Social Science and Public Policy

What Price Knowledge? Arthur G. Miller

The experiments of Stanley Milgram on obedience toauthority have achieved a visibility that is without precedent in the social sciences. Although conducted more than twenty years ago, Milgram’s research may be the most widely cited program of studies in psychology. The treatment given to these experiments in textbooks is extraordinary in terms of space alone. It is not uncom- mon for several pages to be allotted, including pho- tographs of Milgram’s laboratory and of actual episodes of genocide or destructive obedience as these have oc- curred in our history. The obedience experiments, which in many respects are unique and unlike any other variety of behavioral research, have come to be the focal point for analyses and debates about research ethics. From its in- ception, Milgram’s work unleashed a storm of ethical controversy.

The experiment was conducted at Yale University. The subjects, recruited by newspaper advertisement and mail solicitation, were forty men, ranging in age (twenty to fifty) and socioeconomic circumstances (postal clerks, en- gineers, laborers, high-school teachers, and so on). They receive $4.50 for their participation. The stated purpose ofthe study was to examine the effects of punishment on learning. A highly credible rationale for the ensuing study was presented, one that would justify the use of electric shocks.

Three individuals participated in the basic experiment: The experimenter, played by a thirty-one-year-old high- school teacher; the learner (or victim), played by a forty- seven-year-old accountant; and the teacher, always des- tined, by a fixed draw, to be played by the real or true subject. After a short briefing by the experimenter and the role assignments, the learner was placed in an electric- chair apparatus, and an elaborate description was given regarding the nature of the task to be learned and the punishment delivery system.

The teacher was instructed to read a series of word pairs to the learner and then to read the first word ofa pair and four possible associations. The learner was to indicate which of the four associations had been paired with the first word. The response alternatives consisted of four numbered switches, each of which would light up a corre- sponding indicator light on the top ofthe shock generator

in front of the teacher. The instructions authorized the teacher to punish the learner for each error of recall by pressing a lever on a shock generator. The teacher was also required to announce over an intercom the outcome of each trial, the correct answer if an error had been made, and the amount of shock voltage which would be mo- mentarily forthcoming.

The shock generator consisted of a panel with thirty levers, each accompanying a designated voltage ranging from 15 to 450 volts. Various switches, dials, indicator lights, and meters gave a highly authentic appearance to the generator. Particularly important (and later to be- come a point of controversy) were the verbal labels en- graved at various intervals (Slight Shock, Moderate Shock, Strong Shock, Very Strong Shock, Intense Shock, Extreme Intensity Shock, Danger: Severe Shock). The last two shock levers (that is, 435v, 450v) were marked XXX. There was no attempt to conceal the fact that very power- ful shocks could be delivered using this formidable piece of apparatus. To convince subjects ofthe realistic punish- ment that could be administered, each teacher received a sample shock—more than a tingle—which was described as being 45 volts, that is, position #3 on the generator. Milgram reported that no subject suspected the simulated aspect ofthe generator.

Considerable controversy arose regarding the precise amount of harm that subjects perceived could be inflicted during the experiment. While being strapped into place and having the electrodes attached to his arm, the learner was instructed to inquire about the prospect of being harmed. The experimenter’s standard response was: “Al- though the shocks can be extremely painful, they cause no permanent tissue damage.”

The delivery of punishment thus occurred in the con- text of an interaction between the experimenter (au- thority), the teacher, and the learner. The teacher was required to increase the voltage level by one switch, (that is, by 15 volts) for each error made by the learner. On 25 percent of the trials, the learner made the “correct” re- sponse to lend a note of credibility to his performance. In response to questions or hesitation on the part of the teacher, the experimenter answered with one of four in- creasingly strident prods, to the point that the teacher

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should cotititiue. If the subject refused to continue after the fourth prod, the experiment was terminated. There were various inquiries from subjects that received stan- dardized replies, such as a reassurance that no permanent tissue damage would occur, or the fact that “whether the learner likes it or not, you must go on until he has learned all the word pairs correctly,” or the fact that the experi- menter would assume responsibility for the learner’s welfare.

The physical setting involved the teacher and learner in adjacent rooms, with the experimenter in the same room as the teacher. If the subject (teacher) continued to shock the learner to the 300 volt level (the twentieth lever), feed- back from the learner was supplied by his pounding on the wall. This was clearly audible to the teacher. After this point, the learner’s responses no longer appeared on the indicator light. This nonresponse was, according to the experimenter, to be treated as an error, with the shock series being continued as it had been to this point.

