Third Party Rights

By the due date assigned, submit your answers for two scenarios  to this Discussion Area.  Start reviewing and responding to your classmates as early in the week as possible.  You should review and critique the work of other students as outlined in the expanded rubric by the end of the week.

Select two of the scenarios listed below and explain the best solution for each.  Include comments related to any ethical issues that arise.  You should locate at least one scholarly source from the SUO Library or one case that has been decided or is currently pending to support your answer.

Scenario 1    Third Party Rights

Bobby was attending college two hundred miles from his home for the fall semester. Bobby’s wealthy  aunt, Brenda, decides to give Bobby a car for Christmas. In November, Brenda makes a contract with Walker Ford to purchase a new car for $21,800 to be delivered to Bobby just before the Christmas holidays, in mid- December. The title to the car is to be in Bobby’s name. Brenda pays the full purchase price, calls Bobby and tells him about the gift, and takes off for a three-month vacation in Mexico.

  • Is Bobby an intended third party beneficiary of the contract between Brenda and Walker Ford?
  • Suppose that Walker Ford never delivers the car to Bobby. Does Bobby have the right to sue Walker Ford for breaching its contract with Brenda? Explain.

Scenario 2 –   Statute of Frauds

Kathy agreed to purchase specially made cartons for one-of a kind wood sculptures from Pierce Packaging.  Pierce faxed an invoice to Kathy reflecting a purchase price of $35,000, with a 20 percent down payment and the “balance due before shipment.” Kathy paid the down payment. Pierce finished the cartons and wrote Kathy a letter telling her to “pay the balance due or you will lose the down payment.” By then, Kathy had lost her customers for the cartons, could not pay the balance due, and asked for the return of her down payment. 

  • Did these parties have an enforceable contract under the Statute of Frauds? Explain.

Scenario 3 –  Breach and Remedies

Candace Dixon agreed to sell Alana Mendes a house in Alabama for $205,000. The sale was supposed to close by November  30, when the parties were to exchange the deed for the price. The contract included a provision that “if Seller is unable to convey good, clear, insurable, and marketable title, Buyer shall have the option to:

  1. accept such title as Seller is able to convey without reduction of the Purchase Price, or
  2. cancel this Agreement and receive a return of all Deposits.”

An examination of the public records revealed that the house did not have marketable title. Mendes offered Dixon additional time to resolve the problem, and the closing did not occur as scheduled. Dixon decided “the deal is over” and offered to return the deposit. Mendes refused and, in mid-December, decided to exercise her option to accept the house without marketable title. She notified Dixon, who did not respond. She then filed a lawsuit against Dixon in a state court.

  • Discuss whether Dixon breached the contract and decide in whose favor the court should rule.
  • Assume that Dixon breached the contract and determine what the appropriate remedy is in this situation.

Scenario 4 – Third Parties

Ronny enters into a contract with Sean to paint Sean’s house.   Ronny paints Sean’s house an extremely hideous orange and blue even though Sean specified tan. Sean and his neighbor Chris are both fans of the Florida Seminoles and are furious to see the house painted in Florida Gator colors .  Sean and Chris threaten to sue Ronny. 

  • Evaluate the arguments each party will make, determine the outcome and support your answer with appropriate sources.

IN-TEXT CITATION INCLUDED

What are some of the problems the political system faces in overseeing markets

C h a p t e r F o c u s

■ What is economic efficiency and how can it be used to evaluate

markets?

■ Why is it generally undesirable to pursue any goal to perfection?

■ What is the role of government in a market economy?

■ What are externalities? What are public goods?

■ Why might markets fail to allocate goods and services efficiently?

■ If the market has shortcomings, does this mean the government should

intervene?

The principal justification for public policy intervention lies in the frequent and numerous shortcomings of market outcomes.

—Charles Wolf 1

Difficult Cases for the Market

and The Role of Government 5 C H A P T E R

1Charles Wolf, Jr., Markets or Government (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 17.

 

 

110

As we previously discussed, markets and government planning are the two main alternatives for the organization ofeconomic activity. Chapters 3 and 4 introduced you to how markets work and demonstrated how the invisiblehand of the market process directs the self-interest of individuals toward activities in the best interest of society. Throughout, we noted that some qualifications were in order, both in terms of the “rules of the game” that must be in place for

markets to work well and the existence of special cases, in which the invisible hand might not function effectively. In this chap-

ter, we turn our attention to discussing these potential problem areas for the market and consider their implications with regard

to the role of government. In the following chapter, we will analyze how the political process works more directly. ■

Economic efficiency A situation that occurs when (1) all activities generating more benefit than cost are undertaken, and (2) no activities are undertaken for which the cost exceeds the benefit.

2Note to students who may pursue advanced study in economics: Using the concept of efficiency to compare alternate policies typically requires that the analyst estimate costs and benefits that are difficult or impossible to measure. Costs and benefits are the values of opportunities forgone or accepted by individuals, as evaluated by those individuals. Then these costs and benefits must be added up across all individuals and compared. But does a dollar’s gain for one individual really compensate for a dollar’s sacrifice by another? Some economists simply reject the validity of making such comparisons. They say that neither the estimates by the economic analyst of subjectively determined costs and benefits nor the adding up of these costs and benefits across individuals is meaningful. Their case may be valid, but most economists today nevertheless use the concept of efficiency as we present it. No other way to use economic analysis to compare policy alternatives has been found.

A CLOSER LOOK AT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

Economists use the standard of economic efficiency to assess the desirability of economic outcomes. We briefly introduced the concept in Chapter 3. We now want to explore it in more detail. The central idea of economic efficiency is straightforward. For any given level of cost, we want to obtain the largest possible benefit. Alternatively, we want to obtain any particular benefit for the least possible cost. Economic efficiency means getting the most value from the available resources—making the largest pie from the available set of ingre- dients, so to speak.

Economists acknowledge that individuals generally do not regard the efficiency of the entire economy as a primary goal for themselves. Rather, each person is interested in enlarging the size of his or her own slice. But if resources are used more efficiently, the overall size of the pie will be larger, and therefore, at least potentially, everyone could have a larger slice. For an outcome to be consistent with ideal economic efficiency, two condi- tions are necessary:

Rule 1. Undertaking an economic action is efficient if it produces more benefits than costs. To satisfy economic efficiency, all actions generating more benefits than costs must be undertaken. Failure to undertake all such actions implies that a potential gain has been forgone.

Rule 2. Undertaking an economic action is inefficient if it produces more costs than benefits. To satisfy economic efficiency, no action that generates more costs than benefits should be undertaken. When such counterproductive actions are taken, society is worse off because even better alternatives were forgone.

Economic efficiency results only when both of these conditions have been met. Either failure to undertake an efficient action (Rule 1) or the undertaking of an inefficient action (Rule 2) will result in economic inefficiency. To illustrate, consider Exhibit 1, which shows the benefits and costs associated with expanding the amount of any particu- lar activity. We have avoided using a specific example here to ensure you understand the general idea of efficiency without linking it to a specific application. As we will show, the concept has wide-ranging applications—from the evaluation of government policy to how long you choose to brush your teeth in the morning.2

In Exhibit 1, the marginal benefit curve shows the additional benefit associated with expanding the activity. The marginal cost curve shows the cost—including any opportu-

 

 

nity costs—of spending additional time, effort, and resources on the activity. At Q1, the height of the marginal benefit curve exceeds the height of the marginal cost curve. Thus, at that point, the additional benefits of expanding the activity past Q1 exceed the additional costs. According to Rule 1 of economic efficiency, we should continue to expand the activity until we reach Q2. Beyond Q2 (at Q3, for example), the height of the marginal ben- efit curve is less than the height of the marginal cost curve. The additional benefits from expanding activity to that point are smaller than the additional costs. According to Rule 2, at Q3, we have gone too far and should cut back on the activity. Q2 is the only point con- sistent with both rules of economic efficiency.

IF IT’S WORTH DOING, IT’S WORTH DOING IMPERFECTLY

Eliminating pollution. Earning straight As. Being completely organized. Cleaning your apartment until it sparkles. Making automobiles completely safe. Making airplanes fully secure against terrorist attacks. All of these are worthwhile goals, right? Well, they are un- til you consider the costs of actually achieving them. The heading for this section is, of course, a play on the old saying, “If it’s worth doing, it’s worth doing to the best of your ability.” Economics suggests, however, that this is not a sensible guideline. At some point, the gains from doing something even better will not be worth the cost. It will make more sense to stop short of perfection.

Exhibit 1 can also be used to illustrate this point. As more resources are dedicated to an activity, the marginal improvements (benefits) will become smaller and smaller, while the marginal costs will rise. The optimal time and effort put into the activity will be achieved at Q2, and this will nearly always be well below one’s best effort. Note that inef- ficiency results when either too little (for example, Q1) or too much (for example Q3) time and effort are put into the activity.

Do you make decisions this way? Last time you cleaned your car or apartment, why did you decide to leave some things undone? Once the most important areas were clean, you likely began to skip over other areas (like on top of the refrigerator or under the bed), figuring that the benefits of cleaning these areas were simply not worth the cost. Very few

If It’s Worth Doing, It’s Worth Doing Imperfectly 111

Marginal cost

Economic� efficiency

Inefficient

Q2 Q3

Marginal benefit

All points other� than Q2 are� inefficient

Q1

As we use more time and resources to expand the level of an activity, the marginal benefits will generally decline and the mar- ginal costs rise. From the viewpoint of efficiency, the activity should be expanded as long as the marginal benefits exceed the marginal cost. Thus, quantity Q2 is the economically efficient level of this activity. Q1 is inefficient because some production that could generate more benefits than costs is not undertaken. Q3 is also inefficient because some units are produced even though their costs exceed the benefits they create. Thus, both too much and too little of an activity will result in inefficiency.

