Discipline Process

 

Review the following case scenario and answer the questions that follow in a 500-750 word response.  Support your answer with in text references to specific sections of the IDEA as applicable:

Charlie is a 5th grader who receives special education services for a learning disability. Charlie is on grade level in math and two years below grade level in reading. He receives services in a resource setting for one hour each day. Charlie has no history of behavior problems.

Charlie was caught stealing software from the computer lab at his school. His teacher referred him to the assistant principal who issued a three-day suspension and required him to return the stolen materials.

Charlie returned to the classroom to gather his belongings and confronted his teacher. He called her names, threatened to come back to school with a knife to “cut her,” and pretended to swing his fists toward her. Charlie’s teacher called the principal, who, in accordance with the student code of conduct at the school, issued an additional 10-day suspension for Charlie, bringing his total days of suspension to 13.

  1. What      happens immediately to Charlie?
  2. What      services, if any, are provided to Charlie during his removal to an IAES?
  3. Who      needs to be contacted?

Assume a manifestation determination review is held for Charlie, and it’s determined that his behavior was not a manifestation of his disability.

  1. What      disciplinary actions are permissible?
  2. What,      if any, services will be provided to Charlie during the duration of the      disciplinary action?
  3. What      happens if Charlie’s parents appeal the manifestation determination?

Prepare this assignment according to the APA guidelines found in the APA Style Guide, located in the Student Success Center. An abstract is not required.

You are required to submit this assignment to Turnitin.

Source:   Bradley, R. (2007, October). Key issues in discipline. Building the legacy: IDEA 2004 training curriculum. Washington, DC: National

Dissemination Center for Children with Disabilities.

Chapters 6-7

Council for Exceptional Children. (2015). What Every Special Educator Must Know: Professional Ethics and Standards. Arlington, VA: CEC 1

Code of Ethics

Professional special educators are guided by the CEC professional ethical principles, practice standards, and professional policies in ways that respect the diverse characteristics and needs of individuals with exceptionalities and their families. They are committed to upholding and advancing the following principles:

1. Maintaining challenging expectations for individuals with exceptionalities to develop the highest possible learning outcomes and quality of life potential in ways that respect their dignity, culture, language, and background.

2. Maintaining a high level of professional competence and integrity and exercising professional judgment to benefit individuals with exceptionalities and their families.

3. Promoting meaningful and inclusive participation of individuals with exceptionalities in their schools and communities.

4. Practicing collegially with others who are providing services to individuals with exceptionalities.

5. Developing relationships with families based on mutual respect and actively involving families and individuals with exceptionalities in educational decision making.

6. Using evidence, instructional data, research, and professional knowledge to inform practice.

7. Protecting and supporting the physical and psychological safety of individuals with exceptionalities.

8. Neither engaging in nor tolerating any practice that harms individuals with exceptionalities.

9. Practicing within the professional ethics, standards, and policies of CEC; upholding laws, regulations, and policies that influence profes- sional practice; and advocating improvements in the laws, regulations, and policies.

10. Advocating for professional conditions and resources that will improve learning outcomes of individuals with exceptionalities.

11. Engaging in the improvement of the profession through active participation in professional organizations.

12. Participating in the growth and dissemination of professional knowledge and skills.

Project Management 20012 PPMP BP Deepwater Horizon

ii

This report is dedicated to the 11 men who lost their lives on the Deepwater Horizon rig on April 20, 2010 and to their families, in hope that this report will help minimize the chance of another such disaster ever happening again.

Jason Anderson

Aaron Dale Burkeen

Donald Clark

Stephen Curtis

Gordon Jones

Roy Wyatt Kemp

Karl Dale Kleppinger, Jr.

Blair Manuel

Dewey Revette Shane Roshto

Adam Weise

Dedication

 

 

ii

Acknowledgements We wish to acknowledge the many individuals and organizations, government officials and agencies alike that offered their views and insights to the Commission. We would especially like to express our gratitude to the Coast Guard’s Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) for allowing Commission staff to participate in its interviews and discussions, which was invaluable to the preparation of this report. (A copy of the Coast Guard’s ISPR report can be found at the Commission’s website at www.oilspillcommission. gov). We would also like to thank Chevron for performing the cement tests that proved so critical to our investigation into the Macondo well blowout.