Milgram’s experiment is unique in using verbal com- mands that blatantly contradict the subject’s wishes. The element of authority seems to occur most vividly at the third prod—”It is absolutely essential that you continue.” This assertion is qualitatively more emphatic than the two earlier prods (“Please continue. . . . The experiment requires that you continue”). The fmal prod—”You have no other choice, you must go on”—is a clear falsehood. That such verbal utterances, without clear substantive meaning, appear to have strongly influenced subjects to shock (in their own minds) a protesting individual is one ofthe most intriguing findings ofthe study.

Responses to Authority The primary measure was the maximum shock admin-

istered to the learner, ranging in principle from 0 to 450 volts. Although individual differences in following orders were clearly evident, Milgram’s orientation always focused upon the ultimate behavior: “A subject who breaks off the experiment at any point prior to admin- istering the thirtieth shock level is termed a deftant sub- ject. One who complies with experimental commands fully, and proceeds to administer all shock levels com- manded, is termed an obedient subject.”

This categorical designation—obedience versus de- fiance—has an appealing simplicity, and facilitates a comparison of different procedural variations on the sub- jects’ performance. Milgram described a total of eighteen experimental variations on the basic paradigm in his 1974 book Obedience to Authority.

Of the forty subjects participating in the baseline ex- periment described in Milgram’s 1963 publication in the Journal of Abrtormal and Social Psychology, twenty-six pressed the 450-volt switch. This result—an obedience rate of 65 percent—is the major finding of the study. It has become the most well-known result ofthe entire obe- dience research project, despite the fact that in a number of Milgram’s experiments, the obedience rate dropped to zero. The 65 percent obedience result has become a base-

line finding against which other findings, including peo- ple’s intuitive perceptions, are compared.

After the experiments, a debate between Milgram and D. Baumrind appeared in the 1964 American Psychol- ogist. A strong case could be made that this was the impe- tus for a renaissance of sensitivity to ethical issues in human experimentation. Their exchange is invariably cited in any serious review of research ethics. It was not simply that Milgram had used deception, for countless studies prior to his own had used this procedure, often to an extreme degree. Nor was the use of electric shock, or at least the prospect of delivering it, a key factor. There was

Milgram denied that his subjects experienced psychological trauma of

any significant duration.

something about the obedience experiments that aroused a particularly hostile reaction in many readers, a reaction often involving a general rejection of the experiments and, at least by implication, a personal attack on Milgram himself. It is also true that the obedience research, be- cause of its novelty and vivid impact, sensitized social scientists to a broad array of ethical issues which were, in principle, applicable to research in general, research of a more benign surface quality.

We could reason that any research investigation that achieves the kind of celebrity status accorded to Milgram’s work is likely to elicit criticism simply because of its visibility This is not applicable to the obedience experiments, for they were the subject of an impassioned and (what turned out to be an) extraordinarily infiuential ethical criticism less than one year after Milgram’s initial publication in 1963. It was Milgram’s response to Baumrind—and his published reactions to a number of other critics as well—that helped to construct an instruc- tive and enriched scholarly foundation for the controver- sies that emanated from the obedience experiments. Students of the obedience research stand to profit, not simply in being able to arrive at a verdict in terms of whether Milgram “wins or loses” the debate, but rather in learning about the values and premises that generate questions about these experiments, and the strategies and resourcefulness of Milgram and others, in answering them.

Baumrind opened her essay with a recognition that cer- tain types of psychological research may prove unsettling to subjects. Noting that the experimenter is obliged to be attentive to the subjects’ sense of well-being, particularly if the treatment has induced feelings of insecurity, anxiety, or hostility, Baumrind emphasized the dependent posture

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of subjects in experimental settings. She concluded that this role or “mind-set” has important consequences in terms of what may be investigated. Her argument empha- sized the vulnerability of the subject in the experimental setting, a factor that she viewed as having both ethical as well as methodological implications. Experimenters should assume a protective role in view of the emotional distress that could occur, and they should recognize the implausibility of investigating phenomena which, as in obedience, are built into the subject’s role. She did not rule out the use of deception or anxiety-evoking pro- cedures, but stressed the need for sensitive, thorough postexperimental interactions between investigators and their subjects. What specifically were her objections to the obedience experiments? Her focus is on the tension expe- rienced by Milgram’s subjects, as in this description: “I observed a mature and initially poised businessman enter the laboratory smiling and confident. Within 20 minutes he was reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck, who was rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse.” Citing Milgram’s statement that “a friendly reconciliation was arranged between the subject and the victim, and an effort was made to reduce any tensions that arose as a result of the experiment,” Baumrind expressed grave doubts: “His casual assurance that these tensions were dissipated before the subject left the laboratory is unconvincing.”

