Introduction:
In this case study, ReignCom faces the market changes in MP3 Players with a new business strategy and supply chain. The Student will have the opportunity to consider the effects of these policy decisions on the supply chain and their eventual outcomes.
Tasks:
· Read the case: “ReignCom’s Global Outsourcing” in from Bowon Kim: Mastering Business in Asia – Supply Chain Management .
· Identify the situation that this business is facing.
· Consider and evaluate how this business should manage their supply chain in the future. As part of your analysis, answer these questions:
· Can the old strategy continue to work in the future?
· How should they cope with the challenges in China ?
· Construct a final decision (proposal) utilizing elements of supply chain management and business strategy. Comment on the strengths and weaknesses of your decision and the probability of success.
Deliverables and Format: Submit your answer in a Microsoft Word document in 800-1000 words. Font: Arial; 12 point Line Spacing: Double
CASE STUDY: ReignCom’s Global Outsourcing3
How a small Korean company has become a global leader in MP3P
On the first day of September 2003, Deok-Joon Yang, CEO of ReignCom, called a meeting with his management team. Founded in 1999, ReignCom (www.iriver.com) was a maker of MP3 players (see Figure 1.19). Although it had been a relatively small company in Korea, by 2003 it became one of the leading companies in the global MP3 Player (MP3P) industry, enjoying a market share of 52% in Korea and 25% worldwide (see Figure 1.20).
Figure 1.19 ReignCom’s flagship MP3P–iriver iFP series

Figure 1.20 Milestones of ReignCom

Mr Yang was concerned about the future of his company. He knew that the most imminent decision he had to face was about how to meet the challenges in China. But he was well aware that in order to come up with a successful strategy, he had to analyze the history of his company in grueling detail, from the very beginning up until now. He firmly believed that understanding how ReignCom had made it to the current state would lead him to find out how to accomplish his goals in the future. At least, he hoped that such an analysis would enable his management team to find an answer as to whether ReignCom should build its own plant to meet the increasing demand for MP3P in China or look for another outsourcing partner. Another option would be to expand the relationship with its current outsourcing partner, AV Chaseway in Shenzhen, China.
The early MP3P industry
The MP3P (MP3 Player) is an audio device designed to carry compressed digital music files in a flash memory or on hard disk. Since, in terms of mobility and convenience, it is superior to other music playing devices, such as CD (compact disc) and MD (mini disk) players, the MP3P market is growing rapidly, replacing existing audio players (see Table 1.1). In addition, it has more value-added; for example, making an MP3P on average takes about one-third of the time required to produce an MD player. Since making an MP3P has this kind of added economics and perhaps doesn’t require an extremely high level of technological capability at least for the generic market, there are many small and large companies producing the MP3Ps worldwide.
Downloaded from the Internet, an MP3 file is created on the PC and played by the MP3P. Therefore, the explosive growth of the number of Internet users also contributed to the growth of the MP3P market. This is especially true in Korea, where the penetration rate of broadband Internet services increased rapidly from around 2000, which pushed the MP3P market to grow significantly. However, since other industrialized countries lagged behind Korea in gaining access to broadband Internet, there was a significant growth potential in the global MP3P market (see Figure 1.21).
Table 1.1 Comparison of MP3P and other portable audio players
MP3 player
MD player
CD player
Cassette player
Recording
possible
possible
impossible
possible
Type of contents
digital
digital
digital
analog
Portability
very good
good
bad
good
Quality of sound
good
very good
good
bad
Size
very small
small
ordinary
ordinary
Price
various
high
low
low
Creating contents
*secs per music
same as playback
impossible
same as playback
Storage
flash memory/HD
**Midi disc
CD
magnetic tape
Source: Goodmorning Shinhan Securities, Korea
* Seconds
** Hard disk
Figure 1.21 The broadband market and the global MP3P market growth

(a) Broadband penetration
(b) Global PMP3P (portable MP3P) shipment trends and forecasts
Moreover, P2P (peer-to-peer) file exchange made it possible for individual Internet users to exchange their MP3 files with each other directly via the Net. As a result, web sites sharing MP3 music files such as “Soribada” (meaning sea of sound) in Korea and “Winmax” in the United States became popular: the increasing number of P2P sites fueled the growth of the online music exchange.