EXHIBIT 1 Economic Efficiency

 

 

people live in a perfectly organized and clean house, wash their hands enough to prevent all colds, brush their teeth long enough to prevent all cavities, or make their home as safe as Fort Knox. They recognize that the benefit of perfection in these, and many other areas, is simply not worth the cost.

Economics is about trade-offs; it is possible to pursue even worthy activities beyond the level that is consistent with economic efficiency. People seem to be more aware of this in their personal decision-making than when evaluating public policy. It is not uncommon to hear people say things like, “We ought to eliminate all pollution” or “No price is too high to save a life.”

If we want to get the most out of our resources, we need to think about both marginal benefits and marginal costs and recognize that there are alternative ways of pursuing ob- jectives. Consequently, economists do not ask whether eliminating pollution or saving lives is worth the cost in terms of dollars per se, but whether it is worth the cost in terms of giving up other things that could have been done with those dollars—the opportunity cost. Spending an extra $10 billion on worker safety requirements to save 100 lives isn’t efficient if the funds could have been spent differently and saved 500 lives. Furthermore, it makes no more sense to have the government pursue perfection than it does for each of us personally to pursue it. Regardless of sector, achievement of perfection is virtually never worth the cost.

THINKING ABOUT THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

For centuries, philosophers, economists, and other scholars have debated the proper role of government. While the debate continues, there is substantial agreement that at least two functions of government are legitimate: (1) protecting individuals and their property against invasions by others and (2) providing goods that cannot easily be provided through private markets. These two functions correspond to what Nobel laureate James Buchanan conceptualizes as the protective and productive functions of government.

Protective Function of Government

The most fundamental function of government is the protection of individuals and their property against acts of aggression. As John Locke wrote more than three centuries ago, in- dividuals are constantly threatened by “the invasions of others.” Therefore, each individual

112 C H A P T E R 5 Difficult Cases for the Market and The Role of Government

Along Came Polly (2004)

Ben Stiller and Jennifer Aniston struggle to find the efficient (optimal) amount of orga- nization in their lives. In one scene they use a knife to destroy pillows after Aniston convinces Stiller that the 8 minutes a day he spends arranging decorative pillows on his bed (that nobody else sees) isn’t worth the effort. In the next scene, Aniston’s in- efficiently low level of organization is illus- trated when she spends a lot of time searching for her car keys. At the margin,

Stiller’s time spent arranging his pillows isn’t generating enough benefit to justify the cost. Meanwhile, if Aniston were to spend just a little more time getting orga- nized, the benefits to her would exceed the costs. The two of them would both be more efficient, and they’d probably get along better, too!

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“is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liber- ties, and estates.”3 The protective function of government involves the maintenance of a framework of security and order—an infra- structure of rules within which people can interact peacefully with one another. Protec- tion of person and property is crucial. It entails providing police protection and prose- cuting aggressors who take things that do not belong to them. It also involves providing for a national defense designed to protect against foreign invasions. The legal enforcement of contracts and rules against fraud are also cen- tral elements of the protective function. Peo- ple and businesses that write bad checks, violate contracts, or knowingly supply others with false information, for example, are there- fore subject to legal prosecution.

It is easy to see the economic importance of the protective function. When it is per- formed well, the property of citizens is secure, freedom of exchange is present, and con- tracts are legally enforceable. When people are assured that they will be able to enjoy the benefits of their efforts, they will be more productive. In contrast, when property rights are insecure and contracts unenforceable, productive behavior is undermined. Plunder, fraud, and economic chaos result. Governments set and enforce the “rules of the game” that enable markets to operate smoothly.

Productive Function of Government

The nature of some goods makes them difficult to provide through markets. Sometimes it is difficult to establish a one-to-one link between the payment and receipt of a good. If this link cannot be established, the incentive of market producers to supply these goods is weak. In addition, high transaction costs—particularly, the cost of monitoring use and col- lecting fees—can sometimes make it difficult to supply a good through the market. When either of these conditions is present, it may be more efficient for the government to supply the good and impose taxes on its citizens to cover the cost.

One of the most important productive functions of government is providing a stable monetary and financial environment. If markets are going to work well, individuals have to know the value of what they are buying or selling. For market prices to convey this information, a stable monetary system is needed. This is especially true for the many mar- ket exchanges that involve a time dimension. Houses, cars, consumer durables, land, buildings, equipment, and many other items are often paid for over a period of months or even years. When the purchasing power of money fluctuates wildly, previously determined prices do not represent their intended values. Under these circumstances, exchanges involving long-term commitments are hampered, and the smooth operation of markets undermined.

The government’s tax, spending, and monetary policies exert a powerful influence on the stability of the overall economy. If properly conducted, these policies contribute to economic stability, full and efficient utilization of resources, and stable prices. However, improper stabilization policies can cause massive unemployment, rapidly rising prices, or both. For those pursuing a course in macroeconomics, these issues will be central to that analysis.

Thinking About the Economic Role of Government 113

3John Locke, Treatise of Civil Government, 1690, ed. Charles Sherman (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1937), 82.

The English philosopher John Locke argued that people own themselves and, as a result of this self-ownership, they also own the fruits of their labor. Locke stressed that individuals are not sub- servient to governments. On the contrary, the role of governments is to protect the “natural rights” of individuals to their person and property. This view, also reflected in the “unalienable rights” sec- tion of the U.S. Declaration of Independence, is the basis for the protective function of government.

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POTENTIAL SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MARKET

As we previously discussed, the invisible hand of market forces generally gives resource owners and business firms a strong incentive to use their resources efficiently and under- take projects that create value. Will this always be true? The answer to this question is “No.” There are four major factors that can undermine the invisible hand and reduce the efficiency of markets: (1) lack of competition, (2) externalities, (3) public goods, and (4) poorly informed buyers or sellers. We will now consider each of these factors and explain why they may justify government intervention.

Lack of Competition

Competition is vital to the proper operation of the pricing mechanism. The existence of competing buyers and sellers reduces the power of both to rig or alter the market in their own favor. Although competition is beneficial from a social point of view, individually each of us would prefer to be loosened from its grip. Students do not like stiff competitors in their social or romantic lives, at exam time, or when they’re trying to get into graduate school. Buyers on eBay hope for few competing bidders so they can purchase the items they’re bidding on at lower prices. Similarly, sellers prefer fewer competing sellers so they can sell at higher prices.

Exhibit 2 illustrates how sellers can gain from restricting competition. In the absence of any restrictions on competition in the market, the price P1 and output Q1 associated with the competitive supply curve (S1) will prevail. Here, Q1 is the level of output consistent with economic efficiency. If a group of sellers was able to restrict competition, perhaps by forcing some firms out of the market and preventing new firms from entering, the group will be able to gain by raising the price of the product. This is illustrated by the price P2 and output Q2 associated with the restricted supply (S2). Even though the output is smaller, the total revenue (price P2 times quantity Q2) derived by the sellers at the restricted output level is greater than at the competitive price P1. Clearly, the sellers gain because, at the higher price, they are being paid more to produce less.

The restricted output level, however, is clearly less efficient. . At the competitive out- put level Q1, all units that were valued more than their cost are produced and sold. But this is not the case at Q2. The additional units between Q2 and Q1 are valued more than their cost. Nonetheless, they will not be produced if suppliers are able to limit competition and restrict output. When competition is absent, there is a potential conflict between the inter- ests of sellers and the efficient use of resources.

114 C H A P T E R 5 Difficult Cases for the Market and The Role of Government

EXHIBIT 2 Lack of Competition and Problems for the Market

If a group of sellers can restrict competition, it may be able to gain by reducing supply (to S1, for example) and raising the price (to P2, for example) rather than charging the competitive market price of P1. Under these circumstances, out- put will be less than the economically efficient level.

P ri

ce

D

S2 (restricted supply)

Q2

S1 (competitive supply)

P2

P1

Q1

Quantity/ time

 

 

What can the government do to ensure that markets are competitive? The first guide- line might be borrowed from the medical profession: Do no harm. A productive govern- ment will refrain from using its powers to impose licenses, discriminatory taxes, price controls, tariffs, quotas, and other entry and trade restraints that lessen the intensity of competition. In the vast majority of markets, sellers will find it difficult or impossible to limit the entry of rival firms (including rival producers from other countries). The only means by which they can limit competition is lobbying the government to impose restric- tions or controls that limit competition on their behalf. In the interest of efficiency, gov- ernments should refrain from giving in to these demands.

When entering a market is very costly and there are only a few existing sellers, it may be possible for these sellers by themselves to restrict competition. In an effort to deal with cases like this, the United States has enacted a series of “antitrust laws,” most notably the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) and the Clayton Act (1914), making it illegal for firms to collude or attempt to monopolize a market.

For the most part, economists favor the general principle of government action to en- sure and promote competitive markets. There is considerable debate, however, about the effectiveness of actual government policy in this area. Many economists believe that, by and large, government policy in this area has been ineffective. Others stress that govern- ment policies have often been misused to actually limit competition, rather than promote it. These laws have been used as a basis for restricting entry into markets, protecting existing producers from competitors, and limiting price competition. This is counterpro- ductive. For those taking a microeconomics course, non-competitive markets and related policy alternatives will be analyzed in greater detail later.

Externalities—A Failure to Account for All Costs and Benefits

When property rights are unclear or poorly enforced, the actions of an individual or group may “spill over” onto others and thereby affect their well-being without their consent. These spillover effects are called externalities. You are probably familiar with externali- ties. For example, when your neighbor’s loud stereo makes it hard for you to study, you are experiencing an externality firsthand. Although your neighbors do not have a right to come in to your apartment and turn on your stereo, they do have a right to listen to their own stereo, and their listening may interfere with the quietness in your apartment. Their actions impose a cost on you, and they also raise an issue of property rights. Do your neighbors have a property right to play their stereo as loud as they please? Or do you have a property right to quietness in your own apartment? When questions like these arise, how should the boundaries of property rights be determined, and what steps should be taken to ensure adequate enforcement? Although the volume of your neighbor’s stereo may not be a major economic issue, it nonetheless illustrates the nature of the problems that arise when property rights are unclear and externalities are present.

