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Campaign and Election Security Policy:

Overview and Recent Developments

for Congress

January 2, 2020

Congressional Research Service

https://crsreports.congress.gov

R46146

 

 

 

Congressional Research Service

SUMMARY

 

Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress In the United States, state, territorial, and local governments are responsible for most aspects of

selecting and securing election systems and equipment. Foreign interference during the 2016

election cycle—and widely reported to be an ongoing threat—has renewed congressional

attention to campaign and election security and raised new questions about the nature and extent

of the federal government’s role in this policy area.

This report provides congressional readers with a resource for understanding campaign and

election security policy. This includes discussion of the federal government’s roles; state or

territorial responsibilities for election administration and election security; an overview of

potentially relevant federal statutes and agencies; and highlights of recent congressional policy

debates. The report summarizes related legislation that has advanced beyond introduction during

the 116th Congress. It also poses questions for consideration as the House and Senate examine

whether or how to pursue legislation, oversight, or appropriations.

In the 116th Congress, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; S. 1790; P.L. 116-92), enacted in December

2019, contains several provisions related to campaign and election security. Most provisions involve providing Congress or

federal or state agencies with information about election interference. It also requires the Director of National Intelligenc e, in

coordination with several other agencies, to develop a strategy for countering Russian cyberattacks against U.S. elections. In

addition, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93; H.R. 1158), also enacted in December 2019, includes

$425 million for payments to states, territories, and the District of Columbia to make general improvements to the

administration of federal elections, including upgrades to election technology and security.

As of this writing, 116th Congress legislation that has advanced beyond introduction in at least one chamber includes H.R. 1;

H.R. 753; H.R. 1158; H.R. 2500; H.R. 2722; H.R. 3351; H.R. 3494; H.R. 3501; H.R. 4617; H.R. 4782; H.R. 4990; S. 482; S.

1060; S. 1321; S. 1328; S. 1589; S. 1790; S. 1846; S. 2065; and S. 2524. Other bills also could have implications for

campaign and election security even though they do not specifically reference the topic (e.g., those addressing cybersecurity

generally or voter access). Several congressional committees also have held legislative or oversight hearings on the topic.

Federal statutes—such as the Help America Vote Act (HAVA); Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA); and the Voting

Rights Act (VRA)—all contain provisions designed to make campaign finance, elections, or voting more secure. Several

federal agencies are directly or indirectly involved in campaign and election security. These include, but are not limited to,

the Department of Defense (DOD); Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Department of Justice (DOJ); Election

Assistance Commission (EAC); and Federal Election Commission (FEC).

Securing federal elections is a complex policy challenge that crosses disciplinary lines. Some of the factors shaping that

complexity include divisions of authority between the federal and state (or territorial or local) governments; coordination

among federal agencies, and communication with state agencies; funding; changing elections technology; and the different

needs of different sectors, such as campaigns, administrators, and vendors.

This report does not attempt to resolve ongoing policy debates about what campaign and election security should entail. The

report cites other CRS products that contain additional discussion of some of the topics discussed herein. The report does not

address constitutional or legal issues.

 

R46146

January 2, 2020

R. Sam Garrett, Coordinator Specialist in American National Government

Sarah J. Eckman Analyst in American National Government

Karen L. Shanton Analyst in American National Government

 

 

 

Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress

 

Congressional Research Service

Contents

Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1

Defining Election Security ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 2

Scope of the Report …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3

Recent Legislative Activity ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4

Development of Federal Role in Campaign and Election Security …………………………………………. 5

Selected Federal Statutes ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 7

Selected Federal Agencies ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 10

Election Assistance Commission (EAC) ……………………………………………………………………… 10 Federal Election Commission (FEC) …………………………………………………………………………… 11 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) ……………………………………………………………………. 11 Department of Justice (DOJ) ………………………………………………………………………………………. 11 Intelligence Community (IC) …………………………………………………………………………………….. 12 Selected Other Federal Agencies………………………………………………………………………………… 12 Coordination By and Among Selected Federal Agencies ………………………………………………. 13

Department of Homeland Security Coordination Roles …………………………………………… 14 Election Assistance Commission Coordination Roles ……………………………………………… 15 Intelligence Community Coordination Roles …………………………………………………………. 15 Coordination Roles and Selected Other Federal Agencies ……………………………………….. 16

Federal Agency Roles and Campaign Security …………………………………………………………….. 16

Federal Election Security Guidance …………………………………………………………………………………. 17

Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems ………………………………………………………………… 18

Funding for States After the 2016 Election Cycle …………………………………………………………. 18 Funding for Federal Agencies After the 2016 Election Cycle …………………………………………. 19

State and Local Role in Election Security …………………………………………………………………………. 20

Selected Recent Policy Issues for Congress ………………………………………………………………………. 22

Concluding Observations ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 28

 

Tables

Table 1. 116th Congress Legislation, Which Has Passed At Least One Chamber, Related

to Campaign and Election Security …………………………………………………………………………………. 4

Table 2. Selected Statutes Potentially Relevant for Campaign and Election Security ……………….. 8

Table 3. Selected Agency Roles in Campaign and Election Security …………………………………….. 13

Table 4. Selected Recent Policy Issues Related to Campaign and Election Security ……………….. 23

 

Appendixes

Appendix. Legislation Related to Campaign and Election Security That Has Advanced

Beyond Introduction, 116th Congress …………………………………………………………………………….. 30

 

 

 

Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress

 

Congressional Research Service

Contacts

Author Information ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 37

 

 

 

Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress

 

Congressional Research Service 1

Introduction Election security is one of the most prominent policy challenges facing Congress. A November

2019 warning from the heads of several federal agencies illustrates the interdisciplinary and

ongoing nature of the threat to American elections. According to the joint statement, in the 2020

election cycle, “Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign malicious actors all will seek to interfere in

the voting process or influence voter perceptions. Adversaries may try to accomplish their goals

through a variety of means, including social media campaigns, directing disinformation

operations or conducting disruptive or destructive cyber-attacks on state and local

infrastructure.”1

These are just the latest challenges in securing American elections. Traditionally, election

administration emphasizes policy goals such as ensuring that all eligible voters, and only eligible

voters, may register and cast ballots; that those ballots are counted properly; and that the voting

public views that process as legitimate and transparent. Preserving election continuity is a chief

concern. Election officials therefore have long prepared contingency plans that address various

risks, such as equipment malfunctions, power outages, and natural disasters.