We also thank the Department of Energy, which served as our supporting agency, and all of the Department employees whose assistance was so essential to the success and functioning of the Commission. In particular, we would like to thank Christopher Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oil and Natural Gas, who acted as the Commission’s Designated Federal Officer, as well as Elena Melchert, Petroleum Engineer in the Office of Oil and Gas Resource Conservation, who served as the Committee Manager.

But most importantly, we are deeply grateful to the citizens of the Gulf who shared their personal experiences as Commissioners traveled in the region, providing a critical human dimension to the disaster and to our undertaking, as well as the many people who testified at the Commission’s hearings, provided public comments, and submitted statements to our website. Together, these contributions greatly informed our work and led to a better report. Thank you one and all.

Copyright, Restrictions, and Permissions Notice Except as noted herein, materials contained in this report are in the public domain. Public domain information may be freely distributed and copied. However, this report contains illustrations, photographs, and other information contributed by or licensed from private individuals, companies, or organizations that may be protected by U.S. and/or foreign copyright laws. Transmission or reproduction of items protected by copyright may require the written permission of the copyright owner.

When using material or images from this report we ask that you credit this report, as well as the source of the material as indicated in this report.] Permission to use materials copyrighted by other individuals, companies or organizations must be obtained directly from those sources.

This report contains links to many Web sites. Once you access another site through a link that we provide, you are subject to the use, copyright and licensing restrictions of that site. Neither the Government nor the National Commission on the BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (Commission) endorses any of the organizations or views represented by the linked sites unless expressly stated in the report. The Government and the Commission take no responsibility for, and exercise no control over, the content, accuracy or accessibility of the material contained on the linked sites.

Cover Photo: © Steadfast TV ISBN: 978-0-16-087371-3

 

 

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Deep Water The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling

Report to the President

National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling

January 2011

 

 

iv

Commission Members

Bob Graham, Co-Chair

Cherry A. Murray

Donald F. Boesch

Fran Ulmer

Frances Beinecke

William K. Reilly, Co-Chair

Terry D. Garcia

 

 

vv

Table of Contents Foreword

PART I: The Path to Tragedy Chapter 1 “Everyone involved with the job…was completely satisfied….” The Deepwater Horizon, the Macondo Well, and Sudden Death on the Gulf of Mexico Chapter 2 “Each oil well has its own personality” The History of Offshore Oil and Gas in the United States

Chapter 3 “It was like pulling teeth.” Oversight—and Oversights—in Regulating Deepwater Energy Exploration and Production in the Gulf of Mexico

PART II: Explosion and Aftermath: The Causes and Consequences of the Disaster Chapter 4 “But, who cares, it’s done, end of story, [we] will probably be fine and we’ll get a good cement job.” The Macondo Well and the Blowout

Chapter 5 “You’re in it now, up to your neck!” Response and Containment Chapter 6 “The worst environmental disaster America has ever faced.” Oiling a Rich Environment: Impacts and Assessment Chapter 7 “People have plan fatigue . . . they’ve been planned to death” Recovery and Restoration

PART III: Lessons Learned: Industry, Government, Energy Policy Chapter 8 “Safety is not proprietary.” Changing Business as Usual Chapter 9 “Develop options for guarding against, and mitigating the impact of, oil spills associated with offshore drilling.” Investing in Safety, Investing in Response, Investing in the Gulf Chapter 10 American Energy Policy and the Future of Offshore Drilling

 

Endnotes

Appendices Appendix A: Commission Members Appendix B: List of Acronyms Appendix C: Executive Order Appendix D: Commission Staff and Consultants Appendix E: List of Commission Meetings Appendix F: List of Staff Working Papers

Index

vi

xiii 1

21

55

87 89

129

173

197

215 217

249

293

307

356 358 359 362 365 366

368

 

 

vi

Photo: Susan Walsh, Associated Press

Foreword The explosion that tore through the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig last April 20, as the rig’s crew completed drilling the exploratory Macondo well deep under the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, began a human, economic, and environmental disaster.