In 1997, a Korean company developed the first MP3P, named “MPman.” Since then, Korean companies have dominated the global MP3P industry. From a technological perspective, the entry barrier to the MP3P industry was relatively low. For instance, an industry analyst said that anyone with assembly technique and technical knowledge about how to play MP3 music files could make an MP3P. Because of this low entry barrier, the MP3P industry was soon flooded with manufacturers. By 1998, there were more than 100 manufacturers of MP3P in Korea alone. Out of these 100 companies, only 60 remained by early 2003.
Although it was still in an infant stage, the MP3P market had been growing quite rapidly. As the MP3P market grew, customers requested more add-on features in addition to the original function of playing music on their MP3Ps; for example, voice recording, electronic dictionaries, radio, heart rate checking, and so forth, were added to the new versions of MP3Ps. It forced MP3P manufacturers to continuously look for new ways to improve their existing products, many focusing on R&D in order to differentiate themselves from their competitors. This continuous quest for improving MP3Ps caused fierce competition in the market, which in turn shortened the product life cycle (PLC) of the MP3P even further. It was estimated that the average PLC of an MP3P was only about six months.
Thus as we can infer, in order to stay competitive, ReignCom had to find ways to maximize customer satisfaction by identifying the trendy customer tastes and introducing new products specifically tailored to such desires. The company had to have not only scale economies to make the MP3Ps economically and brand power to excel in the consumer’s mind, but also flexibility to respond to the constantly changing market in a timely manner. Although more companies would enter the MP3P industry, only those with these capabilities could have a chance to win in this competitive market.
ReignCom, Co. Ltd.
A brief review of ReignCom’s history
In January 1999, seven employees of Samsung Electronics (SEC) left the company and founded ReignCom Co. Ltd. in Korea. The seven included Deok-Joon Yang, CEO, and Rae-Hwan Lee, Vice-President of ReignCom. At first, ReignCom sold technology solutions for semiconductor production, but soon the top managers recognized the potential of the MP3P industry and jumped into it despite the risks involved in the manufacturing industry. The first MP3 product ReignCom made was an MP3 CDP, which used a regular CD player to play MP3 music. Another possible choice was a flash memory-type MP3P that had a relatively low technical entry barrier, but ReignCom chose the MP3 CDP because it could fully capitalize on its R&D capability for this type of product.
Since the company didn’t have any distribution channel at that time, it took its first step into the US market with the famous brand “Rio,” through an ODM4 contract with Sonic Blue in August 2000. However, the catch was that ReignCom had to make delivery within just three months. ReignCom had to find a production line. Since some of the top managers at ReignCom had worked with AV Chaseway in Hong Kong while they were at SEC, the company first contacted AV Chaseway. Unfortunately, the overall condition at AV Chaseway was substandard and ReignCom visited several other Chinese contract manufacturers. Although some of the other manufacturers seemed qualified, they would not give ReignCom full authority over the production process. ReignCom believed that in order to guarantee the product quality, it had to have complete control over the entire production process, and thus decided to choose AV Chaseway. Once the contract was signed with them, ReignCom dispatched its entire production department to AV Chaseway. ReignCom’s production managers renovated the production line and educated workers at AV Chaseway. After a six-week education program, these workers were able to make the products in 10 days. Finally, ReignCom succeeded in meeting the deadline on January 1, 2001, set by Sonic Blue.
The market favorably accepted ReignCom’s MP3 players with the Rio brand. Thus, ReignCom always had to maintain sufficient amounts of raw materials to meet the increasing demand. However, ReignCom was frustrated by Sonic Blue’s payment delinquency, amounting to more than $6 million by June 2001. When ReignCom introduced a new product, the company demanded to amend the contract with Sonic Blue so that the maximum amount of delayed payment could not go over $4 million and ReignCom would be allowed to sell the products in its own brand “iriver” if the sales volume through Sonic Blue fell below a certain level. However, the contract was short-lived.
