572 TRINA GRIL LO and STEPHANIE M. WlLDMAN

way that gender essentialism ignores or effaces the experiences of women per- ceived as different from the white norm}. For further discussion of the essential- ist critique, sec Kimber!~ Crenshaw, Dema rginalizing the In tersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Anti racist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGA L F. 1391 and Ha rris, supra note 51 see also R. Delgado & ). Stefancic, Wh y Do W e Tell th e Sam e Stories! 42 STAN. L. REv. 207 ( 1989} (describing the role of categorization, broad or narrow, in chan- neling thought}.

8. Harri s, supra note 5, at 601. 9. See, e.g .. S. Wildman, Integration in the 1980s: The Dream of Diversity

and the Cycle of Exclusion, 64 TULANE L. REV. 1625, 1629 (1990} (discussing the privileging of wh ite males in the legal profession}.

10. See F. KENDALL, DIVER SITY IN THE CLASSROOM: A MULTI CULTURA L AP- PROACH TO THE EDUCATION O F YOUNG CHILDREN 19-21 (1983} (describing the de- velopment of racial awareness and ra cial attitudes in young children). Although the prevalent view would state t hat chi ldren are “oblivious to differences in color or culture,” id. at 19, children’s racial awareness and their positive and negativ e feelings about race appear by age three or four. !d. at 20.

11. Scales-Trent, Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different and the Same, 2 YALE). L. & FEMINISM 305,305 (1990}.

12. Standing to talk about the harm of racism has received attention in le- gal acad emic ci rcl es recently. Randall Kennedy argues th at people of color should not receive particul ar legitimacy within the acade my simply because they are of color. R. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 ( 1989). Kennedy takes issue with the writings of several scholars of color whom he chara cteri zes as proponents of a “racial distinctiveness th esis,” which holds that the perspective of a scholar who has experienced racial oppression is differ- ent and valuable beca use of this awareness. /d. at 1746.

Replying to Kennedy, Leslie Espinoza argues that it is precisely Kennedy’s standing as a person of color that gives special voice and power to his message: ” Because Kenn edy is black, his article relieves those in power in legal academia of concern about the merits of ra ce-focused critiques of their stewardship, and it does so on the ‘objective’ basis of scholarly methodology.” L. Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV . 1878 (1990}. Es- pinoza discusses th e ” hidden barriers,” id. at 1879, to participation by people of color in the legal academy; these “ls)ubtle barriers create a cycle of excl usion.” !d. at 1881. The dominant discourse within the legal academy provides an identity to the privileged group as we ll as “a form of shared reality in which its own su- perior position is seen as natural.” R. Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea fo r Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 24 11, 24 12 ( 1989).

50 Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN with ADRIENNE D. DAVIS

THE American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language de fines privilege as “a special advantage, immunity, pe rmission, right, o r benefit granted to or en- joyed by an individual, class, or caste.” The word is derived from th e Latin privi- legium , a law affec ting an individual, privus meaning s ingle or individual and lex meanin g law. This definitio n touched a c hord for me, because the root of the word recogni zes the legal , sys temi c nature o f the term p riv ilege that h as become lost in its modem m eaning. And it is the systemic nature of these power systems that we must begin to examine .

Consider the use of terms like racism and sexism. Increasi n gly, people use -isms langua ge as a way to describe discriminatory treatm e nt. Yet this approach c reates sev eral serio us problems. Firs t, call ing someone racist individualizes th e be h avior, ignoring the larger system within which the person is situated. To la- bel an individual a racis t conc eals that racism can only occur where it is cul tur- a ll y, socially, and legall y s uppo rte d. It lays t h e b la me on the individua l rather t han the fo rces that have shaped that ind ividual and the society that the individ- ual inhabits. For white people this m eans that they know they do not want to be labeled racis t. They become concerned w ith how to avoid that label, rather than worrying about sys temic rac is m and how to change it.