The spillover effects may either impose a cost or create a benefit for third parties— people not directly involved in the transaction, activity, or exchange. Economists use the term external cost to describe a situation in which the spillover effects harm third parties. If the spillover effects enhance the welfare of the third parties, an external benefit is pre- sent. We will analyze both external costs and external benefits and consider why both of them can lead to problems.

External Cost Why should economists worry about external cost? Answer: external cost may result in economic inefficiency. For example, resources may be used to produce goods that are valued less than their production costs, including the costs imposed on the nonconsenting third parties. Consider the production of paper. The firms in the market operate mills and purchase labor, trees, and other resources to produce the paper. But they also emit pollutants into the atmosphere that impose costs on residents living around the mills. The pollutants cause paint on buildings to deteriorate more rapidly. They make it difficult for some people to breathe normally, and perhaps cause other health hazards. If the residents living near a pulp mill can prove they have been harmed, they could take the mill to court and force the paper producer to cover the cost of their damages. But it might

Potential Shortcomings of the Market 115

Externalities Spillover effects of an activity that influence the well-being of nonconsenting third parties.

External costs Spillover effects that reduce the well-being of nonconsent- ing third parties.

External benefits Spillover effects that generate benefits for nonconsenting third parties.

 

 

be difficult to prove that they were harmed and that the pulp mill is responsible for the damage. As you can see, the residents’ property rights to clean air may be difficult to enforce, particularly if there are many parties emitting pollutants into the air.

If the residents are unable to enforce their property rights, the production of paper will generate an external cost that will be ignored by markets. Exhibit 3 illustrates the impli- cations of these external costs within the supply and demand framework. As the result of the external cost, the market supply curve S1 will understate the true cost of producing pa- per. It reflects only the cost actually paid by the firms, and ignores the uncompensated costs imposed on the nearby residents. Under these circumstances, the firm will expand output to Q1 (the intersection of the demand curve D and supply curve S1) and the market price P1 will emerge. Are this price and this output consistent with economic efficiency? The answer is clearly “No.” If all of the costs of producing the paper, including those im- posed on third parties, were taken into account, the supply curve S2 would result. From an efficiency standpoint, only the smaller quantity Q2 should be produced. The units beyond Q2 on out to Q1 cost more than their value to consumers. People would be better off if the resources used to produce those units (beyond Q2) were used to produce other things. Nonetheless, profit-maximizing firms will expand output into this range. Thus, when external costs are present, the market supply curve will understate production costs, and output will be expanded beyond the quantity consistent with economic efficiency. More- over, resources for which property rights are poorly enforced will be overutilized and sometimes polluted. This is often the case with air and water when the property rights to these resources are poorly enforced.

What should be done about external costs? These costs arise because property rights are poorly defined or imperfectly enforced. Initially, therefore, it makes sense to think se- riously about how property rights might be better defined and enforced. However, the nature of some goods will make the defining and enforcement of property rights extremely difficult. This will certainly be the case for resources like clean air and many fish species in the ocean. In cases that involve a relatively small number of people, the parties involved may be able to agree to rules and establish procedures that will minimize the external effects. For example, property owners around a small lake will generally be able to control access to the lake and prevent each other, as well as outsiders, from polluting or overfish- ing the lake.

However, in cases that involve large numbers of people, the transactions costs of arriving at an agreement will be prohibitively high, so it is unrealistic to expect that private contracts among the parties will handle the situation satisfactorily. For example, this will be the case when a large number of automobiles and firms emit pollutants into the atmosphere. In these “large number” cases, government regulations may be the best approach. At this

116 C H A P T E R 5 Difficult Cases for the Market and The Role of Government

EXHIBIT 3 External Costs and Output That Is Greater Than the Efficient Level

When an activity such as paper production imposes external cost on noncon- senting third parties, these costs will not be registered by the market supply curve (S1). As a result, output will be beyond the economically efficient level. The units be- tween Q2 and Q1 will be pro- duced, even though their cost exceeds the value they provide to consumers.

D

S2 (restricted supply)

Q2

S1 (competitive supply)

P2

P1

Q1

 

 

point, we want you to see the nature of the problem when external costs are present. As we proceed, we will analyze a number of problems in this area in detail and consider alternative approaches that might improve economic efficiency.

External Benefits As we mentioned, sometimes the actions of individuals and firms generate external benefits for others. The home owner who keeps a house in good condition and maintains a neat lawn improves the beauty of the entire community. A flood-control dam built by upstream residents for their benefit might also generate gains for those who live downstream. Scientific theories benefit their authors, but the knowledge can also help others who did not contribute to the development of them.

From the standpoint of efficiency, why might external benefits be a problem? Here, inefficiency may arise because potential producers are unable to capture fully the benefits that their actions create for others. Suppose a pharmaceutical company develops a vaccine protecting users against a contagious virus or some other communal disease. Of course, the vaccine can easily be marketed to users who will benefit directly from it. However, because of the communal nature of the virus, as more and more people take the vaccine, nonusers will also be less likely to get the flu. But it will be very difficult for the pharma- ceutical companies to capture any of the benefits derived by the nonusers. As a result, too little of the vaccine may be supplied.

Exhibit 4 illustrates the impact of external benefits like those generated by the vac- cine within the framework of supply and demand. The market demand curve reflects the benefits derived by the users of the vaccine, while the supply curve reflects the opportu- nity cost of providing it. Market forces result in an equilibrium price of P1 and output of Q1. Is this outcome consistent with economic efficiency? Again, the answer is “No.” The market demand curve D1 will register only the benefits derived by the users. Those bene- fits that accrue to nonusers, who are now less likely to contract the flu, will not be taken into account by decision-makers. The producer of the vaccine makes it more likely these people will not get sick, but it doesn’t derive any benefit (sales revenue) from having done so. Thus, market demand D1 understates the total benefits derived from the production and use of the vaccine. Demand D2 provides a measure of these total benefits, including those that accrue to the nonusers. The units between Q1and Q2 are valued more highly than what it costs to produce them. Nonetheless, they will not be supplied because the suppliers of the vaccine will be unable to capture the benefits that accrue to the nonusers. Thus, when external benefits are present, market forces may supply less than the amount consistent with economic efficiency.

Potential Shortcomings of the Market 117

External costs resulting from poorly defined and enforced property rights underlie the problems of excessive air and water pollution.

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While external benefits are a potential source of inefficiency, entrepreneurs have a strong incentive to figure out ways to capture more fully the gains their actions generate for others. In some cases, they are able to capture what would otherwise be external bene- fits by extending the scope of the firm. The accompanying Application in Economics, “Capturing External Benefits: The Case of Walt Disney World,” provides an interesting and informative illustration of this point.

Public Goods and Why They Pose a Problem for the Market

What are public goods? Public goods have two distinguishing characteristics: (1) nonri- valry in consumption and (2) nonexcludability. Let’s take a closer look at both of these characteristics.

Nonrivalry in consumption means that making the good available to one consumer does not reduce its availability to others. In fact, providing it to one person simultaneously makes it available to other consumers. Thus, a consumer has no reason to compete with others for the good. A radio broadcast signal provides an example. The same signal can be shared by everyone within the listening range. Having additional listeners tune in does not detract from the availability of the signal. Clearly, most goods do not have this shared con- sumption characteristic, but are instead rivals-in-consumption. For example, two individu- als cannot simultaneously consume the same pair of jeans. Further, if one person purchases a pair of jeans, there is one less pair available for someone else.

The second characteristic of a public good—nonexcludability—means that it is im- possible (or at least very costly) to exclude nonpaying customers from receiving the good. Suppose an antimissile system were being built around the city in which you live. How could some people in the city be protected by the system and others excluded? Most peo- ple will realize there is no way the system can protect their neighbors from incoming mis- siles without providing similar protection to other residents. Thus, the services of the antimissile system have the nonexcludability characteristic.

It is important to note that it is the characteristic of the good, not the sector in which it is produced, that determines whether it qualifies as a public good. There is a tendency to think that if a good is provided by the government, then it is a public good. This is not the case. Many of the goods provided by governments clearly do not have the characteristics

118 C H A P T E R 5 Difficult Cases for the Market and The Role of Government118 C H A P T E R 5 Difficult Cases for the Market and The Role of Government

Ideal output

D2

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P1

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A vaccine that protects users against the flu will also help nonusers by making it less likely that they will catch it. But this benefit will not be registered by the market demand cur ve (D1). In cases where external benefits like this are present, output will be less than the economically efficient level. Even though the units between Q1 and Q2 generate more benefits than costs, they will not be supplied because sellers are unable to capture the value of these external benefits.

Public goods Goods for which rivalr y among consumers is absent and exclusion of nonpaying customers is difficult.

EXHIBIT 4 External Benefits and Output That Is Less Than the Efficient Level

 

 

Potential Shortcomings of the Market 119

A P P L I C AT I O N S I N E C O N O M I C S

Capturing External Benefits: The Case of Walt Disney World

Sometimes projects that generate more benefits than cost are still unattractive because a substantial share of the benefits are external and therefore difficult to capture. If an entrepreneur could figure out a way to capture more of these benefits, an other wise unprofitable project might be transformed into a profitable one. Sometimes this can be done by extending the scope of a project.

