SHARON BAILIN, ROLAND CASE, JERROLD R. COOMBS and LEROI B. DANIELS

In this paper, the ® rst of two, we analyse three widely-held conceptions of critical thinking: as one or more skills, as mental processes, and as sets of procedures. Each view is, we contend, wrong-headed, misleading or, at best, unhelpful. Some whowrite about critical thinking seem to muddle all three views in an unenlightening me lange. Apart from the errors or inadequacies of the conceptions themselves, they promote or abet misconceived practices for teaching critical thinking. Together, they have led to the view that critical thinking is best taught by practising it. We o€ er alternative proposals for the teaching of critical thinking.

Critical thinking is a subject of considerable current interest, both in terms of theory and pedagogy. A great deal is written about critical thinking, conferences on the subject abound, and educational initiatives aimed at fostering critical thinking proliferate.1 It is our view that much of the theoretical work and many of the pedagogical endeavours in this area are misdirected because they are based on faulty conceptions of critical think- ing. Critical thinking is frequently conceptualized in terms of skills, pro- cesses, procedures and practice. Much of the educational literature either refers to cognitive or thinking skills or equates critical thinking with certain mental processes or procedural moves that can be improved through practice. In this paper we attempt to explain the misconceptions inherent in such ways of conceptualizing critical thinking. It is important to note that much of the literature contains a pervasive miasma of overlapping uses of such terms as skill, process, procedure, behaviour, mental operations,

j. curriculum studies, 1999, vol. 31, no. 3, 269± 283

Sharon Bailin, a professor in the Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada V5A 1S6, is interested in philosophical inquiries into critical thinking, creativity and aesthetic education. Her publications include Reason and Values: New Essays in Philosophy of Education (Calgary, AB: Detselig, 1993), co-edited with John P. Portelli. Roland Case, an associate professor in the Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University, conducts research in social studies and legal and global education. His most recent book is The Canadian Anthology of Social Studies: Issues and Strategies (Burnaby, BC: Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University), co-edited with Penney Clark. Jerrold R. Coombs, a professor in the Faculty of Education, University of British Columbia, has publishedextensivelyon ethical issues in education and the development of competence in practical reasoning. His publications include Applied Ethics: A Reader (Oxford: Black- well, 1993), co-edited with Earl R. Winkler. L eRoi B. Daniels, a professor emeritus in the Faculty of Education, University of British Columbia, is interested in philosophy of mind and legal education. He is currently editing (with Roland Case) the `Critical Challenges Across the Curriculum’ series (Burnaby, BC: Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University).

Journal of Curriculum Studies ISSN 0022± 0272 print/ISSN 1366± 5839 online Ñ 1999 Taylor & Francis Ltd http://www.tandf.co.uk/JNLS/cus.htm

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etc. We thus ® nd similar kinds of error and confusion about critical thinking under super® cially di€ erent ways of talking. We have tried to focus on plausibly distinct uses of skill, process and procedure in our critiques. Our arguments will lay the groundwork for o€ ering a new conception based on di€ erent foundational assumptions in the following paper on this theme.

Cri tic a l th in kin g a s ski l l

Many educators and theorists appear to view the task of teaching critical thinking as primarily a matter of developing thinking skills. Indeed, the discourse on thinking is su€ used with skill talk. Courses and conferences focus on the development of thinking skills and references to skills appear in much of the literature.2 Even leading theorists in the area of critical thinking conceptualize critical thinking largely in terms of skill. Thus, for example, Siegel (1988: 39, 41) writes of the critical thinker as possessing à certain character as well as certain skills’ , and makes reference to `a wide variety of reasoning skills’ . Similarly, Paul (1984: 5) refers to critical thinking skills and describes them as `a set of integrated macro-logical skills’ . The Delphi Report on critical thinking (Facione 1990), which purports tobe based on expert consensus in the ® eld, views critical thinking in terms of cognitive skills in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation and self-regulation.

It is important to note that the term s̀kill’ can be used in a variety of senses and that, as a consequence, some of the discussion of skills in critical thinking is relatively unproblematic. In some instances s̀kill’ is used to indicate that an individual is pro® cient at the task in question. It is used, in this context, in an achievement sense. A skilled reasoner is one who is able to reason well and to meet the relevant criteria for good reasoning. The use of skill in this context focuses attention on students being capable of intelligent performance as opposed to merely having propositional knowl- edge about intelligent performance. Thus, someone who is thinking criti- cally can do more than cite a de® nition for ad hominem. He or she will notice inappropriate appeals to an arguer’s character in particular argu- mentative contexts. Clearly, being a critical thinker involves, among other things, having a certain amount of `know-how’. Such thinkers are skilled, then, in the sense that they must be able to ful® ll relevant standards of good thinking. Conceptualizing critical thinking as involving skill in this achievement sense is relatively benign.