Eleven crew members died, and others were seriously injured, as fire engulfed and ultimately destroyed the rig. And, although the nation would not know the full scope of the disaster for weeks, the first of more than four million barrels of oil began gushing uncontrolled into the Gulf—threatening livelihoods, precious habitats, and even a unique way of life. A treasured American landscape, already battered and degraded from years of mismanagement, faced yet another blow as the oil spread and washed ashore. Five years after Hurricane Katrina, the nation was again transfixed, seemingly helpless, as this new tragedy unfolded in the Gulf. The costs from this one industrial accident are not yet fully counted, but it is already clear that the impacts on the region’s natural systems and people were enormous, and that economic losses total tens of billions of dollars.

On May 22, 2010, President Barack Obama announced the creation of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling: an independent, nonpartisan entity, directed to provide a thorough analysis and impartial judgment. The President charged the Commission to determine the causes of the disaster, and to improve the country’s ability to respond to spills, and to recommend reforms to make offshore energy production safer. And the President said we were to follow the facts wherever they led.

This report is the result of an intense six-month effort to fulfill the President’s charge.

 

 

viivii

From the outset, the Commissioners have been determined to learn the essential lessons so expensively revealed in the tragic loss of life at the Deepwater Horizon and the severe damages that ensued. The Commission’s aim has been to provide the President, policymakers, industry, and the American people a clear, accessible, accurate, and fair account of the largest oil spill in U.S history: the context for the well itself, how the explosion and spill happened, and how industry and government scrambled to respond to an unprecedented emergency. This was our first obligation: determine what happened, why it happened, and explain it to Americans everywhere.

As a result of our investigation, we conclude:

• The explosive loss of the Macondo well could have been prevented.

• The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can be traced to a series of identifiable mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such systematic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry.

• Deepwater energy exploration and production, particularly at the frontiers of experience, involve risks for which neither industry nor government has been adequately prepared, but for which they can and must be prepared in the future.

• To assure human safety and environmental protection, regulatory oversight of leasing, energy exploration, and production require reforms even beyond those significant reforms already initiated since the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Fundamental reform will be needed in both the structure of those in charge of regulatory oversight and their internal decisionmaking process to ensure their political autonomy, technical expertise, and their full consideration of environmental protection concerns.

• Because regulatory oversight alone will not be sufficient to ensure adequate safety, the oil and gas industry will need to take its own, unilateral steps to increase dramatically safety throughout the industry, including self-policing mechanisms that supplement governmental enforcement.

• The technology, laws and regulations, and practices for containing, responding to, and cleaning up spills lag behind the real risks associated with deepwater drilling into large, high-pressure reservoirs of oil and gas located far offshore and thousands of feet below the ocean’s surface. Government must close the existing gap and industry must support rather than resist that effort.

• Scientific understanding of environmental conditions in sensitive environments in deep Gulf waters, along the region’s coastal habitats, and in areas proposed for more drilling, such as the Arctic, is inadequate. The same is true of the human and natural impacts of oil spills.

 

 

viii

We reach these conclusions, and make necessary recommendations, in a constructive spirit: we aim to promote changes that will make American offshore energy exploration and production far safer, today and in the future.

More broadly, the disaster in the Gulf undermined public faith in the energy industry, government regulators, and even our own capability as a nation to respond to crises. It is our hope that a thorough and rigorous accounting, along with focused suggestions for reform, can begin the process of restoring confidence. There is much at stake, not only for the people directly affected in the Gulf region, but for the American people at large. The tremendous resources that exist within our outer continental shelf belong to the nation as a whole. The federal government’s authority over the shelf is accordingly plenary, based on its power as both the owner of the resources and in its regulatory capacity as sovereign to protect public health, safety, and welfare. To be allowed to drill on the outer continental shelf is a privilege to be earned, not a private right to be exercised.

“Complex Systems Almost Always Fail in Complex Ways” As the Board that investigated the loss of the Columbia space shuttle noted, “complex systems almost always fail in complex ways.” Though it is tempting to single out one crucial misstep or point the finger at one bad actor as the cause of the Deepwater Horizon explosion, any such explanation provides a dangerously incomplete picture of what happened—encouraging the very kind of complacency that led to the accident in the first place. Consistent with the President’s request, this report takes an expansive view.