These traditional concerns remain, but have taken on new complexity amid foreign interference in

U.S. elections. In addition to managing traditional security concerns about infrastructure and

administrative processes (e.g., counting ballots), mitigating external threats to the accuracy of

information voters receive, particularly from foreign sources, is a potential challenge for political

campaigns, election administrators, and the public.

Addressing any one of these topics might involve multiple areas of public policy or law. Doing so

also can involve complex practical challenges about which levels of government, or agencies, are

best equipped or most appropriate to respond. How those entities can or should interact with

political campaigns, the private sector, and voters, are also ongoing questions. Technical

complexity in some areas, such as cybersecurity, and the federal structure of shared national, state

or territorial, and local responsibility for administering federal elections make election security

even more challenging.

Election security in general appears to be a shared policy goal, but debate exists in Congress

about which policy issues and options to pursue. Debate over the scope of the federal

government’s role in election security shapes much of that debate. State, territorial, and local

governments are responsible for most aspects of election administration, including security.

This report provides congressional readers with an overview that includes

 how campaign and election security has developed as a policy field;

 recent legislative activity, especially bills that have advanced beyond introduction;

 federal statutes and agencies that appear to be most relevant for campaign and election security;

 state, territorial,2 or local roles in administering elections, and federal support for those functions; and

1 U.S. Department of Justice et al., “Joint Statement from DOJ, DOD, DHS, DNI, FBI, NSA, and CISA on Ensuring

Security of 2020 Elections,” press release, November 5, 2019, at https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-room/

Article/2009338/joint-statement-from-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-and-cisa-on-ensuring-security-of-2/.

2 In general, campaign and election security policy matters are similar in states and territories, although specific statutes

 

 

Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress

 

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 highlights of recent policy debates, and potential future questions for congressional consideration.

Defining Election Security

There is no single definition of “election security,” nor is there necessarily agreement on which

topics should or should not be included in the policy debate. Broadly speaking, election security

involves efforts to ensure fair, accurate, and safe elections. This can include a variety of activities

that happen before, during, and after voters cast their ballots.

 A narrow definition of election security might address only efforts to protect traditional election infrastructure, such as voter registration databases, voting

machines, polling places, and election result tabulations.

 More expansive definitions might also address issues affecting candidates and campaigns. This includes, for example, regulating political advertising or

fundraising; providing physical or cybersecurity assistance for campaigns; or

combating disinformation or misinformation in the political debate.

The policy debates discussed herein can affect different kinds of entities uniquely.

 Perhaps most notably, security concerns affecting campaigns can differ from those for safeguarding elections and voting. Campaigns in the United States

are about persuading voters in an effort to win elections. They are private,

not governmental, operations and are subject to relatively little regulation

beyond campaign finance policy.

 Elections are more highly regulated, although specific practices can vary, as their administration is primarily a state- or local-level responsibility.

 Provisions in state or local law, and, to a lesser degree, federal law, regulate how voters cast ballots and who may do so. Some security discussions

include issues related to voter access, while others view access as a separate

elections policy matter. This report briefly notes that access can be a

component of campaign and election security policy debates, but the report

does not otherwise address access issues.3

This report does not attempt definitively to resolve ongoing policy debates about what campaign

and election security entails or should entail, nor does it fully address all aspects of the policy

issues discussed. Instead, it provides congressional readers with background information to

consider that debate and decide whether or how to pursue legislation (including appropriations) or

distinguish between states and territories in some cases. A discussion of how federal election law applies to territories

versus states is beyond the scope of this report. Unless otherwise noted, campaign and election security concerns

discussed in the text of this report are relevant for territories.

3 Because voter access is primarily a state-level responsibility, this report does not address the topic in detail, although

it does address some Voting Rights Act provisions. For 116th Congress discussion of access issues, see, for example,

U.S. Congress, House Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections, Report on Voting Rights and

Election Administration in the United States of America, prepared by Chairperson Marcia L. Fudge, 116th Cong., 1st

sess., at https://cha.house.gov/report-voting-rights-and-election-administration-united-states-america, which includes

discussion of misinformation issues that are potentially relevant for election security; and U.S. Congress, House

Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections Voting Rights Act Findings: Minority Views, 116th

Cong., 1st sess., at https://republicans-cha.house.gov/voting-rights-act-minority-views. Both documents are undated and

were released in 2019. See also, for example, House debate on H.R. 4, “Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2019,”

House debate, Congressional Record, daily edition, December 6, 2019, pp. H9308-H9334. Most issues related to H.R.

4 do not specifically address campaign and election security and are thus beyond the scope of this report.

 

 

Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress

 

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oversight. Because all the topics noted above—and others discussed throughout the report—have

been components of the recent congressional debate over how to safeguard American campaigns,

elections, and voting, this report uses the general term campaign and election security.

Scope of the Report This report discusses federal agencies, statutes, and policies designed to prevent or respond to

deliberate domestic or foreign security threats to campaigns, elections, or voting. Concepts

discussed in the report also have implications for some unintentional threats, such as natural

disasters or other emergencies that could affect campaigns, elections, or voting. Legislation cited

in the report contains specific references to campaign and election security. This includes bill text

that uses variations of terms such as campaign, election, or vote near variations of the terms

interference or security. Some readers might view areas addressed herein as more or less directly

related to campaign or election security, and alternative methodologies could yield other bills or

policy topics for consideration.

The report does not include detailed attention to more traditional aspects of campaign finance,

election administration, or voting, particularly voter mobilization. For example, the report

discusses Help America Vote Act provisions that authorize funding states may use to help secure

elections, but not provisions that authorize funding for the Election Assistance Commission

generally.4 Similarly, the report briefly discusses Voting Rights Act provisions that prohibit voter

intimidation, but it does not discuss other federal statutes enacted to make registration and voting

easier.5 In addition, the report briefly notes lobbying statutes that might be relevant for regulating

certain corporate or foreign activity related to U.S. election interference, but it does not

substantially address lobbying as a policy area.