However, some of the discussion of skills in the context of critical thinking is more problematic. There is a strong tendency among educators to divide educational goals or objectives into three distinct kinds: knowl- edge, skills (i.e. abilities), and attitudes (i.e. values), and to assign critical thinking to the category of skills.3 Conceiving of critical thinking as a skill in this sense implies more than simply that an individual is a competent or pro® cient thinker. It is based on a conception of skill as an identi® able operation which is generic and discrete. There are di culties with both of these notions. We will begin with the problems entailed in viewing skills as

270 s. bailin ET AL .

generic, i.e. once learned, they can be applied in any ® eld of endeavour; the problems involved in viewing skills as discrete will be dealt with later.

Skills as generic

The identi® cation of critical thinking with skill in the tripartite division of educational goals separates critical thinking from the development of knowledge, understanding and attitudes. Critical thinking is seen to involve generic operations that can be learned in themselves, apart from any particular knowledge domains, and then transferred to or applied in di€ erent contexts. Thus, for example, Worsham and Stockton (1986: 11, 12) claim that t̀here are some skills that are basic and common to most curriculum tasks (for example, gathering information, ® nding the main idea, determining meaning)’ . They further state that:

Most curriculum materials at the high school level require that students analyze, synthesize, and evaluate as well as to[sic] create new `products’, such as original oral and written pieces and artistic creations. Students are expected to apply the appropriate thinking skills to accomplish these tasks.

In a similar vein, Beyer (1987: 163) makes reference to discrete thinking skills and claims that:

To be pro® cient in a thinking skill or strategy means to be able to use that operation e€ ectively and e ciently on one’s own in a variety of appropriate contexts.

The separation of knowledge and critical thinking is fraught with di culties however. If the claim that critical thinking skills are generic is taken to mean that these skills can be applied in any context regardless of background knowledge, then the claim seems clearly false. Background knowledge in the particular area is a precondition for critical thinking to take place. A person cannot analyse aparticular chemical compound if he or she does not know something about chemistry, and without an under- standing of certain historical events a person will be unable to evaluate competing theories regarding the causes of World War I.

Many theorists acknowledge the necessity of background knowledge for critical thinking but still maintain a separation between knowledge and the skill or skills of thinking critically. For example, Nickerson et al. (1985: 49) contend that:

recognizing the interdependence of thinking and knowledge does not deny the reality of the distinction. It is at least conceivable that people possessing the same knowledge might di€ er signi® cantly in how skillfully they apply what they know.

We argue, however, that the distinction is itself untenable. Skilled performance at thinking tasks cannot be separated from knowledge. The kinds of acts, such as predicting and interpreting, which are put forth as generic skills will, in fact, vary greatly depending on the context, and this di€ erence is connected with the di€ erent kinds of knowledge and under-

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standing necessary for successful completion of the particular task. Inter- preting a graph is a very di€ erent sort of enterprise from interpreting a play. The former involves coming to an understanding of the relationships among the plotted entities based on understanding certain geometric conventions; the latter involves constructing a plausible meaning for the play based on textual evidence. Both of these di€ er again from the case of interpreting someone’s motives, which involves imputing certain beliefs or attitudes toan individual based on reading verbal and bodily cues as well as on past knowledge of the person. Similarly, predicting how a story will end calls upon very di€ erent understanding than does predicting the weather. It makes little sense, then, to think in terms of generic skills, which are simply applied or transferred to di€ erent domains of knowledge.

Becoming pro® cient at critical thinking itself involves, among other things, the acquisition of certain sorts of knowledge. For example, the knowledge of certain critical concepts which enable one to make distinc- tions is central to critical thinking. Understanding the di€ erence between a necessary and asu cient condition is not just background knowledge but is very much a part of what is involved in thinking critically.

Similarly, pro® ciency in critical thinking involves an understanding of the various principles which govern good thinking in particular areas, and many of these are domain speci® c, as McPeck (1981) has pointed out. Barrow (1991: 12) makes the point in this way:

What is clear, what is contradictory, what is logical, and so forth, depends upon the particular context. . . . To be logical in discussion about art is not a matter of combining logical ability with information about art. It is a matter of understanding the logic of art, of being on the inside of aesthetic concepts and aesthetic theory. The capacity to be critical about art is inextricably intertwined with understanding aesthetic discourse.

Facione (1990: 10) sums up well this general point:

This domain-speci® c knowledge includes understanding methodological principles and competence to engage in norm-regulated practices that are at the core of reasonable judgements in those speci® c contexts. . . . Too much of value is lost if CT [critical thinking] is conceived of simply as a list of logical operations and domain-speci® c knowledge is conceived of simply as an aggregation of information.