The development of golf courses is an example. Be- cause of the beauty and openness of the courses, many people find it attractive to live nearby. Thus, constructing a golf course typically generates an external benefit—an in- crease in the value of the nearby proper ty. In recent years, golf course developers have figured out how to capture this benefit. Now, they typically purchase a large tract of land around the planned course before it is built. This places them in a position to resell the land at a higher price after the golf course has been completed and the surrounding land has increased in value. By extending the scope of their activities to include real estate as well as golf course devel- opment, they are able to capture what would other wise be external benefits.

Florida’s Walt Disney World is an interesting case study in entrepreneurial ingenuity designed to capture external benefits more fully. When Walt Disney developed Disney- land in California, the market value of the land in the imme- diate area soared as a result of the increase in demand for ser vices (food, lodging, gasoline, and so on). Because the land in the area was owned by others, the developers of Disneyland were unable to capture these external benefits. In addition, Disney felt as if some of the adult nightclubs that had opened around his existing Disneyland park were imposing external costs on him by detracting from the fam- ily image his park was tr ying to attain.

Because of his experience with these externalities, when Walt Disney World was developed outside of Orlando, Florida, in the mid 1960s, Walt Disney purchased far more land than was needed for the amusement park. This en- abled him to capture the increased land value surrounding his development (when he resold the land for a higher price), and reduce the negative externalities imposed on him via his control of the surrounding property.

The purchases were made as secretly as possible to pre- vent speculators from driving up the land prices if Disney’s actions were detected. Disney even created a handful of smaller companies, with names like the Latin-American De- velopment and Managers Corporation and the Reedy Creek Ranch Corporation, to purchase the land. After his first major land purchase of 12,400 acres, Walt Disney was at a meet- ing at which he was offered an oppor tunity to purchase an additional 8,500 acres. Walt Disney’s assistant was ru- mored to have said, “But Walt, we already own 12,000 acres, enough to build the park.” Disney replied, “How would you like to own 8,000 acres around our existing Disneyland facility right now?” His assistant immediately responded, “Buy it!”

After another major acquisition of 1,250 acres, Disney began concentrating on buying smaller land parcels around his main proper ty. By June 1965, Disney had purchased 27,400 acres, or about 43 square miles—an area 150 times larger than his existing Disneyland park, and about twice as big as Manhattan. In October 1965, when an Orlando newspaper finally broke the stor y that Disney was behind the land purchases, the remaining land prices around his proper ty jumped from $183 an acre to $1,000 an acre overnight. But by then, except for several small parcels he was unable to acquire, Walt Disney had pur- chased all of the land he wanted.

Florida eventually gave Walt Disney permission to create an autonomous Reedy Creek Improvement District, outside the authority of any local government in Florida. In a very real sense, Walt Disney World is a jurisdiction of its own, sepa- rate from any other local government authority. Because of this, Walt Disney World can write its own zoning

Potential Shortcomings of the Market 119

(continued)

 

 

120 C H A P T E R 5 Difficult Cases for the Market and The Role of Government

of public goods. Medical services, education, mail delivery, trash collection, and electric- ity come to mind. Although these goods are often supplied by governments, they do not have either nonrivalry or nonexcludability characteristics. Thus, they are not public goods.

Why are public goods difficult for markets to allocate efficiently? The nonexcludabil- ity characteristic provides the answer. Since those who do not pay cannot be excluded, sellers are generally unable to establish a one-to-one link between the payment and receipt of these goods. Realizing they cannot be excluded, potential consumers have little incen- tive to pay for these goods. Instead, they have an incentive to become free riders, people who receive the benefits of the good without helping to pay for its cost. But, when a large number of people become free riders, not very much of the good is supplied. This is pre- cisely the problem: markets will tend to undersupply public goods, even when the popula- tion in aggregate values them highly relative to their cost.

Suppose national defense were provided entirely through the market. Would you vol- untarily help to pay for it? Your contribution would have little impact on the total supply of defense available to each of us, even if you made a large personal contribution. Many citizens, even though they might value defense highly, would become free riders, and few funds would be available to finance national defense.

For most goods, it is easy to establish a link between payment and receipt. If you do not pay for a gallon of ice cream, an automobile, a television set, a DVD player, and liter- ally thousands of other items, suppliers will not provide them to you. Thus, there are very few public goods. National defense is the classic example of a public good. Radio and TV signals, software programs, flood-control projects, mosquito abatement programs, and perhaps some scientific theories also have public good characteristics. But beyond this short list, it is difficult to think of additional goods that qualify.

Just because a good is a public good does not necessarily mean that markets will fail to supply it. When the benefit of producing these goods is high, entrepreneurs will attempt to find innovative ways to gain by overcoming the free-rider problem. For example, radio and television broadcasts, which have both of the public good characteristics, are still pro- duced well by the private sector. The free-rider problem is overcome through the use of advertising (which generates indirect revenue from listeners), rather than directly charging listeners. Private entrepreneurs have developed things like scrambling devices (so nonpay- ing customers can’t tune into broadcasts free of charge) copy protection on DVDs, and tie- in purchases (for example, tying the purchase of a software instruction manual to the purchase of the software itself) to overcome the free-rider problem. The marketing of computer software provides an interesting illustration. Since the same software program can be copied without reducing the amount available, and it is costly to prevent consump- tion by nonpayers, software clearly has public good characteristics. Nonetheless, Bill Gates became the richest man in the world by producing and marketing it!

In spite of the innovative efforts of entrepreneurs, however, the quantity of public goods supplied strictly through market allocation might still be smaller than the quantity consistent with economic efficiency. This creates a potential opportunity for government action to improve the efficiency of resource allocation.

(continued) restrictions and building codes. It can also plan its own road- ways, lakes, security, sidewalks, airpor ts, and recreational areas. Walt Disney World is able to provide goods and ser- vices like these—that might normally be considered public goods—by charging general admission fees to its park. This helped Disney overcome the potential free-rider problems sometimes associated with producing these goods.

Just as Disney expected, the value of the land surround- ing Walt Disney World soared as the demand for hotels, restaurants, and other businesses increased along with the development of the the amusement park. Through the years, the resale of land near the park has been a major source of revenue for the company. To a large degree, the success of the Disney Corporation reflects Walt Disney’s entrepreneur- ial ability to deal with externality and public-good problems.

Free rider A person who receives the benefit of a good without paying for it. Because of their nonexcludable nature, public goods are subject to free-rider problems.

A P P L I C AT I O N S I N E C O N O M I C S

 

 

Potential Information Problems

Like other goods, information is scarce. Thus, when making purchasing decisions, people are sometimes poorly informed about the price, quality, durability, and side effects of alternate products. Imperfect knowledge is not the fault of the market. In fact, the market provides consumers with a strong incentive to acquire information. If they mistakenly pur- chase a “lemon,” they will suffer the consequences. Furthermore, sellers have a strong incentive to inform consumers about the benefits of their products, especially in compari- son to competing products. However, circumstances will influence the incentive structure confronted by both buyers and sellers.

The consumer’s information problem is minimal if the item is purchased regularly. Consider the purchase of soap. There is little cost associated with trying different brands. Since soap is a regularly purchased product, trial and error is an economical means of determining which brand is most suitable to one’s needs. Regularly purchased items such as toothpaste, most food products, lawn service, and gasoline provide additional examples of repeat-purchase items. When purchasing items like these, the consumer can use past experience to acquire accurate information and make wise decisions.

Furthermore, the sellers of repeat-purchase items also have a strong incentive to supply consumers with accurate information about them because failing to do so will adversely affect future sales. Because future demand is directly related to the satisfaction level of current customers, sellers of repeat-purchase items will want to help their customers make satisfying long-run choices. This helps harmonize the interests of buyers and sellers.

But harmany will not always occur. Conflicting interests, inadequate information, and unhappy customers can arise when goods are either (1) difficult to evaluate on inspection and seldom repeatedly purchased from the same producer or (2) potentially capable of serious and lasting harmful side effects that cannot be predicted by a typical consumer. Under these conditions, consumers might make decisions they will later regret.

When customers are unable to distinguish between high-quality and low-quality goods, business entrepreneurs have an incentive to cut costs by reducing quality. Busi- nesses that follow this course may survive and even prosper. Consider the information problem when an automobile is purchased. Are consumers capable of properly evaluating the safety equipment? Most are not. Of course, some consumers will seek the opinion of experts, but this information will be costly and difficult to evaluate. In this case, it might be more efficient to have the government regulate automobile safety and require certain safety equipment.

Similar issues arise with regard to product effectiveness. Suppose a new wonder drug promises to reduce the probability a person will be stricken by cancer or heart disease. Even if the product is totally ineffective, many consumers will waste their money trying it. Verifying the effectiveness of the drug will be a complicated and lengthy process. Conse- quently, it may be better to have experts certify its effectiveness. The federal Food and Drug Administration was established to perform this function. However, letting the experts decide is also a less than ideal solution. The certification process is likely to be costly and lengthy. As a result, the introduction of products that are effective may be delayed for years, and they are likely to be more costly than they would be otherwise.

Information as a Profit Opportunity

Consumers are willing to pay for information that will help them make better decisions. This presents a profit opportunity. Entrepreneurial publishers and other providers of information help consumers find what they seek by offering product evaluations by experts. For example, dozens of publications provide independent expert opinions about automobiles and computers at a low cost to potential purchasers. Laboratory test results and detailed product evaluations on a wide variety of goods are provided by Consumer Reports, Consumer Research, and other publications.

Franchises are another way entrepreneurs have responded to the need of consumers for more and better information. A franchise is a right or license granted to an individual

Potential Shortcomings of the Market 121

Repeat-purchase item An item purchased often by the same buyer.

Franchise A right or license granted to an individual to market a company’s goods or ser vices or use its brand name. The individual firms are indepen- dently owned but must meet certain conditions to continue to use the name.