Like in its manufacturing, ReignCom outsourced the external design of MP3P to INNO Design, an industrial design company in Silicon Valley, recognizing that the product design should be an essential point in winning the customers’ choice. With the new partner, ReignCom started developing new models. With the enhanced design capability, ReignCom introduced its third model “SlimX” in late 2001, and succeeded in entering the Korean MP3 market with its own brand iriver. It’s “Sorry Sony” advertisement made it an instant hit in the market. Buoyed by the series of successes, ReignCom called off its contract with Sonic Blue and tried to enter the US market with its own brand.
However, that was not an easy task. The sales through Sonic Blue accounted for about 75% of ReignCom’s total sales. After breaking up with Sonic Blue, ReignCom couldn’t find a distribution channel that was willing to shelf the company’s iriver MP3 players, even though the products were exactly the same as those sold in the Sonic Blue’s Rio brand. Due to the sharp decrease in demand, ReignCom had to shut down its production at AV Chaseway for several months. Despite its production shutdown, ReignCom had to pay AV Chaseway the promised amount according to the contract clause that forced ReignCom to guarantee a certain level of profitability for AV Chaseway in return for the company’s full control over the production process. Thus the situation faced by ReignCom was really dire. Amid these difficult times, ReingCom learned that Best Buy was interested in the flash memory type MP3P, which the company succeeded in developing for the first time in the world in April 2002.
Valuing ReignCom’s technology and its outstanding design, in June 2002, one of the largest distributors in the US, Best Buy, considered having ReignCom as a supplier. However, there was another string attached. Best Buy demanded that if ReignCom could supply the flash memory type MP3 players in the amount sufficient to stock 500 Best Buy stores in the US in three months, the company would accept ReignCom as a supplier for the entire product line including CDP MP3.
ReignCom had to work frantically. The company worked with INNO Design and eventually came up with a novel “prism-shaped” external design. ReignCom’s own R&D personnel designed a “double-board” structure, which could be safely put inside the prism-shaped case, for the new iFP-100 series. It was the MP3P based on the flash memory, the world’s first “firmware upgrade” MP3P, which enabled customers to constantly upgrade the hardware defects of their old models through the Internet.
Then, ReignCom started mass-producing the products using the production lines at AV Chaseway and met the deadline set by Best Buy by supplying the 500 Best Buy stores with the MP3 players exactly on September 20, 2002.
Thanks to the success of the iFP-100 series, which highlighted a good combination of outsourcing strategy and R&D ability, ReignCom recorded about $35 million in sales in 2002, the first full year of business,. Since then, ReignCom has been continuously successful with its own brand iriver. As a result, in 2002, it was ranked first in the division of portable digital devices by Best Buy. As of 2003, thanks to a series of successful new products, ReignCom enjoyed 52% market share in Korea and 25% worldwide, recording over $200 million in sales and $50 million in operating profits.
ReignCom’s operations strategy
Manufacturing outsourcing strategy–ReignCom had no manufacturing base of its own and therefore had to adopt an outsourcing strategy. AV Chaseway in Shenzhen, China, was the outsourcing partner and manufactured all of ReignCom’s MP3P products. But, it was not an ordinary outsourcing relationship. Unlike a typical outsourcing relationship, ReignCom was fully in charge of operations at AV Chaseway, from production line design, production management, quality control, to resource purchasing. AV Chaseway was responsible for recruiting and managing human resources, as well as managing the relationship between ReignCom and the Chinese government. In return, ReignCom guaranteed AV Chaseway a fixed amount of revenue per production line, amounting to $20,000 per production line in 2003. Eight ReignCom staff members were stationed at the Shenzhen factory, and supervised the plant’s operations and were in charge of some areas of administration. AV Chaseway’s facilities used for ReignCom’s MP3P products were listed in the ReignCom’s 2004 financial statements as an asset (see Figures 1.22 and Table 1.2). One of the ReignCom workers said that ReignCom employees called the Shenzhen AV Chaseway’s factory as “our factory” because ReignCom was able to decide the production volume and conduct quality control without waiting for AV Chaseway’s permission (see Figure 1.23).