Second, the -ism s language focuses on the larger category such as race, gen – der, sexual p re feren ce. -Isms language su gges ts that within these larger categories two seem ingly neutral halves exist, equal parts in a mirror. Thus blac k and white, male and fe male, h e te rosexual and gay/les bian appear as equivalent sub-parts . In fact , a lthough the category does not take note of it, bl acks and whites, men and women, h eterosexu als and gays/l esbians a re not equivalently situa ted in socie ty. Thus the way we t hi nk and ta lk abou t the categories and su b-categories that un- derl ie the -isms obscu res the pa t tern of do mination and subordination within each classification.

Similarly, the phrase -isms itself gives th e i llusion that all patterns of domi- nation and su bo rd ination are the sam e and interchangeable. The l:mguage sug- gests that so m eone su bordinat ed under one form o f oppression would be similarly situated to another person su bordinated under another system or form . Thus,

573

 

 

574 STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN with ADRIENNE D. DAVIS

someone subordinated under one form may feel no need to view himself/herself as a possible oppressor, or beneficiary of oppression, within a different form. For example, white women, having an -ism that defines their condition-sexism- may not look at the way they are privileged by racism. They have defined them- selves as one of the oppressed.

Finally, the focus on individual behavior, seemingly neutral sub-parts of cat- egories, and the apparent interchangeability underlying the vocabulary of -isms mask the existence of systems of power. It is difficult to see and talk about how oppression operates when the vocabulary itself makes those power syst ems in- visible. The vocabulary allows us to talk about discrimination and oppression, but hides the mechanism that makes that oppression possible and efficient. It also hides the existence of specific, identifiable beneficiaries of oppression (who are not always the actual perpetrators of discrimination). The use of -isms language masks the privileging that is created by these systems of power.

The very vocabulary that we use to talk about discrimination obscures these power systems and the privilege that is their natural companion. To remedy dis- crimination effectively we must make the power system s and privileges which they create visible and part of discourse. So this is our problem with talking about race, sex, and sexual orientation: each needs to be described as a power system that creates privileges in some, as well as disadvantages in others. Most civil rights writing and advocacy have focused on disadvantage or discrimination, ig- noring the element of privilege. To really talk about these issues, privilege must be made visible.

Law plays an important role in the perpetuation of privilege by ignoring that privilege exists. And by ignoring its existence, law, with help from our language, ensures the perpetuation of privilege.

What is privilege? We all recognize its most blatant forms. Men only admit- ted to this club. We won’t allow African-Americans into that school. Blatant ex- ercises of privilege certainly exist, but are not the heartbeat of what most people will say they believe belongs as part of our way of life. They are also only the tip of the iceberg in examining privilege.

When we look at privilege we see several things. First, the characteristics of the privileged group define the societal norm, often benefiting those in the privi- leged group. Second, privileged group members can rely on their privilege and avoid objecting to oppression. And third, privilege is rarely seen by the holder of the privilege.

Examining privilege reveals that the characteristics and attributes of those who are privileged group members are described as societal norms-as the way things are and as what is normal in society.1 This normalization of privilege means that members of society are measured against characteristics held by those privileged. The privileged characteristic comes to define the norm. Those who stand outside are the aberrant or “alternative.”

I had a powerful example of being outside the norm recently when I was called to jury service. Jurors are expected to serve until 5 P.M. During this year, my fam –

Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible 575

ily’s life has been set up so that I p ick up my children after school at 2:40 and see that they get to various activities. If courtroom life were designed to privilege my needs, then the re would be an afternoon recess to honor children. But in this cul- ture children’s lives, and the lives of their caretakers are the al ternative (or “other”) and we must conform to the n orm.

Members of the privileged group gain many benefits by their affiliation with the dominant side of the power system. This power affiliation is not identified as such. It may be transformed into and presented as individual merit. This is how legacy admissions at elit e colleges and professional schools are perceived to be merit-based. Achievements by members of the privileged group are viewed as meritorious and the result of individual effort, rather than as privileged. Another example is my privilege to pick up my children at 2:40.