 

 

to market a company’s goods or services (or use their brand name). Fast-food restaurants like McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Burger King are typically organized as franchises. The in- dividual restaurants are independently owned, but the owner pays for the right to use the company name and must offer specific products and services in a manner specified by the franchiser. Franchises help give consumers reliable information. The tourist traveling through an area for the first time with very little time to search out alternatives may find that eating at a franchised restaurant and sleeping at a franchised motel are the cheapest ways to avoid annoying and costly mistakes that might come from patronizing an un- known local establishment. The franchiser sets the standards for all firms in the chain and establishes procedures, including continuous inspections designed to maintain the stan- dards. Franchisers have a strong incentive to maintain their reputation for quality, because if it declines, their ability to sell new franchises and to collect ongoing franchise fees is adversely affected. Even though the tourist may visit a particular establishment only once, the franchise turns that visit into a “repeat purchase,” since the reputation of the entire national franchise operation is at stake.

Similarly, advertising a brand name nationally puts the brand’s reputation at stake each time a purchase is made. How much would the Coca-Cola Company pay to avoid the sale of a dangerous bottle of Coke? Surely, it would be a large sum. Interbrand, a branding consulting agency that evaluates and ranks the top brand names in the world, estimates that Coke’s brand name is worth $67.4 billion. The value of that brand name is a hostage to quality control. The firm would suffer enormous damage if it failed to maintain the quality of its product. For example, in 2000 and 2001, Firestone’s brand name suffered an immense reduction in value after only a few Firestone tires were suspected of being defec- tive. Firestone is still attempting to recover from its loss in brand name value.

Enterprising entrepreneurs have found ways to assure buyers that products meet high standards of quality, even when the producer is small and not so well known. Consider the case of Best Western Motels.4 Best Western owns no motels; however, building on the fran- chise idea, it publishes rules and standards with which motel owners must comply if they are to use the Best Western brand name and the reservation service that the company also operates. To protect its brand name, Best Western sends out inspectors to see that each Best Western Motel meets these standards. Every disappointed customer harms the reputation and reduces the value of the Best Western name, and reduces the willingness of motel own- ers to pay for use of the name. The standards are designed to keep customers satisfied. Even though each motel owner has only a relatively small operation, renting the Best Western name provides the small operator with the kind of international reputation formerly avail- able only to large firms. In effect, Best Western acts as a regulator of all motels bearing its name. It profits by requiring efficient standards—those that produce maximum visitor sat- isfaction for every dollar spent by the motels utilizing the franchise name. As it does so, it helps eliminate problems in the market that result from imperfect information.

Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., is another example of private-sector regulation aimed at overcoming potential information problems. UL, as it is better known, is a private- sector corporation that has been testing and certifying products for more than 100 years based on its own set of quality standards. You have probably seen the UL mark on many of your household appliances. Sellers pay a fee to have UL evaluate their products for pos- sible certification. The value of the UL brand depends on their careful evaluation of every product they certify. If UL allows defective products to carry its mark, its brand value will diminish.

Information published by reliable sources, franchising, and brand names can help consumers make better-informed decisions. Although these options are effective, they will not always provide an ideal solution. Government regulation may sometimes be able to improve the situation, but this, too, has its shortcomings. As with other things, there is no general solution to imperfect information problems.

122 C H A P T E R 5 Difficult Cases for the Market and The Role of Government

4This section draws from Randall G. Holcombe and Lora P. Holcombe, “The Market for Regulation,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 142, no. 4 (1986): 684–696.

 

 

Pulling Things Together 123

Brand names (like Coca- Cola), franchises (like McDonald’s), private sector certification firms (like Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.), and consumer-ratings magazines (like Consumer Reports) are ways the private sector helps buyers overcome potential information problems.

Political decision-making is complex, but the tools of economics can enhance our understanding of how it works. This is the subject matter of the next chapter.

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PULLING THINGS TOGETHER

Throughout this textbook, we have stressed that a sound legal system—one that protects individuals and their property and provides access to evenhanded courts for the enforce- ment of contracts and settlement of disputes—is vitally important for the smooth opera- tion of markets. So, too, is a monetary regime that provides people with access to a sound currency—money that maintains its value across time periods. Beyond these functions, however, there is little justification for government action when there is reason to expect that markets will allocate resources efficiently. But a lack of competition, externalities, public goods, and information problems often pose challenges and sometimes undermine the efficient operation of markets. Market shortcomings due to these factors raise the pos- sibility that government intervention beyond the protective function might improve things. But before jumping to that conclusion, we need better knowledge about how the political process works. We are now ready to move on to that topic.

 

 

124 C H A P T E R 5 Difficult Cases for the Market and The Role of Government

▼ Economists use the standard of economic efficiency to assess the desirability of economic outcomes. Efficiency requires both: (1) that all actions generat- ing more benefit than cost be undertaken, and (2) that no actions generating more cost than benefit be undertaken.

▼ Although perfection is a noble goal, it is rarely worth achieving because additional time and resources devoted to an activity generally yield smaller and smaller benefits and cost more and more. Ineffi- ciency can result when either too little or too much effort is put into an activity.

▼ Governments can enhance economic well-being by performing both protective and productive functions. The protective function involves (1) the protection of individuals and their property against aggression and (2) the provision of a legal system for the enforce- ment of contracts and settlement of disputes. The productive function of government can help people obtain goods that would be difficult to supply through markets.

▼ When markets fail to meet the conditions for ideal economic efficiency, the problem can generally be

traced to one of four sources: absence of competi- tion, externalities, public goods, or poor information.

▼ Externalities reflect a lack of fully defined and en- forced property rights. When external costs are present, output can be too large—units are produced even though their costs exceed the benefits they generate. In contrast, external benefits can lead to an output that is too small—some units are not pro- duced even though the benefits of doing so would exceed the cost.

▼ Public goods are goods for which (1) rivalry in con- sumption is absent and (2) it is difficult to exclude those who do not pay. Because of the difficulties involved in establishing a one-to-one link between payment and receipt of such goods, the market supply of public goods will often be less than the economically efficient quantity.

▼ Entrepreneurs in markets have an incentive to find solutions to each market problem, and new solutions are constantly being discovered. But problems remain that can potentially be improved through government action.

K E Y P O I N T S!

*1. Why is it important for producers to be able to pre- vent nonpaying customers from receiving a good?

2. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, airline security screening has increased dramatically. As a result, travelers must now spend considerably more time being screened before flights. Would it make economic sense to devote enough resources to completely prevent any such future attacks? Why or why not?

3. What are the distinguishing characteristics of “public goods?” Give two examples of a public good. Why are public goods difficult for markets to allocate efficiently?

*4. Which of the following are public goods? Explain, using the definition of a public good. a. an antimissile system surrounding Washington,

D.C. b. a fire department

c. tennis courts d. Yellowstone National Park e. elementary schools

5. Explain in your own words what is meant by exter- nal costs and external benefits. Why may market outcomes be less than ideal when externalities are present?

6. English philosopher John Locke argued that the protection of each individual’s person and property (acquired without the use of violence, theft, or fraud) was the primary function of government. Why is this protection important to the efficient operation of an economy?

7. “If it’s worth doing, it’s worth doing to the best of your ability.” What is the economic explanation for why this statement is frequently said but rarely followed in practice? Explain.

C R I T I C A L A N A L Y S I S Q U E S T I O N S?

 

 

Critical Analysis Questions 125

8. “The traveler in a market economy has no chance for a fair deal. Local people may be treated well, but the traveler has no way to know, for example, who offers a good night’s lodging at a fair price, if the quality and price are not regulated by government.” Is this true or false? Explain.

*9. If sellers of toasters were able to organize themselves, reduce their output, and raise their prices, how would economic efficiency be affected? Explain.

10. What are external costs? When are they most likely to be present? When external costs are present, what is likely to be the relationship between the market output of a good and the output consistent with ideal economic efficiency?

*11. “Elementary education is obviously a public good. After all, it is provided by the government.” Evalu- ate this statement.

12. What are the necessary conditions for economic ef- ficiency? In what four situations might a market fail to achieve ideal economic efficiency?

13. Suppose that Abel builds a factory next to Baker’s farm, and air pollution from the factory harms Baker’s crops. Is Baker’s property right to the land being violated? Is an externality present? What if the pollution invades Baker’s home and harms her health? Are her property rights violated? Is an exter- nality present? Explain.

*14. Apply the economic efficiency criterion to the role of government. When would a government interven- tion be considered economically efficient? When would a government intervention be considered economically inefficient?

*Asterisk denotes questions for which answers are given in Appendix B.

Production Cost Analysis and Estimation Applied Problems

Production Cost Analysis and Estimation Applied Problems

Please complete the following two applied problems:

Problem 1:

William is the owner of a small pizza shop and is thinking of increasing products and lowering costs. William’s pizza shop owns four ovens and the cost of the four ovens is $1,000. Each worker is paid $500 per week.

Workers employed

Qty of pizzas produced per week

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

0
75
180
360
600
900
1140
1260
1360

Show all of your calculations and processes. Describe your answer for each question in complete sentences, whenever it is necessary.

  1. Which inputs are fixed and which are variable in the production function of William’s pizza shop? Over what ranges do there appear to be increasing, constant, and/or diminishing returns to the number of workers employed?
  2. What number of workers appears to be most efficient in terms of pizza product per worker?
  3. What number of workers appears to minimize the marginal cost of pizza production assuming that each pizza worker is paid $500 per week?
  4. Why would marginal productivity decline when you hire more workers in the short run after a certain level?
  5. How would expanding the business affect the economies of scale? When would you have constant returns to scale or diseconomies of scale? Describe your answer.