Why was a corporation drilling for oil in mile-deep water 49 miles off the Louisiana coast? To begin, Americans today consume vast amounts of petroleum products—some 18.7 million barrels per day—to fuel our economy. Unlike many other oil-producing countries, the United States relies on private industry—not a state-owned or -controlled enterprise—to supply oil, natural gas, and indeed all of our energy resources. This basic trait of our private-enterprise system has major implications for how the U.S. government oversees and regulates offshore drilling. It also has advantages in fostering a vigorous and competitive industry, which has led worldwide in advancing the technology of finding and extracting oil and gas.

Even as land-based oil production extended as far as the northern Alaska frontier, the oil and gas industry began to move offshore. The industry first moved into shallow water and eventually into deepwater, where technological advances have opened up vast new reserves of oil and gas in remote areas—in recent decades, much deeper under the water’s surface and farther offshore than ever before. The Deepwater Horizon was drilling the Macondo well under 5,000 feet of Gulf water, and then over 13,000 feet under the sea floor to the hydrocarbon reservoir below. It is a complex, even dazzling, enterprise. The remarkable advances that have propelled the move to deepwater drilling merit comparison with exploring outer space. The Commission is respectful and admiring of the industry’s technological capability.

 

 

ixix

But drilling in deepwater brings new risks, not yet completely addressed by the reviews of where it is safe to drill, what could go wrong, and how to respond if something does go awry. The drilling rigs themselves bristle with potentially dangerous machinery. The deepwater environment is cold, dark, distant, and under high pressures—and the oil and gas reservoirs, when found, exist at even higher pressures (thousands of pounds per square inch), compounding the risks if a well gets out of control. The Deepwater Horizon and Macondo well vividly illustrated all of those very real risks. When a failure happens at such depths, regaining control is a formidable engineering challenge—and the costs of failure, we now know, can be catastrophically high. In the years before the Macondo blowout, neither industry nor government adequately addressed these risks. Investments in safety, containment, and response equipment and practices failed to keep pace with the rapid move into deepwater drilling. Absent major crises, and given the remarkable financial returns available from deepwater reserves, the business culture succumbed to a false sense of security. The Deepwater Horizon disaster exhibits the costs of a culture of complacency.

The Commission examined in great detail what went wrong on the rig itself. Our investigative staff uncovered a wealth of specific information that greatly enhances our understanding of the factors that led to the explosion. The separately published report of the chief counsel (a summary of the findings is presented in Chapter 4) offers the fullest account yet of what happened on the rig and why. There are recurring themes of missed warning signals, failure to share information, and a general lack of appreciation for the risks involved. In the view of the Commission, these findings highlight the importance of organizational culture and a consistent commitment to safety by industry, from the highest management levels on down.*

But that complacency affected government as well as industry. The Commission has documented the weaknesses and the inadequacies of the federal regulation and oversight, and made important recommendations for changes in legal authority, regulations, investments in expertise, and management.

The Commission also looked at the effectiveness of the response to the spill. There were remarkable instances of dedication and heroism by individuals involved in the rescue and cleanup. Much was done well—and thanks to a combination of good luck and hard work, the worst-case scenarios did not all come to pass. But it is impossible to argue that the industry or the country was prepared for a disaster of the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Twenty years after the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska, the same blunt response technologies—booms, dispersants, and skimmers—were used, to limited effect. On-the-ground shortcomings in the joint public-private response to an overwhelming spill like that resulting from the blowout of the Macondo well are now evident, and demand public and private investment. So do the weaknesses in local, state, and federal coordination revealed by the emergency. Both government and industry failed to anticipate and prevent this catastrophe, and failed again to be prepared to respond to it.

*The chief counsel’s investigation was no doubt complicated by the lack of subpoena power. Nonetheless, Chief Counsel Bartlit did an extraordinary job building the record and interpreting what he learned. He used his considerable powers of persuasion along with other tools at his disposal to engage the involved companies in constructive and informative exchanges.

 

 

x

If we are to make future deepwater drilling safer and more environmentally responsible, we will need to address all these deficiencies together; a piecemeal approach will surely leave us vulnerable to future crises in the communities and natural environments most exposed to offshore energy exploration and production.