Many feminist theorists have described the male tilt of normative standards in law, including the gendered nature of legal reasoning, the male bias inherent in the reasonable person standard, and the gender bias in classrooms. Looking more broadly at male privilege in society, definitions based on male models de- lineate many societal norms. As Catharine MacKinnon has observed:

Men’s physiology defines most sports, their health needs largely define insurance coverage, their socially designed biographies define workplace expectations and successful career patterns, their perspectives and concerns define quality in schol- arship, their experiences and obsessions define merit, their military service de- fin es citizenship, their presence defines family, their inability to get along with each other-their wars and rulerships-defines history, the.ir image defines god, and their genitals define sex.2

Male privilege thus defines many vital aspects of American culture from a male point of view. The maleness of that view becomes masked as tha t view is gener- alized as the societal norm, the measure for us all.

Another characteristic o f privilege is that members of privileged groups ex- perience the comfort of opting out of struggles against oppression if they choose. It may be the privilege of silence. At the same time that I was the outsider in jury service, I was also a privileged insider. During voir dire, each prospective juror was asked to introduce herself or himself. The plaintiff’s and defendant’s attor- neys then asked supplementary questions. I watched the defense attorney, during voir dire, ask each Asian-looking male prospective juror if he spoke English. N o one else was asked. The judge did nothing. The Asian-American man sitting next to me smiled and recoiled as he was asked the question. I wondered how many times ‘in his life he had been made to answer ques tions such as that one. I con- sidered beginning my own questioning by saying, “I’m Stephanie Wildman, I’m a professor of law, and yes, I speak English.” But I did not. I feared there would be repercussions if I did. But I exercised my white privilege by my silence. I exercised my privilege to opt out of engagement, even though ,.this choice may not always be made consciously by someone with privilege.

Depending on the number of privileges someone h as, she or he may experi-

 

 

576 STEPHANIE M. WlLDMAN with ADRIENNE D. DAVlS

ence the power of choosing the types of struggles in which to engage. Even this choice may be masked as an identification with oppression, thereby making the privilege that renders the choice invisible. For example, privi lege based on race and class power systems may temper or alleviate gender bias or subordination based on gender. In spite of the common characteristics of normativeness, ability to choose whether to object to the power system, and invisibility, which differ- ent privileges s hare, the form of privilege may vary based on the type of power re- lations hip which produces it. Within each power system, privilege manifests it- self and operates in a manner shaped by the power relationship from which it results. White privilege derives from the system of white supremacy. Male priv- ilege and heterosexual privilege result from the gender hierarchy.3

Exa mining white privilege, Peggy Mcintosh has found it “an elusive and fugi- tive subject. The pressure to avoid it is great, “4 s he observes, as a white person who benefits from the privileges. She defines white privilege as

an invisible package of unearned assets which [she[ can count on cashing in each day, but about which [shel was “meant” to remain oblivious. White privilege is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurance, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear, and blank checks.s

Mcintosh identified 46 conditions available tO her as a white person that her African-American co-workers, friends, and acquaintances could not count on. 6

Some of these include: being told that people of her color made American heritage or civilization what it is; not needing to educate h er children to be aware of sys- temic racism for their own daily protection; and never being asked to speak for all people of her racial group. 7

Privilege a lso exists based on sexual orientation. Society presumes hetero- sexuality, generally constituting gay and lesbian relations as invisible. a Professor Marc Fajer describes what he calls three societal pre-understandings about gay men and lesbians: the sex-as-lifestyle assumption, the cross-gender assu mption, and the idea that gay issues are inappropriate for public discussio n. According to Professor Fajer the sex-as-lifestyle assumption means that there is a “common non-gay belief that gay people experience sexual activity differently from non- gays” in a way that is “all-encompassing, obsessive and coll)pletely divorced from love, long-term relationsh ips, an d family structure.”9 As to the cross-gender as- sumption, Professor Fajer explains that many non-gay people believe that gay men and lesbians exhibit ” behavior stereotypically associated with the other gen- der.”10 The idea that gay issues are inappropriate for public discussion has re- ceived prominent press coverage recently as “Don’t ask; don’t tell” concerning the military. Thus, even if being gay is acceptable, ” talking about being gay is not,” according tO Professor Fajer.”

Professor Fajer does not discuss these pre-understandings in terms of privi- lege. Nevertheless he is describing aspects of the sexual o rientation power sys- tem which allow heterosexuals to function in a world where similar assumptions

Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible 577

are not made about their sexuality. Not only are these assumptions not made about heterosexuals, but also their sexuality may be discussed and even adver- tised in public.