Problem 2:

The Paradise Shoes Company has estimated its weekly TVC function from data collected over the past several months, as TVC = 3450 + 20Q + 0.008Q2 where TVC represents the total variable cost and Q represents pairs of shoes produced per week. And its demand equation is Q = 4100 – 25P. The company is currently producing 1,000 pairs of shoes weekly and is considering expanding its output to 1,200 pairs of shoes weekly. To do this, it will have to lease another shoe-making machine ($2,000 per week fixed payment until the lease period ends).

Show all of your calculations and processes. Describe your answer for each item below in complete sentences, whenever it is necessary.

  1. Describe and derive an expression for the marginal cost (MC) curve.
  2. Describe and estimate the incremental costs of the extra 200 pairs per week (from 1,000 pairs to 1,200 pairs of shoes).
  3. What are the profit-maximizing price and output levels for Paradise Shoes? Describe and calculate the profit-maximizing price and output.
  4. Discuss whether or not Paradise Shoes should expand its output further beyond 1,200 pairs per week. State all assumptions and qualifications that underlie your recommendation.

Carefully review the Grading Rubric (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. for the criteria that will be used to evaluate your assignment.

10

Competitive Bids and Price Quotes

Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

• Discuss the nature of price setting where a buyer calls for competitive bids or tenders to supply goods and/or services that are not available “off-the-shelf.”

• Distinguish between three different modes of competitive bidding: fixed-price, cost-plus- fee, and incentive (risk-sharing) bid pricing.

• Apply the logic of incremental costs and revenues, and thus contribution analysis, to the competitive bid pricing problem, incorporating into the analysis any opportunity and future costs and revenues.

• Demonstrate that high search costs induce firms to set competitive bid prices using a standard markup over a standard cost base, with variations for nonmonetary consider- ations including aesthetics, politics, and risk attitudes of the buyer and seller.

• Explain how the firm can adjust its standard cost base and/or its standard markup rate to raise its success probability, capacity utilization rate, or profit rate, when these are below the levels that best serve the firm’s objectives.

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CHAPTER 10Introduction

Introduction

This is the fourth chapter concerned with the pricing decision of the business firm or other organization. In this chapter, we will look into competitive bidding, a differ-ent type of pricing decision problem that is quite commonly found in business-to- consumer (B2C), business-to-business (B2B), and business-to-government (B2G) transac- tions. Competitive bidding occurs in any market where a single buyer calls for a price quote (or tender) from one or more sellers. It is a single buyer situation in the sense that the buyer wants a special package of goods and services that is not stock standard and, thus, cannot simply or easily be purchased “off-the-shelf” from a supplier. Instead, the buyer calls for competitive bids from one or more potential suppliers and then compares the value proposition offered by each responding bidder. Consumers effectively call for com- petitive bids every time they want their car fixed, their teeth braced, their house painted, or any other kind of repair work or service that is specific to their particular preferences or requirements. Firms call for competitive tenders for stationery supplies, new vehicles or machines, component parts, consulting advice, new buildings, and so on, both to econo- mize on their time and to induce lower prices from suppliers who are most keen to get their business. Governments wanting roads and dams built, military hardware, fleets of cars supplied, and so on, similarly call for competitive bids from potential suppliers. In many cases, some, or even all, of the products required by the buyer are indeed available off-the-shelf, but when the buyer wants a complex combination of products and services it is more efficient if the supplier quotes on the whole package rather than have the buyer separately go around finding out prices and buying them individually (thus avoiding search costs and transactions costs). Quoting on the whole package also allows the sup- plier to reduce its profit margin on individual items in favor of winning a relatively large contract with an acceptable profit margin.

Each seller should expect that the buyer will ask for a competitive bid from other sup- pliers as well; although, in practice, buyers often ask for a single quote and if that seems fair they will accept that price without seeking additional quotes. Seller will realize that if their price quote is too high the business will go elsewhere. Conversely, if their price is too low they will get the job but may end up losing money on the job—this latter situ- ation is known as the winner’s curse.1 The pricing problem in competitive bid markets is that the seller must select a price that is high enough to provide a sufficient contribution to overheads and profit, yet low enough to ensure that it wins enough jobs to maintain a sufficient volume of work to ensure its survival. Sellers cannot expect to win every job they tender for. Since there is only one buyer and several potential sellers, sellers must operate on the basis of “win some and lose some,” but win enough to survive and hope- fully prosper.

1. The winner’s curse applies to a range of situations where the costs of completing the contract are uncertain. If potential suppliers each make estimates of their costs to complete, and one buyer inadvertently underestimates these costs and subsequently bids at a lower level, it is likely to win the contract, but later find out that its actual costs exceed the price tendered and it is forced to take a loss on the contract.

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CHAPTER 10Section 10.1 Types of Competitive Bids and Price Quotes

In addition to the uncertainty the seller faces concerning the bids of other potential sellers, there is uncertainty surround- ing the cost of completing the job as specified. Unless the job is completely specified down to the last nut and bolt, and is oth- erwise straightforward, there will be uncertainty about exactly what repairs, services, parts, and labor will be required. Also, since the price is specified ini- tially and the work is done later, weather and other uncontrolla- ble disturbances may add unex- pected costs to the project. Thus, competitive bidding is a complex pricing practice faced by many firms in the economy and is espe- cially applicable to business-to- business (B2B) transactions.

10.1 Types of Competitive Bids and Price Quotes

There are two main types of competitive bids plus an intermediate (or combination) type. First, there is the fixed-price bid where the seller quotes a price and under-takes to complete the job for exactly that price regardless of unexpected variations in the costs of completing the project. In this case, the seller faces the entire risk of cost vari- ability. That is, if actual costs are higher than expected costs, the seller will make reduced profit (or even take a loss) on the project. The second main type is the cost-plus-fee bid, where the parties agree that the ultimate price will be the actual costs plus a predeter- mined profit margin for the seller, and in this case the buyer bears the entire risk of cost variability. In this case, the buyer may end up paying more than it initially expected the final price to be. In most B2B and B2G situations the buyer retains the right to an audit of the seller’s costs, but in B2C situations it is more commonly a “take it or leave it” tender, or the price is subject to renegotiation if the buyer thinks all the bids are too high. In this case, the buyer might receive the bids and then go back to one or more bidders and ask for variations, inclusions, or exclusions before choosing the winning tender.

©Hemera/Thinkstock

When quoting a price, sellers take a gamble. They must operate on the mentality of “win some and lose some” but sellers must win often enough to cover overhead costs and realize a profit.

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CHAPTER 10Section 10.1 Types of Competitive Bids and Price Quotes

Fixed-price bids are more common where the items to be purchased can be priced sepa- rately, such as building materials, and where labor costs are more predictable. Alterna- tively, cost-plus bids are more common where the degree of uncertainty regarding costs is high. Repair work to automobiles, houses, and industrial plant and equipment typically proceeds on the latter basis because the actual labor time and parts required only become known as the repair work progresses and after the item to be repaired has been at least partially disassembled. The buyer’s problem with cost-plus bids is that the seller has little incentive to work fast and efficiently and thus minimize costs. Given that an audit of the seller’s costs will be time consuming and imperfect, due to the asymmetry of information, the final price to the buyer most likely will be higher than if the seller had a strong incen- tive to keep costs to the minimum.

In Table 10.1, we show the circumstances under which one of these bid types is likely to be preferred over the other. If costs are relatively easy to control, then the buyer will probably demand fixed-price bids and the sellers will need to bid in this mode to be considered by the buyer. Conversely, if costs are harder to control or are subject to unexpected increases, sellers will strongly prefer the cost-plus-fee mode and buyers will generally have to bid in this mode. Of course the bidding mode also depends on the relative bargaining power of the buyer. In some B2B and B2G situations a large and important customer might simply announce that it will only accept fixed-price bids.

Next, we consider the degree of risk aversion of the buyer and seller. If the seller is highly risk-averse, it will prefer not to bid in the fixed-price mode; and oppositely, if the buyer is highly risk-averse it will prefer not to receive cost-plus-fee bids. As we noted in Chapter 2, however, even risk-averse people can afford to be risk-neutral with regard to the next decision if they have a portfolio of risky assets. So, if the seller bids on many tenders over the year, it can afford to be risk-neutral with respect to any one tender, expecting that cost over-runs on one project tender might be offset by cost under-runs on other projects. The same applies from the buyer’s perspective: If the buyer routinely calls for tenders for simi- lar jobs, such as a taxi cab company repairing its cabs, it can afford to be risk-neutral with respect to any one cab repair. This is because some repairs will cost more and others will cost less, and on balance the jobs that cost less than expected will tend to offset the jobs that cost more than expected.

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CHAPTER 10Section 10.1 Types of Competitive Bids and Price Quotes

Table 10.1: Factors influencing choice of fixed-price versus cost-plus bids

Factor Fixed-price bids Cost-plus-fee bids

Degree of cost uncertainty (and/or uncontrollability)

If costs are relatively easy to control, buyers will insist on this mode, and seller must tolerate the risk of cost variability.

If cost uncertainty is high, sellers will strongly prefer this mode, and buyers must tolerate the risk of cost variability.

Seller’s attitude to risk If highly risk-averse, the seller will not want to bid in this mode, unless required to (unless the seller can be risk-neutral due to many concurrent bids, in which case, the seller will tolerate these).

Whatever the degree of risk aversion (unless the seller is risk- neutral) the seller will prefer cost- plus bids since these push all the cost variability risk to the buyer.

Buyer’s attitude to risk If highly risk-averse, the buyer will strongly prefer this mode.

If highly risk-tolerant, the buyer will accept these, and indeed sellers will only want to bid in this mode if cost uncertainty is high.

Many trials of the same risk

If the seller routinely and repetitively bids on similar contracts, it can act as if it is risk- neutral (and submit fixed-price bids), since high-cost jobs will tend to be balanced by low-cost jobs.

