Current Event

Must be APA format, 12pt font, 4-6 legitimate, verifiable sources, title page, an introduction, reference page, in text citations. Due by 6/14/2019 @ 7 p.m. Est. Plagiarism free.

This assignment is a review of a current homeland security event.  Analyze the event based on the material covered so far in class.   You will prepare three to four pages in length (not including cover page or reference pages) exploring the event and any response to the event. An abstract is not required.  Follow the guidelines in either Course Content or in the conference. The paper is due at the end of week 4 and must be submitted in your Assignment folder.  Review the late policy above.Write about the current even topic and how it affected Homeland Security to the United States.

Must be APA format, 12pt font, 4-6 legitimate, verifiable sources, title page, an introduction, reference page, in text citations. Due by 6/14/2019 @ 7 p.m. Est. Plagiarism free.

This assignment is a review of a current homeland security event.  Analyze the event based on the material covered so far in class.   You will prepare three to four pages in length (not including cover page or reference pages) exploring the event and any response to the event. An abstract is not required.  Follow the guidelines in either Course Content or in the conference. The paper is due at the end of week 4 and must be submitted in your Assignment folder.  Review the late policy above. Examples of current events include the recent kidnappings in Algeria or Hurricane Sandy.

GRADING RUBRIC

Top of Form

This table lists criteria and criteria group name in the first column. The first row lists level names and includes scores if the rubric uses a numeric scoring method. Criteria

Exceptional

Good

Fair / Adequate

Limited

Adherence to APA/Paper Requirements

Add Feedback

10 points

Can earn between 9-10 points. No APA style errors. Follows and exceeds expectations noted in instructions

8 points

Three or less APA style errors. Follows instructions.

7 points

Six APA style errors. Follows some but not all instructions.

6 points

Can earn between 0-6 points. No attempt at APA style.  Disregards instructions.

/ 10

/ 10

*

Criterion score has been overridden

Introduction and Conclusion

Add Feedback

20 points

Can earn between 18-20 points. Relevance of topic is apparent. The groundwork for the paper is easy to predict because important topics that will be discussed are specifically mentioned. The writer makes succinct and precise conclusions and/or recommendations.

17 points

Can earn between 16-17 points. A good attempt is made as to why the topic is pertinent, but it may be slightly unclear or lacking in insight or originality. Organization for rest of the paper is stated. Some of the conclusions and recommendations are not supported.

15 points

Can earn between 14-15 points. Introduction may be unclear (contain vague terms), appear unoriginal, or offer relatively little that is new; intro provides little around which to structure the paper. Some of the conclusions and recommendations are not supported; there are weak or trite suggestions for future.

13 points

Can earn between 0-13 points. No reference is made to the topic, audience, or relevance of the topic. There is little or no indication that the writer tried to synthesize the information or to draw conclusions or make recommendations; there are no suggestions for future.

/ 20

/ 20

*

Criterion score has been overridden

Content

Add Feedback

40 points

Can earn between 36-40 points. Clearly explains what led up to the current event and the event itself and what resulted from the event (policies, etc.).  Reader gains important insight; analysis poses novel ways to think of the material; quoted material is well-integrated; coverage is deep without being redundant.

35 points

Can earn between 32-35 points. Somewhat clearly explains what led up to the current event itself and what resulted from the event (policies, etc.). Reader gains some insight; there is occasional evidence of novel ways to think about the material. Quotes are well-integrated into sentences. Topics are adequately addressed, but not in detail or depth.

31 points

Can earn between 28-31 points. Lacking in the details of the event and what resulted.  Reader gains little insight. Essay relies on quotes and paraphrases that are poorly connected. Examples support some topic sentences; there is no evidence of novel thinking, and there is intermittent support through evidence.

27 points

Can earn between 0-27 points. Essay relies on the stringing together of quotes or close paraphrasing. There is a failure to support statements, with major content omitted; quotes are not integrated properly.

/ 40

/ 40

*

Criterion score has been overridden

Organization and Critical Thinking

Add Feedback

15 points

Can earn between 14-15 points. The ideas are arranged logically to support the purpose. Transitions link paragraphs. It’s easy to follow the line reasoning. Subheadings are used throughout the paper, allowing the reader to move easily through the text. Paragraphs have solid topic sentences.

13 points

Can earn between 12-13 points. The ideas are arranged logically to support the central purpose. Transitions usually link paragraphs. For the most part, the reader can follow the line of reasoning. Subheadings are used throughout the paper to guide the reader without creating undue confusion; a few paragraphs lack strong topic sentences.

11 points

Can earn between 10-11 points. In general, ideas are arranged logically, but sometimes, they fail to make sense together. The reader is fairly clear about what the writer intends. While subheadings are used, the content beneath them does not follow; many paragraphs lack topic sentences

9 points

Can earn between 0-9 points. Ideas are not logically organized. Frequently, ideas fail to make sense together. The reader cannot identify a line of reasoning. Subheadings are not used. There are few to no topic sentences.

/ 15

/ 15

*

Criterion score has been overridden

Style, clarity, spelling, grammar, writing mechanics

Add Feedback

15 points

Can earn between 14-15 points. Writing quality in terms of grammar, punctuation, usage, structure, spacing, etc. as well as reader engagement is excellent.

13 points

Can earn between 12-13 points. Writing quality in terms of grammar, punctuation, usage, structure, spacing, etc. as well as reader engagement is good.

11 points

Can earn between 10-11 points. Writing quality in terms of grammar, punctuation, usage, structure, spacing, etc. as well as reader engagement is adequate or below average.

9 points

Can earn between 0-9 points. Many errors that disrupt flow an understanding of the presentation.

/ 15

/ 15

*

Criterion score has been overridden

COURSE MATERIAL IF NEEDED

Module 1: The Origins of Homeland Security

Topics

1. The Historical Development of Homeland Security: Responding to the Asymmetric/Unconventional Threat

2. The Asymmetric Threat of Terrorism: Defining, Categorizing, and Countering the Threat

3. The Terrorist Threat to the United States

4. Summary

 

1. The Historical Development of Homeland Security: Responding to the Asymmetric/Unconventional Threat

The origins of the concept of “homeland security” have deep roots in American history. People often mistakenly join the history of emergency management with the beginnings of homeland security. Homeland security is a much broader concept, whose origins go much deeper than the short history of emergency management. Although a significant component, emergency management is but a small part of a much longer history that shapes our current efforts to secure the United States against the threat of terrorism.

The term homeland security was coined in the haze of the attacks of September 11 and is officially defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security released in 2002. It is defined as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur” (US Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 2).

Homeland security in practice has arguably grown to encompass activities far outside of its originally defined scope. In practical application, the definition is ever changing and differs in different environments. From interoperable radios and incident management, to evacuations and temporary housing, Americans’ expectations regarding homeland security have grown beyond its established definition. The question is whether these expectations and expanded definitions of homeland security have clouded its purpose, confusing traditional emergency management functions with what is needed to prevent terrorism and reduce America’s vulnerability to attack.

The term homeland security is newly defined; however, the need to protect the nation from the threat of asymmetric warfare has been critical since its founding. The term asymmetric warfare is not defined officially in any government publication but rather has a host of slightly varied definitions constructed by authors of related publications. For the purpose of this course, asymmetric warfare is defined as …

acting, thinking or organizing differently than the opponent in order to maximize one’s own advantages or exploit an opponent’s weakness. It comes from one force deploying new capabilities that the opponent force does not perceive or understand. It’s conventional capabilities that counter or overmatch the capabilities of its opponent, or capabilities that represent totally new methods of attack or defense … or a combination of these (Skelton, 2001, p. 3).

It is easy to see how this definition describes the September 11 attacks and the continuing threat of terrorism, which we will further discuss later in this module.

The concept of homeland security overlaps another important concept—homeland defense—in the protection of the United States from its enemies. The US Department of Defense (2006, p. 241) defines homeland defense as “the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the president.”

The mission of homeland defense is assigned to the US Department of Defense, whereas the homeland security mission is assigned to a myriad of federal, state, and local civilian agencies led by the US Department of Homeland Security as will be further discussed in Module 3. Where to draw the line between homeland security and homeland defense has spurred intense debate and will also be examined in further detail in Module 3.

As the following historical examples of asymmetric threats faced by the United States are detailed and the definitions of homeland defense and homeland security are applied, it is difficult to determine if given a similar situation today under which realm it would fall. Understanding this difficulty and the overlapping roles of the military and civilian agencies in protecting the United States from foreign threats is important in the study of homeland security.

At several times in its history, the United States has faced real or perceived threats from asymmetric enemies. Government policies and actions to counter these threats have, in the opinion of some, often run contrary to the spirit of American freedom. Over the years, the words of Benjamin Franklin have surfaced when efforts at safety and security have conflicted with freedom. In a 1755 letter to the governor of Pennsylvania, Franklin wrote, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety” (cited in Labaree, 1963, p. 242).

Our current dilemma in determining the balance of freedom and security makes Franklin’s words timely. The study of modern homeland security must be undertaken with an understanding of our nation’s historical response to asymmetric threats.

The United States and our freedoms have survived direct attacks and attempted attacks against the homeland by foreign powers and the long cold war against communism. How does today’s threat of terrorism differ from that faced throughout our history? Are the policy debates over the National Security Agency wiretaps and the detention of “enemy combatants” in Guantanamo Bay any different from the debate held over the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II?

Asymmetric Threats to the United States

In the following sections, we will summarize some of the points in our history where the United States was threatened by an asymmetric enemy. In each example, we will examine the threat and the US government policy response. The government can respond through either legislative or executive actions. The legislative option is the creation of new laws. In each example below, Congress responded to the threat by creating new laws to counter the threat.

The second option is the use of executive power (power of the president) to counter the threat. In several of the following examples, the president has used executive orders to guide the actions of executive agencies against the threat. In many of the examined periods, the powers of both the legislative and executive branches have been brought to bear on the problem.