Figure 1.22 ReignCom’s organization structure as of September 2003

(a) Company
(b) R&D division
(c) Number of workers
Design outsourcing strategy–ReignCom had never had a formal design department. Instead, a new product planning team took care of work related to design. Generally, this team suggested the concepts for the new MP3P models, and outside professional design companies designed the outer shapes of the new models. This system resulted from the CEO’s philosophy that a design team inside the company could easily fall victim to
Table 1.2 ReignCom’s financial statements


Figure 1.23 Process flow of “XXX-0000” model

“mannerism” and lose freshness unless there existed a truly tough mechanism to control its activity. The first three models were designed by a small domestic design company, and the other subsequent models were designed by a professional industrial design company, INNO Design.
When ReignCom was trying to find a suitable design company, Mr Yang recalled that he was impressed by a book about the importance of innovative designs written by Young-se Kim, CEO of INNO, an international design consultancy in Palo Alto, California. He decided to contact the company. At the meeting with INNO, keeping in mind that ReignCom’s bargaining power at that time was much weaker than INNO’s, the CEO of ReignCom offered them a contract containing the “running guarantee,” under which INNO would receive royalties continuously as long as ReignCom’s MP3 players were sold in the market. This kind of contract was quite unusual in the industry. The CEO of INNO, in turn, was impressed by the enthusiasm and compassion shown by Mr Yang and decided to take the risk by betting on the relationship, which was then untested. This new relationship based on mutual trust eventually paid off–both ReignCom and INNO were handsomely compensated by the huge sales of iriver. Such an amicable relationship between the two companies continues even to today. But, the relationship is not a rigid one; while cooperating with each other, each company is always aware that the relationship cannot be sustainable unless both participate in dynamic innovation.
In the new product development and customization processes, INNO and ReignCom worked together as if they were a single company. For effective coordination, ReignCom decided to change its CAD system so that it became compatible with INNO’s. However, at first, most of the ReignCom engineers objected to the idea, fearing they could lose their flexibility and autonomy. But, soon they realized that the new system could enhance the effectiveness of their cooperation with INNO significantly and accepted the new system. As a result, ReignCom was able to shorten the time for the entire design process.
Joon-hee Cho, an assistant manager at the product marketing department, said, “INNO is our design team. We have never considered INNO as a different company ever since we started working together.”
ReignCom just gave INNO basic technical information about a new model. Once INNO completed the outer shape design in conformance with the technical specifications, ReignCom’s own R&D team started to develop inner circuits that would be fit into the outer shape as designed by INNO. It was a creative process. Usually, the outer shape design was developed after the inner circuits were developed. However, ReignCom broke away from this traditional process and developed the outer design first and then the inner circuits. It was clear that this nontraditional process put an extra burden on the new product development speed. Nevertheless, it reflected ReignCom’s commitment to making MP3Ps attractive to customers–they not only considered functionality, but also aesthetics. It was a shrewd strategy. Since the “technological entry barrier” to the MP3P industry was not high, the product design was a key differentiating point for an MP3P.
According to Mr Yang:
In the competitive MP3P market, where the technological barrier is relatively low, it is critical to develop a product very attractive to young people. A sophisticated design should be critical! Given our present competencies, it seems obvious that we can’t make such a design fast enough to give us an edge in the global market. We have to approach this issue from a very different perspective.
There was an unexpected benefit as well: since the nontraditional process challenged ReignCom’s own R&D team, its competence in developing the inner circuits itself had been improved as their experience accumulated. Thanks to this unconventional design process, ReignCom had been able to develop a world-class, unique R&D capability in both designing and manufacturing sleek MP3Ps.
