perspective, it was the rulers who should serve Islam, not the other way around.

A second response to the question of Muslim decline was offered by conservative activists such as Rashid Rida (a disciple of ʿ Abduh) and Hasan al-Banna (the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt). These individuals were very much influenced by the reform movement’s emphasis on religious revitalization and political change. However, they viewed the underlying problem in a very different light. For them, the problem was not a matter of religious interpretation; rather it was the loss of belief, and failure to adhere to the basic tenets of Islam, that produced Muslim weakness. Nowhere was this abandonment of Islam more evident than in the Muslims’ effort to emulate the West, be they the “modernists” who sought to incorporate European ideas into the Islamic tradition or leaders

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Islam and the State: Part I 117

who embraced secular forms of governance. By mimicking their colonial rulers, al-Banna and others argued, Muslims were internalizing the values of imperial subjugation and betraying their cultural heritage.2 The answer, then, was to “return to Islam” and create a true “Islamic order” (al-nizām al-Islāmī ). Although vague, this argument provides the basis for the modern Islamic state, which will be discussed at length in the next chapter.

A third interpretation of the Islamic decline was offered by the early secularists. For this group, the problem was not a matter of interpreting Islam or a decline in reli- gious belief, as al-Banna would argue; quite the opposite, in fact. For the early secular- ists, the weakness of the Islamic world vis-à-vis Europeans was rooted in what they saw as the continuing influence of a backward tradition in Muslim society. Religion and traditional patterns of social organization, in short, hindered economic and political development and kept Muslim societies from the technological advancement necessary for military competitiveness. Consequently, secularists believed that there was much to learn from the West, even if the European powers were the primary threat to the Muslim world. Moreover, they believed that the full potential of society could only be achieved by diminishing the hold of religion both on the community and on individuals. These assumptions constitute the basis for the early secular project and for the conscious effort to diminish the grip of Islamic tradition upon society. Secularizing political elites consequently sought to break the power of traditional elites – such as the ulamā in the Arab world, the mullahs (leaders or teachers versed both in religion and in canon law) in Iran, or the religious leaders of Turkey. Hence the nationali- zation (and secularization) of education, law, and the economy was intended to extend the control of the modern state into realms of society historically dominated by religious leaders and other traditional elites.

The most dramatic example of this trend was the secular revolution in Turkey (see below). In the aftermath of World War I, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk consciously sought to remove Islam from Turkish public life and to construct a secular state on the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Central to this effort was a state-directed cultural revolution that sought to re-orient Turkish society toward Europe and to modernize both state and society. The assumption, common at the time, was that secularization was associated with modernity and progress, whereas religion was tied to a backward tradition. Moreover, Westernization and modernization were commonly seen as one and the same thing (see Sidebar 6.1).

Sidebar 6.1 Westernization or modernization?

What does it mean to be modern? For many, particu- larly in the early 20th century, to be modern was to be Western and secular. Hence “modernization” entailed the adoption of Western-style political institutions, legal codes, and economic models. It also commonly entailed the adoption of attitudes toward religion that were informed by Enlightenment rationalism. In short, modernization entailed “Westernization.” This was the assumption behind Ataturk’s revolutionary reforms and behind the development strategy of Reza Shah (as well as of his son) in Iran, and it informed many of the development strategies in the 1950s and 1960s in many parts of the Islamic world. In more recent years, how- ever, it has become apparent that there are many forms that “modernity” can take. The real issue, then, is the challenge of all societies to reinterpret their traditions in a contemporary context.

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118 Islam and the Modern World

Hence Ataturk’s efforts were designed in large measure to replicate, within Turkey, the kind of modern economic, military, and political structures that allowed the Europeans to dominate the planet. This was part and parcel of a broader state- building project and of Ataturk’s effort to create a modern nation-state out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. A similar strategy was evident in early 20th- century Iran, though it was not carried through in such an extreme manner.

The secular trend was also evident in Gamal Adbel Nasser’s Egypt and in the Pan-Arab movement that informed the 1950s and 1960s (see below). Although not as dramatic as Ataturk and his reforms, the Arab nationalists were similarly keen to break with the traditional elites that had cooperated with British colonial rule. Nasser’s secular Arab nationalism also posed a threat to the traditional monarchies of the region, particularly those in the Gulf countries. In Nasser’s view, conserva- tive religion was an obstacle to the kind of economic and political reform that he and his fellow Arab nationalists wished to implement. The Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood and of the establishment ulamā was tainted, in Nasser’s view, by its association with reactionary elites. For Nasser and other modernizing state actors, secularism was a prerequisite for both freedom and development.