We will now examine specifically the undeclared war with France (1797–1800), the Civil War (1861–1865), Red Scare I (1917–1920), the threat of espionage and sabotage during World War II (1941–1945), Red Scare II (1947–1957), and the threat of terrorism from 1993 to the present. In each case, the United States faced a threat from a real or perceived asymmetric enemy and responded with policy decisions that had broadscale effects on American society. Understanding the threat and requisite response helps provide context to the dangers to both national security and internal freedom that come from domestic actions to counter security threats.

Undeclared War with France: 1797–1800 Asymmetric Threat to the Homeland: Foreign Agents in America

The late 1790s saw the deterioration of relations between the United States and France. The US agreement with Great Britain through the Jay Treaty in 1795 angered the French. They believed the treaty signaled that the United States had sided with Great Britain and would support her in her war against France. This belief led to an undeclared war at sea between France and the United States.

The controversy that resulted from the interaction of a US peace delegation sent to France to negotiate an end to hostilities fueled the flames. The conflict led to the XYZ affair (1797). The French foreign minister refused to negotiate with the US delegation until a substantial bribe was paid. The incident is called the XYZ affair after the three unnamed French agents (X, Y, and Z) who sought to broker the transaction. When word of the incident reached the United States, it fanned the flames of war.

A declared war was averted, but Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 in response to the possibility of war and the threat of foreign agents in the United States. There is also controversy as to the true intention of the acts. Some historians suggest that the acts were a politically motivated attempt to silence criticism of President John Adams.

Domestic Policy Response During the Period

The Alien and Sedition Acts consisted of the following four acts.

1. The Naturalization Act (June 1798) changed the requirement for citizenship from 5 to 14 years of residency. It was repealed in 1802.

2. The Alien Friends Act (June 1798) allowed the president to deport any noncitizen considered dangerous to the “peace and safety of the United States.” It expired two years after being enacted.

3. The Alien Enemies Act (July 1798) allowed the president to arrest and deport citizens of foreign nations at war with the United States. This law is still in effect today (War and National Defense, 50 USC § 21).

4. The Sedition Act (July 1798) made the actions of “writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States” a crime. It expired in 1801.

The Civil War: 1861–1865 Asymmetric Threat to the Homeland: Espionage and Sabotage by Confederate Agents

The deterioration of relations between Northern and Southern states during the 1850s and ’60s led to the secession of several Southern states and eventual full-scale armed rebellion. The threat of espionage, riots, local militia action, and other potential disruptions of the war effort by Confederate agents in the remaining states forced the president to take action. In light of the threat, President Lincoln exercised authority under Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, which states, “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”

Habeas corpus (Latin translation: “you have the body”) is the legal requirement that someone imprisoned be brought before a court for review. This review determines if the person is lawfully detained, and a judge may decide whether the individual should be released from custody. Fearing Maryland would secede from the Union, cutting off Washington, DC, Lincoln first suspended habeas corpus in Maryland on April 27, 1861. The suspension of habeas corpus allowed those who may have supported the Southern rebellion to be imprisoned for a time without legal review by a judge. The suspension served as an effective tool to maintain control of areas sympathetic to the Confederacy.

In addition to the suspensions, Lincoln also ordered the establishment of military courts. These courts often tried “copperheads” (peace Democrats) who supported the Confederacy. Several cases were brought to the courts challenging the constitutionality of the suspension of habeas corpus and the authority of the military courts over citizens in noncombat zones.

One of the landmark Supreme Court decisions concerning these issues was Ex parte Milligan 71 US 2 (1866). Milligan and four others were accused of plotting to steal weapons and free prisoners from Union prisoner-of-war camps. Milligan was tried by a military tribunal and sentenced to hang. The sentence was issued in 1864, but the sentence was not to be imposed until 1865. This delay gave Milligan the chance to appeal after the hostilities ceased. The Supreme Court held that Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus was constitutional but also held that citizens, even in wartime, could not be tried by military courts where civil courts were operating.

Domestic Policy Response During the Period

· Presidential suspension of habeas corpus—The Constitution still today does not expressly state who has the authority to suspend habeas corpus. It only gives examples of the conditions (rebellion, invasion, or public safety) under which suspensions may occur. Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus gave the government strong tools to fight the spread of insurrection. The potential for suspension of habeas corpus is important today as government powers are debated and applied in the war of terrorism.

· Military courts―The establishment of military courts for the trial of suspected collaborators was an efficient way to quell dissent. Those taken into custody included prominent legislators in several states. Many argue that Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus and establishment of military tribunals were among the most egregious assaults on Americans’ basic freedoms in our history.

· Habeas Corpus Act of 1863―In this act, Congress said the president, “whenever in his judgment the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States or any part thereof” (Ex parte Milligan, 1866).

Red Scare I: 1917–1920 Asymmetric threat to the homeland: (1) foreign agent infiltration and sabotage; (2) terrorist/anarchist bombing campaign; (3) potential Communist revolution in America

Convinced that the Nation faces an organized campaign of anarchy and terrorism which calls for heroic action, the Department of Justice and other branches of the Government today took steps which it is believed will effectively put an end to the plot.

—”Flynn to direct search for Reds,” 1919

The period during and immediately following World War I stirred US fears of a worldwide communist revolution. The spread of communism in Europe, European immigration, and widespread labor strikes fueled fears of an impending communist/anarchist revolution in the United States. The period saw a host of anarchist bombings reaching a fever pitch by 1919.

The fears reached new heights when in April 1919 more than 30 bombs were mailed to prominent US citizens and government officials, including John D. Rockefeller and Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Most did not reach their destination. The ensuing investigation found 16 undelivered bombs in a New York post office. Only one reached its destination and detonated, but its intended target, former Georgia Senator Thomas Hardwick, was unharmed. Senator Hardwick’s wife and maid were injured in the blast while opening the mail (“Bomb,” 1919, p. 1).

In June 1919, the conflict escalated as eight American cities experienced almost simultaneous bombings. One device was delivered to the home of US Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer in Washington, D.C. He and his family were home at the time of the attack but were unharmed. The bomb intended for Palmer detonated prematurely, killing the bomber on Palmer’s front doorstep (“Palmer,” 1919, p. 1).

The period saw the passage of a series of laws aimed at both securing the homeland from the threat of foreign agent infiltration and quelling the anarchist/terrorist threat. We summarize these laws in the following section.

Domestic Policy Response During the Period

· The Espionage Act of 1917 made it a crime to convey information that hindered the war effort or promoted the success of the nation’s enemies. It also allowed for mail privileges to be revoked on any publication that printed material that did not support the war effort. The act essentially controlled dissent in America against the government and the war effort. Several sections were repealed in 1921, but portions remain in the US Code today (Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 USC §§ 793, 794).

· The Sedition Act of 1918 was added as an amendment to the Espionage Act of 1917. It extended the prohibition against promoting the nation’s enemy to make it criminal to use “disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language” about the US government. It was repealed in 1921.

· The Anarchist Act of 1918 allowed for the detention and removal of any alien belonging to a subversive organization that opposed the US government. It was modified by the Internal Security Act of 1950 but still exists in some form in the US Code (Espionage Act of 1917).

Armed with the series of laws just described and in response to the escalating threat of anarchist/terrorist attacks during early 1919, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer launched a series of investigations resulting in the arrest of thousands. These operations would later be known as the Palmer Raids. By January 1920, Palmer and his federal agents rounded up and deported nearly 10,000 radicals, including 4,000 in one day. Federal agents conducted several operations that captured 249 Russian radicals whom they placed on a ship bound for the Soviet Union. Throughout the period of the raids, the aliens were detained and deported under the Anarchist Act, passed in 1918. The threat and the federal government response are instructive in our present efforts to again fight terrorism in America.

World War II—Espionage and Sabotage in America: 1941–1945 Asymmetric threat to the homeland: espionage/sabotage by within the American population segments

Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939 and France in 1940 set the United States on a collision course toward world war. As the initial conflict in Europe grew, Great Britain (1939) and Italy (1940) also declared war. In the Pacific, Japan invaded China in 1937 and in 1940 signed the Tripartite Agreement with Germany and Italy. Japan soon afterward turned its attention to British and French colonies in the Pacific and in late December 1941, to the United States.

Many who were part of the mass European migration during the 1920s settled on the East Coast, while large numbers of Asian immigrants settled on the West Coast. Thus, the United States had large populations of immigrants from nations on all sides of the conflict. As the country was drawn closer to war, these populations became a concern for US internal security. The perceived threat of espionage and sabotage by elements within the country sympathetic to US enemies resulted in a strong government response.

The United States was drawn into the war by the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. Shortly after the attack, a series of executive orders were issued that ordered the enforcement of The Alien Enemies Act of 1798, allowing for the internment of foreign nationals. Although German Americans and Italian Americans were also detained, the largest number of detainees were Japanese Americans (figure 1.1). More than 120,000 Japanese Americans were forcibly relocated to internment camps (US Department of Interior, 2001, p. 4). More than 10,000 Italians were forced to leave coastal areas of California but were subject to self-relocation and were not forcibly detained (US Department of Justice, 2000, p. v).

Figure 1.1 Internment of Japanese Americans During World War II

“Persons of Japanese ancestry arrive at the Santa Anita Assembly Center from San Pedro. Evacuees lived at this center at the former Santa Anita race track before being moved inland to relocation centers” (NARA).

Source: The National Archives, “Pictures of World War II” Photo taken by Clem Albers, Arcadia, CA, on April 5, 1942

In 1942, the asymmetric threat of infiltration and sabotage came to fruition. Two groups of German soldiers were put ashore by German submarines in the United States. One group arrived in Amagansett, New York, and a second group came ashore at Ponte Verdra Beach, Florida. The objective of these soldiers was the sabotage of rail lines, war production facilities, and the New York City water supply. The plot was foiled when one of the saboteurs with prewar ties to America turned himself in to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Washington, D.C.