The Deepwater Drilling Prospect The damage from the spill and the impact on the people of the Gulf has guided our work from the very beginning. Our first action as a Commission was to visit the Gulf region, to learn directly from those most affected. We heard deeply moving accounts from oystermen witnessing multi-generation family businesses slipping away, fishermen and tourism proprietors bearing the brunt of an ill-founded stigma affecting everything related to the Gulf, and oil-rig workers dealing with mounting bills and threatened home foreclosures, their means of support temporarily derailed by a blanket drilling moratorium, shutting down all deepwater drilling rigs, including those not implicated in the BP spill.

What are the primary and secondary hypotheses and the objectives?

Title of the thesis: : Analysis of inclusive education in the academic performance of students with special needs: Advantages and disadvantages

Candidate must submit a thesis statement, abstract 250 words, and introduction use articles in the introduction part the introduction part will be answer the following:

why is this problem important?

How does the study relate to previus work in the area?

what are the primary and secondary hyphoteses and the objectives?

What are the primary and secondary hypotheses and the objectives?

How do the hypotheses and the researchs desing relate to one another?

How do the hypotheses and the research design relate to one another?

the paper will be completed in appropriate APA format.

Citations must be used and because there will be citations, a reference page must be included. Be sure that every citation aligns with a reference and every reference listed has a corresponding citation.

I submitted articles and the outline of the paper

British Educational Research Journal Vol. 36, No. 5, October 2010, pp. 733–744

ISSN 0141-1926 (print)/ISSN 1469-3518 (online)/10/050733-12 © 2010 British Educational Research Association DOI: 10.1080/01411920903142958

Constructing inclusive education in a neo-liberal context: promoting inclusion of Arab-Australian students in an Australian context Annelies Kamp* and Fethi Mansouri Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia Taylor and FrancisCBER_A_414468.sgm(Received …; revised …; accepted …)10.1080/01411920903142958British Education Research Journal0141-1926 (print)/1469-3518 (online)Original Article2009Taylor & Francis0000000002009AnneliesKampkampa@missionaustralia.com.au

School systems are a major social change agent capable of challenging social inequalities and economic disadvantages. Yet, while schools in Australia are being confronted with increasingly cul- turally diverse populations as well as an increasing focus on student retention, this transformative role is increasingly being played out in a broader educational context that has been found to replicate rather than challenge patterns of social inequality. Successive governments in Australia have re- sponded to this context with a raft of policy initiatives. This paper, based on three-year longitudinal research undertaken in the city of Melbourne, outlines this policy context and introduces the theo- retical approach that underpins its innovative approach to managing cultural diversity in educational institutions. It argues for, and presents, a multidimensional model for managing cultural diversity in schools, one that provides the tools for transformative practices to be undertaken to effect positive change in school environments for the benefit of all students.

Introduction

A distinguishing feature of contemporary political life is thus the insistence that only if those differences which are constitutive of identity—whether differences of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, culture, language and so on—are given full acknowledgement and respect, not merely in law but in a society’s basic institutions, can equal participation for all citizens in a democracy be realised. The most basic social institution of all in this regard is of course a society’s public education system, since it is through education that identity, whether individual or societal, is reflected—validated or discounted—and reconstructed for the future. (Jonathan, 2000, pp. 377–378)

*Corresponding author. Strategy and development manager, Mission Australia, L2, 398 Lonsdale Street, Melbourne, VIC 3000, Australia. Email: kampa@missionaustralia.com.au

 

 

734 A. Kamp and F. Mansouri

Multicultural education has been defined as ‘an approach to teaching and learning that is based upon democratic values and beliefs and that affirms cultural pluralism within culturally diverse societies in an interdependent world’ (Bennett, 2003, p. 14). There is broad agreement on the objective of multicultural education: ‘it relates to the quality of living in an ethnically and culturally diverse society’ (Leeman, 2003, p. 32).

Although now commonly recognised in education policy discourse of culturally pluralist nations, education practice has often been based on an assumption that a non-mainstream background is an educational liability (Campbell, 2000). In Australia throughout the 1990s the key change in education was the growth in competition at every level: between students; between teachers; between schools and types of schools; and between school districts (Marginson, 2006, p. 209). This curtailed the ability of schools to cooperate in meeting the needs of diverse groups of students given a shift in focus from student need to student performance (Apple, 2001). Devolved governance based on competitive positioning, parental choice and per capita funding created both opportunities and tensions for schools in the context of increased inter-racial tension post-9/11.

