Short Essay #2 – Rethinking Modernism

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Journal of the Royal Musical Association

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Round Table: Modernism and its Others

Laura Tunbridge, Gianmario Borio, Peter Franklin, Christopher Chowrimootoo, Alastair Williams, Arman Schwartz & Christopher Ballantine

To cite this article: Laura Tunbridge, Gianmario Borio, Peter Franklin, Christopher Chowrimootoo, Alastair Williams, Arman Schwartz & Christopher Ballantine (2014) Round Table: Modernism and its Others, Journal of the Royal Musical Association, 139:1, 177-204, DOI: 10.1080/02690403.2014.887301

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Round Table: Modernism and its Others

Introduction

LAURA TUNBRIDGE

MODERNISM remains a preoccupation of musicological study. Its persistence as a topic or issue on a certain level is probably banal: the twentieth century is currently one of the most highly populated fields of research, as is evident from conference programmes and publication catalogues. In almost any area one considers within that time frame, the legacy of modernist thought and practices can be found – a perhaps inevitable consequence of it being the century during which the discipline of musicology came of age. Resistance to modernism’s dominance over historiographical and methodological frameworks has come in the form of expanded definitions, and studies of music outside its canon. Modernism has been pluralized and contextualized, its aesthetic, geographical and technological boundaries surmounted and squashed. Yet it has not gone away. Instead, modernism remains the phenomenon against which other musical subjects frequently are measured, but its influence is not always acknowledged.

The purpose of this round table is thus to consider modernism’s significance for the study of music today. The contributors’ brief was to produce short, provocative statements; they are not intended to talk directly to one another, and we have tried to keep overlaps to a minimum. The range of perspectives is deliberately broad, to represent various areas of interest and different scholarly approaches. Gianmario Borio is concerned with the aesthetic implications of both modernism and postmodernism, while Peter Franklin argues that modernism can fruitfully be understood as a late bloom of Romanticism. Christopher Chowrimootoo considers the relationship between modern- ism and middlebrow culture of the 1930s; Alastair Williams modernism in relationship to cold war politics. Arman Schwartz advocates taking on board elements of sound studies, not least its attention to noise and performance; Christopher Ballantine calls for a greater flexibility in order to embrace popular and non-Western music. Our hope is that readers will take the round table as starting points for discussion in seminars or through the student blog on the Royal Musical Association website, <http://www.rma.ac.uk/students>.

E-mails: laura.tunbridge@manchester.ac.uk, gianmario.borio@unipv.it, peter.franklin@music.ox.ac.uk, christopher.chowrimootoo.1@nd.edu, a.williams@keele.ac.uk, a.schwartz.1@bham.ac.uk, ballanti@ ukzn.ac.za

Journal of the Royal Musical Association, 2014 Vol. 139, No. 1, 177–204, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02690403.2014.887301

© 2014 The Royal Musical Association

 

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02690403.2014.887301

 

Musical Communication and the Process of Modernity

GIANMARIO BORIO

THE debate on modernism that has taken place over recent decades in musicology is full of contradictory claims and methodological uncertainties. The ‘-ism’ suffix tends to place the concept in a negative light, making it seem tendentious and exclusive. Modernism is portrayed as the predominant force in music schools and the concert hall, as an ideological apparatus with technocratic components or as a utopia with ominous implications; it is sometimes even under suspicion of connivance with dictatorships of the twentieth century. Often cited as the prime examples of musical modernism are the 12-note system and integral serialism – two approaches that are represented as one single monolithic and self-referential system despite their differences and internal articulations. The critique draws on statements by commentators from a whole range of disciplines who are labelled indiscriminately as ‘postmodernists’: Susan Sontag, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Harold Bloom, Frederic Jameson, Umberto Eco and others. In its most polemical utterances it culminates in an ethical judgment that admits of no reply: modernism is academic, authoritarian, intolerant, chauvinistic and colonialist. This attitude is borne out in various ways in works by Georgina Born, Susan McClary, Lawrence Kramer, Derek B. Scott and Richard Taruskin, and prevails in many texts on postmodernism in music.1

The misunderstandings and distortions that permeate the debate on modernism result from a cursory analysis of the process of modernity within which the musical facts, theories and works under discussion occur. Modernity is a tenet of the philosophy of history: the concept delineates a set of premisses that were defined during the aftermath of the French

1 Georgina Born, Rationalizing Culture: IRCAM, Boulez, and the Institutionalization of the Musical Avant- Garde (Berkeley, CA, 1995); Western Music and its Others: Difference, Representation, and Appropriation in Music, ed. Georgina Born and David Hesmondhalgh (Berkeley, CA, 2000); Susan McClary, ‘Terminal Prestige: The Case of Avant-Garde Music Composition’, Cultural Critique, 12 (1989), 57– 81, repr. in Keeping Score: Music, Disciplinarity, Culture, ed. David Schwarz, Anahid Kassabian and Lawrence Siegel (Charlotteville, VA, and London, 1997), 54–74 (this essay was originally a 1988 conference paper); Lawrence Kramer, Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge (Berkeley, CA, 1995); Derek B. Scott, ‘Postmodernism and Music’, The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism, ed. Stuart Sim (London, 2011), 182–93; Richard Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music, 6 vols. (Oxford, 2005), v: The Late Twentieth Century, 411–14; Postmodern Music: Postmodern Thought, ed. Judy L. Lockhead and Joseph H. Auner (New York, 2002); Kenneth Gloag, Postmodernism in Music (Cambridge, 2012). The present overview concentrates on the main bulk of the critique of modernism, leaving out (for reasons of space) some important contributions that show signs of inverting the trend: Alastair Williams, New Music and the Claim of Modernity (Aldershot, 1997); The Pleasure of Modernist Music: Listening, Meaning, Intention, Ideology, ed. Arved Ashby (Rochester, NY, 2004); Music and the Aesthetics of Modernity, ed. Karol Berger and Anthony Newcomb (Cambridge, MA, 2005); The Modernist Legacy: Essays on New Music, ed. Björn Heile (Aldershot, 2009); David Metzer, Musical Modernism at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, 2009).

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Revolution, whose representative minds engaged themselves in defining the new historical phase. Self-reflectivity is thus inherent in the process of modernity, and it relies on constant evaluation and criticism of its achievements. Jürgen Habermas pointed out how this specific trait went hand in hand with the formation of a new ‘time consciousness’: modernity defines itself through ‘the reflective clarification of its own standpoint from the horizon of history as a whole’.2 The consciousness of the relations between past and present, continuity and discontinuity, has characterized art music in various ways over the last two centuries. In fact, the pursuit of the ‘new’ is not an abstract principle with ideological nuances but one component of ‘time consciousness’; it is expressed in the historical distance that transpires in enquiries into the compositional techniques of earlier periods (undertaken by generations of composers), as well as in the theorizing with which the composer defines the issues he/she is faced with and above all in the creation of sound forms which stimulate new communicative dynamics. These sound forms characterize the Jetztzeit not simply for their novelty content but also as the expression of the general subjectivity captured at a given moment. In discussing this dimension of collective awareness, Theodor W. Adorno introduced the distinction between the empirical ‘I’ and the ‘collective subject’, while Carl Dahlhaus similarly distinguished between the biographical and the aesthetic subject.3 The fact that a general subjectivity may mark the Jetztzeit makes apparent two aspects which Habermas related to one another in his reconstruction of the ‘discourse of modernity’: ‘subject-centred reason’ and ‘inter-subjective communication’.4

Instrumental reason (‘instrumentelle Vernuft’), which in modern societies takes the forms of industrial production, economic planning and administrative apparatus, has in the field of music a peculiar manifestation: the construction of sound worlds and listening modalities. Thus production is a fundamental concept of modernity, informing all the various spheres of cultural life and social action.5 Opponents of modernism tend to view construction, exemplified by 12-note technique and the serial organization of the sound space, as an end in itself. This assessment fails to take into account the fact that all musical compositions imply construction, and this is defined with respect to a specific realization in sound; thus, the debate should move from the abstract level, where the focus is construction as a principle, to the concrete level involving a discussion of the adequacy of the procedures enacted vis-à-vis the result obtained. In other words, it should be turned into an aesthetic rather than an ideological judgment.

2 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA, 1987); I propose here a different translation of the passage. Karol Berger, in ‘Time’s Arrow and the Advent of Musical Modernity’, Music and the Aesthetics of Modernity, ed. Berger and Newcomb, 5–19, explores the concept of ‘time consciousness’ in music.

3 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedeman (London and New York, 2004), 219–23; Carl Dahlhaus, Beethoven: Approaches to his Music (Oxford and New York, 1993), 30–42.

4 See Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics, and Postmodernism, trans. David Midgley (Cambridge, MA, 1991), especially the article ‘The Dialectic of Modernism and Postmodernism: The Critique of Reason Since Adorno’, 36–94.

5 Ästhetische Moderne in Europa: Grundzüge und Problemzusammenhänge seit der Romantik, ed. Silvio Vietta and Dirk Kemper (Munich, 1998), 37.

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The centrality of construction can be considered a parallel phenomenon to the affirmation of a ‘means/ends rationality’ which, according to Max Weber, is the salient feature of societal modernization. In the field of music, too, the productive drive can turn into a mechanism that spins on its axle without producing meaning. However, modernity has come up with a corrective: the dynamic of the cultural sphere itself, which makes selections on the basis of shared criteria, identifies and discusses the problems that occur, determines the paradigmatic value of certain works and rejects other solutions. This dynamic is public and intersubjective. Far from being an element that has been disregarded by modernity and mysteriously reinstated by postmodernist music, communication is an aspect inherent in the process itself. Seen in these terms, self-reflection appears not only as a premiss for the creation of new techniques and the mutation of the sonic imaginary, but also as a decisive factor for the articulation of historical processes. The crisis is inscribed in the process, not a catastrophic event produced by chance or destiny – and this also concerns the ‘crisis’ of tonality. Habermas came up with a different interpretation of the phenomena viewed as manifestations of postmodernism, recognizing them as signs of a critique of procedural rationality, which is focused on the subject, and of a movement to the fluid and open operativity of intersubjective networks. This dialectic has also taken place in the sphere of musical composition through the progressive differentiation of approaches – a pluralization of modernity which can only be grasped if one considers the whole complex in its overall dynamic, rather than one specific sector. The opposition of very different aesthetic (and compositional) options, which characterized the twentieth more than any previous century, is the clear demonstration of this differentiation. At just about the same time as Habermas was formulating his critique of postmodernism, Charles Taylor pointed out the need for a second approach to modernity, taking what he called a ‘cultural’ perspective.6 In the following decades, the dialogue between philosophy and anthropology has produced the notion of ‘hybrid modernity’, highlighting the multiple and transnational nature of the process; as Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar explains: ‘Modernity has travelled from the West to the rest of the world not only in terms of cultural forms, social practices, and institutional arrangements, but also as a form of discourse that interrogates the present.’7

Jonathan Kramer has listed 16 aspects in which the music of postmodernism differs from that of modernism. Here I shall deal only with the eighth: ‘[Postmodernism] considers music not as autonomous but as relevant to cultural, social, and political contexts.’8 This is one of the recurring issues in discussions about modernism, and the one that has given rise to the greatest confusion. Martin Scherzinger has illustrated a different outlook, showing that far from distancing itself from social reality, the adherence to the principle of autonomy actually

6 Charles Taylor, ‘Two Theories of Modernity’, Alternative Modernities, ed. Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar (Durham, NC, 2001), 172–96.

7 Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, ‘On Alternative Modernities’, Alternative Modernities, ed. Gaonkar, 1– 23 (p. 14). In the domain of music the idea of hybrid modernity was developed by Steven Feld; see in particular his Jazz Cosmopolitanism in Accra: Five Musical Years in Ghana (Durham, NC, 2012), 201–43.

8 Jonathan D. Kramer, ‘The Nature and Origins of Musical Postmodernism’, Postmodern Music: Postmodern Thought, 13–26 (p. 16).