In spite of the pervasiveness of privilege, anti-discrimination practice and the- ory has generally not examined it and its role in perpetuating discrimination. Anti-discrimination advoca tes focus only on one half of the power system dyad, the subordinated characteristic, rather than seeing the essential companionship between domination that accompanies subordi nation and privilege that accom- panies discrimination.

Professor Adrienne Davis has written:

Anti-discrimination activists are attacking the visible half of the dom ination/sub- ordination dyad, trying bravely to chop it up into li ttle pieces. These anti-dis- crimination activists fail to realize that the subordination will grow back from the ignored half of the dyad of privilege. Like a mythic double-headed hydra, which will inevitably grow a second head if both heads arc not slain, discrimina- tion cannot be ended by focusing only on subordination.l2

Yet the descriptive vocabulary and conceptu alization of discrimination hin- ders our ability to see the hydra-head of privilege. This invisibility is serious be- cause that which is not seen cannot be discussed or changed. Thus, to end sub- ordination, one must first recognize privi lege. Seeing privilege means articulating a new vocabulary and structure for anti-subordination theory. Only by visualiz- ing this privilege and incorporating it into discourse can people of good faith com- bat discrimination.

For me the s truggle to visualize privilege most often has taken the form of the struggle to see my own white privilege. Even as I write about this struggle, I fear that my racism will make things worse, causing me to do more harm than good. Some readers may be shocked to see a white person contritely acknowledge that she is racist. Understand I do not say this w ith pride. I simply believe that no mat- ter how hard I work at not being racis t, I s t ill am. Because part of racism is sys- temic, I benefit from the privilege that I am struggl ing to see.

Whi tes do not look at the world through a filt er of racial aware ness, even though whites are, of course, a race. The power to ignore r<tce, when whi te is the race, is a privilege, a societal advantage. Yet whites spend a lot of time trying to convince ourselves and each other that we are not racist. I think a big step would be for whites to admit that we are racist and then to consider what to do abou t it.13 I also work on not being sexist. This work is different from my work on my racism, because I am a woman and I experience gender subordination. But it is important to realize that even when we are not privileged by a particular power system, we are products of t he culture that instills its attitudes in us. I have to make sure that I am calling on women students and listening to them as carefully as I listen to men.

Wh ile we work at seeing privilege, it is also important to remember that each of us is much more complex tha n si mply our race and gender. Professor Kimberle

 

 

578 STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN with ADRIENNE D. DAVIS

Crenshaw and others introduced the idea of the intersection into feminist juris- prudence. Her work examines the intersection of race, as African-American, with gender, as female. Thus, Crenshaw’s intersectionality analysis focused on inter- sections of subordination.

1ntersectionality can help reveal privilege, especially when we remember that the intersection is multi-dimensional, including intersections of both subordina- tion and privilege. Imagine intersections in three dimensions, where multiple lines intersect. From the center one can see in many different directions. Every individual exists at the center of these multiple intersections, where many strands meet, similar to a Koosh ball.l4

The Koosh ball is a popular children’s toy. Although it is called a ball and that category leads one to imagine a firm, round surface used for catching and throw- ing, the Koosh is neither hard nor firm. Picture hundreds of rubber bands, tied in the center. Mentally cut the end of each band. The wriggling, unfirm mass in your hand is a Koosh ball, still usable for throwing and catching, but changing shape as it sails through the air or as the wind blows through its rubbery limbs when it is at rest. It is a dynamic ball.

The Koosh is the perfect post-modern ball. Its image “highlights that each person is embedded in a matrix of … [categories] that interact in different con- texts” taking different shapes.ISffi some contexts we are privileged and in some subordinated, and these contexts interact.

Societa.l efforts at categorization are dynamic in the same way as the Koosh is, changing, yet keeping a central mass. When society categorizes someone on the basis of race, as either white or of color, it picks up a strand of the Koosh, a piece of rubber band, and says, “See this strand, this is defining and central. It matters.” And it might be a highly important strand, but looking at one strand does not really help anyone to see the shape of the whole ball or the whole per- son. And race may be a whole cluster of strands including color, culture, identi· fication, and experience. Even naming the experience “race” veils its many facets.