The report emphasizes domestic implications of campaign and election security. This includes

attention to protections for U.S. campaigns and elections from the effects of foreign

disinformation and misinformation efforts. The Appendix at the end of this report includes

sanctions or immigration legislation that specifically references interference in U.S. elections, and

which has advanced beyond introduction during the 116th Congress. However, foreign policy

implications of such interference, or a discussion of offensive operations and tactics that the

United States might or might not use against foreign adversaries, are otherwise beyond the scope

of this report.6

Because of the still-developing and complex policy challenges surrounding campaign and

election security, other areas of law, policy, or practice might also be relevant but are not

addressed here. The report references other CRS products that contain additional discussion of

4 Similarly, the report does not address funds for aspects of election security other than securing election systems, such

as Intelligence Community efforts to identify sources of election disinformation.

5 Other CRS products contain additional discussion. See, for example, CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S.

Campaigns and Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett; CRS Report RS20764, The Uniformed and Overseas

Citizens Absentee Voting Act: Overview and Issues, by R. Sam Garrett (originally authored by Kevin J. Coleman); and

CRS Report R45030, Federal Role in Voter Registration: The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and Subsequent

Developments, by Sarah J. Eckman.

6 For additional discussion of foreign policy implications and key concepts, see CRS Report R45142, Information

Warfare: Issues for Congress, by Catherine A. Theohary; and CRS In Focus IF10771, Defense Primer: Information

Operations, by Catherine A. Theohary; CRS In Focus IF10694, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions

Act, by Dianne E. Rennack, Kenneth Katzman, and Cory Welt; CRS In Focus IF10779, U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An

Overview, by Dianne E. Rennack and Cory Welt; CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory

Welt; and CRS In Focus IF10694, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, by Dianne E. Rennack,

Kenneth Katzman, and Cory Welt.

 

 

Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress

 

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several such topics. The report does not provide legal or constitutional analysis. It also does not

attempt to catalog all alleged or established instances of campaign and election interference or

security concerns, or to independently evaluate allegations.

Recent Legislative Activity Highlights of recent legislative activity include the following. Additional discussion appears

throughout the report.

 The 115th Congress (2017-2019) appropriated $380 million for FY2018 for improvements to the administration of federal elections, including upgrades to

election technology and security.

 The 116th Congress (2019-2021) appropriated $425 million for FY2020 in the consolidated appropriations bill (H.R. 1158; P.L. 116-93) enacted in December

2019. The “Funding for States After the 2016 Election Cycle” section of this

report contains additional detail.

 The 116th Congress enacted S. 1790 (P.L. 116-92), the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), in December 2019. The legislation contains several

provisions related to campaign and election security.

Table 1 below lists bills that have passed at least one chamber. The Appendix in this report

briefly summarizes 116th Congress legislation containing campaign and election security

provisions that has advanced beyond introduction.

Table 1. 116th Congress Legislation, Which Has Passed At Least One Chamber,

Related to Campaign and Election Security

See the “Scope of the Report” section and the Appendix of this report for additional detail.

Bill Number Short Title Latest Major Action

H.R. 1 For the People Act of 2019

 

Passed House (234-193),

03/08/2019

H.R. 753 Global Electoral Exchange Act of 2019 Passed House (voice

vote), 05/20/2019

H.R. 1158 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 Became P.L. 116-93,

12/20/2019

H.R. 2500 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2020

Passed House (220-197),

07/12/2019

 

H.R. 2722 Securing America’s Federal Elections (SAFE) Act Passed House (225-184),

06/27/2019

H.R. 3351 Financial Services and General Government

Appropriations Act, 2020

Passed House (224-196),

06/26/2019; see also H.R.

1158

H.R. 3494 Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years

2018, 2019, and 2020

Passed House (397-31),

07/17/2019

H.R. 4617 Stopping Harmful Interference in Elections for a

Lasting Democracy Act (SHIELD Act)

Passed House (227-181),

10/23/2019

 

 

Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress

 

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Bill Number Short Title Latest Major Action

S. 1321 Defending the Integrity of Voting Systems Act Passed Senate (unanimous

consent), 07/17/2019

S. 1328 Defending Elections against Trolls from Enemy

Regimes (DETER) Act

Passed Senate (unanimous

consent), 06/03/2019

S. 1790 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2020

Became P.L. 116-92,

12/20/2019

S. 1846 State and Local Government Cybersecurity Act

of 2019

Passed Senate (unanimous

consent), 11/21/2019

Source: CRS analysis of bill texts.

Notes: Bills in the table specifically reference campaign and election and security. Other legislation not included

in the table could be relevant for campaign or election security once implemented or in practice. See the “Scope

of the Report” section of this report and the Appendix for additional detail. The table excludes resolutions

(e.g., proposed constitutional amendments) and routine appropriations bills that propose funding for agencies

such as the Election Assistance Commission or Federal Election Commission, unless the appropriations bill also

contains additional provisions specifically addressing campaign and election security.

 In addition, during the 116th Congress, committees in both chambers have held hearings on these and related campaign and election security topics.7 The

Committee on House Administration and Senate Committee on Rules and

Administration exercise primary jurisdiction over federal elections. Several other

committees oversee related areas, such as intelligence or voting rights issues.

Another CRS product contains additional discussion of committee roles in

federal campaigns and elections generally.8

Development of Federal Role in Campaign and

Election Security Foreign interference is only the highest-profile and latest campaign and election security policy

challenge.9 Physical security, to protect voters, ballots, and vote counts, has been an ongoing

7 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and

Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 1: Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure with Additional

Views, 116th Cong., 1st sess., July 25, 2019, at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/

Report_Volume1.pdf; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns

and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 2: Russia’s Use of Social Media with Additional Views, 116th

Cong., 1st sess., October 8, 2019, at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/

Report_Volume2.pdf; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Oversight of the U.S. Election

Assistance Commission, 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 2019, S. Hrg. 116-74 (Washington: GPO, 2019); U.S. Congress,

House Committee on Homeland Security, Defending Our Democracy: Building Partnerships to Protect America’s

Elections, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, Serial No. 116-1 (Washington: GPO, 2019); and U.S. Congress,

House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Securing U.S. Election Infrastructure

and Protecting Political Discourse, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, Serial no. 116-28 (Washington: GPO,

2019). See also, for example, discussion and witness testimony presented during an October 22, 2019, House Judiciary

Committee oversight hearing, “Securing America’s Elections Part II: Oversight of Government Agencies.” As of this

writing, the hearing record does not appear to have been published. Video and written materials are available on the

committee website, https://judiciary.house.gov/legislation/hearings/securing-america-s-elections-part-ii-oversight-

government-agencies.