If the buyer routinely and repetitively calls for similar tenders, it can act as if it is risk-neutral (and submit cost-plus-fee bids), since high-cost jobs will tend to be balanced by low-cost jobs.

Any request for tender (RFT) by a buyer will have an implicit or explicit quality expecta- tion built into the specifications of the work to be done. For example, if you ask for a quote for new tires on your car, or to fix your transmission, you expect the job to be completed to a particular level of quality. You want new tires that comply with road safety regulations, or you want your transmission to work properly again. The buyer will typically be happy enough to bear a legitimate cost over-run that is necessary to achieve that expected level of quality, even if the extra cost is unexpected. The problem is the asymmetry of infor- mation between the buyer and the seller: The buyer may not be sure that the extra costs charged by the seller are, in fact, necessary to achieve the desired level of quality. Where observation and monitoring of the project by the buyer is unsafe (as in the workshop) or would be expensive (in terms of incurred costs and opportunity costs) there needs to be a mechanism to ensure that the seller does indeed deliver the specified quality without leveraging the asymmetry of information to raise its profit at the expense of the buyer.2

2. By seeking multiple quotes, and more detail from each potential seller, the buyer is likely to reduce the information asymmetry by gaining more information about the production side of the job, including what the job is most likely to involve and what is likely to be the costs of labor, materials, parts, and so on.

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CHAPTER 10Section 10.1 Types of Competitive Bids and Price Quotes

The third type of competitive bid provides one such mechanism. It is known as incentive bid pricing, and involves the buyer and seller agreeing on the bid price initially, but also agreeing to share any deviation from the expected cost in an agreed proportion. The vari- ance of actual costs from the expected costs is a cost over-run (if positive) or a cost under- run (if negative). For example, the share of the cost variance might be agreed to be 50% to each party, or in another case 70:30, with one party taking the larger proportion. In these situations, the seller has a substantial incentive to control costs, since it will have to pay a proportion of any cost over-run and this will reduce its profit from the job. Conversely, any cost under-run will also add to its profit because the seller will receive an agreed portion of that cost saving. The buyer’s incentive to pay more, to cover unexpected cost increases, is to achieve the desired level of quality associated with the job. On the other hand, if the repair is not as extensive as anticipated, or if weather and other uncontrollable factors play nicely, both the buyer and the seller benefit from the unexpected cost savings.

Apart from price and quality, the third major issue with competitive tenders is time to completion. Project management of a competitive bid transaction involves the efficient management of costs, quality, and the time it takes to complete the project. The buyer will typically want to set a deadline by which time the job is to be completed, and this deadline will usually be part of the tender specifications. Especially when the project is consid- ered to be urgent, such as completing major road works, bridges, and other public infra- structure (for B2G contracts); completing the manufacture and installation of new capital equipment to allow a business to get back in business (for B2B contracts); or completing a car repair or house renovation (for B2C contracts), the tender specifications might include a clause relating to penalties for late completion, and, conversely, for bonuses if the project is completed before the deadline. Note that such agreements are effectively risk sharing agreements as well, since production delays might be caused by both controllable factors (such as poor management by the seller) and uncontrollable factors such as bad weather and unavoidable delays in receiving materials. If the seller beats the deadline it receives a bonus for early completion, and indeed it may have put in place an incentive contract

with its own managers and employees to share this bonus with them if the contract is com- pleted prior to the deadline. The buyer will be happy to pay this bonus because it will allow early access to the completed project and the bonus will be less than the opportunity cost associated with waiting for the job to be completed. On the other hand, if completion of the project is delayed beyond the planned delivery date, the seller’s profit will be reduced to the extent of the penalties imposed and the buyer’s opportunity costs will be offset to some degree.

©iStockphoto/Thinkstock

Project management of a competitive bid transaction involves the efficient management of costs, quality, and the time it takes to complete the project.

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CHAPTER 10Section 10.2 Incremental Costs and Revenues and the Optimal Bid Price

10.2 Incremental Costs and Revenues and the Optimal Bid Price

From the information above, we can deduce that it is very important that the prospec-tive seller carefully calculates the incremental costs that are expected to be associated with completing any contract that it wins through a competitive tender process. We saw in Chapter 6 that there are three main categories of incremental costs and revenues, namely present-period explicit costs and revenues, opportunity costs and revenues, and future-period costs and revenues. Let us now consider these in the competitive bid pricing problem.

The Incremental Costs of the Contract The incremental costs of the contract are all those costs, expressed in present value terms, that are incurred as a result of winning and completing the contract. Costs that have been incurred already (sunk costs) and costs that will be incurred whether this contract is won or lost (unavoidable costs) are not incremental costs for the purposes of the pricing deci- sion to be made.

Present-Period Explicit Costs

These include the direct and explicit costs associated with undertaking and completing the project. Included are such cost categories as direct materials, direct labor, and variable overheads that are due to the project under consideration. These may be estimated on the basis of the firm’s experience with completing similar contracts previously, modified to reflect present materials and labor prices, plus a trend factor if completion of the project will take several months or years. In addition, the contract may require the firm to pur- chase and deliver to the buyer capital equipment that needs to be purchased by the seller at current prices.

In some cases, the completion of the contract will necessitate the seller purchasing special machines, tools, or other items of capital equipment that are needed to complete the job but which remain the property of the seller after the contract is completed. If these items have a useful life remaining, it seems unfair to the buyer to charge the entire cost against the current contract. The appropriate way to deal with this is indeed to charge the entire cost of the item as an incremental cost to the buyer, but to also take account of possible future income or cost savings that are likely to be obtained subsequently. These should be counted as incremental revenues to reduce the incremental cost by an amount represent- ing the net present value of the future revenues and the future costs avoided (which we call “opportunity revenues”).

Another consideration is the capacity utilization rate of the firm. When the firm is at or near to its full capacity rate of output, it must consider the additional incremental costs that will be incurred if it wins the contract, such as overtime labor rates, outside contract- ing expenses, penalty charges associated with delays on other existing contracts, and new capital equipment that must be purchased to enable the contract to be undertaken and completed.

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CHAPTER 10Section 10.2 Incremental Costs and Revenues and the Optimal Bid Price

Opportunity Costs

As we know, opportunity costs are the value of resources in their next-most-valuable use. Hence, if plant and equipment are lying idle, they have zero opportunity cost if they are used in the contract under consideration.3 On the other hand, if they are currently employed in a project that must be set aside, delayed, or cancelled to accommodate the contract under consideration, then the contribution to overheads and profits that these resources could have made must be counted as an opportunity cost for the project under consideration. For example, a firm producing relatively low-value items to build up its inventories for supply to wholesale and retail customers may decide to bid on a tender and if successful would stop producing these items, utilizing its resources more profitably on the contract under consideration. The contribution foregone is an opportunity cost of the contract under consideration. If the alternative production is simply delayed and this simply causes revenues from the sale of those items to be delayed, the opportunity cost is simply the interest income foregone on the revenues involved.

Future Costs

Future incremental costs may include the effects of customer ill will, deteriorating labor relations or supplier relations, and legal recourse by dissatisfied buyers or government prosecutors. Ill will (or ill feeling) toward the seller may manifest itself in the expected present value of contribution (EPVC) of future contracts that are lost if this current con- tract is undertaken. For example, undertaking a difficult or politically contentious contract today might come back to haunt the firm if it upsets employees, suppliers, or government regulators. To the extent that such future costs are envisioned, the firm should allow for them in the current calculation of incremental costs. For example, a trucking company that wins a contract to move the city’s garbage during a garbage-workers’ strike may well expect to lose business in the future from people and organizations who are sympathetic to labor unions.

In practice, it is not likely to be worth the search costs required to carefully estimate every single opportunity and future incremental costs associated with a particular competi- tive tender, nor is the bidding firm likely to have the time required for this information search activity, since RFTs are typically issued with only a short time for potential sellers to respond. More realistically the bidding firm will simply add a “cushion” (or safety mar- gin) to its explicit incremental costs to reflect its recognition that there are opportunity and future incremental costs involved.

Augmented Solow Model Essay, 1300 Words

Lecture 3: The Augmented Solow Model

March 5th, 2018

 

 

Recap

I In the last lecture, we studied the basic Solow model without population growth and without technological progress (chapter 5 Garin et al 2018)

I We studied the key equation: the transitional dynamics [TD] equation

kt+1 = sAf (kt) + (1 − δ)kt

I The properties of f (k) (diminishing returns + INADA) ensure this equation converges to a long-run equilibrium (k∗)

I We discussed that the model predicts conditional convergence

I Today, we will finish working with the model and extend it to have technological progress and population growth

 

 

Graphical analysis

Similar if the economy starts at kt > k∗

 

 

Transition dynamics

 

 

What about (short-term) economic growth? (Assume f(k) = kα)

Assume for now that At = A for all t (no technological progress)

kt+1 = sAk α t + (1 − δ)kt,

divide it by kt 1 + gk = sAk

α−1 t + (1 − δ)

gk = sAk α−1 t −δ

We know that yt = Yt Nt

= Akαt . Take logs and subtract the lag:

ln yt − ln yt−1 = α(ln kt − ln kt−1)

use the fact that ln ( yt

yt−1

) = ln(1 + gy) ≈ gy, for gy ≈ 0, to get

gy = αgk = α(sAk α−1 t −δ),

which depends on the level of technology, the capital share (α), the investment rate (s), the current level of capital (kt), and the depreciation rate (δ)

 

 

Is there long run growth when At = A for all t? No!