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implied in the twentieth century taking a standpoint in relation to this reality.9 His argument, which takes place mostly on the theoretical level, can be integrated with a reconstruction of the debate that occurred in the second half of the twentieth century in response to the direction indicated by the cultural policy of the Soviet bloc. The sphere of this debate is commonly indicated by the term ‘commitment’, which Jean-Paul Sartre introduced in an article written in 1947; among the most significant contributions to the debate were L’artiste et sa conscience by René Leibowitz (1950), ‘Presenza storica nella musica d’oggi’, a lecture given by Luigi Nono at Darmstadt in 1959, ‘Commitment’, a lecture Adorno gave on Radio Bremen in 1962, and the article ‘Del modo di formare come impegno sulla realtà’ by Umberto Eco.10

The debate was pursued and extended over three decades. In the aftermath of 1968, thanks in part to the input of anti-establishment movements, the issue of the independence of artistic production was not limited to relationships with the state but was extended to cover scope for freedom in a communicative system, seen to be increasingly conditioned by the cultural industry and market laws. (And the emergence of avant-garde experimentation in jazz and rock is symptomatic of the fact that this problem does not pertain exclusively to art music.) When Heinz-Klaus Metzger, speaking during a student protest at the Musi- khochschule in West Berlin in 1969, defended the principles of ‘aesthetic autonomy and the immanent substance of an artistic creation’,11 he did not posit the ontological superiority of the model of music that had established itself in the West, but reacted against it: he advocated a history of artistic liberty which has asserted itself over the centuries and encountered all sorts of obstacles. Metzger’s arguments were based on the definition of art that Adorno had developed over the previous years as a fait social, dispensing with the traditional opposition between autonomy and functionalism.12 Starting from similar premisses, in the same years Dieter Schnebel developed the concept of the political bias that is implicit in the practice of artistic autonomy; he sought to redefine the principle of autonomy in view of a social significance which evades the system of values imposed by the entertainment industry. From this perspective, the passivity of the recipient and the isolation of experimental art are seen as products of the ideology of entertainment and standardized communication. Nonetheless, Schnebel did not defensively revert to models which had

9 Martin Scherzinger, ‘In Memory of a Receding Dialectic: The Political Relevance of Autonomy and Formalism in Modernist Musical Aesthetics’, The Pleasure of Modernist Music, ed. Ashby, 68–100.

10 Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature? and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA, 1988); René Leibowitz, L’artiste et sa conscience: Esquisse d’une dialectique de la conscience artistique (Paris, 1950); Luigi Nono, ‘Presenza storica nella musica d’oggi’, Scritti e colloqui, ed. Angela Ida De Benedictis and Veniero Rizzardi, 2 vols. (Lucca, 2001), i, 46–56 (trans. as ‘The Historical Reality of Music Today’, The Score, 27 (1960), 41–5); Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Commitment’, Can One Live after Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Stanford, CA, 2003), 240–58; Umberto Eco, ‘Del modo di formare come impegno sulla realtà’, Menabò, 5 (1962), 198–237, repr. in Opera aperta: Forma e indeterminazione nelle poetiche contemporanee (Milan, 1976), 235–90 (trans. Anna Cancogni as ‘Form as Social Commitment’, in Eco, Open Work (Cambridge, MA, 1989), 123–57).

11 Heinz-Klaus Metzger, ‘Musik wozu’, Musik wozu: Literatur zu Noten, ed. Rainer Riehn (Frankfurt am Main, 1980), 294–306 (p. 296).

12 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Hullot-Kentor, 295–7. On this topic, see Lydia Goehr, ‘Political Music and the Politics of Music’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 52/1: The Philosophy of Music (winter 1994), 99–112.

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shown a certain resilience in the past. He chose instead also to call for change in terms of production: ‘Nowadays an autonomous art can no longer permit itself to manufacture its products remaining, as it were, aloof from reality, concentrating on the development of the material, as was the case in Schoenberg’s school and later in the serial music of the fifties.’13 The recognition of the ‘social content’ of the musical material implies new procedures aiming to produce a different experience of reality and transform ‘regimented communica- tion’ into ‘genuine’ communication.14

The positions I have cited indicate the ways in which a significant number of avant-garde composers reacted to social changes not only in theoretical reflection but also in their composing practice (examples I might mention include A floresta è jovem e cheja de vida by Nono and Maulwerke by Schnebel). Alongside these statements, which share a basis in so- called ‘Western Marxism’, the critique of the principle of autonomy also emerged among composers who identified with another trend in modernity: structuralism and semiotics. The seminars held by Henri Pousseur in 1970 at the Centre de Sociologie de la Musique in the Université Libre de Bruxelles started from the conviction that ‘sounds are not independent entities which are detached from reality and can be used without taking reality into account’.15 Each sound is a genuine story in miniature; together with its physical properties, it carries within it a semantic layer that has accumulated during its use through the ages and is reactivated by the listener by means of an unconscious memory.16 Thus emphasis comes to be placed on usage, on the continuous reorganization of the sounds in view of a ‘message’. Moreover, Pousseur emphasized that the sound’s production is linked to a practice that cannot be separated from its social context: ‘Any music, even one held to be pure and autonomous, constitutes an authentic theatre, first and foremost in the mind, but also more “external”, in which the allegories of our destiny are represented.’17

There are undoubted affinities between Pousseur’s approach and the position of Luciano Berio, as seen more fully in the latter’s compositions than in his sporadic writings. Berio did, nonetheless, leave one essay of particular relevance to our subject of enquiry, in which he focused on the concept of gesture.18 Once again, the discussion takes place in the context of a

13 Dieter Schnebel, ‘Autonome Kunst politisch’, Denkbare Musik: Schriften 1952–1972, ed. Hans Rudolf Zeller (Cologne, 1972), 474–87 (p. 479).

14 Ibid., 480. See also Helmut Lachenmann, ‘Die gefährdete Kommunikation: Gedanken und Praktiken eines Komponisten’ (1973), Musik als existentielle Erfahrung: Schriften 1966 –1995, ed. Josef Häusler (Wiesbaden, 1996), 99–103.

15 ‘Les sons ne sont pas des entités indépendantes, détachées du restant de la réalité et utilisables sans tenir compte de celle-ci.’ Henri Pousseur, Musique, sémantique, société (Paris, 1974), 7. Pousseur refers here to the conception of music elaborated in Michel Butor, ‘La musique, art réaliste: Les paroles et la musique’, Répertoire 2 (Paris, 1964), 27–41.

16 ‘C’est toute une petite histoire que chaque son, chaque structure sonore nous raconte.’ Pousseur, Musique, sémantique, société, 8.

17 ‘En fait, toute musique, même la plus prétendument pure et autonome, constitue un véritable théâtre, mental d’abord mais aussi plus “extérieur”, où se jouent les allégories de nostre destin.’ Ibid., 13.

18 Luciano Berio, ‘Du geste et de Piazza Carità’, La musique et ses problèmes contemporains 1953 –1963, Cahiers de la Compagnie Madeleine Renaud–Jean-Louis Barrault, 2/41 (Paris, 1963), 216–33; I cite, however, from the Italian version: ‘Del gesto e di Piazza Carità’, Luciano Berio, Scritti sulla musica, ed. Angela Ida De Benedictis (Turin, 2013), 30–6 (p. 31).

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reflection on modernity: rather than seeking to identify a pre-linguistic sphere, freed from historical processes, Berio tries to highlight ‘linguistic objects which we find ready and waiting on our arrival in a world that already possesses a language’.19 Gesture is distinguished from other objects because it is the ‘residue of a linguistic act which has already taken place’ and which accordingly ‘also contains the experience of the sign’.20 These considerations give expression to a critique of ‘a music based exclusively on the notes and not on the sound and the gestures of performance and listening’, as well as the composer’s awareness of operating on objects which have social implications. Like Pousseur, Berio arrives at a broad notion of theatre as the representation of social relationships.

The excerpts from the writings of the composers I have referred to should be related to the compositional techniques they used; this is a crucial step, because technique can be seen as the engine of musical communication and the composers’ writings represent only one side of the complex network that defines musical thinking (or poetics). Associating composers’ public utterances with the complex problems they tried to solve in a given time would make it even clearer that the principle of autonomy, rather than having suffered an external attack from the joint forces of the cultural industry and postmodernist music, has always been involved in a dialectical interplay with its opposite. This dialectic in turn can be seen as a segment of a historical reality whose investigation requires a reflection on the process of modernity in music that needs to be more thoroughgoing than it has been hitherto.

Modernismus and the Philistines

PETER FRANKLIN

HOW modern is modernism? Pondering our brief to ‘be provocative’ here, I am minded to invoke earlier sceptics in the Chapel of Higher Modernism, not least when confronting its devotional text: Julian Johnson’s Who Needs Classical Music? 21 Inevitably, one thinks of Richard Taruskin’s amusing and often rude comments about Johnson in his notorious review article ‘The Musical Mystique: Defending Classical Music against its Devotees’.22 Next in line (perhaps at a slightly disrespectful distance from Taruskin) would have to be Susan McClary: I still love her ‘Terminal Prestige’ essay of 1988 (‘the retreat to the boys’ club of modernism was not simply a matter of sloughing off soft, sentimental, “feminine” qualities for the sake of more difficult, “hard core” criteria’).23 But this is more than a transatlantic

19 Ibid. 20 Ibid., 32. 21 Julian Johnson, Who Needs Classical Music? Cultural Choice and Music Value (Cambridge, 2002). 22 Richard Taruskin, ‘The Musical Mystique: Defending Classical Music against its Devotees’, The

Danger of Music and Other Anti-Utopian Essays (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2009), 330–53 (first published in The New Republic, 22 October 2007).

23 McClary, ‘Terminal Prestige’, 72.

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spat between down-to-earth Americans with agendas and head-in-the-clouds European aesthetes and idealists (indeed, a butt of McClary’s humour was the recently deceased American high high-modernist Milton Babbitt). Let me venture a possibly provocative proposal from this side of the Atlantic: that European high modernism of the period c.1909– c.1970 was profoundly and primarily a product and function of European Romanticism – perhaps it even marked a late, decadent phase of Romanticism.

By ‘Romanticism’ I mean to invoke in particular the cross-disciplinary movement in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Germany that was as much about ideas as it was about Gothic tales, ‘medieval’ fantasies and nostalgic escapism (French Romanticism pursued a related, but slightly different course). The ideas were often precisely about Art, both its products and its practice. We imagine we know about musical Romanticism from an oft- reiterated mantra about E. T. A. Hoffmann creating the notion of ‘absolute music’ in his 1813 essay ‘Beethoven’s Instrumental Music’. (Did not the Romantics rather create the whole idea of Classical Music?) Let us be clear that Hoffmann’s hero Beethoven was more specifically (and politically?) an ‘absolute monarch’ of the ‘inner realm of harmony’. This was far from the cool abstraction that absolute music became. It was shot through with ‘burning flashes of light’ and ‘giant shadows’ that reduce us not to transcendentally disembodied spirit, but rather to ‘the pain of that endless longing in which each joy that has climbed aloft in jubilant song sinks back and is swallowed up’ – yet only, it turns out, to ‘burst our breasts with a many-voiced consonance of all the passions’, leaving us ‘enchanted beholders of the supernatural’.24 This was hardly the ‘opposite of programme music’, ‘without reference to anything beyond itself’, as Beard and Gloag’s Musicology: The Key Concepts understandably puts it when defining the ‘absolute music’ of what was really a later period.25 Other examples of Hoffmann’s writings open up the broader field of Romanticism that I have in mind. His little story ‘The Artushof ’ (1815) will do nicely.

Its title might be translated as ‘The Court of Arthur’. It is indeed the mythical British king that is alluded to – for Germans of that period this was the very stuff and embodiment of escapist, Romantic–medievalist fantasy. But while Romantic images inspired by that mythology were indeed involved here, they turn out to be no more than the decorative wall and ceiling adornments of a public hall of commerce in the port of Danzig (we know it as Polish Gdańsk). Rather un-Romantically, the Artushof resounds, like a sort of stock exchange, ‘with the noise of commerce[;] people of all nationalities ran hither and thither, and the ear was deafened by their transactions’. Only when the exchange is closed for the night does Hoffmann envisage the ‘strange pictures and carvings’ somehow ‘coming alive’ in the ‘magical twilight’.26

In other words, this piece of ‘Romanticism’ rather humorously sets its anticipated fantasy world of aesthetic escape into past times over and against the ‘modern’ world of bourgeois capitalism which it decorates, but which its more sensitive practitioners rather despise. One such is the young Herr Traugott, a delicate pen-pusher and associate of the firm of Elias

24 E. T. A. Hoffmann, ‘Beethoven’s Instrumental Music’ (1813), Strunk’s Source Readings in Music History, rev. edn, gen. ed. Leo Treitler, 7 vols. (New York and London, 1998), vi: The Nineteenth Century, ed. Ruth A. Solie, 151–6 (all quotations here from pp. 152–3).