8 See CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett.

9 According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), foreign interference with U.S. elections falls

into “five distinct categories.” Collectively, these include “cyber” or “covert” operations. “Cyber operations” target

 

 

Campaign and Election Security Policy: Overview and Recent Developments for Congress

 

Congressional Research Service 6

concern. Specifically, in modern history, the federal government’s first role in securing elections

was primarily about access and voting rights.10 In 1965, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act

(VRA), which protects voters against race- or color-based discrimination in registration,

redistricting, and voting.11 More explicitly related to security, the VRA prohibits intimidation,

threats, or coercion in voting.12 Congress primarily tasked the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)

with enforcing the statute and related criminal provisions. Federal law enforcement agencies,

especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), also support states and localities—which

retain primary responsibility for election administration in the United States—in investigating

election crimes and providing physical security at the polls.

Fully utilize the materials that have been provided to you in order to support your response

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Provide a response to the following:

Our Nation’s well-being relies upon secure and resilient critical infrastructure—the assets, systems, and networks that underpin American society. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) — NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience — outlines how government and private sector participants in the critical infrastructure community work together to manage risks and achieve security and resilience outcomes. Review the NIPP and identify how the government and private sectors work together to manage risks while achieving security outcomes.

Instructions: Fully utilize the materials that have been provided to you in order to support your response. Your initial post should be at least 350 words. APA format. Please be sure to reference chapter from textbook in addition to other sources.

Order Code RL33648

Critical Infrastructure: The National Asset Database

Updated July 16, 2007

John Moteff Specialist in Science and Technology Policy

Resources, Science, and Industry Division

 

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/index.html

 

Critical Infrastructure: The National Asset Database

Summary

The Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been developing and maintaining a National Asset Database. The Database contains information on over 77,000 individual assets, ranging from dams, hazardous materials sites, and nuclear power plants to local festivals, petting zoos, and sporting good stores. The presence of a large number of entries of the latter type (i.e. assets generally perceived as having more local importance than national importance) has attracted much criticism from the press and from Members of Congress. Many critics of the Database have assumed that it is (or should be) DHS’s list of the nation’s most critical assets and are concerned that, in its current form, it is being used inappropriately as the basis upon which federal resources, including infrastructure protection grants, are allocated.

According to DHS, both of those assumptions are wrong. DHS characterizes the National Asset Database not as a list of critical assets, but rather as a national asset inventory providing the ‘universe’ from which various lists of critical assets are produced. As such, the Department maintains that it represents just the first step in DHS’s risk management process outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. DHS has developed, apparently from the National Asset Database, a list of about 600 assets that it has determined are critical to the nation. Also, while the National Asset Database has been used to support federal grant-making decisions, according to a DHS official, it does not drive those decisions.

In July 2006 the DHS Office of the Inspector General released a report on the National Asset Database. Its primary conclusion was that the Database contained too many unusual and out-of-place assets and recommended that those judged to be of little national significance be removed from the Database. In his written response to the DHS IG report, the Undersecretary of DHS did not concur with this recommendation, asserting that keeping these less than nationally significant assets in the Database gave it a situational awareness that will assist in preparing and responding to a variety of incidents.

Accepting the DHS descriptions of the National Asset Database, questions and issues remain. For example, the National Asset Database seems to have evolved away from its origins as a list of critical infrastructures, perhaps causing the differences in perspective on what the Database is or should be. As an inventory of the nation’s assets, the National Asset Database is incomplete, limiting its value in preparing and responding to a wide variety of incidents. Assuring the quality of the information in the Database is important and a never-ending task. If DHS not only keeps the less than nationally significant assets in the Database but adds more of them to make the inventory complete, assuring the quality of the data on these assets may dominate the cost of maintaining the Database, while providing uncertain value. Finally, the information currently contained in the Database carries with it no legal obligations on the owner/operators of the asset. If, however, the Database becomes the basis for regulatory action in the future, what appears in the Database takes on more immediate consequences for both DHS and the owner/operators.

 

 

 

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A Short Review of the DHS IG Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The National Asset Database: What It Is and What It Is Not . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

What Are Its Intended Uses? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 First Step in Identifying Critical Assets and Prioritizing Risk

Reduction Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Situational Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Basis for Allocating Critical Infrastructure Protection Grants . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 What to Keep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 A Potential Change in Status for the Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

List of Figures

Figure 1. National Asset Database Entries by Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

 

 

1 Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Inspector General. Progress in Developing the National Asset Database. OIG-06-04. June 2006. 2 Operation Liberty Shield was a comprehensive national plan to protect the homeland during U.S. operations in Iraq. For a discussion of some of the other initiatives taken as part of Operation Liberty Shield, see CRS Report RS21475, Operation Liberty Shield: Border, Transportation, and Domestic Security, by Jennifer E. Lake.

Critical Infrastructure: The National Asset Database

Introduction

The Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been developing and maintaining a National Asset Database. The Database contains information on a wide range of individual assets, from dams, hazardous materials sites, and nuclear power plants to local festivals, petting zoos, and sporting good stores. The presence of a large number of entries of the latter type (i.e. assets generally perceived as having more local importance than national importance) has attracted much criticism from the press and from Members of Congress. Many critics of the Database have assumed that it is (or should be) DHS’s list of the nation’s most critical assets and are concerned that, in its current form, it is being used inappropriately as the basis upon which federal resources, including infrastructure protection grants, are allocated. According to DHS, both of those assumptions are wrong.