Domestic Policy Response During the Period

· The Alien Registration Act of 1940 (Smith Act) required that all noncitizen adults residing in the United States register with the government. It also made it a crime to “knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty, necessity, desirability or propriety of overthrowing the Government of the United States or of any State by force or violence, or for anyone to organize any association which teaches, advises or encourages such an overthrow, or for anyone to become a member of or to affiliate with any such association” (Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 USC § 2385). The law would later be used during the second Red Scare to prosecute suspected communists. Although it was declared unconstitutional in several of those prosecutions, the law remains in the US Code.

· Executive Proclamations 2525, 2526, and 2527―An executive proclamation is essentially a public announcement. Each of these proclamations by President Roosevelt targeted a nation and its citizens at war with the United States (2525, Japan; 2526, Germany; and 2527, Italy). The proclamations officially declared the citizens of these countries living in the United States as “alien enemies” and subject to the Alien Enemies Act of 1798. The orders were in force during the period of declared war between the United States and the named countries.

· Executive Order 9066―This order, also issued by Roosevelt, empowered the secretary of war and military commanders to designate “military areas” within the United States. Once designated, “any and all persons” could be excluded from the designated area, with transportation, food, shelter, and accommodations provided as necessary. It also gave the military the power to enforce compliance with the designation. The order allowed the designation of much of the West Coast as a military area and the exclusion of Japanese and Italians from the area. The order ceased to be effective after the end of World War II. In 1976, President Gerald Ford issued Presidential Proclamation 4077 officially repealing E.O. 9066.

World War II resulted in a resounding victory for the Allied forces. The victory was tempered with governmental actions at home that many considered unconstitutional. In 1988, Congress issued an official apology to Japanese Americans and paid reparations of $20,000 to each surviving detainee.

Red Scare II: 1947–1957 Asymmetric Threat to the Homeland: Communist Espionage in America

The period of 1947–1957 saw increased concerns about the internal security of the United States from the threat of Communism. The concerns reached new heights in 1950 when State Department employee Alger Hiss was convicted of perjury, and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were arrested for providing atomic secrets to the Soviets. The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), formed in 1938 to investigate the activities of Americans sympathetic to our enemies during World War II, focused its attention on Communism. It was this committee that brought the charges against Alger Hiss for his involvement with the Soviets. The most famous question for those compelled to testify before the committee became, “Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party of the United States?” The committee also studied the influence of Communists in Hollywood. Those found with real or insinuated ties to Communism were “blacklisted” and unable to find work after the accusations.

The Senate also conducted investigations into government officials with ties to Communism. The accusations leveled by Senator Joseph McCarthy through a series of public speeches led to the investigations. The intense anti-Communist activity during this period of American history is often referred to as McCarthyism.

Domestic Policy Response During the Period

· President Truman’s 1947 Executive Order 9835 created a program (Federal Employee Loyalty Program) that conducted loyalty reviews of federal employees to expose Communist sympathies. The order also allowed the FBI to check the names of federal employees and investigate any suspicious information uncovered. The Supreme Court invalidated the order in several cases brought before it over dismissals related to the loyalty review.

· The Internal Security Act of 1950 required Communist organizations to register with the attorney general. It also established the Subversive Activities Control Board to investigate Communist activities and to require Communists to register (War and National Defense, 50 USC §§ 781 et seq.). During the 1960s, the Supreme Court overturned major provisions of the act.

· The Immigration and Nationality Act (1952) allowed the government to deport immigrants and naturalized citizens involved in subversive activity. It also provided the mechanism to prevent unwanted potential subversives from entering the country. Many of the provisions of the act were reversed by the Immigration and Nationality Services Act of 1965.

· The Communist Control Act of 1954 made the Communist Party of the United States illegal and criminalized membership or support of the organization. It also prohibited Communists from holding leadership positions in labor organizations (War and National Defense, 50 USC §§ 841–842, 68 Stat. 775, 1954). The provisions of the law that outlawed the Communist Party have since been repealed.

Terrorism in America: 1993–2001 Asymmetric Threat to the Homeland: Terrorist Threat from International and Domestic Terrorists

Politically motivated violence has always been present at some level in America, but the actors and targets have varied depending on the era. Such violence occurred during the Red Scares, the civil-rights struggle, and the 1960s–70s protests against the Vietnam War. The period from 1993 to the present shows a shift in terrorist activity from primarily American-on-American violence in support of some political change to the threat of international terrorists diametrically opposed to the United States and its foreign policy.

International terrorists threatened US interests abroad for decades before 1993. Just two examples are the 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in Lebanon and the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Americans have been the targets of many incidents in foreign countries, but the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center opened a new front for international terrorism: the continental United States.

On February 26, 1993, a group led by Ramzi Yousef, a Kuwaiti of Pakistani descent, placed a rental van packed with explosives in the parking garage of World Trade Center Tower 1 in New York City. Yousef constructed the 1,500-pound urea nitrate–based device in the hope that it would collapse Tower 1, causing it to fall into Tower 2, taking down both buildings. The detonation resulted in severe damage to the parking garage but did not take down the buildings as Yousef hoped. Following a worldwide manhunt, Yousef was captured in Pakistan in 1995 and returned to New York for prosecution. He and two associates were convicted and given life sentences in 1996.

In 1995, the United States was again the target of terrorism. This time the perpetrator was one of our own. American Timothy McVeigh, supported by a radical right-wing antigovernment ideology, detonated a Ryder truck with 4,800 pounds of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) outside the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995 (figure 1.2). The blast killed 168 people. McVeigh was convicted and sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out June 11, 2001.

Figure 1.2 Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building Bombing 

Source: NASA Ames Research Center Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team

The United States continued to face the wrath of international terrorists outside the continental United States. Between Yousef’s strike at the World Trade Center in 1993 and the attacks of September 2001, US interests were targeted by Islamic militants and al-Qaeda, including attacks against military personnel in the Khobar Towers bombing (1998, Dharan, Saudi Arabia, 19 US casualties) and the bomb attack on the USS Cole (2000, Aden, Yemen, 17 US casualties).

Other US interests were also targeted, including near-simultaneous bombings at the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya (12 US casualties), and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (7 US casualties). During this time, the radical Islamic terrorist organization al-Qaeda became known and was likely responsible for several of the incidents. In 1998, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden released a religious edict called a fatwah, claiming the United States had made “a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims,” essentially making his own declaration of war against the United States (Congressional Research Service, Al-Qaeda, 2005, p. 4).

On September 11, 2001, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda brought their war to the American homeland. Nineteen terrorists, including trained pilots, hijacked four passenger airliners and crashed them into symbols of America’s economic and military strength. American Airlines Flight 11, piloted by operation leader Mohammed Atta (Egypt), was the first to reach its target, crashing into World Trade Center Tower 1 at 8:46 a.m. United Airlines Flight 175, piloted by Marwan al-Shehhi (United Arab Emirates), found its target next, crashing into World Trade Center Tower 2 at 9:03 a.m. (figure 1.3). The strikes resulted in the collapse of both buildings and the death of 2,726 people.

Figure 1.3 World Trade Center, September 11, 2001

Source: US Coast Guard Photo taken by PA2 Tom Sperduto, New York, NY, on September 11, 2001

The third plane to find its target was American Airlines Flight 77. Piloted by Hani Hanjour (Saudi Arabia), it struck the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m., penetrating three outer rings of the building, causing a partial collapse, and killing 125 people. The final plane, United Airlines Flight 93, piloted by Ziad Jarrah (Lebanon) did not reach its intended target. Based on evidence of telephone calls and flight recordings, the 9/11 Commission concluded that the terrorists crashed the plane in response to an attempt by the passengers and crew to retake the aircraft. It crashed into an empty field outside Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 10:03 a.m., killing 44 people.

The crash of Flight 93 ended the attacks of September 11. The hours and weeks that followed saw a flurry of activity at all levels of government not seen since the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was unknown if and when the next attacks would come. The military, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement officials at all levels of government took unprecedented actions in an attempt to locate additional terrorists in the United States.

The remainder of this course will focus on the policy response to the attacks of September 11 and the continuing threat of terrorism evidenced by the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. The initial policy response to September 11 brought about the creation of homeland security as an academic discipline. In the following subsection, we briefly introduce the government’s actions in the first few months following September 11. We will examine these and other actions in greater detail in Module 2. The response to the attacks of September 11 continues even today, many years after the incident.

Initial Domestic Policy Response

· Public Law 107-40—Congress authorized the president to use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons” (September 14, 2001).

· Justice Department detentions—On September 17, 2001, this department revised its regulations concerning the detention and charging of aliens. Prior to this change, courts had to be notified within 48 hours of the identity and location of aliens detained on immigration charges. The revised regulation allowed exceptions to these provisions in cases related to national security (US Department of Justice, 2003). The revision allowed for “secret detentions” of aliens. More than 1,100 people were detained under the revised regulations in the months following the change.

· Creation of the Office of Homeland Security—On September 20, 2001, President Bush announced the creation of a cabinet-level Office of Homeland Security to be headed by Governor Tom Ridge. The office was the precursor to the Department of Homeland Security, of which Ridge served as the first secretary. We will study in greater detail the development of the department in Modules 2 and 3.

· Public Law 107-56, USA PATRIOT Act—On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act into law. The act expanded the powers of the government to interdict terrorist activity and included a new criminal statute addressing the material support and harboring of terrorists. For a complete summary, see the Congressional Research Service Report: The USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch. The law was created with a sunset provision that allowed for many sections to expire unless reauthorized. The most recent legislation, passed in 2011, reauthorized those sections of the PATRIOT Act for four additional years.

Return to top of page

 

2. The Asymmetric Threat of Terrorism: Defining, Categorizing, and Countering the Threat

In this section, we explore homeland security further by examining its defining component, terrorism. We look at the definitional problems of terrorism and several of the many theories of terrorist behavior in the context of the homeland security mission.

Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?

To accomplish the homeland security mission, we must understand and define the target: terrorism. The problem is that terrorism evades a hard-and-fast definition. Terrorism researchers for decades have sought a comprehensive definition that to date has not been agreed upon. Terrorism has many facets and can be studied through the lens of multiple academic disciplines, including sociology, political science, economics, psychology, and history. Each discipline must define the phenomenon.

Because there is no international consensus on what terrorism is (even the United Nations has not arrived at an objective definition), it is difficult to say whether someone is a terrorist or a freedom fighter. In Political Terrorism: A Research Guide, author Alex Schmid spends nearly one hundred pages attempting to develop a defensible definition of terrorism and concludes that there is no universally acceptable definition (1984).

We are left at the same crossroads faced by the US Supreme Court in attempting to define what is obscene as it relates to pornography in the 1964 case Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 US 184, 197 (1964). Justice Potter Stewart’s definitional struggle with pornography and obscenity outlined in his concurring opinion gives us the “clear as mud” simplicity that can be applied to the definitional problem of terrorism. Stewart wrote, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it ….”

In The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems, Brian Jenkins takes a similar but somewhat clearer stance, writing, “if one identifies with the victim of the attack, then it is considered terrorism, but if one can identify with the perpetrator it is not” (1980, p. 10). In Terrorism, the father of terrorism research, Walter Laqueur wrote, “a comprehensive definition of terrorism … does not exist nor will it be found in the foreseeable future” (1977, p. 5).

The failure to arrive at a comprehensive objective definition is rooted in the four possible methods for defining terrorism described in table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Defining Terrorism

Method	Defines Terrorism by …	Example
1	the nature of the act itself	If civilians are targeted, it is terrorism.
2	the identity of those who carry it out	Regardless of the act, the characteristics of the organization determine if an act is terrorism.
3	the root cause of the violence	If an attack is perpetrated to advance a political grievance, it is terrorism. (An attack for financial gain is not terrorism.)
4	the policy response to the act	An attack that results in military action vs. criminal investigation, and redress occurs through the legal system, is terrorism.

Each method has its limitations. For example, to use method 1 without qualification leaves the question: were the American bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II terrorism? Coming closer to a comprehensive definition of terrorism requires consideration of several of the methods described in table 1.1. In his seminal work Inside Terrorism, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman does not prescribe a definition but bridges the gap by developing the elements of terrorism that include multiple methods of defining the concept:

1. political in aims and motives;

2. violent or, equally important, threatens violence;

3. designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target;

4. conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia); and

5. perpetrated by a subnational group or nonstate entity (1998, p. 43).

In academic circles, definitions can be debated over time. For governments, which operate under the rule of law and the threat of terrorism, definitions are essential for the description of statutes for prosecution. The US government operates under the following three different definitions of terrorism.

· The US Department of Defense (US DoD) defines terrorism as

the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological (2006, p. 540).

· The Department of State (DoS) uses the definition provided in Title 22 of the US Code, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, § 2656f(d)(2):

Terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.

· The FBI defines terrorism as

the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (Judicial Administration, 28 C.F.R. § 0.85).

Each definition serves the need of each agency and defines terrorism in relation to the individual agency mission. For example, the FBI definition accounts for acts against property and considers terrorism not only as violence, but as force. This definition is appropriate for the FBI’s function in the domestic investigation of terrorism for prosecution. The DoS definition enables the secretary of state to designate foreign terrorist organizations under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Aliens and Nationality, 8 USC § 1189).

Varying definitions within one government become problematic as times change. If it is difficult to define traditional terrorism, it is even more difficult to define modern forms such as cyberterrorism, bioterrorism, and agroterrorism. Is a cyber attack launched against the New York Stock Exchange terrorism if it does not include violence?

The way we define and describe terrorism has far-reaching effects on those to whom the label terrorist is attached. In 1980, Brian Jenkins wrote,

Some governments are prone to label as terrorism all violent acts by their political opponents, while anti-government extremists frequently claim to be the victim of government terror. Thus what is called terrorism thus seems to depend on one’s point of view. Use of the term implies a moral judgment; and if one party can successfully attach the label to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint. Terrorism is what the bad guys do (Jenkins, 1980, p. 5).

This section details the difficulties in objectively defining terrorism. For the purposes of the remainder of this course, we will use the FBI definition. Understanding the difficulty in defining terrorism is instructive as the phenomenon continues to evolve. Also, as technological advances morph the tactics, the elements seen as making up an act of terrorism will change. Therefore, the actions necessary to achieve homeland security will also evolve because the core mission of homeland security is to prevent and reduce our vulnerability to terrorism.

Categorizing Terrorism: Group Motivations

Terrorist organizations come together for several reasons. Essentially these groups can be organized into three broad categories of motivation: ethnonationalist/separatist terrorists, religious terrorists, and ideological terrorists. In the following subsections, we will examine the characteristics of each type of organization.

Ethnonationalist/Separatist Terrorism

In Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism, Audrey Cronin describes ethnonationalist/separatist terrorists as

the most conventional, usually having a clear political or territorial aim that is rational and potentially negotiable, if not always justifiable in any given case. They can be astoundingly violent, over lengthy periods. At the same time, it can be difficult to distinguish between goals based on ethnic identity and those rooted in the control of a piece of land (2003, p. 40).

The ethnonationalist/separatist terrorists arose in the postcolonial period following World War II. During this period, native peoples challenged colonial powers for control of their governments. Ethnonationalist/separatists are motivated by the desire to establish a region ruled by their ethnic or nationalist group. This remains a strong motivation today as evidenced by the conflicts in Europe (Spain), Russia (Chechnya), the Middle East (Palestine and Turkey), and Southeast Asia (Sri Lanka). In each of these conflicts, terrorist organizations operate with ethnonationalist/separatist goals. The Sri Lankan ethnonationalist terrorist group, the LTTE (Tamil Tigers), is particularly lethal, being one of the leading organizations in employing suicide bombings.

Religious Terrorism

In Inside Terrorism, Hoffman relates that

for the religious terrorist, violence is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative … its perpetrators are consequently unconstrained by the political, moral or practical constraints that may affect other terrorists … religious terrorists often seek the elimination of broadly defined categories of enemies … religious figures are often required to “bless” terrorist operations before they are executed (1998, p. 94).

Many of the world’s major religions have seen terrorist acts justified by their tenets. Examples include Catholicism (Irish Republican Army), Protestantism (Army of God), and Islam (Hamas, al-Qaeda). The nature of religious terrorism makes it extremely dangerous because its violence may be unconstrained, but also because such terrorists are seek not simply to change the current social/political system but to destroy and replace it (Cronin, 2003, p. 41).

Religious terrorism is not limited to those using the major religions for justification, but also includes cult religions that take violent actions. The 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system by the doomsday cult group Aum Shinrikyo is just one example.

Ideological Terrorism

All terrorism, whether nonreligious or ethnonationalist in nature, falls into the more general category of ideological terrorism. Ideological terrorism can be grouped into three subcategories of right wing, left wing, and single issue. Essentially these are groups organized around a particular unifying idea or ideas that are political, economic, or social in nature, or a combination thereof. They employ political violence to achieve their goals. Below, we attempt to determine the scope of the three subcategories.

· Right-wing terrorism—Right-wing terrorists often draw on fascist and Nazi ideas and include groups that promote racial supremacy, antigovernment militias, anarchists, and neo-Nazis. Some groups under this subgroup also draw inspiration from radical religious interpretations fueling anti-Semitism and hatred of homosexuals.

· Left-wing terrorism—Former FBI Director Louis Freeh described left-wing terrorist groups as those who “profess a revolutionary socialist doctrine and view themselves as protectors of the people against the ‘dehumanizing effects’ of capitalism and imperialism” (Threat of Terrorism, 2001). The moniker can also be attached to economic-based anarchists opposed to the World Bank and Western democracies. Examples of these groups are FARC (Columbia), Shining Path (Peru), and FALN (United States—Puerto Rico).

· Single-issue terrorism—In the Canadian Security Intelligence Service brief Single Issue Terrorism (1998), G. Davidson Smith described such terrorism as “extremist militancy on the part of groups or individuals protesting a perceived grievance or wrong usually attributed to governmental action or inaction. Generally, three principal issues are regarded to fall under that definition: animal rights, environmentalism, and abortion” (p. 3). Single-issue terrorists are generally not focused on complete overthrow of a political system, just change within it. For instance, animal-rights terrorists in the United States and Great Britain do not seek to destroy the governments, only to pass laws to protect animals from exploitation (e.g., by animal testing and by the fur industry, and the like).

These categories are subject to interpretation and are not mutually exclusive. An organization may fall into several categories, but its dominant overarching motivation will be evident and will often be consistent with one of the broad categories. These categories describe the motivations that bring groups together around common problems, but they do not explain why these groups choose violence over nonviolent options for political and social change.

Decision Point: Why Choose Terrorism?

Although recognizing that definitions of terrorism vary, we at least understand its elements, can categorize its elements and motivations, and have settled on the use of the FBI definition for the purposes of our study. Now the question becomes why do groups choose terrorism?

Terrorism is essentially a violent or forceful act aimed at furthering a political or social objective. The choice is made individually to join a group, and a group decision is made concerning the use of violence. Essentially, individuals and then individuals acting as part of a group decide whether to pursue social or political change violently or nonviolently. The decision point occurs when the individual either picks up a sign and marches to protest a government policy or plants an explosive device in an attempt to achieve the same objective. It would be reasonable to consider that terrorism may be the only option in countries run by repressive governments that do not tolerate the open expression of dissent. However, terrorism transcends political systems and is perpetrated against dictatorships and democracies alike.