25 David Beard and Kenneth Gloag, Musicology: The Key Concepts (London and New York, 2005), 3. 26 E. T. A. Hoffmann, Tales of Hoffmann, selected and ed. R. J. Hollingdale (London, 1982), 127–57

(p. 127); the quotations in the following paragraph are from p. 136.

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Roos, which operates in the Artushof. Traugott harbours artistic aspirations as he gazes at the historical images around and above him. He hates his colleagues’ devotion only to ‘the acquisition of more and more money for the cashbox, only the greater splendour of Fafner’s baleful hoard!’ He, an ‘artist’, ‘longs to leave the city and with head held high breathe in all the reviving odours of spring’.

The tension between the two worlds is maintained and dramatized in this little story, whose critical balance tips in favour of Traugott’s aesthetic opposition to the soulless, uncreative world of commerce – although he survives most of his more radical fantasies to marry a beautiful girl in Italy, to whom he will clearly become a proverbial ‘good husband’. But so too is he finally transformed into a painter, who will leave the Artushof behind him. In short, this tale, like a good deal of ‘Romantic’ literature, is as much about Romantic idealism and the possibly ill-advised aestheticization of life as it is straightforwardly an indulgence in such things. It is therefore conceptually a piece of ‘modernism’: Romantic modernism – and by ‘modernism’ here I will understand a mode of art whose innovative aspect is associated with an explicitly or implicitly critical attitude to past and present norms and manners of artistic production and consumption, and the restricted imaginative world of its frequently (to the artist) insensitive consumers.

Move forward just 20 years and we will find Robert Schumann, or at least his flamboyant alter ego Florestan, fleeing with the sensitive and impressionable Eusebius from the concert hall in which they have just heard Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony.27 The aim was to escape from the vexing platitudes and embarrassing rhetoric of connoisseurship being loudly faked and broadcast by the bourgeois ‘social’ concert-goers who surrounded them. Distancing themselves from these ‘Philistines’, Florestan’s Band of David (the unbiblical might need to be reminded that Goliath was an ethnic Philistine) sought to preserve, unsullied by the ill- chosen explanatory words of others, their profound sympathetic understanding of the tautologically ineffable ‘depth’ of Beethoven’s music, which they sought thus to rescue from the audience that plainly and all too enthusiastically supported and funded its performance.

Schumann’s Davidbündler were Romantic in the sense not that they wrote ‘romantic music’ (whatever that might be: Hoffmann had used the term for all the ‘classical’ music that he admired) but more that they despised those listeners as they took on ever clearer characteristics of the same mass audience that literary historian John Carey’s late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century ‘intellectuals’ would always despise and seek to philistinize (if such a verb exists).28 The gradual shift away from entertainment and the masses – particularly the bourgeois masses – would finally be institutionalized by the bourgeois Schoenberg and his Second Viennese School, with their post-First World War ‘Society for Private Musical Performances’ (no critics, no applause, no enthusiastic clichés).29 Inheriting the spirit of the Davidsbund, their music became tortuously crafted precisely to exclude and even repel all but self-appointed connoisseurs who could, in reality, be quite as pompous and ridiculous as Schumann’s

27 Robert Schumann, ‘Florestan’s Shrove Tuesday Address Delivered after a Performance of Beethoven’s Last Symphony’, Strunk’s Source Readings in Music History, vi, ed. Solie, 104–6.

28 I refer to John Carey, The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary Intelligentsia 1880 –1939 (London, 1992).

29 ‘Second Interlude: The Society of Musical Private Performances’ (from the society’s prospectus, written by Alban Berg); see Willi Reich, Alban Berg, trans. Cornelius Cardew (New York, 1974), 46–9.

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philistines. Not so far down that road lay the Contemporary Music, ‘avant-garde’ concerts and ‘happenings’ that I recall as a student in Wilfrid Mellers’s York Music Department long ago in the late 1960s. They often inspired an awkward balance of effortful reverence and humorous disbelief that occasionally tipped into laughter that would send some of us rushing into the cool night air for entirely reverse reasons to those of Schumann in 1835. I came to feel decidedly oppressed by the supposedly unclichéd, unadjectival technical Analysis of the latter-day Davidsbündler (quite unlike the richly imaginative, humane critical hermeneutics of Mellers himself ). The world of the banished philistines seemed suddenly liberating.

One can now see all this as being something other than the forward march of musical Progress that it once seemed (its narrative oddly similar to that of the very modernity modernism affected to be reacting against). The barriers and targets for the corporate project of bourgeois-shocking outrage were reached and surpassed almost with the relish and efficiency of the target-driven financial and managerial services into which not a few of the student composers of that era found their way. Was it not all part of a single and singular cultural complex in which the fabled ‘rising’ middle classes were romantically struggling to recreate a new kind of cultural power, of cultural aristocracy even? It was one in which the old servant-class musician might become an aristocrat of the spirit and no less haughtily dismiss as useless ‘others’ the disinherited purveyors of what Adorno used to call ‘Unterhaltungsmusik’ (‘light’ or ‘entertainment music’, into which category Britten and Shostakovich were often angrily relegated, along with everything that lay further back from the ‘cutting edge’ and closer to the world of the forgotten masses). The garde had become as much après as avant, and it was as a willing bearer of the Boulezian stigma of ‘USELESS’ (how can one forget that capitalized put-down from ‘Possibly’?)30 that I became a scholar of late Romanticism, of the period in which the German term ‘Modernismus’ was often satirical and intentionally comic, as much as a signifier of the urgency of the necessary New.

Even Adorno, in ‘The Aging of the New Music’, could see that the explosive authenticity of Berg’s Altenberg-Lieder and Stravinsky’s Sacre du printemps had become blunted, its critical impulse ‘ebbing away’,31 and might have anticipated that the new music of 2013 would often sound oddly like that of the decades following 1913; but I actually want to end on a more positive note. The various canons of modernism that once made up the alluringly frightening category of ‘Twentieth-Century Music’ (albeit endlessly domesticated and tamed by mass-media ‘arts’ programmes) have been valuably repositioned and subjected to long-overdue critique not only in the writing of McClary and the bracing historical hatchet-work of Taruskin, but also in a growing body of musicological and historical scholarship that has cut through the often patriarchal, authoritarian and elitist devices and desires of the old modernist narrative. Its increasingly multiple-seeming manifestations have been resituated in specific political and sociocultural contexts. From analyses of the cold war role of the CIA in supporting avant-garde ‘formalism’ as a bulwark against the march of communism, to the historically nuanced writing on Britten of scholars like Heather Wiebe or to Nadine Hubbs’s The Queer Composition of America’s Sound and

30 Pierre Boulez, ‘Possibly’ (originally ‘Éventuellement’, 1952), Stocktakings from an Apprenticeship (Oxford, 1991), 111–40 (p. 113).

31 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘The Aging of the New Music’ (1955), trans. Susan Gillespie, in Adorno, Essays on Music, ed. Richard Leppert (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2002), 181–202 (p. 181).

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studies of ‘gay Darmstadt’, the variously scary, odd and charming aspects of modernism have been better revealed.32

The New also begins to seem less singular and less exclusive. Recent Masters students I have encountered have been quite happy to follow an essay on Schoenberg’s Erwartung with one on Beyoncé, taking proper account of a quite different literature and mode of scholarship. Graduate composers seem less inclined to factionalism, and while the pitfalls of postmodern utopianism are legion, those same composers do seem able to draw without guilty apologetics upon a wide range of stylistic possibilities. They seek to build no ideological Berlin Walls between the musical worlds of ‘art’, dance, film, popular culture and even video games. I take some comfort from the tone of a recent enthusiastic review of a work by Mark Simpson which found the piece ‘exciting and assured […] rewarding whether you consider its poetic context or take the music itself: either way it thrills the ear and sends the imagination wild’.33 I can do without the Johnsonesque ‘music itself’ (whatever and wherever that might be), but take comfort that this critic is prepared not to keep faith with Johnson’s assertion that ‘the value of music-as-art lies in a difficult balancing act between the particularity of its materials and the abstract idea that it projects’.34 In the Chapel of Modernismus, our critic’s thrilled ear and wild imagination sound deliciously philistine, indeed like a kind of historical provocation in themselves.

Reviving the Middlebrow, or: Deconstructing Modernism from the Inside

CHRISTOPHER CHOWRIMOOTOO

[Middlebrow] culture presents a more serious threat to the genuine article than the old-time pulp, dime-novel […]. Unlike the latter, which has its social limits clearly marked out for it, middlebrow culture attacks distinctions as such and insinuates itself everywhere […]. Insidiousness is of its essence, and in recent years its avenues of penetration have become infinitely more difficult to detect and block. For we are all of us becoming guilty in one way or another.

(Clement Greenberg, 1948)35

32 Specific references are to Mark Carroll, Music and Ideology in Cold War Europe (Cambridge, 2003); Heather Wiebe, Britten’s Unquiet Pasts: Sound and Memory in Postwar Reconstruction (Cambridge, 2012); Nadine Hubbs, The Queer Composition of America’s Sound: Gay Modernists, American Music and National Identity (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2004); David Osmond-Smith and Paul Attinello, ‘Gay Darmstadt: Flamboyance and Rigour at the Summer Courses for New Music’, Contemporary Music Review, 26 (2007), 105–14.

33 Guy Dammann, review of Mark Simpson, A Mirror-Fragment, BBCSO/Brabbins, The Guardian, 22 April 2013, 24.

34 Johnson, Who Needs Classical Music?, 130. 35 Clement Greenberg, ‘The State of American Writing’ (1948), Arrogant Purpose, 1945–1949, ed.

John O’Brian (Chicago, IL, and London, 1986), 254–8 (pp. 257–8).

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AT a time when musicology’s sights seem set ever more squarely on eradicating boundaries – whether aesthetic, geographical, disciplinary or even ontological – the study of modernism can seem a rather antiquated concern. Modernism is arguably all about boundaries, in the heightened sense that it is itself a contested category, whose only red thread seems to have been an investment in distinction and hierarchy. Moreover, whether or not setting itself in opposition to convention, sentimentality or pleasure more broadly, modernist discourse has thrived on the so-called ‘great divide’: for a number of twentieth-century commentators, one was either for modernism or a panderer to mass culture; there was absolutely no space for compromise or moderation.36 ‘The middle road’, Schoenberg famously insisted, ‘is the only one that does not lead to Rome.’37

Now that we have all learnt to be suspicious of binaristic thinking, it should come as no surprise that scholars have sought to challenge the implications of such a vision. Before Susan McClary denounced the modernist critical tradition as the fons et origo of musicology’s disciplinary problems (its esotericism, formalism and even misogynism), Peter Franklin lamented the more specific, if no less pernicious, shadow that it cast on the historiography of twentieth-century music.38 The problem, Franklin explained, was that standard narratives of this period had started life as propaganda for the Second Viennese School, dividing composers between a select group of esoteric modernists on the one hand and an unholy rabble of reactionaries and populists on the other. In this ‘mythic picture’, modernism was no neutral category but an aesthetic and ethical imperative, a standard of progress and difficulty against which most composers were judged and found wanting.

As with most complaints against the modernist critical tradition, such a critique was initially resisted and then hardened into scholarly orthodoxy; today, few would endorse such a monolithic vision of ‘modernism’ on the one hand and ‘mass culture’ on the other. Nevertheless, old habits die hard, and modernism’s divisive legacy lives on in sometimes subtle, sometimes not so subtle ways. The most obvious examples come from those revisionists who have sought to redeem a number of conservative or populist composers as modernists.39 While such scholarship offers useful correctives to long-standing denigrations of Sibelius, Strauss and Elgar (to name but a few examples), it keeps faith with an old modernist commitment to ‘progress’ and the conviction that twentieth-century music can usefully be sorted into modernism on the one hand and everything else on the other. Neither has this dualistic vision been dislodged by the steady invective of anti-modernists who have echoed and amplified new musicological critiques in more recent years. Indeed, in

36 The term ‘great divide’ was coined by the literary critic Andreas Huyssen (After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington, IN, 1986)).