Building ReignCom’s own original brand–Initially, ReignCom had tried to sell its products under other companies’ brand names, such as Sonic Blue’s Rio. But soon it realized that relying on an ODM contract was not a good strategy–it could not provide ReignCom with enough revenues and profits. Therefore, as long as ReignCom was dependent on other companies’ brand power, the CEO thought that there would be no possibility that ReignCom could grow continuously in this extremely competitive market. Mr Yang decided to have ReignCom’s own brand! But, ReignCom didn’t seem a good brand name that appealed to young people. He needed something that sounded fancy, modern, and energetic. After grueling search efforts, he finally created a new name, “iriver” as the ReignCom’s brand name. But, making the new name known to customers was not easy. When ReignCom got the supply contract with Best Buy, using their own brand name iriver in the US market, their brand was met with resistance. Despite this difficulty, however, ReignCom stood by its newly created name. As the outer design became more attractive and ReignCom introduced better MP3Ps to the market, sticking with its own brand eventually paid off. ReignCom had successfully made iriver a prestigious brand in the MP3P market, and even was able to enjoy a 10% price premium over its competitors.
ReignCom’s R&D–ReignCom’s R&D capability was the company’s core competence. When it was established in 1999, all of the founding members were engineers working for one of the world’s most admired electronics companies, Samsung Electronics. Each of them had specialized in an R&D area. For example, three out of six got the Jang Young Sil prize, which was one of the highest awards given to engineers or scientists for their creative R&D activities in Korea. One of them also received the Korean President’s medal for his R&D excellence. In short, the company was founded by engineers and scientists of great caliber. It established a sort of tradition of the company. Even to this day, ReignCom puts an enormous emphasis on R&D excellence (see Figure 1.22). More than 50% of its employees were working at the R&D department and they continuously developed world firsts such as Multi-Codec CDP,5 slim-type MP3 CDP, digital camera built-in MP3P, and so on.
Competitive dynamics of the MP3P market
Trends of MP3P
The early models of MP3P were similar to CD players. Around mid-2002, flash memory began to be used as the storage media for MP3Ps. The flash memory type MP3P was smaller in size and more durable against external shocks than a CDP-type MP3P. These features made it easy to carry and play music. Moreover, its storage ability reached up to one gigabyte because of the technological innovation that has been pushing the memory price down (see Table 1.3). Thus, the flash memory-type MP3P gradually became popular in the market.
There was another type available, which used a hard disk drive (HDD) as the storage media. The HDD-type MP3P market was expected to grow much faster from 2003 (see Figure 1.24). The latest technological innovations addressed some of the critical problems associated with the HDD-type MP3P–it had been much heavier and much weaker against external shocks than the flashy memory-type MP3P. Therefore, the HDD-type MP3P was also becoming popular in America, Europe, and Japan. Since the HDD-type MP3P was able to store several gigabytes of data, the MP3P could become a more advanced multimedia player that would be able to handle complex multimedia functions. Apple was leading in the HDD-type MP3P market with its launch of the iPOD, a HDD-type MP3P with 20–40 gigabytes storage space, in 2001. Apple announced that in 2004, it would launch a 4-gigabyte iPOD mini and keep the iPOD boom going. In Korea, the iPOD mini was on the shelf in July 2004 and was already gaining attention.
Table 1.3 Comparison of the different types of MP3P
Advantages
Disadvantages
Market condition
CD-based
–CD-RW is cheaper
–Pretty large
–Higher entry barriers
–MP3 and Audio
–No direct saving of
–High-performance with slim
CD player
data (possible with CD-RW)
design and low voltage
combined
Flash
–Small size and
–No permanent storage
–Low entry barriers
memory-
light weight
–Highly dependent on
–Current market trend
based
–Diverse prices due
the memory price
–Mature stage in PLC
to various storage
–Korean companies
mediums from
taking the lead
32 Mb to 1 Giga
HDD-
–Huge storage,
–Weak against external
–Introduction stage in PLC
based
medium to 40G
shock
–Apple taking the lead
–Utilized as a PC
–High storage space,
support storage
high price
Source: ReignCom data and Hana Securities Research Center
Figure 1.24 Estimated sales (in units) of each MP3P type

Unforeseen competition–Digital convergence and the MP3 Mobile Phones
Digital convergence, caused by an unprecedented innovation in digital technology, has meant the collapse of the barriers between electronic industries, which were previously divided into three worlds: PC, mobile communications, and household appliances. More advanced technology brought about more intelligent digital devices such as video phones, camera phones, PDAs (personal digital assistants), GPS (global positioning system) built-in car audios, and the like. The MP3 playing technology, created by the household appliances industry, was now applied in various fields. For example, there were MP3P built-in mobile phones and MP3P built-in PDAs (see Figure 1.25). The MP3P producers were adding new functions as well; for example, digital camera function, moving picture playing capability, and so on (see Figure 1.26 and Figure 1.27).