Experts once thought that terrorists must have some psychological defect that causes them to pursue violent means to achieve political ends. However, 30 years of psychological research on known terrorists indicates that “terrorists operating in groups, especially groups that can organize attacks that are successful, are very unlikely to suffer from serious psychopathology” (McCauley, 2002, p. 37). If terrorists do not have psychological defects, the question still remains, why do individuals perpetrate these violent acts?

In Psychological Issues in Understanding Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism, Clark McCauley describes the power of the group dynamic: “This is the power of cause, a group cause that can give meaning to an individual’s life. Terrorist groups, like cult groups, cut the individual off from other contacts and are particularly attractive to individuals without close connections and the meaning that comes with group anchoring” (2002, p. 46). He further describes the path an individual takes to becoming a terrorist: “Whether as an individual joining an extreme group, or as a member of a group that becomes more extreme over time, the individual becomes more extreme in a series of steps so small as to be near invisible” (p. 48). He describes the results of the process as “terrorists kill for the same reasons that groups have killed other groups for centuries. They kill for cause and comrades, that is, with a combination of ideology and intense small-group dynamics” (p. 44).

In The Radical Group in Context: An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism, Post, Ruby, and Shaw describe a combination of four factors that constitute the risk factors for the migration of a group toward terrorism. These factors are:

· the historical, cultural, and contextual features that give rise to the group and form the backdrop against which the group operates

· the key actors affecting the group

· the group itself, including the characteristics, processes, and structures that define it

· the immediate situation confronting the group that can trigger a change in tactics to increasing levels of violence or terrorism (2002, p. 75)

In Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches, Martha Crenshaw describes two basic explanations—instrumental and organizational—for radical groups’ use of terrorism. In the instrumental approach, terrorism is viewed as “a means to a political end” (1988, p. 13). In the instrumental approach, the group “acts on the basis of calculation of the benefit or value to be gained from an action, the costs of the attempt and its failure, the consequences of inaction, or the probability of success” (1988, p. 14). This cost-benefit analysis results in the decision to attack or not attack. The targets of attacks by instrumental groups will also be directly related to the political cause or ideological belief. For example, a group seeking to gain political support for its cause from a population is unlikely to engage in mass-casualty attacks of civilians that will result in a loss of support. With this “instrumental” goal in mind, its targets will be government buildings, troops, and so forth.

The organizational approach Crenshaw describes is consistent with the psychological aspects of the group dynamic described by McCauley and by Post et al. The organizationally motivated group terrorist behavior “represents the outcome of the internal dynamics of the organization rather than strategic action” (Crenshaw, 1988, p. 19). In this approach, terrorism is a result of the group effort to maintain its organization, and for the leaders, their roles within the organization. Crenshaw describes “the popular image of the terrorist … as an individual motivated exclusively by … political commitment obscures a more complex reality” (p. 19). She believes the group, group identity, and group survival can become more important than the political belief that may have originally brought the organization together. Individuals join the group for incentives. This process and the need for leaders to provide incentives can also explain the degeneration of terrorist organizations into traditionally criminal organizations.

Crenshaw explains that if members become dissatisfied within the group they have two alternatives, exit or attempt to change the group internally. Exiting the group could include joining another organization or encouraging others to leave and form a new splinter organization. The other exit option is to leave terrorism altogether. To prevent this abandonment and to maintain cohesiveness and loyalty, Crenshaw reports that terrorist groups usually employ high initiation costs that make it difficult or impossible for group members to rejoin regular society (commission of crimes, and so on). The second option, changing the organization from within, can result in challenges for leadership of the group and lead to the decline of the group.

The organizational approach explains terrorism in terms of internal group objectives such as satisfying existing members and recruiting new ones, and so forth. As the organization is driven by internal politics its targeting and action may be erratic and inconsistent.

These studies indicate that terrorism arises out of a multifaceted dynamic that includes elements of the psychology of group interaction, political cause, and external influences. Understanding this dynamic is essential for efforts to counter the threat of terrorism. Terrorism is complex and therefore requires multiple levels of effort to counter it. Understanding the group, its motivations, leadership, internal politics, and targeting are all essential for government efforts to fight terrorism.

Countering the Threat

Regardless of the motivating factor, terrorism exists within a society because some element of the society openly or covertly supports the existence of terrorist organizations. The organizations cannot exist in isolation. They are not nations, but subnational groups that require a host for resources and support.

Figure 1.4 represents the dynamic between terrorists, the people of a given society, and the government. Essentially, the people are the “receivers” of propaganda and violent acts by terrorist organizations. The government provides social policies and enacts and enforces laws. The people, or some subset, provide recruits, funding, and logistical and political support to terrorist organizations, allowing them to continue to operate. It may be that outside actors, interested in destabilizing the government, help terrorist organizations by providing capital or other logistics support (training, weapons, and so forth). In the terrorism dynamic, the people assist government counterterrorism efforts by providing information and intelligence to help capture terrorists.

Figure 1.4 The Terrorism Dynamic

Each of the two competing forces, the government and the terrorists, has advantages and disadvantages in the dynamic. Terrorists have the advantage of intelligence. Governments, particularly in democracies, are open and accessible. In many cases, they are themselves limited by the rule of law in the counterterrorism efforts they may carry out, particularly those that may invade individual privacy. The clandestine nature of terrorist organizations also gives them the ability to “hide in plain sight” among the population.

Governments have the advantage of resources. Powers to collect taxes, provide social programs, and so on give the government the resources to give incentives to the population to assist in counterterrorism efforts. In addition to understanding the motivating elements for terrorist organizations, one must understand this dynamic when planning ways to disrupt terrorism.

Governments essentially have three options in combating terrorism: undertake offensive actions for terrorism prevention; employ antiterrorism defensive measures to reduce vulnerability; or negotiate or give concessions to terrorist demands to stop attacks. Counterterrorism strategy aims at the deterrence of terrorist activity.

Deterrence can include both offensive and defensive measures against terrorism. Some governments pursue a strategy consisting of offensive and defensive measures only because some nations, including the United States, are unwilling to negotiate with terrorists. If a target is hardened with defensive measures (armed security, security cameras, fences, and so forth), the terrorist may not attack that location because of the potential consequences. The full spectrum of efforts to disrupt terrorism includes both civilian and military operations. In the United States, these efforts encompass the missions of homeland security and homeland defense introduced earlier in this module.

Offensive actions to disrupt terrorism include criminal investigation and prosecution, intelligence gathering, and potentially the use of military force. The nature of the terrorist enemy determines which strategy is used. If the enemy is located within the population of a given country and lacks identifiable foreign assistance, military action cannot be used. The United States has used military action in response to terrorist attacks as a form of deterrence. It has also tried to affect the cost-benefit analysis of groups considering terrorist action by increasing the costs of attacks against the United States.

In 1986, the United States conducted air raids against Libya in response to the bombing of a Berlin, Germany, nightclub that targeted US personnel. The United States also used cruise-missile attacks against Sudan and Afghanistan in response to the embassy bombings in 1998, and in response to the attacks of September 11 the United States invaded Afghanistan with ground troops.

In each of these cases, there was a nation-state to find culpable or complicit in the attacks. Military action was taken to inflict a high cost and deter further support of terrorist activities by that particular nation and as an example for other nations considering the provision of material support to terror.

It is extremely difficult to fight terrorism in a society, particularly in a democratic society, because of the high regard placed on individual rights. In such societies, the use of the military for domestic counterterrorism options is impossible. A democratic government facing a problem with terrorism from within its borders has limited options. These options are to increase use of its coercive powers, i.e., laws and enforcement (figure 1.4), and potentially to create more effective antiterrorist laws.

More stringent laws or harsh enforcement actions to root out terrorism, when targeted at the people of a democratic nation, can also result in less information and intelligence being shared with the government. It may also foster sympathy for the terrorists within the population. The need to balance these concerns makes counterterrorism policy decisions and implementation difficult. Democratic governments can also offer social programs that garner citizens’ support in counterterrorism efforts.

Another option is the employment of defensive, antiterrorism strategies that deny terrorists the opportunity to strike. These strategies consist of assessing risk and vulnerabilities then hardening likely terrorist targets. Target hardening may involve building modifications, such as installing security cameras, or increasing security patrols at critical facilities. These actions deter terrorist attacks by decreasing the likelihood that an attack will succeed and by influencing the decision of terrorists to strike a particular target. The effectiveness of target hardening is evidenced in a quote by PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) founder George Habash: “The main point is to select targets where 100 percent success is assured” (as cited in Hoffman, 1998, p. 178).

Offensive and defensive measures are often aimed at interdicting terrorism at several points in the terrorist planning cycle (figure 1.5). A comprehensive strategy seeks to attack terrorism at every phase and step of the cycle. As described in the policy response to September 11 above, immediately following the attacks, counterterrorism efforts were focused at each phase of the planning cycle and included offensive and defensive measures. Counterterrorism actions in the development stage were focused on support elements, including funding and support for terrorist operations (Afghanistan). The intelligence community focused its efforts on the organizational phase, collecting information of the identity, nature, and links of the al-Qaeda organizations. To counter the attack phase, antiterrorism measures were employed, including placing National Guard troops in airports and placing other forces at other critical facilities. The terrorist planning cycle is a critical element in the study of homeland security.

Figure 1.5 The Terrorist Planning Cycle

Source: Adapted from the US Army, Military Guide to Terrorism in the 21st Century (TRADOC DCSINT Handbook #1), and Congressional Research Service, Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness

The final option beyond offensive and defensive operations is negotiation with the terrorists. Although many nations, including the United States, are absolutely unwilling to negotiate with terrorists, some nations have capitulated to demands. In How Terrorism Ends, Crenshaw writes:

Governments can elect to enter into negotiations with terrorist groups and make concessions in exchange for the groups’ renunciation of violence. While governments are often reluctant to do so at the beginning of terror campaigns, negotiations may be the only way to resolve some long-standing disputes (1999, p. 3).