37 Arnold Schoenberg, ‘Foreword to Three Satires for Mixed Chorus, op. 28’ (1925–6), A Schoenberg Reader, ed. Joseph Auner (New Haven, CT, 2003), 186–7 (p. 186).

38 McClary, ‘Terminal Prestige’; Peter Franklin, The Idea of Music: Schoenberg and Others (London, 1985).

39 Some of the most prominent examples of this sort of historiographical revisionism include James Hepokoski, ‘Fiery-Pulsed Libertine or Domestic Hero? Strauss’s Don Juan Reinvestigated’, Richard Strauss: New Perspectives on the Composer and his Works, ed. Bryan Gilliam (Durham, NC, 1992), 135–75; idem, Sibelius: Symphony No. 5 (Cambridge, 1993); and J. P. E. Harper-Scott, Edward Elgar, Modernist (Cambridge, 2006).

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continuing to pour scorn over its values, modernism’s staunchest opponents have arguably helped to reinforce its terms and oppositions, even making them seem more unassailable than they really are.40

In the last few years, however, some scholars have begun to conjure up less exclusive and divisive visions. In Stefan Wolpe and the Avant-Garde Diaspora, Brigid Cohen follows the much broader definition of modernism, set out in a 1999 essay by Miriam Hansen.41

According to Hansen, ‘Modernism encompasses a whole range of cultural and artistic practices that register, respond to, and reflect upon processes of modernization and the experience of modernity.’42 While Cohen’s expansion may harbour some of the redemptive inclinations of other recent musicological revisionism, the result differs in a number of ways. Aside from striving to resist the aesthetic judgments that have often divided scholars of modernism, it allows for greater diversity within the modernist sphere. Instead of stylizing certain works and composers to conform to a narrow set of criteria, it seeks to dislodge these expectations from music history. With such ideologically charged ideals of progress, difficulty and distinction out of the picture, moreover, modernism’s boundaries become messier and more porous. Indeed, as histories ‘acquire the specificity and complexity of varied lives lived, musics performed, institutions built, visions enacted’, Cohen explains, modernism comes to seem less like a stable category of style or identity and more like a range of cultural ambivalences that undermine the very boundaries it was supposed to have upheld.43

Such a redefinition of modernism offers an attractive alternative to the old boundaries and hierarchies, bringing musicology into line with all the talk of ‘modernisms’ elsewhere in the humanities.44 But this opportunity carries with it a number of risks, as Cohen herself acknowledges. The first is that the category of modernism risks being so broad as to become meaningless. After all, which twentieth-century cultural and artistic practices did not register, respond to and reflect upon processes of modernization and the experience of modernity? The second problem is that of whitewashing history: a history of modernism without ideas of autonomy, progress and hierarchy is – one might argue – like an action movie without violence.45 As Cohen points out, many of the associations she is keen to shake off ‘inflected many modernists’ own interpretations of themselves and their projects’.46 Yet it was not just

40 For an elaboration of this point, see my discussion of Richard Taruskin’s Britten chapter in The Oxford History of Western Music, v, chapter 64: ‘Standoff (I)’, 221–59, in Christopher Chowrimootoo, ‘Bourgeois Opera: Death in Venice and the Aesthetics of Sublimation’, Cambridge Opera Journal, 22 (2010), 175–216 (pp. 211–12).

41 Brigid Cohen, Stefan Wolpe and the Avant-Garde Diaspora (Cambridge, 2012), 8–12; Miriam Hansen, ‘The Mass Production of the Senses: Classical Cinema as Vernacular Modernism’, Modernism/Modernity, 6/2 (April 1999), 59–77.

42 Ibid., 60. 43 Cohen, Stefan Wolpe and the Avant-Garde Diaspora, 2. 44 For an important milestone in the theorization of ‘modernisms’ in the plural, see Peter Nicholls,

Modernisms: A Literary Guide (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1995). 45 Björn Heile offers a similar warning about alternative modernisms, albeit from quite a different

perspective, in a recent review article (‘Musical Modernism, Sanitized’, Modernism/Modernity, 18/3 (September 2011), 631–7).

46 Cohen, Stefan Wolpe and the Avant-Garde Diaspora, 9.

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modernist self-conceptions that were coloured by crude hierarchies and oppositions; it was also their immediate reception, and the reception of contemporary culture more broadly. Indeed, despite (or even because of ) their crudity, oppositions between new and old, difficult and sentimental, high and low came close to dominating early and mid-twentieth-century cultural criticism in a variety of contexts. For every highbrow like Theodor W. Adorno who diagnosed a split between modernism and mass culture, there were countless mainstream critics who arrived at the same conclusion. For those critics, moreover, modernism was almost invariably associated with overt novelty and difficulty, which – in the musical sphere – often meant the Second Viennese School (or the ‘official revolution’, as Constant Lambert satirically dubbed it).47

Thus, the historiographical problem with which scholars now struggle is also a historical problem, one that we risk obscuring if we dispense all too readily with cultural boundaries and hierarchies. Acknowledging the centrality of rigid boundaries to historical conceptions of modernism, however, need not imply endorsing their reality or even reinforcing their conceptual hegemony. One might suggest instead that the best way to destabilize such boundaries is not by constantly denouncing them or throwing them out altogether but rather by seeing through them. It is here that recent work on ‘middlebrow’ culture and aesthetics in literary scholarship may offer some useful provocations to modernist studies in musicology. For the category of the middlebrow, I suggest, offers a chance to acknowledge the historical power of modernist critical oppositions on the one hand, while looking beyond them on the other – a chance, in other words, to deconstruct modernism from the ‘inside’, balancing current desires to challenge modernist historiography with sensitivity to its history.

Although a precise origin is difficult to pin down, the term ‘middlebrow’ was clearly cast in the crucible of the twentieth-century great divide. As the opening epigraph makes clear, it was often used as an insult against people and artworks that blurred the boundaries between modernism and mass culture, enjoying both the pleasures of the low and the prestige of the high. This simultaneous accusation of philistinism and pretentiousness was, moreover, by no means limited to literary circles, as Adorno’s critique of Britten, Shostakovich and other ‘new conformists’ demonstrates: ‘This characterizes a musical type who, with undaunted pretensions to modernity and seriousness, conforms with calculated idiocy to mass culture.’48 For those more favourably disposed towards it, the middlebrow embodied more positive ideals of moderation, synthesis and sincerity. According to J. B. Priestley, for example, middlebrows were those who avoided the herd mentality of both high and low, who ‘snap their fingers at fashions, who only ask that a thing should have character and art, should be enthralling, and do not give a fig whether it is popular or unpopular [… or] belongs to a certain category’.49 Whether the middlebrow’s cultural impulses were put down to duplicity or open-mindedness, however, most commentators agreed that it gave rise to a decidedly eclectic or ambivalent style, whose characteristic feature was its ability to confuse the

47 Constant Lambert, Music Ho! A Study of Music in Decline (3rd edn, London, 1948). 48 Theodor W. Adorno, The Philosophy of New Music, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis, MN,

2006), 9. 49 J. B. Priestley, ‘High, Low, Broad’, Open House: A Book of Essays (London, 1926), 162–7 (p. 166).

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categories of modernist criticism: ‘The universal style, after World War II,’ Adorno elaborated, ‘is the eclecticism of the shattered.’50

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the term middlebrow became a casualty of the modernist critical tradition’s success, with its use almost dying out in the latter half of the century. In recent years, however, literary scholars have revived the category as a means of redressing a scholarly balance tipped towards the extremes of ‘mass culture […] and the exploits of literary rebels’.51 In The Making of Middlebrow Culture, Joan Rubin redirected attention towards those cultural institutions of the mid-century middle classes which – from the Book of the Month Club to Educational Radio – strove for a balance between challenging readers on the one hand and entertaining, moving and engaging them on the other.52 More recently, scholars have resuscitated the term’s generic or stylistic connotations to make sense of the aesthetically ambivalent or eclectic novels that emerged from such cultural milieux:

The middlebrow novel is one that straddles the divide between the trashy romance or thriller on the one hand, and the philosophically or formally challenging novel on the other: offering narrative excitement without guilt, and intellectual stimulation without undue effort.53

This attempt to carve out a complex, middle space of moderation, mediation and even contradiction holds useful lessons for musicology, in which accounts of twentieth-century institutions, audiences, composers and works have often reaffirmed modernism’s mythic oppositions. From the perspective of institutions and audiences, Sabine Feisst’s recent work on Schoenberg’s American years offers a telling case study.54 While her central thesis – that Schoenberg’s music was much more widely performed and appreciated than hitherto realized – carries with it the potential to unsettle assumptions about modernism’s isolation from the marketplace, her story remains steeped in the logic of the great divide. By drawing sharp distinctions between Schoenberg’s ‘populist’ (tonal) and ‘modernist’ (atonal) works, Feisst preserves familiar visions of conservative institutions and an unthinking public pitted squarely and inexorably against the progress of modernism.55 On the level of composers and works, musicology has likewise preferred the black and white of modernism to the middlebrow’s shades of grey. While those who turned sharply towards and away from modernism at different stages (like Strauss or Copland) and those who incorporated modernist styles into an eclectic mix (like Britten and Shostakovich) have never really suffered a lack of recognition,

50 Adorno, The Philosophy of New Music, trans. Hullot-Kentor, 10. 51 James Gilbert, ‘Midcult, Middlebrow, Middle Class’, American History, 20 (1992), 543–8 (p. 543). 52 Joan Shelley Rubin, The Making of Middlebrow Culture (Chapel Hill, NC, 1992). 53 Nicola Humble, The Feminine Middlebrow Novel, 1920s to 1950s: Class, Domesticity and

Bohemianism (New York and Oxford, 2001), 11–12. 54 See Sabine Feisst, ‘Schoenberg Reception in America, 1933–51’, The Cambridge Companion to

Schoenberg, ed. Jennifer Shaw and Joseph Auner (Cambridge, 2010), 247–57, and eadem, Schoenberg’s New World: The American Years (New York and Oxford, 2011).

55 Feisst, ‘Schoenberg Reception in America’, 247–8, 256–7.

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scholars have sought anxiously and consistently to defuse their aesthetic and stylistic ‘contradictions’.56

In reviving the concept of the middlebrow, there are obvious dangers, not least of reinforcing the modernist opposition that it straddles. In those cases where the middlebrow has been championed as a kind of plump, stable centre with clearly defined goals and boundaries, this problem looms large. However, as a number of scholars have observed, the boundaries of the middlebrow were never quite so stable.57 If modernist discourse posited rigid distinctions, the middlebrow was a category with ever-expanding boundaries. As the opening epigraph makes clear, one of the reasons that modernists like Greenberg so detested the middlebrow was that it unsettled their own sense of identity; for once we begin to acknowledge the potential for mediation between modernist binaries, we start to see ambivalence and compromise in even the most extreme practices. Indeed, as I have suggested elsewhere, there is a sense in which modernism itself was always middlebrow.

In literary scholarship, middlebrow studies have often – perhaps unsurprisingly – gone hand in hand with critical reconsiderations of modernism, and carving out a space for a middlebrow might likewise open up fresh perspectives on the history of musical modernism. On a stylistic level, this might mean examining the extent to which even the music of Schoenberg, Berg and Webern was implicated in ‘middlebrow’ compromise or eclecticism. It would also involve delving more deeply into the Second Viennese School’s active cultivation of (as opposed to principled disdain for) audiences, whether through pedagogy, promotion or publicity.58 On a broader aesthetic level, it would mean examining the ways in which modernist opposition to the marketplace was – as was often complained of the middlebrow – a strategy for entering the market.

When seen from this perspective, modernism may begin, once again, to look like the vision sketched by Hansen, Cohen and other recent scholars: a space in which ambivalence and variety reigns, and boundaries ultimately disappear. However, reviving the category of the middlebrow suggests a way of making space for different kinds of engagement with modernism while simultaneously preserving a sense of modernism’s narrow boundaries and rigid hierarchies. To put it another way, the category offers a means of challenging modernist historiography without necessarily writing over its history. Rather than subordinating modernism’s unequivocal ideals to its ambivalent practice, finally, the middlebrow

56 For an examination of this problem in the critical and scholarly reception of Benjamin Britten’s Albert Herring (1947), see Christopher Chowrimootoo, ‘The Timely Traditions of Albert Herring’, Opera Quarterly, 27 (2011), 379–419.