The purpose of this report is to discuss the National Asset Database: what is in it, how it is populated, what the Database apparently is, what it is not, and how it is intended to be used. The report also discusses some of the issues on which Congress could focus its oversight. This report relies primarily on a DHS Office of the Inspector General (DHS IG) report,1 released on July 11, 2006, but makes reference to other government documents as well.

A Short Review of the DHS IG Report

The genesis of the National Asset Database remains somewhat unclear. A list of critical sites was begun in the spring of 2003 as part of Operation Liberty Shield.2

The list contained 160 assets, including chemical and hazardous materials sites, nuclear plants, energy facilities, business and finance centers, and more. The assets were selected by the newly formed Protective Services Division within the Office of Infrastructure Protection, in what was then called the Information Analysis and

 

 

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3 DHS offered assistance to help protect these sites through its Buffer Zone Protection Plan program. At times the State Homeland Security grants could be used to help pay for overtime of law enforcement officials and National Guardsmen protecting critical sites. 4 According to testimony by the then Undersecretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, a list of 1,700 assets (according to the DHS IG report the actual number was 1,849) was culled from the larger list. However, the DHS IG report implied that the Protected Measures Target List grew independently, to which was added additional information from the states and other sources, leading to a combined list of 28,368 assets, which then grew into the National Asset Database. 5 In June 2004, the House Appropriations Committee made reference to a Unified National Database of Critical Infrastructure, described as a master database of all existing critical infrastructures in the country. See, U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2005. H.Rept. 108-541. p. 92. The comparable Senate Appropriations Committee report (S.Rept. 108-280) made reference to a National Asset Database. The budget request for FY2005 mentions the development of a primary database of the nations critical infrastructure, but gave it no name. 6 The statutory definition of critical infrastructure is given in the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L.107-56). It is: “…systems and assets…so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health and safety, or any combination of those matters.” There are currently 12 sectors of the economy and 5 groups of key resources (dams, commercial assets, government facilities, national monuments, nuclear facilities) that DHS considers as possessing systems or assets that, if lost, may have a critical impact on the United States.

Infrastructure Protection Directorate, Department of Homeland Security. The Secretary of DHS asked states to provide additional security for these sites.3

During the course of the year (2003), DHS continued to collect information on various assets from a variety of sources. By early 2004, DHS had accumulated information on 28,368 assets. Although Operation Liberty Shield was now considered over, the initial list of 160 critical assets, those judged to be in need of additional protection because of their vulnerability and the potential consequences if attacked, grew to 1,849 assets and became known as the Protected Measures Target List.4 It is not clear when the information being gathered became known as the National Asset Database.5

By January 2006, according to the DHS IG report, the Database had grown to include 77,069 assets, ranging from nuclear power plants and dams to a casket company and an elevator company. It also contains locations and events ranging from Times Square in New York City to the Mule Day Parade in Columbia Tennessee (which, according to the city’s website, draws over 200,000 spectators each year for the week-long event).

The IG report categorized entries in the National Asset Database by critical infrastructure/key resource sector (see Figure 1).6 Additionally, the DHS IG report identified some of the entries with more specificity. For example, the Database contained, at the time, 4,055 malls, shopping centers, and retail outlets; 224 racetracks; 539 theme parks and 163 water parks; 1,305 casinos; 234 retails stores;

 

 

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7 Department of Homeland Security. National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Released June 30, 2006. See, [http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/editorial_0827.shtm]. 8 According to the DHS IG report, examples of existing government databases that have contributed to the National Asset Database include the Chemical Sites List (an Environmental Protection Agency database), and the Government Services Administration list of GSA Buildings.

514 religious meeting places; 127 gas stations; 130 libraries; 4,164 educational facilities; 217 railroad bridges; and 335 petroleum pipelines.

Source: Office of the Inspector General. Department of Homeland Security. Taken from Progress in Developing the National Asset Database.

The DHS gets information for the Database from a variety of sources. According to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)7, sources include existing government and commercially available databases;8 sector-specific agencies and other federal entities; voluntary submittals by owners and operators; periodic requests for information from states and localities and the private sector; and DHS- initiated studies. The number of assets in the Database is expected to grow as additional information is gathered.

The DHS IG report focused much of its attention on information provided by states and localities as the result of two data requests made by DHS. According to the DHS IG report, the vast majority of the 77,069 entries was collected as a result of those requests.

Commercial Assets, 17327

National Monuments and Icons, 224

Public Health, 8402

Postal and Shipping, 417

Energy, 7889

Not Specif ied, 290

Dams, 2029Agriculture and Food, 7542

Inf ormation Technology, 757

Transportation, 6141

Banking and Finance, 669

Water, 3842

Telecommunications, 3020

Chemical/Hazardous Materials, 2963

Nuclear Pow er Plants, 178

Emergency Services, 2420

Government Facilities, 12019

Def ense Industrial Base, 140

Figure 1. National Asset Database Entries by Sector

 

 

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9 Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Inspector General. Op. Cit. p. 11. The Office of Domestic Preparedness is now called Grants and Training and is located within the Federal Emergency Management Agency, newly reconstituted by the Post-Katrina Management Reform Act of 2006 (part of the FY2007 DHS appropriation bill). Referred to as ODP throughout this report, it manages the majority of grants to states and localities for homeland security and critical infrastructure protection. 10 Ibid p. 8. 11 Ibid p. 8. This is similar language used in ODP’s Urban Areas Security Initiative grants. 12 Ibid. p. 12. 13 The collection of personal information in the Database requires DHS to publish a Privacy Impact Assessment. That Assessment can be found at [http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_nadb.pdf]. A discussion of the Assessment is beyond the scope of this report. Site last visited on July 16, 2007. 14 Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Inspector General. Op. cit. p. 6. 15 According to the DHS IG report, the Database contains 11,018 entries identified as nationally significant, 32,631 identified as not considered nationally significant, and 33,419 whose significance are undetermined.

According to the IG report, the first data call to the states, made by the Office of Domestic Preparedness in 2003, yielded poor quality data.9 The IG report described the guidance given states and localities as “minimal.”10 The guidance apparently did tell states, however, to “consider any system or asset that, if attacked, would result in catastrophic loss of life and/or catastrophic economic loss.”11 As a result, assets such as the petting zoos, local festivals and other places where people within a community congregate, or local assets ostensibly belonging to one of the critical infrastructure sectors, were among the assets reported. According to the IG report, many state officials were surprised to learn that additional assets from their states were added to the Database, which raises additional questions about how the information was collected.