In this paper we draw on research funded by the Australian Research Council Linkage Project and conducted from 2003–2006 with three Melbourne secondary schools characterised by high levels of cultural diversity and social disadvantage. Other project partners included a community service agency, Victorian Arabic Social Services and the Scanlon Foundation, a philanthropic trust with an interest in cultural diversity and social cohesion. The project, entitled ‘Diversity: an educational advantage’, had a number of aims: to develop a multi-tiered best practice model that encouraged school communities to better manage their cultural and linguistic diver- sity; to provide teacher and school support resources and professional development; to build strong partnerships between schools and local communities to promote positive relationships and a more inclusive school environment; and to inform and influence the further development of multicultural education policy and practice. These aims were pursued through three approaches: the work of an in-school cultural diversity facilitator; the development of print and on-line resources for teachers and other school staff; and research to inform the development and assess the impact of the other project components.

The research focus was Arab-Australians, a group marked by diversity of religion, nationality, gender, class and, most notably, language. Immigration from the Arabic-speaking countries constituted 8% of the total migration to Australia in 2001, with the population of the various Arabic-speaking communities quadrupling in size between 1976 and 2001 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2001). In 2006, 204,700 people spoke Arabic at home, making it the fourth largest language group other than English in Australia and representing a 37% increase over a decade (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006). In the schools participating in this study, up to 80% of the student population came from non-English-speaking backgrounds, with the largest language group being Arabic (Victorian Office of Multicultural Affairs, 2003). Data were collected from Arabic and non-Arabic students (n = 264),

 

 

Inclusive education in a neo-liberal context 735

teachers (n = 117) and Arabic parents (n = 78), through surveys, focus groups and interviews and were analysed both longitudinally and comparatively.

The paper proceeds with a discussion of multicultural education and related policy. The theoretical perspective underlying the project is then introduced and the research findings presented. Finally, the paper outlines the resources that have been developed in pursuit of the aim of promoting cultural diversity as an educational advantage.

Multicultural education in context

Multicultural education, both in Australia and internationally, has often resulted in remedial interventions aimed at ethnic groups. Yet the ability to successfully live and interact in a globalized, interdependent world is increasingly being seen as a funda- mental component of the education of all students. Thus, references to ‘multicultural education’ relate to activities on two dimensions: firstly, the educational work of enabling all students to prepare themselves to live in a multicultural world and, secondly, optimising educational opportunities and outcomes for students thereby allowing democratic participation regardless of cultural background (Leeman, 2003).

In Australia, official support for multicultural education has centred on the aims of encouraging civic duty, cultural respect, equity and productive diversity for all Australian students. This intent is clearly outlined in The Adelaide declaration on national goals for schooling in the twenty-first century, an ‘historic’ commitment by all Australian governments that, in addition to outlining the talents and capacities, knowledge and skills that all Australian students should acquire, also outlined a commitment to socially just schooling where:

all students understand and acknowledge the value of cultural and linguistic diversity and possess the knowledge, skills and understanding to contribute to, and benefit from, such diversity in the Australian community and internationally. (Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs, 1999, n.p.)

However, such official support for multicultural education ‘mask(s) an uneasy ambivalence’ towards multiculturalism and multicultural education by elites within the Anglo-Celtic ‘core’ of Australia (Hickling-Hudson, 2002, p. 3). In an effort to maintain an ideal of social order and cohesion, systemic disadvantages can go unchallenged within superficial forms of multicultural education that acknowledge diversity on a purely ethnic level (Troyna, 1993). An example of this is occasional activities such as Harmony Day, an Australian government initiative that encour- ages all Australians to contribute to and build upon Australia’s social cohesion through the promotion of Australian values including understanding, tolerance and inclusion. Even though initiatives such as Harmony Day represent unques- tionably positive initiatives that are conducive to social cohesion, they are exam- ples of multicultural education as a ‘superficial “celebration of difference” through “foods and festivals” activities rather than an examination of how “difference” serves to advantage some and disadvantage others’ (Dixson & Rousseau, 2005, p. 16–17).