57 In recent years, a number of literary scholars have started to explore the middlebrow’s sprawling aesthetic boundaries, focusing particularly on its overlap with modernism. See, for example, Daniel Tracy, ‘Middlebrow Modernism: Professional Writing, Genre, and the Circulation of Cultural Authority in US Mass Culture, 1913–1932’ (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign, 2008). See also a recent issue of Modernist Cultures devoted to the relationship between modernism and the middlebrow: The Middlebrow – Within or Without Modernism, ed. Melissa Sullivan and Sophie Blanch, Modernist Cultures, 6/1 (special issue, 2011).

58 In ‘Proclaiming the Mainstream: Schoenberg, Berg and Webern’, The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Music, ed. Nicholas Cook and Anthony Pople (Cambridge, 2005), 228–59, Joseph Auner points towards ways in which these often overlooked questions could be addressed.

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foregrounds this tension – between the erection and erosion of hierarchy, mythic rhetoric and pragmatic realities – as a central, even definitive, part of the modernist story.

Post-War Modernism: Exclusions and Expansions

ALASTAIR WILLIAMS

IT is reasonable to maintain that modernism in its most formalist guise was a manifestation of the cold war: the West had an ideological interest not only in funding culture, but also in supporting a kind of cultural scientism that separated the arts from the realm of politics and empowered them to experiment in ways that distinguished them clearly from socialist realism. The most comprehensive unfolding of this perspective is to be found in Richard Taruskin’s Music in the Late Twentieth Century;59 and this critical viewpoint is also presented succinctly in the same author’s article ‘Afterword: Nicht blutbefleckt?’, which appeared after the first (2005) edition of that volume.60 Drawing on Martin Brody’s ‘“Music for the Masses”’,61 in the article he writes of Milton Babbitt’s ‘scientific language and scientific method’ in relation to musical discourse and of his ‘abstract and technical conception of musical content and value’. He adds:

The status of twelve-tone music as a no-spin zone, a haven of nonalignment and implicit resistance in the postwar world[,] was widely touted and accepted from the start, both in Europe, where it could be seen to embody the ‘neither/nor’ option within the territories formerly held or occupied by the fascists (now being wheedled by the two formerly allied, now opposing Cold War powers), and in America.62

(Taruskin’s context indicates that antipathy to Soviet-style communism is what is meant by ‘implicit resistance’.) This argument is valuable, and it inevitably receives more detailed support in the context of a book.

However, the cold war framework can be somewhat monolithic, because the manner in which new ways of organizing musical material encountered disintegrating forms, in the mid- twentieth century, was not exclusively determined by this context. Moreover, the fact that Adorno was able to argue (in 1955) that new music should not reject its expressive origins indicates that he was able to think in terms that were not dominated by the cold war.63 The formalist, or constructivist, preoccupations of modernism in the 1950s worked in two

59 Richard Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music, rev. edn, 5 vols. (New York and Oxford, 2010), v: Music in the Late Twentieth Century.

60 Richard Taruskin,‘Afterword: Nicht blutbefleckt?’, Journal of Musicology, 26 (2009), 274–84. 61 Martin Brody, ‘“Music for the Masses”: Milton Babbitt’s Cold War Music Theory’, Musical

Quarterly, 77 (1993), 161–92. 62 Taruskin, ‘Afterword’, 276. 63 Adorno, ‘The Aging of the New Music’ (1955), trans. Hullot-Kentor.

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directions. On the one hand, they were a radical intensification of the principles of technique and autonomy in the manner suggested by Taruskin. On the other hand, they unleashed the capacity to organize materials in ways that were not tonal, thereby enhancing the prospect of moving away from what Adorno dubbed ‘the language-character of music’ (meaning an established syntax and familiar conventions, which are in some ways the equivalent to realism in literature and art) that is so associated with notions of the integrated bourgeois subject.64

These two moments are linked, for it was the point at which John Cage and Pierre Boulez took formalism to its limits that it began to reveal its own internal contradictions. At this intersection, constructivist preoccupations started to undermine notions of centred subject- ivity and acquired the capacity to attack bourgeois institutions. Cage’s Variations IV, for example, which is about the relative nearness or distance of sounds, focuses attention on the institution of the concert and on sonic environment. Yet because the sound-map is controlled by chance operations, the score does not contain an explicitly political dimension – unless listeners decide to interpret it as a critique of bourgeois practices.

It took the social unrest of 1968 to make such dynamics more political (in Europe at least), as demonstrated by Mauricio Kagel, who aimed directly at institutions. His film Ludwig van, for instance, tackles the institutionalization of beauty for which Beethoven came to stand in prosperous West Germany at the time of his bicentenary. Therefore, the upshot of 1968 was that as a constructivist model of modernism came under attack, so too did the institutions of classical music, as part of an increasing awareness of the social functions of music. In 1972, the left-wing German composer Nicolaus A. Huber commented that ‘new music says something about music. However, that only makes sense if it says something about human nature as well.’65 This dialectical formulation has the advantage of linking reflection on technique to social meaning, even if Huber’s own compositional focus on what he considers to be the illusory element of established gestures is somewhat excessive. When Huber’s contemporary Helmut Lachenmann states that ‘composing means an encounter with composition as such and with its conditions’,66 he is writing about an approach in which entrenched musical and social habits can change. The idea that composing engages social meanings is certainly not one that could be depicted as a no-spin modernism. Moreover, if this perspective is linked to a stronger sense of reception than is envisaged by Lachenmann, then it becomes compatible with an enlarged understanding of modernism that allows perception of music to be related to life experiences, which is something that happens anyway – whether or not it is acknowledged.

So an indirect result of the political turn in the late 1960s was to assert, once more, that music has meanings – even if they were considered to be undesirable ones. It was because the notion of music as political re-engaged with the idea of semantics in music that it facilitated

64 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘On the Contemporary Relationship of Philosophy and Music’, trans. Susan Gillespie, in Adorno, Essays on Music, ed. Leppert, 135–61.

65 Nicolaus A. Huber, ‘Critical Composition’, trans. Petra Music and Philipp Blume, Contemporary Music Review, 27 (2008), 565–8 (p. 565).

66 Helmut Lachenmann, ‘Philosophy of Composition – Is There Such a Thing?’, trans. Wieland Hoban, Identity and Difference: Essays on Music, Language and Time, ed. Peter Dejans (Leuven, 2004), 55–69 (p. 57). In making this point, Lachenmann is revisiting an essay from 1986: Helmut Lachenmann, ‘Über das Komponieren’, Musik als existentielle Erfahrung, ed. Häusler, 73–82.

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the unforeseen emergence of the ‘new subjectivity’ in the 1970s, especially in West Germany.67 Although this expressionism is principally associated with Wolfgang Rihm, it also marks a much broader awareness that gestures could be detached from an underlying tonal framework. This was a shift that affected a wide range of composers at the time, including established ones. In Mantra, Karlheinz Stockhausen developed the idea of formula composition in order to create recognizable thematic material, and in Rituel, Boulez engaged with the principle of larger form, possibly as a response to his developing activities as a conductor. This trend even impacted on a resolutely constructivist composer such as Brian Ferneyhough, who in an article from 1984 felt the need to critique the practice of historical inclusion.68 Hans Werner Henze, who had resisted the call to rationalize music, participated in this transformation as well, but for him it took the form not so much of a re-engagement with the past as a re-engagement with a specifically German tradition, as he had previously sought to distance himself from a German identity. The heated exchange of views, in 1982 and 1983, between Henze and Lachenmann with regard to whether or not the expressive norms of bourgeois music had become an obsolete currency remains significant for its articulation of the problem. In general terms, although Henze was right to assert that existing meanings can be reworked, Lachenmann has a point, too, when he claims that a refusal of these meanings can access hitherto unenvisaged domains of expressivity.69

In the 1980s there was a blossoming of what might be considered an expanded modernism in Europe, in the sense that it included many of the expressive and gestural aspects of music that had been suppressed in the 1950s. It is significant that the turbulent inner selves of Robert Schumann and Friedrich Hölderlin proved during this decade to be significant resources for composers who were interested in investigating the past. Schumann is a major presence in Rihm’s Fremde Szenen, a score which does not just look back to the past but interprets and changes it as well. In addition, Luigi Nono’s string quartet Fragmente – Stille initiated a new phase for this composer by turning to the inwardness of Hölderlin as an expressive resource.70

Since modernism no longer enjoys the prestige it once held, it is now less likely to restrict a range of musical practices. Indeed, it may well be that modernism now functions more as a reservoir of traditions and techniques than as a controlling compositional aesthetic. Arguably the most defining characteristic of modernism is a break with the language-character of music in some capacity – although that language-character is now no longer so strongly tied to bourgeois traditions. Even music that rejects a modernist aesthetic potentially carries a trace of it, since the knowledge that music can push beyond its linguistic confines cannot be

67 For more on the ‘new subjectivity’ in West Germany at this time, see Jessica Balik, ‘Romantic Subjectivity and West German Politics in Wolfgang Rihm’s Jakob Lenz’, Perspectives of New Music, 47 (2009), 228–48.

68 Brian Ferneyhough, ‘Il tempo della figura’, Collected Writings, ed. James Boros and Richard Toop (Amsterdam, 1995), 33–41.

69 A transcript of the recorded exchange between the two composers is included in an appendix to Helmut Lachenmann, ‘Open Letter to Hans Werner Henze’, trans. Jeffrey Stadelman, Perspectives of New Music, 35 (1997), 189–200.

70 For more on this transformation in Germany, see Alastair Williams, Music in Germany Since 1968 (Cambridge, 2013).

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undone. It seems likely that music will continue to be created in which the expressive dimension and meaning are directly linked to the ways in which material is conceived and perceived.

However, modernism has not just extended its horizons in compositional practice: the discourses of modernism have come under scrutiny in an interpretative sense as well, as Taruskin’s critique demonstrates. In general, post-war modernism is, or was, defined as much by what it is not as by what it is: it is not the tonal tradition; it is not popular music; and it is not postmodernism. The boundary between modernism and music that has retained older traditions is now less rigid, even if the two cannot be completely collapsed into each other. It is notable that precisely the word ‘expansion’ which I have applied to recent modernist compositional practice is used by J. P. E. Harper-Scott, who wishes ‘to allow for the demonstration of modernist process in music [primarily twentieth-century British tonal music] that has not previously been considered part of that hallowed canon’.71 Nevertheless, this point requires some balancing: Cage and Kagel helped to liberate art music from what the philosopher Albrecht Wellmer calls ‘the ideological ghetto of false greatness, depth and spirituality’,72 and music outside the modernist canon is not without pretensions in these areas. There has been a thaw, too, in the relations between modernism and popular culture, so that intellect is no longer located entirely on one side of the equation, supposedly, and sensuality on the other. What is more, the puncturing of inflated claims facilitated by Cage and Kagel is instructive in this area as well, for it encourages a more dynamic interface between modernism and popular culture.

Modernism is, though, the dominant term in relation to postmodernism, which is defined as a reaction to modernism, and which has been rather less durable as a concept than tradition, popular culture or modernism. Postmodernism, it turned out, was more of a corrective to modernism than its replacement, equipping it to function in a less dogmatic manner. Equally, however, it was a mistake for modernism ever to have considered itself to be the only legitimate response, through a primary concern with internal reflection on its material, to twentieth-century modernity. The range of modern subjectivities can be expressed by more than one approach to material, while it is also possible to interact with modernity through a range of social practices in music.

One of the achievements of musicology in the past 25 years has been to reconsider the frameworks that control the semantic discourses of music. By challenging and broadening standard ways of interpreting music, such musicology has been able to address issues of subjectivity and ideology that were previously unacknowledged. Most of what was known as ‘new’ musicology was hostile to modernist music, on account of its hermetic qualities.73 Indeed, a mid-twentieth-century style of modernism that values little beyond organicist construction is not obviously compatible with a musicology that is interested in the cultural

71 J. P. E. Harper-Scott, The Quilting Points of Musical Modernism: Revolution, Reaction and William Walton (Cambridge, 2012), viii.

72 Albrecht Wellmer, ‘On Music and Language’, trans. Wieland Hoban, Identity and Difference, ed. Dejans, 71–131 (p. 129).