The ability to negotiate is also determined by the aims, motivation, and relative strength of the terrorist organization. Religiously motivated terrorist groups will likely not compromise because they believe they have divine authority to destroy the enemy. Success in negotiations will likely depend on the distance between the opposing sides, and the willingness of participants to compromise on overall objectives. Nations that have negotiated with terrorist organizations include the following:

· Spain, with ETA (translated as “Basque Homeland and Freedom”)

· Great Britain, with the IRA (Irish Republican Army)

· Israel, with the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) through the Oslo Accords (Neumann, 2007)

· Sri Lanka, with the LTTE (Tamil Tigers)

Return to top of page

 

3. The Terrorist Threat to the United States

In this section, we describe the threat of terrorism that forms the basis for all US homeland security antiterrorist policy. We examine the domestic and international terrorist organizations that threaten the United States, the categories of threat, and the specific groups that target the US homeland.

The Domestic Terrorism Threat

Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States (or its territories) without foreign direction, committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

—The Threat of Eco-Terrorism, 2002

The most recognizable act of domestic terrorism in recent history was the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing by former US soldier Timothy McVeigh. Prompted by radical views of racial supremacy and an intense hatred of the federal government, McVeigh detonated a rental truck packed with 4,800 pounds of ammonium nitrate mixed with fuel oil outside the Murrah Federal Building on April 19, 1995, killing 168 people.

The other notable face of domestic terrorism belongs to Eric Robert Rudolph, who perpetrated a series of bombings in the South, including the bombing of Centennial Olympic Park during the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games (1 killed, 111 injured), the 1997 Atlanta abortion clinic bombing (6 injured), and the bombing of a gay and lesbian nightclub in Atlanta (5 injured). In 1998, Rudolph targeted an abortion clinic (1 killed, 1 injured) in Birmingham, Alabama. Rudolph’s rhetoric included antigovernment writings, which included anti-Semitic and religious references against abortion and homosexuality. A nationwide manhunt ensued for Rudolph. He spent nearly five years on the run before being captured in Murphy, North Carolina, in 2003. Rudolph pleaded guilty to all the bombing incidents.

These individuals represent just two of the several categories of the terrorist threat currently menacing the United States from within. Recent events have increased the lack of distinction between domestic (home-grown) or internationally driven. The 2013 Boston bombings is one example of this blurring of lines. Given the emergence of radical Muslim Americans, as evidenced by this bombing and the 2009 Fort Hood Shootings, it would appear that the FBI would have ranked them as a high domestic threat. In its 2013 National Threat Assessment for Domestic Extremism, the FBI has not identified radical Islam as a threat.

This brings us back to our discussion in the previous section – how does one define terrorism, domestic or international. The FBI narrowly defines domestic terrorism as being related to eight subgroups. Its premise is that these terrorist do not fit into one of these subgroups, and even though they were incidents done by American citizens, the ideology, beliefs and motivations were internationally based. Whether this will change if these types of incidents continue to increase, is yet to be seen. This article, FBI National Domestic Threat Assessment Omits Islamist Terrorism , provides more detailed and current information on the report and the trends in domestic terrorism.

The FBI (2002) divides the domestic terrorist threat into three broad categories: right-wing, left-wing, and special interest. We will explore these categories, highlighting their ideology and naming several of the groups as examples.

The threat is captured by using the term extremism to describe organizations with political theories “favoring immoderate uncompromising policies” (WordNet, n.d.). These groups are characterized as extremist because they engage in activities that are protected by constitutional rights of free speech and assembly. However, these groups may have previously or may in the future take advantage of these rights to foment politically motivated violence (terrorism).

The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security do not maintain an official list of domestic terrorist or extremist organizations. Actions by many groups have resulted in charges under various statutes related to terrorism, but the constitutionally protected rights to free speech and assembly prevent the establishment of such lists. In the United States, it is not a crime to espouse radical ideas, but to take violent action in support of those ideals is criminal. Legitimate First-Amendment organizations that promote extremist ideals are fertile ground for the development of clandestine cells willing to take criminal action to further the cause. In Single Issue Terrorism: A Neglected Phenomenon? Rachel Monaghan states, “Activists are not full-time terrorists and often engage in both legal and illegal activities” (2000, p. 260).

The difficulty for domestic counterterrorism is balancing the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution with the need to investigate terrorism. Terrorism investigations are predicated on criminal activity that is, has, or is about to occur, not on a person’s political or social beliefs.

The overall domestic terrorist threat is dynamic; the broad categories described in the following subsections serve to inform and do not reflect a complete current terrorism threat assessment. The specific groups named below, where possible, are linked to current information about them from sources such as the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism—Terrorist Organization Profiles at the University of Maryland, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Anti-Defamation League.

Left-Wing Domestic Extremism

Left-wing terrorists seek to overthrow the US government to establish a new government based on socialist or communist ideals. Also grouped under left-wing extremism are separatist groups such as the Black Panther Party. Left-wing groups reached their peak during the 1960s and have generally been on the decline since the fall of communism. One of the most active domestic groups in this category has been the Armed Forces for Puerto Rican National Liberation (FALN—Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquena). The group has perpetrated bombings on the US mainland and in Puerto Rico in efforts to create an independent socialist nation free of the United States. One of the key leaders of the independence movement, Filiberto Ojeda Rios, was killed in a shootout with the FBI in Puerto Rico in September 2005.

Right-Wing Domestic Extremism

Right-wing terrorist groups are generally focused on ideas of racial supremacy and embrace antigovernment, antiregulatory beliefs. Generally these groups exercise constitutionally protected rights to free speech and assembly. They cross the line from constitutionally protected activities into criminal acts when they move from speech to action.

Active racial supremacy groups include the Ku Klux Klan, the Creativity Movement (formerly the World Church of the Creator), Aryan Nations, National Alliance, the neo-Nazi National Socialist Movement, Covenant Sword and Arm of the Lord (CSA), and the Hammerskin Nation. There are a multitude of other local or regional groups that may fall under the umbrella of or be an affiliate of one of the larger organizations. In a December 2006 article, the Southern Poverty Law Center reported that “racist skinhead gangs have tripled since 2002” (Holthouse, 2006).

The antigovernment and antiregulatory activities of right-wing extremists are mostly based in the militia movement, sovereign citizen groups, and tax protest groups. A militia is not specifically defined; however, the 1999 FBI report on domestic threats titled Project Megiddo presents the following criteria as guidelines: “(1) a militia is a domestic organization with two or more members; (2) the organization must possess and use firearms; and (3) the organization must conduct or encourage paramilitary training.” Other terms used to describe militias are Patriots and Minutemen (FBI, 1999).

Through the 1980s and early 1990s, militias grew to include groups in just about every state. The focus by law enforcement on militia groups following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 greatly reduced their numbers. Belonging to a militia group is not itself illegal. It is the potential for violence that draws law-enforcement interest.

Many of these groups have multiple facets to their ideological beliefs. Their beliefs often include elements of racial superiority in addition to opposition to the federal government. These mixed ideologies may also include conspiracy theories such as a belief in a New World Order in which the US government is thought to be collaborating to allow an invasion of the United States by troops under the auspices of the United Nations. These groups often will not recognize government authority over themselves or their property. One of the most recognizable of these groups is the Montana Freemen. This group engaged the FBI and local authorities in an 81-day standoff in 1996 before surrendering. Many militia groups, sovereign citizens, and tax protest groups are still active, including Sheriff’s Posse Comitatus, Arizona Patriots, and the Republic of Texas.

Special-Interest Domestic Extremism

In his 2002 congressional testimony, FBI Domestic Terrorism Section Chief James Jarboe said that special-interest terrorism “differs from traditional right-wing and left-wing terrorism in that extremist special interest groups seek to resolve specific issues, rather than effect more widespread political change. Special-interest extremists continue to conduct acts of politically motivated violence to force segments of society, including the general public, to change attitudes about issues considered important to their causes” (The Threat of Eco-Terrorism, 2002). Active special-interest terrorist organizations include ecoterrorists and those focused on the abortion issue.

Ecoterrorism

Ecoterrorism is led by three main groups and several splinter organizations. The three main organizations are the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), Earth Liberation Front (ELF), and Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC). ALF and ELF are closely aligned and pursue only slightly different objectives. In his May 18, 2005, testimony before the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works, John Lewis, deputy assistant director of the FBI Counterterrorism Division, described ALF and other special-interest extremist groups as “one of today’s most serious domestic terrorism threats”; Lewis also reported that from “January 1990 to June 2004, animal and environmental rights extremists have claimed credit for more than 1,200 criminal incidents.”

The ALF, as its name suggests, focuses on preventing the exploitation of animals. Its targets include laboratories and businesses that use animals for testing, university research laboratories, fast-food establishments, fur farms and retailers, and the scientists who conduct tests on animals. The tactics include arson, setting research animals free, cyber denial-of-service attacks, and harassment.

The group has refrained from deliberately targeting humans, but splinter-group rhetoric has indicated that humans may become targets. One of these splinter groups, the Revolutionary Cells Animal Liberation Brigade took credit for bombings at two California corporations in 2003. The construction of the devices used indicated they were intended to take human life, but their use did not result in any casualties. The group SHAC is also concerned with animal welfare, but it focuses on one large corporation involved in animal research and testing, Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS). SHAC has used harassment, intimidation, and cyber tactics against HLS.

The ELF is focused on deterring threats to the environment. Its targets have included new construction (e.g., housing developments), sport-utility vehicle dealerships, and logging operations. ELF also opposes violence against human targets and employs “monkey-wrenching,” i.e., sabotage, to disrupt operations and cause financial loss to organizations involved in activities they deem destructive to the environment. ELF also uses arson to inflict financial loss.

Antiabortion Terrorism

The final category of active special-interest terrorism is antiabortion groups. The most recognizable organization in this category is the Army of God. This group combines antiabortion and antigay and antilesbian ideologies. Its most notable member was Eric Robert Rudolph, whose terrorist activities were discussed earlier in the module. Tactics of antiabortion extremists include intimidation, arson, bombing, and assassination. In several instances, doctors have been specifically targeted and killed for performing abortions.