According to the IG report, the second request to the states for critical infrastructure information came from the Office of Infrastructure Protection in July 2004 and was “significantly more organized and achieved better results.”12 Guidance was more specific, as was the information requested. DHS requested information for 17 data fields. Of those, DHS considered the following to be most important: address, owner, owner type, phone, local law enforcement point of contact, and latitude and longitude coordinates.13 States were also asked to identify those assets that they felt met a level of national significance. Criteria for identifying assets of national significance was provided by DHS. The criteria described certain thresholds, such as refineries with refining capacity in excess of 225,000 barrels per day, or commercial centers with potential economic loss impact of $10 billion or capacity of more than 35,000 people. Although the request was more specific, states were given much leeway as to what to include, and OIP accepted into the Database every submitted asset.14 As a result, additional assets of questionable national significance were added to the Database.15

The DHS IG report drew two primary conclusions. The first is that the Database

contains many “unusual, or out-of-place, assets whose criticality is not readily

 

 

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16 Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General. Op. cit. p. 9. 17 Ibid p. 18. 18 Other examples of what the DHS IG considered to be inconsistent were: some states listed schools for their sheltering function, some did not; Indiana listed over 8,000 assets, more than states larger in area and population like New York, Texas, and California; and, fewer banking and finance centers are listed for New York than North Dakota. 19 Office of Homeland Security. National Strategy for Homeland Security. July 2002. p. 30. 20 White House. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. February 2003. p. 23.

apparent,”16 while, at the same time, it “may have too few assets in essential areas and may present an incomplete picture.”17 The second conclusion was that the types of assets that were included and the information provided are inconsistent from state to state, locality to locality. For example, California entries included the entire Bay Area Regional Transit System as a single entry, while entries listed for New York City included 739 separate subway stations.18

The IG report made 4 recommendations:

! review the National Asset Database for out-of-place assets and assets marked as not nationally significant, and determine whether those assets should remain in the Database;

! provide state homeland security advisers the opportunity to review their assets in the Database to identify previously submitted assets that may not be relevant;

! during future data calls, provide States a list of their respective Database assets to reduce … duplicate submissions; and

! establish a milestone for the completion of a comprehensive risk assessment of critical infrastructure and key resources and ensure they are accurately captured in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

The National Asset Database: What It Is and What It Is Not

The National Strategy for Homeland Security recognized that not all assets within each critical infrastructure sector are equally important, and that the federal government would focus its effort on the highest priorities.19 The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets stated that DHS will develop a methodology for identifying assets with national-level criticality and using this methodology will build a comprehensive database to catalog these critical assets.20 Judging from the criticism leveled at it, many believe the National Asset Database is (or should be) DHS’s list of assets critical to the nation.

 

 

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21 Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General. Op. cit. p. 29. 22 Department of Homeland Security. National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Op. cit. pg159. 23 See USA Today, “Database is Just the 1st Step,” by Robert Stephan. July 21, 2006. p. 8A. 24 See Congressional Quarterly’s internet publication, CQ Homeland Security, July 29, 2004, at [http://homeland.cq.com/hs/display.do?docid=1278697&sourcetype=31], last viewed July 16, 2007.

However, in his written response to the IG report, the Undersecretary for Preparedness, George Foresman, to whom the Office of Infrastructure Protection reports, stated that the National Asset Database is “not a list of critical assets…[but rather] a national asset inventory…[providing] the ‘universe’ from which various lists of critical assets are produced.”21 According to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the National Asset Database is a comprehensive catalog with descriptive information regarding the assets and systems that comprise the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources.22 The Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, Robert Stephan, has called the Database a ‘phonebook’ of 77,000 facilities, assets and systems from across the nation, needed to facilitate more detailed risk analyses.23

Some may ask why there should be this difference in perception regarding the National Asset Database. One possible explanation is that, as noted above, the National Asset Database started out as the Protected Measures Target List, which was a prioritized list of assets considered critical at the national level. Also, as reported in at least one media source, when asked for its list of critical assets, Members of Congress were shown the expanded list containing the questionable assets.24 Based on subsequent response, Congressional interest appears focused on a prioritized list.

Write a three-to-five page executive brief to support the implementation of the research project.

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UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

WRITING AN EXECUTIVE BRIEFING

Introduction: At some point during your career you will be asked to brief an executive audience on some work-related issue or project. The briefing may be in writing, in person (e.g. a live or oral presentation), or both. Below are some guidelines for executive briefings that may help you be more successful.

The Purpose of an Executive Briefing

You may be asked to give an executive briefing that is purely informational in nature. It is much more likely, however, that the purpose of your briefing will be to obtain something from the executive audience. You might seek to obtain:

· permission to carry out a project or a policy/process change;

· the resources needed to carry out a project or action; or

· something else that only the executives of your organization can provide.

What do we mean by Executive?

Executives are persons who possess the highest level of decision-making authority in an organization. Executives typically set organizational missions and goals; decide major policy initiatives; and have the final say in allocating the organization’s resources.

In the private sector, an organization’s executives (sometimes referred to as “executive officers”) will include the President/CEO (Chief Executive Officer), the Senior Vice Presidents, and such persons as the CFO (Chief Financial Officer). In the public sector, executives may have similar titles; they may also have different titles depending upon the nature and structure of the organization. For example, in a local law enforcement organization the Sheriff or Police Chief is certainly an executive officer, as are any senior offices to whom the Sheriff or Chief has delegated a high level of decision-making authority.

Characteristics of an Executive Audience

In preparing a briefing for an executive audience, keep in mind that executives have certain characteristics that influence various aspects of your briefing.

1. Executives are very busy people with a lot of demands on their time.

2. Executives are used to thinking strategically (the “Big Picture” rather than the localized operational details).

3. Executives tend to evaluate ideas and actions as they relate to the Vision, Mission, and Strategic Plans of the organization.

4. Executives have a bottom-line orientation.

5. Executives are not easily fooled.

What do these characteristics mean for you, the person preparing and/or delivering the briefing?