73 For a critical account of new musicology and European modernism, see Björn Heile, ‘Darmstadt as Other: British and American Responses to Musical Modernism’, Twentieth-Century Music, 1 (2004), 161–78.

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work done by music. However, there is a certain irony in this distaste for modernism, because new musicology was strongly influenced by post-structuralists such as Julia Kristeva and Jacques Derrida, who are modernists in the sense that they struggle against the conventions that are built into language. Thus there is potential for a hermeneutic musicology to confront the constructivist way in which some modernism has presented itself, so as to portray it in a less limited fashion. Even the music of the 1950s can be understood in terms other than the restricted ones by which it was defined – and acknowledging the role played by the cold war is very much part of this process. When its narrower claims are challenged, modernism becomes potentially embedded, situated and socialized.

Musicology, Modernism, Sound Art

ARMAN SCHWARTZ

MUSICOLOGY’S move from a narrow focus on ‘music’ to a broader consideration of ‘sound’ may prove to be the most significant disciplinary upheaval in many years. And while an increased attention to the materiality of voices and instruments, to scientific and philosophical discourses of audition, and to non-musical cultures of listening could enliven the study of any period, these topics seem especially relevant to the study of modernist music – of music, that is to say, produced amid a proliferation of acoustic technologies and other radical transformations to the lived soundscape, developments that have profoundly unsettled how we listen and what we hear. The assumption that pitch was the primary ground of early twentieth-century musical innovation – perhaps the only bias shared by Richard Taruskin’s Oxford History of Western Music and J. P. E. Harper-Scott’s explicitly anti-Taruskinian attempt to reassert the subversive power of atonality – will get us only so far as we attempt to make sense of a whole range of phenomena: the violent noises of Italian futurist music and poetry; the fractured, constantly shifting timbres of Webern’s orchestral music; the ontological upheavals wrought by the phonograph and wireless.74 But if a turn towards ‘auditory culture’ might prompt us to revisit entrenched approaches to musical modernity, what new stories might we tell?

It seems significant that the most sustained attempt to answer this question has been developed largely outside musicology, by philosophers and art historians working on the topic of ‘sound art’. Although a contested category, writing on sound art has nonetheless started to coalesce around a narrative, a canon and a common set of critical concerns.75 For Christoph Cox, among the most incisive voices here, the history of sound art begins in the wake of Edison’s phonograph, extending ‘from the intonorumori of Russolo and Varèse’s “liberation of sound” through Schaeffer and Cage, the sound poetry of Henri Chopin and

74 Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music (2005), iv: The Early Twentieth Century; J. P. E. Harper-Scott, The Quilting Points of Musical Modernism.

75 For a valuable compendium of approaches to the topic, see Caleb Kelly, Sound (London, 2011).

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François Dufrêne, Luc Ferrari’s “almost nothing”, Brian Eno’s “ambient music” and beyond’.76 What links these figures, he suggests, is an engagement with ‘the conditions of possibility of audition and the noisy substrate of significant sound’, an engagement that sets them apart from the more narrowly aestheticist concerns of notated concert music.77

Elsewhere he elaborates this opposition between sound art and musical tradition in even starker terms:

Even in the music that paralleled visual modernism, the new conception of sound was not wholly apprehended. The world of noise opened up by the phonograph surely influenced Arnold Schoenberg’s move toward atonality, which, however, soon gave way to a rigorously formal serialism. The Futurist painter turned composer Luigi Russolo, who declared his intention to dispense with musical sounds in favor of the noise of the world, found himself musicalizing this material via a new set of musical instruments that would ‘give pitches to these diverse noises, regulating them harmonically and rhythmically’. […] Of the early modernists, it was perhaps only Edgard Varèse who affirmed the new sonic culture, taking inspiration from physics, chemistry, geology, and cartography, and abandoning the term ‘music’ in favor of ‘organized sound’.78

The oppositions that run through this passage – noise versus structure, the immanent sounds of the natural world versus the humanly mediated domain of instruments – appear in numerous other texts, as do the specific figures Cox valorizes. If there is a central uncertainty in this conversation, it concerns less what constitutes sound art and more how it might be evaluated. Criticism has focused overwhelmingly on the aesthetic and political value of sound itself, with scholars either celebrating the power of pure sound or worrying that the lure of acousmatic listening may draw us away from social meaning.79

This discourse is compelling, both in the attention it gives to figures that have often appeared as little more than sideshows to the ‘real’ story of twentieth-century music, and in its foregrounding of a novel set of aesthetic questions. Equally striking, though, is the narrowness of its concerns. On the one hand, I wonder if critics’ fixation on ‘sound in itself’ is less an accurate reflection of major twentieth-century issues than a product of the narrowly avant-garde canon (of composers, but also of works) they have themselves constructed. On the other, it seems reasonable to ask what is gained – other than the maintenance of disciplinary boundaries – by the rigid separation of the categories of ‘sound art’ and ‘music’. Brian Kane has noted that much writing on the former is characterized by

76 Christoph Cox, ‘Sound Art and the Sonic Unconscious’, Organized Sound, 14 (2009), 19–26 (p. 25).

77 Ibid., 24. 78 Christoph Cox, untitled contribution to ‘Abstraction, 1910–1925: Eight Statements’, October, 143

(2013), 28–31 (p. 30). 79 Key texts in this discussion include, in addition to the essays by Cox cited above, Douglas Kahn,

Noise Water Meat: A History of Sound in the Arts (Cambridge, MA, 2001); Seth Kim-Cohen, In the Blink of an Ear: Toward a Non-Cochlear Sonic Art (New York, 2009); and Salomé Voegelin, Listening to Noise and Silence: Towards a Philosophy of Sound Art (New York, 2010).

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an acute ‘musicophobia’.80 It is telling, though, that the solution he proposes is a return to what he terms ‘the only set of demands that matter’, ‘those adequate to the unavoidable, unruly, unfashionable thing that we used to call “the work”’.81 Kane’s flirtation with the rhetoric of New Criticism at the climax of an otherwise incisive critique is symptomatic of a discourse that, while rejecting a pitch-centred narrative of modernism (Schoenberg, Webern, Boulez, Babbitt) in favour of a noise-based one, seems to have left the basic values of the old tale intact. But if sound studies, a discipline predicated on its sensitivity to issues of mediation, can teach us anything, it is surely to be suspicious of romances of autonomy and authorship in any form.

One alternative to the Whiggish assertions of Kane or Cox might be to enlarge our definition of sound art to include not just ‘composers’ but also performers, and not just impeccably avant-garde figures, but also those whose experimentalism was considerably more compromised. Think of Clara Rockmore, the theremin’s first virtuosa, a woman who devoted her life to mastering the most technologically advanced instrument available, and to using it to explore some of the less reputable corners of the Romantic canon. (I find her performance of Tchaikovsky’s Valse sentimentale especially moving.) Although it is common to attack Rockmore for failing to appreciate the radical potential of her instrument (‘slavishly simulating well-known classical pieces’, in the words of Thomas Y. Levin), perhaps it would be more productive to imagine her self-consciously interrogating the relationship between ‘the new sonic culture’, on the one hand, and a host of seemingly more outmoded values – virtuosity, feeling, the past – on the other.82 Certainly her practice set the ground for numerous later acoustic innovators, Glenn Gould and Wendy Carlos chief among them. The categories of performance practice have never quite been able to accommodate these figures – sexual outliers, wilful appropriators, technophiliac purveyors of multimedia spectacle, performers who, in very different ways, called attention to the body; perhaps an expanded definition of sound art (and one more in tune with the concerns of contemporary art in general) might build them a better home.

Before Carlos, Gould and Rockmore there was Leopold Stokowski – church organist, Bach enhancer and inventor of a uniquely ‘phantasmagorical’ string technique, but also an habitué of sound-engineering studios and enthusiastic patron of the one modernist composer Cox finds untainted by Romantic metaphysics, Varèse.83 Thinking of the floppy-haired conductor looking over the shoulder of the hard-nosed experimentalist is another way to combat ‘musicophobia’, to undo facile oppositions between tradition and innovation, music and noise. Trying to understand what attracted Stokowski to Varèse’s ‘organized sound’ might prompt us to listen to his oeuvre with new ears; it might also lead us to question whether an

80 See Brian Kane, ‘Musicophobia, or Sound Art and the Demands of Art Theory’, <nonsite.org>, 8 (2012/13), 1–18 (accessed 27 February 2013).

81 Ibid., 15. 82 See Thomas Y. Levin, ‘“Tones Out of Nowhere”: Rudolph Pfenninger and the Archeology of

Synthetic Sound’, Grey Room, 12 (2003), 32–79 (p. 60). 83 For an eye-opening attempt, however ‘popular’, to think about Stokowski in the context of sound

technology, see Greg Milner, Perfecting Sound Forever: An Aural History of Recorded Music (New York, 2009), 50–76. For Gould’s own thoughts on his predecessor, see his ‘Stokowski in Six Scenes’, The Glenn Gould Reader, ed. Tim Page (New York, 1990), 258–82.

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interest in new sounds and new technologies was ever the exclusive property of the avant- garde.

I began by asking what the idea of ‘sound art’ might contribute to musicology, but perhaps it might be more helpful to pose the question in reverse. One thing our stubbornly historicist discipline could offer is a series of variations on the Stokowski–Varèse encounter. What does it mean that Gustave Charpentier’s Louise and Giacomo Puccini’s Il tabarro experimented with the sounds of modern industry decades before Poème électronique? Should it matter that it was Ottorino Respighi, and not Russolo or Cage, who first used a documentary sound recording as part of an orchestral score?84 Or, from a different perspective, that Pierre Schaeffer, that arch acousmatician, was also a deeply committed Catholic, that he entitled his works ‘Etude’ and ‘Symphony’ during a period when such generic markers were out of fashion, and that he wrote an opera on the venerable myth of Orpheus? To raise these questions is not to say that there is no difference between late Romantic orchestral music and mid-century experimentalism, nor to undermine the seriousness and desperation with which the avant-garde often struggled to break free of the past. It is, instead, to remember that the radically disorientating effects of modernity were felt across a wide cultural spectrum, and that our understanding of both ‘music’ and ‘sound art’ will remain impoverished as long as we remain stuck in the habitus of any one discipline, unwilling to confront the true challenge of modernism writ large.

Modernism and Popular Music

CHRISTOPHER BALLANTINE

ARE there ways of thinking about modernism that, without damaging its progressive purposes or traction, would make it more responsive to other (non-elite, non-Western) contexts? Such ways of thinking would require that we keep the concept open and flexible, instead of fixing, reifying or essentializing it. This would allow the possibility that the concept could play a strong, critical role elsewhere, on atypical terrains; for instance, in the domain of popular music, of both Western and non-Western provenance. For popular music, after all, has traditionally been flagged as modernism’s binary, defining ‘Other’. Andreas Huyssen has called this the ‘great divide’;85 and the gulf yawned larger as music’s ‘high’ or ‘classical’ formations increasingly rationalized themselves as a reaction against the growth of popular forms in the era of mass commodification and vastly expanding capitalist markets.

84 I refer, of course, to the use of pre-recorded birdsong in the‘Pini del Gianicolo’ movement of Pini di Roma (1924). For attempts to contextualize Respighi’s innovation as, variously, grammophonmusik, media link and late Romantic literalism with suspect political undertones, see Mark Katz, Capturing Sound: How Technology has Changed Music (Berkeley, CA, 2010), 118; Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz (Stanford, CA, 1999), 98; and Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music (2005), iv, 750.