When the economy reaches its steady state k∗ = kt = kt+1, the rate at which capital is created (total investment per-capita) equals the rate at which capital is “’destructed’

kt+1 = sAk α t + (1 −δ)kt [TD]

∆kt+1 = sAk α t −δkt [TD

′]

At steady state, ∆kt+1 = 0, implying

sAk∗α = δk∗,

implying that in the long run

gk = 0 ; gy = 0

Capital accumulation only leads to per-capita economic growth along the transition dynamics

 

 

Long-run GDP Although this simple model is not consistent with the data (gy ≈ 2%), it is useful to understand the transition dynamic of alike countries

Use the [TD] equation to find an expression for k∗ and y∗

kt+1 = sAk α t + (1 − δ)kt,

k∗ = sAk∗α + (1 − δ)k∗,

δk∗ = sAk∗α,

k∗ = ( sA δ

) 1 1−α ,

y∗ = ( sA δ

) α 1−α ,

A key prediction from the model is that economies with similar characteristics (s, A, δ, α) converge to similar levels of income y∗ = k∗α. Is this true in the data?

 

 

Conditional Convergence (more empirics in lecture 5)

Figure: Source: Garin et al (2017)

 

 

Experiments: increased saving rate

Figure: Source: Garin et al (2017)

 

 

Experiments: increased saving rate

Figure: Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

Experiments: increased saving rate

Note that c∗ = (1 − s)y∗. So, it is unclear whether the new c∗ is larger or smaller

Figure: Source: Garin et al (2018

 

 

Experiments: increased saving rate

Figure: Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

Experiments: increased saving rate

Figure: Source: Garin et al (2018)

Initial burst of higher growth but eventually come back to 0 growth.

 

 

Experiments: increased productivity (A)

Figure: Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

Experiments: increased productivity (A)

What is the main difference wrt a change in s? a direct level effect on y

Figure: Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

Experiments: increased productivity (A)

Figure: Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

Experiments: increased productivity (A)

Figure: Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

Discussion

How do we know we achieved our long-run equilibrium? Is the observed positive growth (gy > 0) due to transitional growth?

Or, is it due to frequent shocks that move the economy from one long-run equilibrium to another?

Use the model to shed lights on this. Calibrate our [TD] equation. In the data, α ≈ 0.3, δ ≈ 0.1 (annual), s ∈ (0.2, 0.4), A? k0? Use

kt+1 = sAk α t + (1 −δ)kt,

and

k∗ = (sA δ

) 1 1−α ,

How should the growth path look like when the economy is in the transition?

 

 

Confront the model with the data

How can the U.S and Australia achieve higher levels of GDP per-capita?

More investment (s)? Higher productivity (A)?

 

 

Confront the model with the data

How can the U.S and Australia grow persistently more than Chile and Argentina?

Did they do it by persistently increasing the saving rate (s)? https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RTFPNAAUA632NRUG

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/KIPPPGAUA156NUPN

 

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RTFPNAAUA632NRUG
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/KIPPPGAUA156NUPN

 

Confront the model with the data How do we account for Singapore’s and Venezuela’s case?

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RTFPNASGA632NRUG

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RTFPNAVEA632NRUG

 

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RTFPNASGA632NRUG
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RTFPNAVEA632NRUG

 

Golden Rule When is long-run consumption maximized?

c∗ = (1 − s)A∗f (k∗)

Figure: Source: Garin et al (2017)

 

 

Golden Rule When is long-run consumption maximized?

Figure: Source: Garin et al (2017)

 

 

Golden Rule

When is “good” to save more? (think of c as a measure of welfare)

Figure: Source: Garin et al (2017)

 

 

Policy Implications

I Is the model’s equilibrium Pareto efficient? I Does the model provide insights on how to improve

productivity? I In the next lectures, we will extend the model to

incorporate mechanisms through which the long-run growth rate is endogenously determined.

 

 

Take aways

I A simple version of the Solow model explains the observed conditional convergence in GDP per-capita levels

I Physical capital accumulation is key in the generation of economic growth along the transition dynamics

I Changes in the saving rate, the capital share, or the depreciation of capital can only have a transitory effect on growth

I Long-term growth requires technological progress

 

 

The Augmented Solow model

Learning resource: chapter 6 Garin et al (2018)

I So far, the model misses the observed trend in GDP per-capita observed in the data (gy ≈ 1.7% in Australia)

I Thus, we will augment the Solow growth model to allow for: population growth and technological progress

I We will, for now, stick to the assumption of exogenous growth

I In lecture 4, we will study endogenous growth models

 

 

Intro to the augmented Solow model

Assume there is labor-augmenting productivity Zt (At is the factor neutral productivity), this is

Yt = AtF(Kt, ZtNt),

where ZtNt is called efficiency units of labor. Assume that

Zt = (1 + z)Zt+1, z > 0

Nt = (1 + n)Nt+1, n > 0

We assume that At controls for the level of technology and that Zt is the one growing overtime.

In reality, A and Z grow and are important drivers of economic growth. See Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2018) “Measuring the Bias of Technological Change”, Journal of Political Economy, (Forthcoming).

 

 

Equations that characterize the augmented model

Production function : Yt = AtF(Kt, ZtNt) Goods’ market clearing : Yt = Ct + It Evolution of capital : Kt+1 = It + (1 −δ)Kt Investment “decision” : It = sYt

Equilibrium wage rate : wt = AtZt ∂F(Kt,ZtNt) ∂ZtNt

Equilibrium rental rate : rt = At ∂F(Kt,Nt) ∂Kt

Population growth : Nt = (1 + n)t

Labor productivity growth : Zt = (1 + z)t

 

 

The key difference equation of the model

Kt+1 = sAtF(Kt, ZtNt) + (1 −δ)Kt,

divide it by ZtNt (efficiency units of labor) to get

Kt+1 ZtNt

= Kt+1

Zt+1Nt+1 Zt+1Nt+1

Nt = sAtF(

Kt ZtNt

, 1) + (1 − δ) Kt

ZtNt

k̂t+1(1 + z)(1 + n) = sAtf (k̂t) + (1 − δ)k̂t,

k̂t+1 = 1

(1 + z)(1 + n) [ sAtf (k̂t) + (1 −δ)k̂t

] [TD2]

Today’s level of capital per-efficiency units (predetermined) determines tomorrow’s capital stock per-efficiency units k̂t+1. Note that we still care about per-capita variables. However, the system converges to a steady state in efficiency units variables.

 

 

Rewrite the whole system of equations in efficiency units

Production function : ŷt = Atf (k̂t) Goods’ market clearing : ŷt = ĉt + ît Evolution of capital : k̂t+1 = ît + (1 −δ)k̂t Investment “decision” : ît = sŷt

Equilibrium wage rate : wt = Zt[Atf (k̂t) − Atf ′(k̂t)k̂t]

Equilibrium rental rate : rt = At ∂f(k̂t) ∂k̂t

 

 

Graphical analysis

Figure: Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

Steady state and long-run growth of K and Y We know that in the long-run

k̂t+1 = k̂t = k̂ ∗

Kt+1 Zt+1Nt+1

= Kt

ZtNt

Kt+1 Kt

= Zt+1Nt+1

ZtNt

1 + gK = (1 + z)(1 + n)

gK ≈ z + n

In the long-run, the level of capital stock grows at the product (approx. the sum) of the growth rates of Zt and Nt

 

 

Steady state and long-run growth of k and y

What about per-capita variables?

Kt+1 Zt+1Nt+1

= Kt

ZtNt

Kt+1 Nt+1

= Zt+1Kt+1

ZtNt

kt+1 kt

= 1 + gk = 1 + z

gk ≈ z

Using the same approach, in the long-run, gy ≈ z. Thus, technological progress accounts for the trend in GDP per-capita in the data.

 

 

Steady state and long-run growth of w and r

What about the rental rate and the wage rate?

r = A∗f ′(k̂∗)

wt = Zt[A ∗f (k̂∗ − A∗f ′(k̂∗k̂∗].

We know that f (k̂) is an increasing function of k̂, while f ′(k̂) is a decreasing function of k̂. In the long-run equilibrium, k̂ stays constant.

Thus, r is constant and equal to r∗ in the long run, while w grows at the same rate at which Z grows (z).

 

 

Consistent with Kaldor facts?

1. Labor productivity has grown at a sustained rate

2. Capital per worker has also grown at a sustained rate

3. The real interest rate, or return on capital, has been stable

4. The ratio of capital to output has also been stable

5. Capital and labor have captured stable shares of national income

 

 

Consistent with Kaldor facts?

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

Consistent with Kaldor facts?

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

An increase in the saving rate

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

An increase in the saving rate

Effect on per-efficiency units variables:

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

An increase in the saving rate

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

An increase in the saving rate

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

An increase in the saving rate

Effect on per-capita variables:

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

An increase in the saving rate

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

An increase in the saving rate

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

An increase in the saving rate

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

An increase in the level of productivity A

The effect on per-efficiency units variables

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

An increase in the level of productivity A

The effect on per-efficiency units variables

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

An increase in the level of productivity A

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

An increase in the level of productivity A

The effect on per-capita variables

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

An increase in the level of productivity A

The effect on per-capita variables

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

An increase in the level of productivity A

Source: Garin et al (2018)

 

 

Take aways

1. The Augmented Solow model (with population growth and labor-augmenting technological progress) converges to a steady state in per-efficiency units

2. The model predicts long-run steady growth in per-capita variables and the wage rate (growth rate z)

3. These predictions are partially consistent with the Kaldor facts

4. Blog article for discussion (at the end of Lecture 4) https:

//www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-11-16/

the-robot-revolution-is-coming-just-be-patient

5. Additional readings (not for discussion): 1) https://pubs. aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.31.2.145 and 2) https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mac.2.1.224

 

https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-11-16/the-robot-revolution-is-coming-just-be-patient
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-11-16/the-robot-revolution-is-coming-just-be-patient
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-11-16/the-robot-revolution-is-coming-just-be-patient
https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.31.2.145
https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.31.2.145
  • Introduction