1. Your briefing will be shorter than a document or presentation prepared for a different type of audience (e.g. an audience of your peers, or of specialists in the subject).

2. Your briefing will have fewer details in it.

3. Your briefing will show that the ideas or recommendations in it are congruent with your organization’s Mission and Vision.

4. Your briefing will cover the financial and/or resource implications of your request or proposal.

5. Your briefing will have to be accurate, well-argued, and supported by evidence or data.

Let’s look at each of these items separately.

Length/Duration: If you hand an executive a 60-page briefing document, chances are very good that she will not read it. It’s not that she’s rude or dismissive of your work; it’s simply that she has neither the time nor the inclination to do so. Furthermore, as an executive she is used to quickly evaluating information, making a decision, and then moving on to the next item. The same thing is true of a “live” presentation; if you prepare an MSPowerPoint slideshow with 45 slides and ask for an hour in which to present it, the executive audience will likely stop listening to you after your fourth or fifth slide. It is your responsibility to present the key features of your proposal or recommendation in a short, succinct manner.

Level of Detail: In your position within the organization you and your colleagues no doubt understand and apply a very large amount of detailed knowledge to get work done. You may be tempted to include such details in your executive briefing on the grounds that they are important to the overall argument. Remember, though, that the executives in your organization are several levels removed from purely operational matters. Too much detailed information may confuse or distract them from your main points.

Mission and Vision: An organization’s mission and vision statements are among the tools with which executives evaluate the merits of a proposal or recommendation. In many cases, the executives are evaluated by how well they achieve the carrying out of the mission and vision. In your briefing you will need to address the mission and vision and, if appropriate, demonstrate how your proposal or recommendation aligns with, and helps to fulfill, the mission and vision.

Financial and Resource Implications: The ideas you present in your briefing may seem like the greatest things in the world to you, so great that they should be acted upon immediately regardless of cost or impact to the organization. Keep in mind, though, that the organization’s executives are the ones who have to sign the checks, pay the bills, etc. In your briefing you will have to let them know how much your proposal is going to cost, or how many resources will have to be added or diverted to carry out your recommendation, so that they can weigh the costs/benefits as part of the decision-making process.

Argumentation and Accuracy: People who rise to executive levels within organizations are likely to be very smart. Further, they’re also likely to be sensitive to logic and to the appropriate use of evidence. If you try to fool them, they will know. If you try to manipulate data to make a situation look more attractive or beneficial than it really is, they’ll catch on quickly. If you try to make up an answer to a question they pose to you, they’ll figure it out and you will lose credibility in their eyes. Therefore, the arguments you make in your briefing must be solid, and the data you present in support of those arguments must be accurate and properly presented.

Guidelines for Preparing a Written Executive Briefing

1. Keep it as short as possible. If you have no choice but to provide a great deal of information (or if you were specifically asked to do so), then prepare an Executive Summary for your briefing document. An Executive Summary is a short (typically four paragraphs of four sentences each) description of the main points in the document, for example:

a. The Problem or Situation to be Resolved or Addressed;

b. The Proposed Solution or Recommendation;

c. The Costs of the Solution or Recommendation;

d. The Benefit(s) to the Organization of the Solution or Recommendation.

2. Don’t overuse charts, tables, and graphs. These items are, of course, useful for displaying large amounts of data. They are more effective, however, when used sparingly. Also, be sure that the charts, tables, and graphs can be read and easily understood when placed in a written document.

3. Make the document as “readable” as possible. By this we mean apply the general principles of good business writing, for example:

a. Use an appropriate font and font size;

b. Leave a suitable amount of “white space” on the pages (don’t use very narrow margins or try to cram too much text onto a page);

c. Avoid long sentences.

d. Avoid overuse of the passive voice.

e. Use informative section headings (and make sure to provide a Table of Contents for them).

f. Use “vertical lists” for long lists (i.e. more than three items in the list)

4. Provide references for any documents or sources quoted in the briefing. This seems pretty obvious, but a surprisingly large number of people forget to do this, especially when they’re in a hurry to complete the briefing document.

5. Present the main recommendation, proposal, or feature of your briefing early in the document. If your briefing is about a recommended policy change or purchase of equipment, state that on the first page of your document (and in the first paragraph of your Executive Summary, if you prepare one).

Guidelines for Preparing an Oral Executive Briefing

1. If you use a presentation medium such as MSPowerPoint, treat your presentation as if it were a document. In other words, apply the four guidelines listed above to the preparation of your PowerPoint slides.

2. Do not give your audience documents (including copies of your slides) before your presentation. If you do, you run the risk that your audience will start reading the documents rather than paying attention to your briefing. You can hand out written materials after your presentation.

3. Be prepared for questions. If your presentation is effective, it will likely trigger questions from the executive audience. Have material with you that you can consult when trying to answer a question. If you don’t know the answer and don’t have the appropriate material with you, say so and offer to get the answer for the questioner as soon as possible.

4. Be respectful but confident. As the presenter of the briefing, you are viewed as the expert on the contents. Make eye contact with the audience; control the flow of the presentation (e.g. stipulate that you would prefer questions to be held until the end of the presentation); and don’t make apologies for being unable to answer a question right on the spot.

Conclusion: Writing for, and presenting to, an executive audience is challenging but sometimes necessary for you to succeed in your profession. Be mindful of the characteristics of the executive audience and shape your briefing accordingly.

Chemical Biological Hazards

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**ANSWER THIS QUESTION 250 words min**

Evaluate the arguments and evidence that terrorist groups are likely or unlikely to use CBRN weapons.  In particular, what do you think are the prospects for ISIS and/or other sub-state actors to acquire and use a CBRN weapon in a

**ANSWER THIS QUESTION 250 words min**

Evaluate the arguments and evidence that terrorist groups are likely or unlikely to use CBRN weapons.  In particular, what do you think are the prospects for ISIS and/or other sub-state actors to acquire and use a CBRN weapon in a foreign country? In the United States? Why or why not?