85 See, for example, Huyssen, After the Great Divide, viii.

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Indeed, the triumph of capitalism is modernity’s founding – and rupturing – condition. Modernity’s attitude to its own history is reckless, even destructive; its sense of continuity is always in jeopardy; in a word, it chronically forgets. Paul Connerton has recently shown that modernity’s habit of forgetting is ‘structural’, that its culture is ‘post-mnemonic’ and, besides, that a principal feature of the cultural outlook to which it later gives rise – postmodernism – is ‘an absence of faith in the future’.86

Yet modernity has also generated a dissident critique of these depredations: we call it modernism. As an aesthetic response, modernism assigns a role of special importance to composers, artists, writers and others who, if they are geared to progressive ends, seek ways of representing ‘the eternal and the immutable in the midst of all the chaos’.87 And since modernity forgets, modernism of necessity seeks to remember. Indeed, for the aesthetician Stanley Cavell, ‘the unheard of appearance of the modern in art is an effort not to break, but to keep faith with tradition’ – that is ‘the essential moral motive of modern art’.88 For this reason, among others, modernism has always thought deeply and innovatively about modalities of representation, specifically about its own aesthetic material; so its ‘linguistic’ dimension, rather than its mimetic or expressive content, has occupied the foreground. The point of such innovations is to defamiliarize, to render strange, to disarm, in the hope that such disruptions of the taken-for-granted coordinates of the ‘common-sense’ world might release and strengthen resistant subjectivities, kindle memory, create bulwarks against forgetting, produce opportunities for insight, ultimately even illuminate what Adorno, modernism’s most profound and powerful theorist, calls a ‘world that is not yet’.89

These are crucial commitments. How does popular music measure up to them? In the most progressive sorts of popular music (as in its ‘classical’ counterparts), the target

of this defamiliarizing aesthetic is the ‘normal’, the taken for granted, the already co-opted. And the aesthetic intention can play along any or all of popular music’s parameters (including genre, timbre, instrumental usage, sonic mix and stylistic provenance), typically expressing itself through innovations, recollections, renewals, combinations, subversions and transgressions. With a nod towards the Situationist International, George Lipsitz and others have named these strategies détournements. The concept is helpful. Associated with the French theorists Guy Debord and Gil Wolman, détournement describes an ‘extremist innovation’ in which existing or adapted elements, ‘no matter where they are taken from’, are clashed and combined to produce new relationships and new meanings.90 These ‘discoveries’ may also lead to – or even be – a new kind of politics, especially where the collisions, transgressions and integrations signify real or potential alliances.

86 Paul Connerton, How Modernity Forgets (Cambridge, 2009), 10, 146, 78. 87 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change

(Oxford, 1990), 20–1. 88 Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? (2nd edn, Cambridge, 2002), 206. 89 Cited in Lydia Goehr, ‘Dissonant Works and the Listening Public’, The Cambridge Companion to

Adorno, ed. Tom Huhn (Cambridge, 2004), 222–47 (p. 243). 90 George Lipsitz, Footsteps in the Dark: The Hidden Histories of Popular Music (Minneapolis, MN,

2007), 241. See also Guy Debord and Gil J. Wolman, ‘A User’s Guide to Détournement’, Les lèvres nues, 8 (1956), Situationist International Online, <http://www.cddc.vt.edu/sionline/presitu/users guide.html>, accessed 2 January 2014.

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http://www.cddc.vt.edu/sionline/presitu/usersguide.html
http://www.cddc.vt.edu/sionline/presitu/usersguide.html

 

A useful way to think about this is by way of Motti Regev’s twin ideas of ‘aesthetic cosmopolitanization’ – a global process that, since the 1960s, has comprised ‘intensified aesthetic proximity, overlap, and collectivity between nations and ethnicities or, at the very least, between prominent large sectors within them’ – and its outcome, ‘aesthetic cosmopolitanism’, in which ‘large proportions of aesthetic common ground’ are shared, and aspects of a ‘singular world culture’ are prefigured (but without forfeiting a sense of the local).91 Globally, the best-known musical instances of this occur in the many genres and styles that Regev names ‘pop-rock’, a term that includes progressive (or art) rock, ‘ethnic’ rock, punk, metal, electronic dance and hip hop. While the pop-rock of such places as Eastern Europe, the former Soviet-bloc territories and parts of Latin America springs readily to mind, it is also true that a large number of other countries have used one or more of these component styles in radically transgressive ways. The examples Regev gives include Premiata Forneria Marconi (PFM) in Italy; Spain’s rock andaluz (where, in bands such as Triana and Guadalquivir, the détournement may involve the braiding of flamenco with progressive rock); the Yellow Magic Orchestra and other sorts of art rock in Japan; and the French band Magma, whose rock idiom involves aspects of jazz, Stravinsky and Bartók.92

But acts of transgression and integration can also be ways to remember (as in the cases already mentioned). Let me try to clarify this point through further examples. If modernity wreaks havoc with memory, and if one of the tasks of modernism is to help recuperate this loss, then Bob Marley is a popular musician in whose use of détournement the act of remembering has a special place. In addition to fusing rock, jazz, soul and reggae, the Jamaican reggae superstar’s habit was to cite the work of others – ‘chosen ancestors and creative kin’, despite disparities of musical language – in order to make ‘the past audible in the present’; the results could be as bold and surprising as they were ‘ironic or ludicrous, respectful or parricidal’.93 The modernism of these conjunctions sprang in part from the revolutionary cosmopolitanism they connoted. They overturned what Paul Gilroy has described as the ‘U.S.-centred discourses on blackness and its limits’, including its fixation on consumerism and ‘the generic versions of black culture’.94 Instead, they looked forward to a postcolonial, post-racial, egalitarian future.

So too, of course, did the music of legendary rock guitarist Jimi Hendrix, whose ‘cosmopolitan Afro-futurism’ (as Gilroy dubs it) evoked a modernist, utopian ‘not yet’, in shocking musical and performative transgressions that struck Brazilian singer-songwriter Caetano Veloso as ‘half blues, half Stockhausen’.95 That conjunction is modernist precisely because in renewing the blues to make it adequate to a rapidly modernizing world it simultaneously resists modernity’s structural impulse to forget, and from these collisions reaps new imperatives for the future. Through these achievements, Hendrix signified the ‘not yet’ he hoped his music would help realize; but in so doing he became (in Gilroy’s words)

91 Motti Regev, Pop-Rock Music: Aesthetic Cosmopolitanism in Late Modernity (Cambridge, 2013), 3. 92 Ibid., 38. 93 Paul Gilroy, Darker than Blue: On the Moral Economies of Black Atlantic Culture (Cambridge, MA,

2010), 127. 94 Ibid., 88. 95 Ibid., 132, 130.

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‘an advocate of peace in an act of treason so profound and complete that it would make him an enemy of power until this day’.96

When Hendrix famously expanded the capabilities of the guitar and created new modalities of representation, this involved bold transgressions that were both technical and technological. Of course, certain forms of electronic popular music involve a still more complete dependency on new technologies. Just as in the much-discussed case of ‘classical’ electroacoustic music, these technologies can subvert genre, transcend the limits of human capability by placing undreamt-of control in the hands of the music’s creators, and challenge our notions of music itself. One might think here of the variety of dance musics hosted by the German label Mille Plateaux, headed by the remarkable Achim Szepanski (who is wont, in all seriousness, to liken the label’s musical outputs to advanced social-theory concepts developed by Deleuze and Guattari).97

Still more suggestive is the dance music that was created by young people in the economically devastated black neighbourhoods of Detroit in the 1970s, 1980s and beyond, and that became known as Detroit techno. Made with sequencers, synthesizers and old collections of vinyl and tape, this was an innovative ‘homemade hybrid that mixed hip hop rhythms, rock and funk guitar riffs, Eurodisco melodies and harmonies, electronic effects, and “break beats”’. More specifically, its sources included ‘the techno-electronic-art-rock music of Kraftwerk, the Eurodisco productions of Giorgio Moroder, Japan’s Yellow Magic Orchestra, and Jamaican and British ska’.98 If such sources seem incommensurable, the achievement of these young producers was to bring the elements into a détournement that, as Lipsitz has argued, created new senses of place, space and temporality. Their way of responding to neighbourhood devastation was to meet ‘deterritorialization with reterritori‐ alization’ and, in effect, create ‘new cognitive mappings of the city’. Significantly, Detroit techno also resisted the destruction of memory that the brutal de-industrialization of the city had unleashed upon its inhabitants: the new cognitive mappings were, in reality, ‘recombinant permutations of past times and spaces’.99

Let me not be misunderstood. My cited instances of modernism in popular music are exactly what I am calling them: they are examples and, as such, particular instances of much larger sets (which include, among countless others, the likes of The Beatles, Björk, PJ Harvey, Radiohead and Santogold). And since modernity is a global phenomenon, so too is the popular-music incarnation of modernism. To give substance to this claim, I shall conclude by looking, beyond Europe and the US, at two examples from contemporary South Africa.

Founded in 1998, four years after the formal ending of apartheid, Mahube is a 12-piece band whose music declared a modernist intention: to strive towards a time that was ‘not yet’. Apartheid had split South Africa from the rest of the continent; despite the new democracy, healing that split was always going to be a difficult task – as sporadic outbreaks of xenophobic violence have since confirmed. The arrival of Mahube was the strongest sign yet that, creatively, the first beginnings of this reconnection – this re-membering – were on the

96 Ibid., 134. 97 Simon Reynolds, Energy Flash: A Journey through Rave Music and Dance Culture (London,

1998), 386. 98 Lipsitz, Footsteps in the Dark, 239, 243. 99 Ibid., 244–5.

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agenda. Some of what the band ‘discover’ is historical as much as geographical: associated with memory, as much as with place and subculture. Solo and group song-styles are a reminder of the traditional idioms that underlie much of what Mahube attempt; these are woven into the close-voiced wind arrangements and harmonic progressions of South African township jazz of the 1940s and 1950s, the bright instrumental sounds, vocal harmonizations and bouncy rhythms of later township genres (mbaqanga), and a guitar style flavoured with migrants’ music (maskanda). Such idioms collide, happily and unexpectedly, not only with each other, but also with ones from further north. What then results is music that also incorporates, say, Shona mbira patterns from Zimbabwe (Oliver Mtukudzi is, famously, a key member of the band, both as composer and performer), or even the vocal melodies and harmonies of Congolese popular music of the 1950s. The music is an ecstatic invocation of a new, hybrid, southern-African ‘not yet’.

But the new democracy’s truly signal development in popular music was a rap-like idiom known as kwaito. Especially since about 2000, the more progressive varieties of kwaito have confidently sought incorporations of – and syntheses with – a proliferating range of indigenous and exogenous idioms, none of them previously imaginable, all of them in principle disruptive of and incommensurable with the genre. Frequently these détournements have involved the inclusion, within the kwaito performing group, of musicians who are masters of the incorporated idiom. The resulting hybrids are as astonishing as they are complex and diverse. Disrupting the coordinates of our common-sense world, they involve fusions with, for example, precolonial idioms, ‘neotraditional’ styles, local popular music of the 1950s, protest music of the apartheid era, Western popular music, gospel, jazz, ‘classical’ music and ethnically marked music from other parts of the globe. Kwaito’s genre expansiveness has clearly been crucial to the internationalism that – modernistically – it aspired to and hoped to convey, so the idiom has stretched to include styles, songs and recordings sourced from, or principally identified with, places elsewhere in Africa or the world. In such instances, ‘foreign’ musical elements seem to have been imported into kwaito songs for, in part, their normative significance; the combinations thus become symbolic enactments of core aspects of the songs’ lyrics. Because of the associations carried from their home domains, these imported ‘vehicles of meaning’ (to use Clifford Geertz’s term) are able to do particular kinds of work in their new and unfamiliar kwaito contexts.100 Innovations of this sort are, according to any sensible understanding of the term, modernist. In their best work, kwaito musicians and groups such as Bongo Maffin, Boom Shaka, Kabelo, Mafikizolo, M’du and TKZee rethink the modalities of representation, make the familiar strange, disrupt our everyday coordinates, remember in the face of ‘structural’ forgetting. And by offering important insights into, and imaginaries for, the hybrid, creole, modern identities so crucial to the future of South Africa’s fledgling democracy, they also fulfil Adorno’s precept of illuminating the ‘world that is not yet’.

In sum, it is time to acknowledge that, in practice, progressive modernism has itself long since come in from the cold. It has embraced the popular; we might even say that its transgression of the ‘great divide’ has been its own détournement. So modernism has modernized. Its gatekeepers should do so, too.

100 Clifford Geertz, After the Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 114.

204 ROUND TABLE

2 – Rethinking Modernism

“At a time when musicology’s sights seem set ever more squarely on eradicating boundaries…the study of modernism can seem a rather antiquated concern.  Modernism is arguably all about boundaries, in the heightened sense that it is itself a contested category, whose only red thread seems to have been an investment in distinction and hierarchy.”

from Christopher Chowrimootoo, “Reviving the Middlebrow, or: Deconstructing Modernism from the Inside,” in Journal of the Royal Musical Association, vol. 139, no. 1 (2014), p. 188.