Mobile phone manufacturers were also trying to capitalize on the MP3P popularity. Recently, some mobile phones were made to play MP3 songs, and there were two different groups of experts having opinions about these MP3 mobile phones. The first group believed that the MP3 mobile phone was a huge threat to the “pure” MP3P. On the contrary, the second group thought the MP3 mobile phone and the MP3P would complement each other and one could have a positive effect on the other’s demand. The first group of experts argued that with a high penetration rate and portability, the mobile phones already had advantages in the digital convergence era. They also predicted that in the near future, the mobile phones would be equipped with the full MP3P function.
Figure 1.25 Roadmaps of the MP3 player, handset, and PDA

Figure 1.26 Global film and digital camera sales (in units)

Figure 1.27 Digital camera and DiCa-phone sales (in units)

There was another opinion apart from the two groups. At a recent interview with financial analysts, Mr Yang commented, “There would be no perfect convergence product.” His reasoning was as follows: As more and more functions are installed in the mobile phone, its size and weight will increase. Eventually, it will not be a very “mobile” mobile phone, and, in fact, not much different from a PDA, PMP (portable media player), or PMC (personal media center). It could take longer than five years to make these mobile phones small and light enough to really compete. In those five years, the MP3P would be able to find new ways to survive, or a totally new technology could emerge. As such, the future of the mobile phone would be different from that of the MP3P, which would still remain the dominant player in the portable music player market. Mr Yang further pointed out the case of the digital camera and the digital camera mobile phone. At first, the digital camera mobile phones seemed to affect the sales of digital cameras. However, eventually both products’ sales had increased.
Growing Chinese MP3P market
In China, the number of Internet users had been growing rapidly since 1997, and in 2003 about 60 million Internet users were expected to use the Internet for work or entertainment. Among them, five million would be DSL6 line users (see Figure 1.28). Because of the Internet boom, free MP3 downloading sites had become popular in China.
When the MP3P was first introduced to the Chinese in 2000, the MP3P market was just at its beginning stage. According to a market research firm, in 2001, 2.2% of all the money spent on digital consumer products in China went to MP3P: 71.4% to CD players, 20.8% to PDAs, and 5.6% to digital cameras. However, the growth now seems to be finally accelerating. Another market survey company predicted that the Chinese MP3P market would grow by 125.6% in 2003 and 86% in 2004, compared with the previous year’s sales respectively. In 2005, the number of MP3P units sold would reach more than 4 million.
Figure 1.28 Number of Internet users in China

As of late 2003, there were more than 100 MP3P companies, which were churning out more than 300 different models in China. Apple, Sony, and the other major electronics companies were all competing against the Chinese domestic companies such as Aiguazer (
) and Lenshian (
). In particular, the two companies Aiguazer and Lenshian were the two top brands, enjoying over 70% of the Chinese MP3P market. These two companies had solid distribution channels in China and therefore were able to retain cost-competitiveness over their competitors. But, these Chinese companies were dominating only the low-end market. Most Chinese MP3Ps were OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) products, except for a few produced by Chinese conglomerates. Although the technological entry barrier to the MP3P market was relatively low, the overall technological capability of the Chinese MP3P producers was weaker than that of their foreign counterparts. Even worse, only a few Chinese companies invested resources in developing new products. Many analysts, therefore, expected that it would take a longer time for the Chinese companies to compete in the high-end MP3P market (see Figure 1.29).
High tariffs in China seem to be the most compelling explanation for Chinese companies’ domination in the low-end MP3P market. In 2003, all imported products were charged a 17% tariff. What’s more, this is a reduction from the 30% tariff that was levied before China joined the WTO. Most foreign companies, including the Korean MP3P makers, faced stiff competition vis-à-vis their Chinese counterparts. In order to avoid the high tariffs, foreign companies had to get a license, which was the permit from the Chinese government to allow them to sell their products in the domestic market. To obtain this license, a foreign company had to have a manufacturing facility in China and the product had to be produced in that facility.