Categorical thinking obscures our vision of the whole, in which multiple strands interrelate with each other, as well as our vision of its individual strands. No individual really fits into any one category; rather, everyone resides at the in- tersection of many categories. Yet categorical thinking makes it hard or impossi- ble to conceptualize the complexity of an individual. The cultural push has long been to choose a cat.egory.l6 Yet forcing a choice results in a hollow vision that cannot do justice. Justice requires seeing the whole person in her or his social con- text.

Complex, difficult situations that are in reality discrimination cannot be ad- equately described using ordinary language, because that language masks privi- lege. Language masks privilege by making the bases of subordination themselves appear linguistically neutral, so that the cultural hierarchy implicit in words such as race, gender, and sexual orientation is banished from the language. Once the hierarchy is made visible the problems remain no less complex, but it becomes possible to discuss them in a more revealing and useful fashion.

Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible 579

NOTES

Note: I acknowledge my intellectual debt to two colleagues, Adrienne Davis and Trina Grillo, both professors at my school. The three of us worked together fo r almost two years, writing several working papers examining privilege and sub· ordination. The ” wit h” des ignation for authors hip reflects Davis’s contribution in pa ragraphs concerning “-isms” language and categories wh ich we wrote to· gether for the working papers. [S.M.W.J

1. Richa rd Delgado &.Jean Stefancic, Pornography and Harm to Women: “‘No Empirical Evidence!”‘, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1992) (describing this “way things are.” Becaus e the norm or reality is perceived as including these be nefits, the privileges are not visible.)

2. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 224 (1989).

3. Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 187, 197 (1 988); MarcFajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together! Storytelling. Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51 1, 617 (1992). Both articles describe heterosex- ism as a form of gender oppression.

4. Peggy Mcintosh, Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack: White Privilege, CREATION SPIRITUALITY, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 33. Mamie Mahoney has also described aspects of white privilege. Martha Mahoney, Whit eness and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J. L. &. FEMINISM 217 (1993).

5. Mcintosh, supra note 4, at 33. 6. ld. at 34. 7. ld. 8. Adrie nne Rich , Comp ulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in

BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY, SELECTED PROSE 1979-1985 (1986) 9. Id. at 514.

10. Id. at SIS. 11. Id.

12. Adrienne D. Davis, Toward a Post-Essentialist Methodology; or, A Call to Co untercategorical Practices (unpublished, 1994).

13. See also Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Water Buffalos and Diversity: Naming Nam es and Reclaiming the Racial Discourse, 26 CONN. L. REV. 209 (1993) (urging people to na me racism as racism).

14. T he image of t he koosh ball to describe the individual at the center of many intersections evolved during a working session between Adrienne Davis, Trina Grillo, and me.

15. Joan C. Williams, Dissolving t.he Sameness/ Difference Debate: A Post- Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Femirtist and Critical Race Th eory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 307.

16. Thus in 1916 Harold Laski wrote: ” Whether we will or no, we are bun- dles of hyphens. Wh en the central linkages conflict, a choice must be made.” Ha rold Laski, The Personality of Associations, 2~ FiARv. L. Rr.v. 404, 425 (1916).

 

 

From the Editor: Issues-and Comments

I s M 1 NoR 1 T Y racial status only possible in a society that has formed the cat- egory of whiteness as a preferred condition? That is, are whiteness and blackness (or brownness, etc.) mutually dependent notions, such tha t without the one the other wou ld not exist? If so, should it be a first order of business for any society bent on achieving racial justice to come to grips with the meaning of its own dom- inant coloration, namely whiteness? Do you agree that in our own society white- ness is equated with innocence, as Thomas Ross says; is the basis for extrapola- tion and metaphor, as Grillo and Wildman say; and is the baseline for determining privilege, as Wildman and Davis s uggest? When it comes to decid ing who can in· termarry and w ho can natura lize, is even a drop of nonwhite blood tantamount to contamination, as Haney L6pez implies, based on his assessment of Supreme Court jurisprudence?