Baumrind appears to dismiss the validity of Milgram’s assurance. Her use of the term “casual” could be taken as a reference to Milgram’s irresponsible professional con- duct, an implication also made when she asks: “What could be the rational basis for such a posture of indif- ference?” She asserts that in terms of research ethics, Milgram has taken a position that the “ends are worth the

The obedience research sensitized social scientists to a broad array of

ethical issues.

means.” Because of the scientific value of his research, the costs, in terms of the distress experienced by his subjects, are viewed as acceptable. Baumrind does not agree: “Un- like the Sabin vaccine, for example, the concrete benefit to humanity of his [Milgram’s] particular piece of work, no matter how competently handled, cannot justify the risk that real harm will be done to the subject.” Her posi- tion is that behavioral scientists cannot, in principle, have the kind of confidence that medical researchers would have regarding society’s evaluation of their work.

I am tempted to say that Baumrind’s conception of a breakthrough phenomenon in research is naive, for rarely

do we know when a breakthrough is before us. Only after the fact can we recognize such a phenomenon in science; invariably the “breakthrough” refiects decades of related research efforts, many of which were destined to blind alleys instead of public acclaim. Baumrind may also be suggesting that psychological research is, categorically, not as important as medical research, hence procedures that threaten research subjects with emotional stress are simply unwarranted. This, too, would be an “ends are worth the means” logic in that such stress would appar- ently be acceptable in medical research because of the long-term gains from its discoveries. Yet, the question of the value or “benefit to humanity” of Milgram’s research is certainly reasonable to ask. Also, the cost/benefit framework raised by Baumrind has been a very infiuen- tial argument in subsequent analyses of ethical issues in research.

Consequences Baumrind outlined two unacceptable outcomes of the

subjects’ participation in the Milgram paradigm. One is a shaken faith in authority. Subjects may generalize their encounter with the deceitful experimenter and experience difficulty in their future relationships with authority fig- ures. Second, the subject’s self-image is threatened, in a manner that may be resistant to effective debriefing. It is largely irrelevant to tell the subject that no shocks were actually delivered, because the issue centers on the im- plications of the subject’s behavior when he or she be- lieved that the shocks were being delivered to the learner.

Emphasizing her earlier argument regarding the high baseline of dependency inherent in the role of laboratory subject, Baumrind takes exception to linking the obe- dience research to the genocide perpetrated by the Nazis. She notes that the Nazi SS officers (analogous to the teacher) were not under the impression that the ultimate authority—that is. Hitler—was kindly disposed toward the victims. The victims were not (as in the obedience paradigm) social peers of the SS but rather were de- humanized to an extreme degree. Baumrind contends that the conflict expressed by many subjects is evidence of their concern for the learner—again unlike the Nazi anal- ogy—and that the subjects’ tensions may have refiected their inability to comprehend the behavior of the experi- menter as much as, or even more than, their misgivings about how they were treating the learner.

While the generalizability of Milgram’s work is, strictly speaking, a methodological rather than ethical problem, these two perspectives are often closely related. Because one of Baumrind’s central arguments rests on the trust and dependence of the subject with respect to the experi- menter—that is, that the experimenter is a “good” person who is kindly disposed toward human beings—it is pre- cisely this perspective that leads her to see the entire para- digm as unconvincing in its relevance to the Nazi death camps. The laboratory, to subjects, is a trustworthy and safe place. Milgram violated this presumption and that was his ethical error Yet, because the laboratory is still

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presumably invested with these qualities, one cannot in- terpret the subjects’ behavior as reflecting destructive obe- dience with parallels to the Holocaust.

Baumrind concluded with a strong although not abso- lutist recommendation: “I would not like to see experi- ments such as Milgram’s proceed unless the subjects were fully informed of the dangers of serious aftereffects and his correctives were clearly shown to be effective in restor- ing their state of well-being.”

The use of deception as a research strategy appears to be acceptable to

potential subjects.

Milgram’s published response to Baumrind’s criticism appeared several months later in the 1964 American Psy- chologist. Milgram had collected the entire set of data prior to the 1963 publication, and he had made reference in that publication to the fact that a larger data set had been collected, including some containing relevant infor- mation concerning the apparatus and initial reaction of subjects. Baumrind had published her ethical criticism without first contacting Milgram and making inquiries pertinent to her objections.

Milgram went into considerable detail concerning the debriefing phase of his research. Subjects, regardless of their obedience or defiance, were each given an explana- tion that bolstered their sense of esteem and supported their course of action. Subjects were also sent a report presenting various procedural details as well as findings. He emphasized that “their own part in the experiments was treated in a dignified way and their behavior in the experiment respected.”