Global competition of the MP3P market
Figure 1.29 Favorite MP3P brands among Chinese teenagers

Competition in the Korean MP3P market was also becoming more intense after Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics decided to aggressively increase their market shares in the domestic market. Samsung Electronics, the biggest company in Korea, increased marketing expenses and started a gigantic commercial campaign to promote its flagship model Yepp, featuring popular rock group Donbangsingi, whose members were among the most admired idols in Asia. LG Electronics declared a stop to selling its OEM models and started developing their own. Apple, the top maker in the global MP3P market, also launched iPOD mini in July 2004, and expressed its intention to expand its market share in the Korean MP3P market.
Likewise, the global competition was getting hotter. Sony, one of the most powerful players in the consumer electronics industry, chose to enter the MP3P market, where big household names such as Apple, RCA, Sonic Blue, Philips, and Samsung were already competing against each other. Replicating their Walkman’s great success in the portable audio market, Sony vowed to dominate the MP3P market with its new MP3P, Network-Walkman. According to AWSJ (Asian Wall Street Journal), Sony’s Network Walkman was superior to other competitors’ MP3Ps in terms of weight and performance. Therefore, Sony’s entry into the MP3P market would cause a big shakeup in the world MP3P market, where Apple, RCA, Sonic Blue, and ReignCom were presently dominating.
Call for a New Outsourcing Strategy
ReignCom has recently faced many changes, both internal and external. Thanks to the success of the company’s iFP-100 series, the demand for ReignCom’s MP3Ps in Korea and North America increased by 130% from 2002. Many analysts forecasted that China’s Internet boom would continue and the market for MP3Ps would soon explode. In the meantime, the Chinese government continued to charge high tariffs to the products that were not produced by a manufacturing facility in China. Mr Yang knew that ReignCom couldn’t afford to forego the Chinese market. But, he murmured, “Then what should we do?”
The September Meeting
At the beginning of the meeting on September 1, the CEO said that he would like to have a discussion that helped him analyze the various options available to the company. He said: “Our first decision should be on whether we want to be a strong player in the Chinese market or just ignore it. As you probably guess, ignoring the world’s fastest growing market is not an option if we indeed strive to become a global company in the MP3P market. The next question is whether we want to sell the products under our own brand iriver, give other companies the license to use our brand, or stay as an ODM contractor. The first option requires us to build a new plant, otherwise we have to pay the high tariff; that is, it is our status quo. Under the second option, we are able to use our brand, but I am not quite sure about the profitability. Finally, the last option is that we sell our products in China under the brands of other Chinese companies. Of course, if we want to increase our sales in China, we probably need to either increase the capacity at AV Chaseway or find another outsourcing partner. The more serious concern I have is about whether it contradicts our core strategy to promote our own brand as well as to maintain high profitability. Which option should we take? I somehow believe that the answer depends on the condition of the Chinese market in the future, say, for the next five years. How should we make the decision? What do you think about it?”
Moon, chief production executive, sparked the discussion, saying: “If we look at the fact that the global demand for MP3P is expected to reach over 30 million units per annum in a few years and we have a 20% share in the world market, we should have capacity enough to produce 6 million units every year. However, we are now able to produce only 3 million units. The best option I can think of is to construct a new plant in China. Considering our cash flow, we can afford it. Without our own plant in China, we would have to pay a 17% tariff, which puts an enormous burden on our cost structure.”
Lee, vice-president, interjected: “It will be very risky to build a new plant, when we are not sure about the market in the future. It will cost a lot. What if the demand decreases or our market share shrinks dramatically in three years? Our business model was based on a small and agile organization. I believe that it would be better to add more lines at the plant of our partner, AV Chaseway.
Moon threw up his hands, replying, “Listen, we don’t have an unlimited capacity with AV Chaseway! According to the data, we can increase the capacity up to 1.8 million at best. Considering the velocity of the MP3P market growth in China, it’s not a good alternative. Moreover, depending too much on the company can be problematic. For one thing, our production will be dependent on AV Chaseway completely. We should also consider that we could lose our bargaining power. At the beginning, we had to outsource our production to AV Chaseway since we simply didn’t have enough expertise and experience to manage human resources in China. But now I believe that we have acquired essential skills, as well as know-how in managing human resources in China and maintaining a good relationship with the Chinese government.”