The reader intrigued by recent Critical attention to the idea of whiteness may well wonder what is next, in particular whether masculinity, another category fre ighted by power and privilege, will not come in for examination. In the past few years, novels (e.g., Al ice Walker, The Color Purple) and book-essays (e.g., Ish· mae! Reed, Airing Dirty Laundry) have calle d attention to issues of misogyny and divisions between men and women of color. Recently a few race-Crits have be- gun to address these issues as well. Derrick Bell’s And We Are Not Saved con- tains a pungent- and controversial- Chronicle concerning black professional women’s marriage chances. Through a fictional interlocutor, Bell raises the pos- sibility that black men who date or marry white women, get themselves arrested, or othenvise make themselves unmarriageable are responsible for the predica- ment of black women faced with a lonely future (Derrick Bell, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 193-214 (1987)).

Kevin Brown continues the interrogation of traditional n otions of black mas· culinity. In a recent article (THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF A RAPE VICTIM, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 997) he uses conversations with African American males in indi- anapolis to show how belief systems operating in the black community con- structed heavyweight boxing champion Mike T yson as a victim of white justice, even though he was accused and convicted of raping Desiree Washington. Brown, an African American, points out how loyalty to the black community demands that racism trump sexism as the first struggle to be won, due to the ingrai ned be- lief that justice is white and sexism mainly a white issue. Brown argues that this view victimizes African-American women, leaving them exposed, perhaps indef- initely, because the racial problem will never be solved. It also victimizes black men by reinforcing stereotypes of them as violent and oversexed.

jerome Culp, writing about the Rodney King case (NOTES FROM CALIFORNIA: RODNEY KING AND THE RACE QUESTION, 70 Denver U. L. Rev. 199 (1993)) argues that white insecurities play a large part in the predicament of black m en. White

580

Suggested Readings 581

police officers view uppity African -American men as sexual and 1· · 1 . • po 1t1ca com- petito rs and make sure that they re mai n in their place. Culp details th e “r 1 f eng ” b h · h A1 . u es o . age ment Y w 1e many ncan-American males are taught to survive dur- ~ ng e_nc~unt~rs ~vith_ the police and urges that not acknowledging the role of rac e m cnmmal JUStice Simply increases racial subordination.

Will <?ritical R~c~ Masc~linism be t~e next area of inquiry for civil rights ~cholarsh1p and acuv1sm? Wd l we see a ude of writing reexamining the dynam- ICS of sex from within the civil rights community? And if so, will this be a wel- come tendency or_ a needless distraction? Developments move quickly in Criti- cal thought: e~pec1ally during t imes of ferment like the present. Only a few years a~o, essenuahsm and am iessentialism, and intersectionality, were only begin- ~m~ to be Wntten about. Today, they are on the front burner. Critical white stud- Ies 1s an even ~or~ recent development; some books o n Crit ical Race Theory do ~ot even ment1on lt. Although making predictions is always hazardous it seems hkely that a r_eexamination of the role of gender i n communities of col~r and of the construction of femininity and masculinity in ge neral, is very much i~ order.

Suggested Readings

Be ll, Derrick, Wh ite Superiority in America: Its Legacy, Its Economic Costs, Part n th is volume. ‘

Flagg, Barbara, “Was Blind, But N ow I See”: Whit e Race Consciousness and the Requ · e- m em of Discriminators Intent . 91 MI CH. L. REV. 9 53 1! 993 ). II

Gordon, }ames W ., Did th e First Ju stice Harlan Ha ve a Black Brother!. Part If!, this vol – ume.

Harris, Cheryl, Whit eness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1707 (1993 ). Pelle r, Gary, Notes Toward a Postm odern N ationalism , 1992 u. ILL. L. REv. 1095. Russell, Margaret M., Race and the Dom inant Gaze: Narratives of Law and Inequality in

Popular Film. Part IJ, this volume . Scales-Trent, Judy, Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different, and the Sam e

2 YALE J.L. &. FEMINISM 305!1990). ‘ Thomas, Kendall, A House Divided Against itself: A Comment on “Mastery Slavery a d

. ~mancipation,” 10 CARDOZO L. RE V. 148 1 (1989). ‘ ‘ n Willia ms, Patricia, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Idea ls from Deconstructed Righ ts

2 2 HAR V. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (198 7). ‘