The International Terrorism Threat

International terrorism against the United States is foreign based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the United States. The activities of these countries or groups transcend national boundaries.

—FBI, Terrorism in the United States, 1996

The FBI divides the current international terrorist threat to the United States into three broad categories: state sponsors of international terrorism, formalized terrorist organizations, and loosely affiliated international radical extremists. The terrorist threat is dynamic, and discussion of the categories in this section serves as an overview. It does not constitute a complete current terrorism threat assessment. As in our domestic terrorism section, named groups are linked to current information about them at sources such as the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism—Terrorist Organization Profiles at the University of Maryland and the Anti-Defamation League.

Whereas domestic terrorism is primarily a law-enforcement issue led by the FBI, international terrorism draws other government agencies, including the US State Department, the US Department of Defense, and the intelligence community. Combating international terrorism can take multiple routes and include combinations of diplomatic action, military action, and clandestine activity by the intelligence community.

State-Sponsored International Terrorism

State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations.

—US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006

Under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (War and National Defense, 50 USC Appx. § 2405); section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (Foreign Relations and Intercourse, 22 USC § 2780); and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act (Foreign Relations and Intercourse, 22 USC § 2371), the US secretary of state may designate countries as state sponsors of terror (SSTs). These countries have been found to repeatedly provide support for acts of international terrorism. Under these laws, such countries are subject to the following four sanctions: “restrictions on US foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual-use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions” (US State Department, State Sponsors of Terrorism, 2006).

The legislation also authorizes actions to impose similar restrictions on those who trade with nations designated as an SST. The secretary of state currently designates five nations as SSTs. A description of each country, the reason for the designation, and current activities are contained on the US Department of State website for State Sponsors of Terrorism.

Terrorist Organizations

These autonomous organizations have their own infrastructures, personnel, financial arrangements, and training facilities. They are able to plan and mount terrorist campaigns overseas and support terrorist operations inside the United States.

—John F. Lewis, Jr.

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (1952) (INA) and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the secretary of state may designate organizations as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) under the following criteria:

· It must be a foreign organization.

· The organization must engage in terrorist activity, or terrorism, as defined in US law or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.

· The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of US nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States (US State Department, 2010).

The State Department currently has 54 organizations officially designated as FTOs. Once the designation is made, the following elements are also placed in effect:

· It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide material support or resources to a designated FTO. [The term material support or resources is defined in Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 USC § 2339A(b)(1), as “any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.”]

· Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the United States.

· Any US financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the US Department of the Treasury (US State Department, 2010).

These measures help ensure that material “support” from the United States, its citizens, or economic structures is not provided to terrorist organizations. Many of these groups do not pose a significant threat to the US homeland, but the designation includes the threat to US interests abroad, including economic or military targets. Because of the global reach of US economic and military activity, even local or regional groups within a foreign nation may be designated.

We know that al-Qaeda has been the greatest threat to the United States homeland for a long time, but is it still the greatest threat today? With the killing in 2011 of al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama Bin Laden, the power of AQ was diminished. Its splinter groups, those sharing its same radical Islam beliefs, became stronger. One of the most powerful cells is the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (aka, ISIL, Islamic State, and ISIS). Like al-Qaeda, ISIL wants to form an Islamic state over national borders (hence the word ‘state’). There are various opinions on whether this group is or is not a threat to the homeland. U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson feels it is a threat to America that must be addressed though there is no specific, credible threat at this time. He presents his thoughts in Homeland Security Secretary Johnson on ISIS, Ebola, and Preventing Homegrown Terrorism.

Detailed information about each of these 54 organizations is available in Country Reports on Terrorism , published annually by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism within the US Department of State. Another source of specific information on FTOs is the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism—Terrorism Knowledge Base.

Loosely Affiliated International Radical Extremists

These extremists are neither surrogates of, nor strongly influenced by, any one nation. They have the ability to tap into a variety of official and private resource bases in order to facilitate terrorist acts against US interests.

—FBI, Terrorism in the United States, 1996

The historical example of a loosely affiliated radical extremist is Ramzi Yousef. Yousef constructed and delivered the explosive device used in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. Such individuals are not officially members of designated organizations but may get support from them. They perpetrate attacks that advance the goals of groups supporting their operations.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

weapons of mass destruction: weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be [high-yield] explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon.

—US DoD, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

The abbreviation CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high-yield explosive) is often used to describe the materials that may constitute a weapon of mass destruction. One of the major concerns is countries that have advanced capabilities in biological or nuclear weapons development supplying terrorists with WMD material. The State Department says, “Most worrisome is that some of these countries also have the capability to manufacture WMD and other destabilizing technologies that can get into the hands of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups” (US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006).

Domestic Terrorism and WMD

The concern about WMD is not only focused on international terrorists but domestic terrorists as well. Elements of domestic extremist organizations have also been involved with the possession and development of weapons of mass destruction. The most notable domestic extremist who experimented with WMD materials is Larry Wayne Harris. A member of a Christian identity (Creativity Movement) group and the Aryan Nations, in 1995 Harris was found with bubonic plague samples that he had acquired from a company in Maryland. At the time, it was not illegal to possess these materials, as it is now, so Harris was convicted on only one count of fraud.

Harris gained significant notoriety again in 1998 when he was accused of possessing a WMD agent when he claimed to possess weapons-grade anthrax. The material turned out to be harmless anthrax vaccine, and the charges were dropped. There have also been several incidents involving extremists in possession of the toxin ricin, which is derived from castor beans. In 1985, a raid on the compound of the right-wing extremist group Covenant Sword and the Arm revealed a large supply of cyanide that an FBI investigation revealed was intended to poison the water supplies of several cities.

The September 2001 anthrax letter attacks also provide a reminder of the potential impact of biological agents. In the days following the September 11 attacks, letters containing a high-grade form of powdered anthrax were mailed to several media outlets and two US senators. Five people, including two postal workers, died from inhalation anthrax as a result of exposure to the letters. The deaths represented the first casualties from a biological agent in the United States. It was not the nation’s first biological attack. In 1984, a cult group, the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh sect in The Dalles, Oregon, sprayed salmonella on the salad bars in several restaurants, hoping to influence local elections in the sect’s favor. The attack sickened more than 700 people but did not result in any deaths. In another more recent example, letters contaminated with Ricin (a biological toxin) were sent to several elected leaders, including the president of the United States. These incidents show the availability of and willingness to employ these agents.

International Terrorism and WMD

Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons [WMD], then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.

—Osama Bin Laden, as quoted in “Wrath of God,” Time, 1999

A major concern for US counterterrorism policy is international terrorists’ access to WMD and their willingness to employ them. Since 1992, there have been several documented instances of al-Qaeda or its associates’ contacts with scientists and those capable of developing nuclear weapons materials. It is also reported that Osama Bin Laden received approval from religious authorities to employ nuclear weapons in the name of Islam (Hoffman, 2007). There is also evidence that al-Qaeda explored the possibilities of obtaining and using chemical and biological weapons. The potential production of chemical weapons was the impetus for the 1998 cruise-missile attack by the United States against a factory purportedly being used by al-Qaeda in Sudan. Preventing the proliferation of CBRNE takes a concerted international effort. Based on their rhetoric and evidence presented, there is certainly a desire and willingness on the part of international terrorists to develop and use WMD materials.

Return to top of page

 

4. Summary

This module serves as the foundation for the remainder of our study of the discipline of homeland security. Throughout this module, we established the historical context of homeland security by examining asymmetric threats the United States faces and has faced, and the nation’s policy responses to them throughout history. To clarify where we are in light of our past, this module explored the current threat environment, including the nature of the current asymmetric threat of terrorism. We examined various definitions of terrorism and its broad categories and motivations to develop a foundation of knowledge that will inform our study of the core policies and programs that constitute homeland security.

 

 

References

Aliens and Nationality, “Designation of foreign terrorist organizations,” 8 USC § 1189 (1996).

Bomb for Hardwick. (1919, April 30). The Washington Post.

Congressional Research Service. (2005). Al-qaeda: statements and evolving ideology (RL32759). Washington, DC: Blanchard, C.

Congressional Research Service. (2005). Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness (RL33160). Washington, DC: Pearl, R.

Crenshaw, M. (1999, May 25). Special report: How terrorism ends. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace. Available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr990525.pdf.

———. (1988). Theories of terrorism: Instrumental and organizational approaches. In David C. Rapoport (Ed.), Inside terrorist organizations (pp. 13–31). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Crimes and Criminal Procedure, “Advocating overthrow of government,” 18 USC § 2385 (1994).

Crimes and Criminal Procedure, “Gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information” and “Gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign government,” 18 USC §§ 793, 794 (1996).

Crimes and Criminal Procedure, “Providing material support to terrorists,” 18 USC § 2339A(b)(1) (2006).

Cronin, A. K. (2003). Behind the curve: Globalization and international terrorism. International Security, 27(3), 30–58.

Espionage Act of 1917, 65 Cong. Ch. 30, tit. 1, 3; 40 Stat. 217, 219 (Comp. St. 1918, 10212c).

Ex parte Milligan 71 US 2 (1866).

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (1999). Project Megiddo. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Available: http://www.constitution.org/y2k/megiddo.pdf.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2002). Terrorism 2000/2001 (FBI Publication 0308). Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Available: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terror/terrorism-2000-2001.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (1996). Terrorism in the United States. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Available: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terror_96.pdf.

Flynn to direct search for Reds. (1919, June 4). The New York Times, p. 2.

Foreign Relations and Intercourse, “Annual country reports on terrorism,” 22 USC § 2656f(d)(2) (2004).

Foreign Relations and Intercourse, “Prohibition on assistance to governments supporting international terrorism,” 22 USC § 2371 (1961).