Cho, chief marketing executive, suggested another alternative. “Why don’t we look for another company in China? It won’t be so difficult to build another outsourcing partnership and thus have enough bargaining power. We can export the products from AV Chaseway to the US and/or Europe and sell MP3Ps from this new partnership to China. Furthermore, we can expect some cost savings by bringing them into competition.”
Moon expressed some concerns. “It will be very difficult to find another outsourcing partner willing to give us the right to control the whole process like AV Chaseway. Also, even if we find a partnership, managing two outsourcing relationships simultaneously will be another problem.”
Park, the system engineer, asked, “Why don’t we think about ODM/OEM contract? Why does everyone stick to the ‘control’ issue?”
According to Moon, “It’s because our brand power is not strong enough to make them produce high-quality MP3Ps without our controlling their process. As you all recall, we decided to outsource manufacturing only if we were able to control every process at our outsourcing partner’s plant.”
Another Yang, chief financial officer, estimated that “by the end of 2003, our asset will be over $150 million and our net cash flow over $8 million. And I think we will have enough resources to build a new plant, if we want. I also collected some data that can help us financially analyze the various options in the handouts” (see Table 1.4).
Lee had the last words before a break: “I am still concerned about the uncertainty not only in the Chinese market, but also in the global MP3P market. It is because of several environmental, as well as technological, changes such as new developments in the HDD-based MP3P and the move to charge for MP3 files on the Internet. Of course, the competition will continue to be fierce. Considering all these, I must say building a new plant is too risky.”
While looking out of the conference room windows as the sun set over the Han River in Seoul, the CEO recalled how ReignCom had been surviving. The key, he thought, was a combination of its technological excellence and its shrewd outsourcing strategy. Can the old strategy continue to work in the future? How should we cope with challenges in China? The CEO was watching his colleagues enter the conference room and sit around the table after the coffee break. He then called the meeting back to order. It was time to make a decision.
Table 1.4 ReignCom’s market and production data

Note that the above data are derived from the authors’ estimates for the purpose of case discussion and don’t reflect the company’s forecasts and/or strategies.
ENDNOTES
1 See Kim, B. (1996), “Learning-induced control model to allocate managerial resources for production technology development,” International Journal of Production Economics, 43 (2–3), 267–82; Kim, B. (1997), “An empirical study on the learning-updating strategy to allocate managerial resources for operations improvement,” Management Decision, 35 (5–6), 436–46; Kim, B. (1998), “Manufacturing learning propensity in operations improvement,” Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing, 8 (1), 79–104.
2 See Upton, D. M. and B. Kim (1994), “Daewoo shipbuilding and heavy machinery,” Harvard Business School Case No. 695–001; Upton, D. M. and B. Kim (1995), “Samsung heavy industries: The Koje shipyard,” Harvard Business School Case No. 695–032; Upton, D. M. and B. Kim (1998), “Alternative methods of learning and process improvement in manufacturing,” Journal of Operations Management, 16 (1), 1–20.
3 Copyright © 2004 KAIST Graduate School of Management. All rights reserved. This case was written by Professor Bowon Kim, Mr Seung Oh Park, Ms Sun Min Oh, Mr Jin Seok Park (MS students), and Mr Soo Hong Chon (an MBA student) at KGSM. Professor Kim would like to thank Professor Michael Roberts at KGSM for his valuable comments on the case. Some of the information is disguised to protect confidentiality of the company and its employees.
4 ODM (original development/design manufacturing)
5 By the Multi-Codec method, CD-DA, MP3, WMA, AAC, ASF-type files become readable.
6 Digital Subscriber Line is a technology that brings high-bandwidth information to homes and small businesses over ordinary copper telephone lines.
(Kim, Bowon. Supply Chain Management in the Mastering Business in Asia series. John Wiley & Sons (P&T), 10/21/05. p. 40).
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