It was in this context that the relative merits of a “secular” and a “religious” state were widely debated. In what would come to be known as the “secular– integralist” debate, the Islamists (most notably Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, but others as well) argued for a central role for Islam in the modern state. By “Islamists” we mean those groups and activists commonly referred to as “ fundamentalist” or Salafist, who advocate a return to the fundamentals of the tradition. The basic argument is that Islam provides a “comprehensive program” meant to regulate all facets of human existence. To preclude a central role for Islam in government would, according to this view, be a violation of God’s revelation. While there was some questioning as to what this meant in practice, the need for an Islamic state, it was argued, was clear. (The next chapter will examine this argument in greater detail.) The secular Arab nationalists, on the other hand, disagreed and argued that the type of state structure adopted by the country was, from a religious perspective, immaterial. They believed that there was nothing inconsistent between Islam and a secular state as long as certain minimal prohibitions were upheld. The secularists were also concerned about linking religious and political power too closely. As Khalid Muhammad Khalid argued in 1950, a religious state would hinder Egypt’s socio-economic development, since the unification of religious and political authority would have corrupting effects on both. What was truly needed, he argued, was a social revolution. Such an alternative, though, would be hindered by a “priesthood” that “colluded with tyrants,” and, in its pursuit of power, used reli- gion to “keep the people poor and ignorant” (Hourani 1991: 353).

These debates have periodically recurred, in Egypt and elsewhere, and were a central feature of the Islamist challenge of the 1990s. The same question as the one posed in 1950 has remained central – namely whether a secular or an Islamic (that is, “traditionalist”) state is preferable. The competing arguments remain largely the same today. As in earlier years, the secular perspective generally takes

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Islam and the State: Part I 119

one of two approaches. The first argues that nowhere in the Qurʾan is a particular form of government specified; hence a secular form is consistent with the Islamic tradition. The second claims that social life needs to be free from the dominance of any institutionalized religion – if for no other reason, the diver- sity of the national community requires it. The Egyptian Wafd Party’s slogan in the early part of the 20th century, “religion belongs to God, the nation belongs to all” (al-dīn llāh, wa al-watan li al-jami), reflects this idea that social harmony is best ensured by relegating religion to the private sphere.3 It was not that the early Wafdists were hostile to religion. Rather they were concerned about the politicization of religious authorities and about the manipulation of religion by political actors.

One of the complicating factors in this debate is a lack of clarity regarding the essence of the secular idea. On the one hand, secularism is commonly interpreted as state neutrality in matters of religion and religious doctrine. According to this understanding of secularism, the state is not meant to be the enforcer of religious law or the regulator of religious orthodoxy. On the contrary, it is up to individual conscience (or at least that of religious authorities) to determine which interpretation of religious doctrine reflects God’s will. Moreover, it is believed that efforts on the part of governments to coerce individual conscience will likely pro- mote hypocrisy (nifāq), not true belief. There is also the argument that the politi- cization of religion leads to its corruption. Hence, separating religious authority from political authority is intended to preserve the integrity of religion. According to a second interpretation, secularism does not, however, involve a state of neu- trality, but rather one of active hostility toward religion. If, in the first interpreta- tion, this concept was compatible with religious expression in public life, in the second it is not: the second interpretation sees religion as a detrimental force in society and seeks its marginalization. This is what informs the French conceptions of laïcité (discussed in Chapter 8), as well as Ataturk’s ardent secularism. Not sur- prisingly, this interpretation leads Islamists to believe that secularism is either a form of unbelief (kufr) or an active hostility to religion, religious authority, and public expressions of religion. From an Islamist point of view, the alternative to an Islamic state is not a “civil state,” but rather a non-religious one.

Cases

Turkey

Although Islam was a central feature in Ottoman rule, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire ushered in a new era of secular nationalism. Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey, saw Islam as part of a backward East and embraced secular norms as a means of re-orienting Turkish society toward a European and Western vision of modernity. In an effort to create a modern nation-state from the rem- nants of the Ottoman Empire, Ataturk and his allies developed a secular political structure, which separated religion from government and consciously sought to

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