**REPLY TO THESE TWO ANSWERS 150 WORDS MIN EACH**

1. After this week’s readings I would say that it is highly unlikely, but not impossible, for a terrorist group to use CBRN weapons.  There just seem to be too many factors going against terrorists when it comes to the production and acquisition of CBRN weaponry.  A terrorist group would first need the expertise in their members to prepare the CBRN materials.  They would also need the special equipment and resources needed to produce CBRN material, which they do not have.  The materials needed are usually very hard to obtain as they are closely monitored for security reasons and antiterrorism efforts.  I do feel, however, that if a terrorist group had the resources and capabilities to acquire a CBRN weapon, they would not hesitate for a second to use it.  It would be a very effective tool for terrorism as it has the ability to cause mass panic and mass casualties.

Speaking specifically about ISIS, I believe they do have the finances and connections to pose a legitimate threat of obtain and using CBRN weapons.  I do not think they have the capabilities to produce their own, but they could acquire such weapons by other means.  The most plausible way would be from other countries who have stockpiles of CBRN munitions, either through theft or illegal purchase.  With that being said, if a terrorist group such as ISIS were to poses such a weapon, I do think they would be able to use it in a foreign country.  However, I do not think they would be able to use it on the United States as our border and coastal security is superior and getting such a weapon even remotely close to the U.S. would be nearly impossible in itself.

References:

Mauroni, A. (2010). Homeland Insecurity: Thinking About CBRN Terrorism. Homeland Security Affairs. Retrieved October 05, 2020, from https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/1266215242

2. To start off, I would just like to say it’s refreshing to discuss CBRN weapons rather than simply “WMDs”. As our reading from Mauroni attests, WMD is a very unclear term, while CBRN states specifically what we are discussing.

It seems to me that the evidence clearly shows both intent and capability of terrorist groups to utilize CBRN weapons. In our current threat environment, we have seen ISIS show a significant technical proficiency in utilizing chemical weapons, including developing chemical mortar rounds. This was the first time the world saw a non-state entity with the engineering capability to not only develop chemical weapons, but pair them with a stand-off projectile delivery system (Strack, 2017). Even before that, Al-Qaeda attempted to purchase weapons-grade Uranium from a Sudanese military officer in 1993, and in 2006 a plot by a Russian national to sell weapons-grade uranium was thwarted (Sinai, 2007).

The fact is, the world has created a perfect storm for CBRN terrorism. With the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Eastern Europe in varying degrees of upheaval, there are plenty of areas for terrorists to operate, develop, and train with CBRN weapons. When the possibility of governments weakened by ongoing conflict is added into the equation, the possibility of CBRN proliferation becomes a likelihood.

The question then becomes, how likely is a terrorist group to export a CBRN weapon from one of those unstable areas where they can exist unchecked to a country with a strong anti-terrorist capability? Again, one has to examine the global climate. Mass numbers of refugees fleeing conflict provide a perfect cover for terrorist infiltration. Governments naturally have to relax border controls to take in large numbers of refugees, so the opportunity for importing such weapons clearly exists. When the fact that the global economy also relies on free trade is considered, the picture is clear: terrorists can commit such an attack, and they have demonstrated clear intent to do so.

country? In the United States? Why or why not?

**REPLY TO THESE TWO ANSWERS 150 WORDS MIN EACH**

1. After this week’s readings I would say that it is highly unlikely, but not impossible, for a terrorist group to use CBRN weapons.  There just seem to be too many factors going against terrorists when it comes to the production and acquisition of CBRN weaponry.  A terrorist group would first need the expertise in their members to prepare the CBRN materials.  They would also need the special equipment and resources needed to produce CBRN material, which they do not have.  The materials needed are usually very hard to obtain as they are closely monitored for security reasons and antiterrorism efforts.  I do feel, however, that if a terrorist group had the resources and capabilities to acquire a CBRN weapon, they would not hesitate for a second to use it.  It would be a very effective tool for terrorism as it has the ability to cause mass panic and mass casualties.

Speaking specifically about ISIS, I believe they do have the finances and connections to pose a legitimate threat of obtain and using CBRN weapons.  I do not think they have the capabilities to produce their own, but they could acquire such weapons by other means.  The most plausible way would be from other countries who have stockpiles of CBRN munitions, either through theft or illegal purchase.  With that being said, if a terrorist group such as ISIS were to poses such a weapon, I do think they would be able to use it in a foreign country.  However, I do not think they would be able to use it on the United States as our border and coastal security is superior and getting such a weapon even remotely close to the U.S. would be nearly impossible in itself.

References:

Mauroni, A. (2010). Homeland Insecurity: Thinking About CBRN Terrorism. Homeland Security Affairs. Retrieved October 05, 2020, from https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/1266215242

2. To start off, I would just like to say it’s refreshing to discuss CBRN weapons rather than simply “WMDs”. As our reading from Mauroni attests, WMD is a very unclear term, while CBRN states specifically what we are discussing.

It seems to me that the evidence clearly shows both intent and capability of terrorist groups to utilize CBRN weapons. In our current threat environment, we have seen ISIS show a significant technical proficiency in utilizing chemical weapons, including developing chemical mortar rounds. This was the first time the world saw a non-state entity with the engineering capability to not only develop chemical weapons, but pair them with a stand-off projectile delivery system (Strack, 2017). Even before that, Al-Qaeda attempted to purchase weapons-grade Uranium from a Sudanese military officer in 1993, and in 2006 a plot by a Russian national to sell weapons-grade uranium was thwarted (Sinai, 2007).

The fact is, the world has created a perfect storm for CBRN terrorism. With the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Eastern Europe in varying degrees of upheaval, there are plenty of areas for terrorists to operate, develop, and train with CBRN weapons. When the possibility of governments weakened by ongoing conflict is added into the equation, the possibility of CBRN proliferation becomes a likelihood.

The question then becomes, how likely is a terrorist group to export a CBRN weapon from one of those unstable areas where they can exist unchecked to a country with a strong anti-terrorist capability? Again, one has to examine the global climate. Mass numbers of refugees fleeing conflict provide a perfect cover for terrorist infiltration. Governments naturally have to relax border controls to take in large numbers of refugees, so the opportunity for importing such weapons clearly exists. When the fact that the global economy also relies on free trade is considered, the picture is clear: terrorists can commit such an attack, and they have demonstrated clear intent to do so.