How do the relative advantages of mediation and arbitration, create a synergy in a combined strategy of MED-ARB?

first assignment

Module 4 – Case 3 pages
MEDIATION & ARBITRATION
Assignment Overview
Mediation? Arbitration?
.       Don’t we have enough of each one by itself?
.       To make matters “worse,” the following article sheds an interesting light on the combination of these two strategies, and the sequence between them.
Case Assignment
Please read (access via ProQuest):
McLean, D.J., & Wilson, S.P. (2008). Compelling Mediation in the Context of Med-Arb Agreements. Dispute Resolution Journal. New York: Aug-Oct 2008. Vol. 63, Iss. 3; pg. 28. Abstract: It is obvious to all who work in the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) field that the most important federal statute — the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) — does not define its key term: “arbitration.” A recent case, Advanced Bodycare v Thione, invited the 11th Circuit to explore which types of ADR processes are considered “arbitration” for purpose of the FAA. Under the 11th Circuit’s narrow test, an agreement to mediate, as well as an agreement to mediate or arbitrate, falls outside of the scope of the FAA. There is a fundamental distinction between an ADR agreement that allows parties to either mediate or arbitrate disputes, and a classic med-arb agreement, which calls for mediation as a condition precedent to binding arbitration. While a med-arb agreement was not before the 11th Circuit in Thione, the authors caution against applying that court’s reasoning to med-arb agreements..
After carefully reading through the background materials, and this article, please answer (in about 3 pages), the following question:
.       How do the relative advantages of mediation and arbitration, create a synergy in a combined strategy of MED-ARB?
Assignment Expectations
1.      Point out the advantages of each method, then
2.      Focus on how when combined they create synergy.
3.      Do not summarize the article, but input your insight as to the concepts of each method and their combination.

second assignment

Module 4 – Case
LABOR RELATIONS LAWS
Assignment Overview
Labor Laws, Unionization, and the Workplace
A good place to start familiarizing yourself with legal issues involving unions in the workplace is by looking over the National Labor Relations Board website at:
National Labor Relations Board. The NLRB Process. Retrieved from https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrb-process
You should familiarize yourself with the following laws and their amendments:
U.S. Department of Labor. (2017) Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, As Amended. Retrieved from https://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/compllmrda.htm
HR Hero (2017). National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Retrieved at http://topics.hrhero.com/national-labor-relations-act-nlra/
National Labor Relations Board. (n.d.) 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions. Retrieved from https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1947-taft-hartley-substantive-provisions
Case Assignment
After you have reviewed the above laws, view the video and read the following articles concerning the labor unrest that occurred at Verizon.
Communication Workers of America (2016). What #VictoryAtVerizon Means to Us | 2016 Verizon Strike | CWA Video. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YwWKNLiiiFY
Dayen, D. (April 15, 2016). The Verizon Strike Signals a Larger Economic Battle. New Republic. https://newrepublic.com/article/132707/verizon-strike-signals-larger-economic-battle
Scheiber, N. (May 20, 2016). Verizon Strike to End as Both Sides Claim Victories on Key Points. New York Times. Retrieved from Trident Online Library.
Sherk, J. (April 13, 2016) Verizon Strike No Morality Play. The National Review. Retrieved from http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/434050/verizon-strike-landline-workers-go-strike
Smith, A. (April 15, 2016) Verizon Strike Not as Intimidating As It Appears. Retrieved at https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/labor-relations/pages/verizon-strike-lower-numbers.aspx
Stangler, C. (April 15, 2016) 40,000 Verizon Workers Launch One of the Biggest Strikes of the Decade: Can the strike at Verizon help kickstart the American labor movement? The Nation. Retrieved at https://www.thenation.com/article/40000-verizon-workers-launch-one-of-the-biggest-strikes-of-the-decade/
Prepare a 4- (not including title and references page) paper in which you address the following questions:
1.      What is the story behind the Verizon strike of 2016?
2.      How does the Verizon strike reflect the current state of unions in the United States?
3.      Do you agree that the Verizon Strike “signaled a Larger Economic Battle” or was it “No Morality Play”? Support your position.
4.      What can an HR manager learn from the experience of the Verizon strike of 2016?
Use at least 5 Trident Online Library sources plus any applicable background readings to support your discussion.