Foreign Relations and Intercourse, “Transactions with countries supporting acts of international terrorism,” 22 USC § 2780 (1968).

Gertz, B. (2014, August 29). FBI national domestic threat assessment omits Islamist terrorism. Available: http://freebeacon.com/national-security/fbi-national-domestic-threat-assessment-omits-islamist-terrorism/

Gifis, S. H. (1998). “Executive order.” In Dictionary of legal terms: A simplified guide to the language of law (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Barron’s.

Gryboski, M. (2014, September 15). Homeland Security: ISIS not a threat to the US. Available: http://www.christianpost.com/news/homeland-security-isis-not-a-threat-to-the-us-126415/

Hoffman, B. (2007). CBRN terrorism post–9/11. In B. G. Russell & J. F. Forrest (Eds.), Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Holthouse, D. (2006, Fall). Motley crews: With decline of hammerskins, independent skinhead groups grow (Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Report, Issue No. 123). Available: http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=688.

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 US 184, 197 (1964).

Jenkins, B. M. (1980). The study of terrorism: Definitional problems. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Johnson, J. (2014, September 10). Homeland security secretary Johnson on ISIS, ebola, and preventing homegrown terrorism. Available: http://www.cfr.org/homeland-security/homeland-security-secretary-johnson-isis-ebola-preventing-homegrown-terrorism/p33405

Judicial Administration, “General functions,” 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (2004).

Labaree, L. W. (Ed.). (1963). The papers of Benjamin Franklin. Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor, November 11, 1755. (Vol. 6: April 1, 1755 through September 24, 1756), p. 242.

Laqueur, W. (1977). Terrorism. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Lewis, J. F., Jr. (1999, March). Fighting terrorism in the 21st century. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 68(3), 3–10. Available: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/1999-pdfs/mar99leb.pdf.

McCauley, C. (2002). Psychological issues in understanding terrorism and the response to terrorism. In Christopher E. Stout (Ed.), The Psychology of Terrorism. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Monaghan, R. (2000). Single-issue terrorism: A neglected phenomenon? Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 23(4), 255–265.

NASA Ames Research Center, Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team. (1995). Oklahoma City bombing 1995: What it looked like before we arrived on scene. San Mateo, CA: NASA DART. Available: http://dart2.arc.nasa.gov/Deployments/OklahomaCityBombing1995/Oklahoma-12a_JPG.html.

The National Archives, Pictures of World War II. Persons of Japanese ancestry arrive at the Santa Anita Assembly Center from San Pedro (photograph taken by Clem Albers, Arcadia, CA, April 5, 1942 [210-G-3B-414]). Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration. Available: http://www.archives.gov/research/military/ww2/photos/images/ww2-29.jpg.

Neumann, P. R. (2007, January/February). Negotiating with terrorists. Foreign Affairs, 86(1), 128–138.

Palmer and family safe. (1919, June 3). The New York Times, p. 1.

Planas, R. (2014, September 11). DHS doesn’t think ISIS is plotting attack through U.S.-Mexico Border. Available: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/11/isis-border_n_5806468.html

Post, J. M., Ruby, K. G., & Shaw, E. D. (2002). The radical group in context: An integrated framework for the analysis of group risk for terrorism. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25, 73–100.

Public Law 89-236, “An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes.” (1965).

Sanchez, R. (2015, January 23). ISIS, ISIL or the Islamic state? Available: http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/09/world/meast/isis-isil-islamic-state/index.html

Schmid, A. P. (1984). Political terrorism: A research guide. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

Skelton, I. (2001, September-October). America’s frontier wars: Lessons for asymmetric conflicts. Military Review, 81(5), 22–27.

Smith, G. D. (1998, Winter). Single issue terrorism (CSIS Commentary No. 74). Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Available: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/com74e.htm.

Statement before the United States Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 109th Congress, 1st Session (2005). (Testimony of John Lewis, deputy assistant director, Counterterrorism Division, FBI.)

The threat of eco-terrorism: Hearing before the House Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, 107th Congress, 2nd Session (2002). (Testimony of James F. Jarboe, section chief, Domestic Terrorism, Counterterrorism Division, FBI).

The threat of terrorism to the United States: Hearing before the United States Senate, Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Select Committee on Intelligence, 107th Congress, 1st Session (2001). (Testimony of Louis J. Freeh, director, FBI.)

US Army. (2005). A military guide to terrorism in the 21st century (DCSINT Handbook No. 1). Washington, DC, p. B-1.

US Coast Guard. (2001). World Trade Center, 9-11-01: “Smoke rises from where the World Trade Centers once stood” (photograph taken by USCG PA2 Tom Sperduto, New York, NY, September 11, 2001). Washington, DC: US Coast Guard/US Department of Homeland Security. Available: http://cgvi.uscg.mil/media/main.php?g2_itemId=99810.

US Department of Defense. (2010, November 8). Department of Defense dictionary of military and associated terms (as amended through 15 April 2013) (Joint Publication 1-02). Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. Available: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

US Department of the Interior. (2001, January). Report to the president: Japanese-American internment site preservation. Washington, DC: US Department of the Interior. Available: http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/internment/.

US Department of Justice. (2001, November). A report to the congress of the United States: A review of the restrictions on persons of Italian ancestry during World War II. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice. Available: http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/Italian.pdf.

US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. (2003, June). The September 11 detainees: A review of the treatment of aliens held on immigration charges in connection with the investigation of the September 11 attacks. Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, US Department of Justice. Available: http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0306/.

US Office of Homeland Security. (2002). The national strategy for Homeland Security. Washington, DC. Available: http://www.ncs.gov/library/policy_docs/nat_strat_hls.pdf. See also: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=479633.

US State Department. (2006). Country reports on terrorism. Washington, DC: US Department of State. Available: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2005/. See also: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/index.htm.

US State Department (2010). Foreign terrorist organization designation: Fact sheet. Washington, DC: Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State. Available: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm.

War and National Defense, “Communist Control Act of 1954,” 50 USC §§ 781 et seq. (1954).

War and National Defense, “Findings and declarations of fact,” and “Proscription of Communist Party, its successors, and subsidiary organizations,” 50 USC §§ 841-842 (1954).

War and National Defense, “Restraint, regulation, and removal,” 50 USC § 21 (1918).

War and National Defense, “Foreign policy controls,” 50 USC Appx. § 2450 (1979).

WordNet. (n.d.). Extremism. Available: http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn.

Wrath of God: Osama bin Laden lashes out against the West. (1999, January 11). Time, 153(1). Available: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2054517,00.html.

 

MORE COURSE MATERIAL

 

· Watch Not on My Watch: Memorials

· Watch Timeline of the Events on September 11, 2001

· Nine Facts about Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11

· Review the links relating to the Department of Homeland Security’s Components

· American Deaths in Terrorist Attacks https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_AmericanTerrorismDeaths_FactSheet_Oct2015.pd

· When it comes to defining ‘terrorism’ there is no consensus http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/defining-terrorism-consensus/

· Defining Terrorism – Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?  This replaces an earlier version that is embedded in the course https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1123/Defining-Terrorism-Is-One-Mans-Terrorist-Another-Mans-Freedom-Fighter

· Homeland Security Chief Discusses Changing Nature of Terrorism https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/622878/homeland-security-chief-discusses-changing-nature-of-terrorism/

· Access the Global Terrorism Database at https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ and practice with a data search

· View the PBS series  Frontline – The Man Who Knew .

· Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the United States  http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_ProfilesofPerpetratorsofTerrorismintheUS_ResearchHighlight_July2014.pdf

· Review Terror threat snapshot May 2017 at file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/nps84-050817-04.pdf and search for current monthly updates

· Homeland Security warns of homegrown terror threats http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2017/05/17/Homeland-Security-warns-of-homegrown-terror-threats/6581494992864/

· Violent sovereign-citizen plots grow in U.S. — and now go worldwide http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article51885525.html

· Is it terrorism or mass murder? That depends on our biases  https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/is-it-terorrism-or-mass-murder-that-depends-on-our-biases/2017/06/16/5ad57414-5211-11e7-91eb-9611861a988f_story.html?utm_term=.c7cfd040792c

· 5 domestic terrorism threats you haven’t thought of in a while, but are still here https://www.policeone.com/ambush/articles/285859006-5-domestic-terrorism-threats-you-havent-thought-of-in-a-while-but-are-still-here/

· Optional: A Dark and Constant Rage: 25 Years of Right-Wing Terrorism in the United States  https://www.adl.org/education/resources/reports/dark-constant-rage-25-years-of-right-wing-terrorism-in-united-states

· 15 years after 9/11, this is how the US has changed https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/09/15-years-after-9-11-how-has-the-us-changed/

· 15 years after 9/11, how has national security changed? https://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/articles/15-years-after-9-11-how-has-national-security-changed

· Maintaining America’s Ability to Collect Foreign Intelligence: The Section 702 Program http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/maintaining-americas-ability-collect-foreign-intelligence-the-section-702-program

· Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community pages 1-15 https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf

· 9/11 Commission Recommendations:  https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/opa/highlights-of-our-progress-implementing-9-11-commission-recommendations-progress-report-2011.pdf Implementing 9/11

· Passenger Aviation Security Layers: http://scitechconnect.elsevier.com/passenger-aviation-security-layers/

· TSA Aviation Security Challenges:  https://www.tsa.gov/news/testimony/2015/07/29/testimony-tsa-aviation-security-challenges

· FBI Terrorist Screening Center: https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/national-security-branch/tsc

· Executive Summary – A Failure of initiative:  Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina:  http://www.npr.org/documents/2006/feb/katrina/house_report/executive_summary.pdf

· Review Major Terrorism Cases Past and Present http://brat.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=229

· Critical Infrastructure Protection Act Passed by House Homeland Security Committee:  http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/critical-infrastructure-protection-act-passed-by-house-homeland-security-committee/4c86568bda0a4e5fb2489cc14cffa599.html