What does it mean for music to be “modern”?  And why should we care?  For the last few decades, musicologists have thought about these questions, finding that modernist composers often defined themselves by differentiating their work both from traditional forms of expression and from mass popular culture.  Although this so-called “great divide” between art and popular music, between traditional and progressive ideas is prevalent in many primary sources, it need not be the only way we think about the last 150 years of music history.

Please read Christopher Chowrimootoo’s “Reviving the Middlebrow” (pp. 187-193 in the “Modernism and its Others” PDF.  Chowrimootoo claims that we should begin to rethink this history of modern music by paying more attention to “middlebrow” music: repertories that fall somewhere in between modernism’s divides.  Write a brief essay in which you try this approach: consider music that does not align neatly with clear categorizations and hierarchies, and reflect on how understanding this music might impact our understanding of music history.

Your essay should address the following points:

  • How do you understand the “great divide” discussed on p. 188? How has it affected our discussions of music history, and of music more generally?  Please expand on Chowrimootoo’s short discussion by briefly citing examples of composers or pieces from different sides of the divide (at least one from each side).
  • What does Chowrimootoo mean by “middlebrow” (introduced on p. 190)? What, specifically, does paying more attention to middlebrow music do to help our understanding of music history more generally?
  • Select a piece (from the syllabus or elsewhere), and consider it from the “middlebrow” perspective. How does it fit between tradition and innovation?  Between “high” art and popular culture?  Be specific, and be sure to consider both its musical features and its historical context.
  • Do you think music history ought to focus more on these “middlebrow” pieces? How should they be balanced with our understanding of a more divided view of modernism?

Chicago High Rise Fire Case Study

Read the new items in the folder “high rise fire case study” and then write a short paper about the case study fire, briefly covering both of the following items:

  1. Many mistakes were made during this incident (that is, active errors). Briefly describe three specific example of active errors. For each specific active error, describe the latent conditions that led to the active error. For each of the three active error you discuss, make at least one recommendation about how the mistake can be avoided in similar future incidents by correcting latent conditions.
  2. Based on the readings, explain why this building did not meet the same requirements as some other high rise buildings in downtown Chicago.
  3. Five page minimum including APA style citations6 die in Loop blaze 7 listed serious or critical in government building By Mickey Ciokajlo and Sabrina L. Miller Tribune staff reporters Published October 18, 2003 At least six people were killed and at least seven others were in serious or critical condition following a fire that swept through the 12th floor of a Loop high-rise filled with government offices late Friday afternoon, choking the upper floors of the 35-story building with smoke. As of late Friday, investigators had not determined the cause of the blaze, which forced evacuation of the Cook Country Administration Building at 69 W. Washington St. Though owned by the county, the structure houses 2,500 workers of county, city and state agencies. Cook County Public Guardian Patrick Murphy said at least three of his employees had died in the fire. Authorities had not released identities of the victims as of late Friday but said one of them was a 39-year-old woman from Chicago who worked in the building. A spokesman for Stroger Hospital said the woman was brought into the facility in cardiac arrest and could not be revived. He said the woman did not have any burns and the cause of death was smoke inhalation. Chicago Fire Commissioner James Joyce said the deaths were concentrated in a small section of the 22nd floor. “The people who passed away appear to be, for the most part, in one area of one stairwell,” he said. The 12th floor, where the blaze began, Chicago fire officials said, is occupied entirely by workers reporting to Illinois Secretary of State Jesse White. David Druker, a spokesman for White, said workers on the floor reported “seeing flames coming from a closet, flames from the ceiling in a storage closet.” Fire officials said the blaze was reported at 5:03 p.m., a time when many government offices had already closed. Joyce said a floor-by-floor sweep after the fire was contained turned up 11 people in serious or critical condition. Some of the victims were conscious and breathing, and some were not, Joyce said. The injured were transported to Northwestern Memorial, Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s, Stroger and Mercy Hospitals. Several people who escaped the building after the blaze began said they did not hear a fire alarm, though they said at least two announcements ordering various levels of evacuations were made over the building’s public address system. “I don’t know when the fire alarms went off,” Joyce told reporters. “That will be part of our investigation.” Devine describes flight Cook County State’s Atty. Richard Devine, who was in the building when the fire broke out, said he and several aides tried to evacuate through a stairwell but encountered smoke on the 22nd floor and turned back. Devine said they tried to access several exit doors on their way back up but could not open them. He said they finally opened a door on the 27th floor. Marienne Branch, who works at the Cook County public defender’s office on the 17th floor, said that the first announcement from building management officials was made minutes before 5 p.m. and ordered only occupants of the 12th floor to evacuate. Branch said she kept working until 10 minutes later, when she started to smell smoke. She called building management and was told to leave. Branch and her fellow employees took the stairs to the first floor. “I had to hold on to the banister. I had to take my time,” Branch said. “I was scared. I’m still scared. You see the building on fire a half-hour after you leave–it’s very scary.” Evacuation missed many Officials initially believed that the building had been completely evacuated, but Joyce said victims trapped on floors 16 to 22 of the building continued to call 911. Shortly after 5 p.m. plumes of smoke could be seen billowing from the concrete high-rise on Washington Street directly across from Daley Center. Within minutes, the Chicago Fire Department responded with 135 firefighters and paramedics and 45 pieces of equipment. Smoke began to fill some of the upper floors, triggering panic among many still in the building and setting off a spate of cell phone calls to loved ones. Michael Mermall said his wife, Meribeth, who works in the Cook County state’s attorney’s office on the 27th floor, called him at 5:20 p.m. on his cell phone and was hysterical. Meribeth Mermall, who is a legislative aide for Devine, told her husband that Devine and his entire executive staff were on the floor at the time and the office had filled with smoke. She said the staff was hesitant to leave their office because the staircase was full of smoke. Nevertheless, they piled down the stairway, suffering from minor smoke inhalation. Once they reached the ground floor, they were all given oxygen. “The first thing you think is it’s another 9/11,” said Michael Mermall. “You don’t expect to get a frantic phone call from your wife saying she’s trapped in a building with smoke.” One key cause of concern when the blaze erupted was the fate of about 20 children who were at the county’s day-care center on the second floor of the building, Beth Lakier, regional manager for the private company that operates the center for the county, said all the children were evacuated safely and no children were missing at any time. Lakier said the children and staff were first evacuated outside to a play area immediately adjacent to the building. But when staff members looked up and saw smoke, they realized they were no longer safe and moved the children farther away, Lakier said. The 12th floor secretary of state offices where the blaze began deal with corporate and other financial records as well as records of drivers who have had their licenses suspended or revoked. The building is not equipped with a sprinkler system and was not required to because of its age, according to Larry Langford, a spokesman for the city’s office of emergency communications. Once known as the Brunswick Building, the structure, built in the early 1960s, was purchased by the county in 1996 for nearly $40 million. At the time, County Board President John Stroger argued the purchase would save the county money by allowing it to consolidate several offices in one location and eliminate the need to lease office space. Location was key Stroger cited the building’s location, across the street from Daley Center and next to the County Building, as another advantage to owning it. The County Board subsequently awarded a management contract to operate the building to a politically connected joint venture formed by U.S. Equities and East Lake Management and Development Corp., which is run by Elzie Higginbottom, a strong political backer of Stroger and Chicago Mayor Richard Daley.

    Copyright © 2004, Chicago Tribune

The Autobiography Of Benjamin Franklin

The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin

Directions:  Answer the following questions from the text.  Make sure to give textual evidence when answering and write answers in complete sentences.

  1. What is Franklin’s original purpose in writing his autobiography?

2. What does Franklin mean when he describes himself as having a “bookish inclination” on page 227?

3.What did Franklin’s father want him to do to earn a living? How would Franklin accomplish this? Was Franklin agreeable?

4. What made Franklin abandon writing poetry and how does he feel about that decision?

5, What “very bad habit” did Franklin develop with John Collins?

6. Did Franklin always believe in the side/position for which he argued?

7. What observations by Franklin’s father about his writing made him want to work to improve his writing skills? How did he accomplish this?

8. What did it mean for Franklin to “board” himself, and why did he wish to do this?

9. Based on his reactions to failure, what type of person was Franklin?

10. Based on Franklin’s readings and studies, what conclusions did he come to about the best ways to influence people?

11. Why does Franklin choose to leave Boston and where does he go?

12. What happens to Franklin’s and John Collins’ friendship?

13. Franklin and Ralph concocting a plan to do what? Why?

14. How does Franklin’s purpose change in Part Two?

15. Which virtue does Franklin struggle with the most? Why?

16. Which virtue does a friend of Franklin accuse him of lacking? Why? Do you find this to be true of Franklin?

17. Why does Franklin avoid including religion in his plan to improve himself?

“The Pueblo Revolt” in Issues and Controversies in History.

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The Pueblo Revolt, 1680 Kevin M. Gannon (2013) Issues and Controversies in History.

Were the Pueblo Indians Justified in Rebelling Against the Spanish?

The Issue

The 1680 Pueblo Revolt in the Spanish colony of New Mexico was the first—and only— successful rebellion of Native American peoples against the Europeans who ruled them by force during the colonial period of American history. Spanish colonizers and their Pueblo subjects embraced diametrically opposed beliefs about the world and their place within it; the tensions that sprang from this opposition would culminate in an extraordinary outbreak of violence and insurrection in the summer of 1680. The Spanish believed that their colonial presence in New Mexico was eminently justifiable, and that Spanish colonization was a mandate from God. To the Pueblo, the Spanish used religious conversion as a vehicle of oppression, abused the native population, and were powerless to protect the Pueblos from the numerous threats they faced to their very survival.

• Arguments that the Spanish Presence in New Mexico Was Legitimate and Just: The Spanish justified their conquests in the “New World” by arguing that the conversion of Native Americans to Roman Catholicism was of paramount importance—the true Word of God was being spread, and Indian souls were saved. Inherent in this view was a belief that indigenous Americans were inferior to Europeans. By demonstrating the proper ways to exploit the bountiful resources of the Americas (including plentiful amounts of silver) and to worship the Christian God, the Spanish were undertaking a mission to “civilize” what they saw as backwards, ignorant, and savage Indians.

• Arguments that the Spanish Presence in New Mexico Was Intolerable and that the Spanish Must be Expelled by the Pueblo: For decades, the Pueblo had seen their land and people mercilessly exploited by the Spanish. The Spanish had forced the Pueblo to give them a share of their crops and other goods, leaving them with scant provisions to sustain themselves and their families. The efforts of the Spanish Franciscan priests to convert them to Catholicism also meant the often violent suppression of their native religious practices. The Franciscans’ message of a loving and merciful Christian God did not match the harsh and violent reality of Spanish colonization, which seemed to grow worse over time.

Background

For Pedro Hidalgo, August 10, 1680, started out as probably most days did. A Spanish soldier, Hidalgo served as a one-man security detail for Fray Juan Pío, a Franciscan missionary to the Indians of the Tesuque Pueblo, one of many native pueblos in the Rio Grande region claimed by the Spanish as part of the colony of New Mexico. Early in the morning, Hidalgo and Pío had set out from the capital of Santa Fe toward Tesuque, where the priest was to say mass. At dawn, the two Spaniards reached the pueblo, only to find it empty; even the livestock was gone. Baffled, the soldier and the priest decided to search for the villagers, and a quarter-league from the

 

 

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pueblo, they found some of them—armed and wearing war paint. Pío approached the pueblos. “What is this, children,” he asked, “are you mad? Do not disturb yourselves; I will help you and die a thousand deaths for you.” Pío’s imploring produced no discernible effect. Hidalgo and Pío split up in an attempt to flank the main body of Pueblo, who were headed toward a nearby sierra, and convince them to return to the village. As Hidalgo would later testify, he soon encountered two Indians called El Obi and Nicolás by the Spanish; El Obi was carrying the shield which Fray Pío had originally possessed, and Nicolás was menacingly painted and “splattered with blood,” presumably Pío’s. These two, and other Pueblo who quickly came up from behind them, “assailed” Hidalgo,

grasping the reins of the horse he was riding; they surrounded him, taking away his sword and hat, whereupon he grasped his harquebus, and, making good his escape, spurred his horse down the hill, dragging along those who had hold of him. He broke away from them and descended to the plain, where they followed him, discharging many arrows, none of which reached or harmed him, and he escaped safely.

Hidalgo assumed Pío was dead, and thus sped off toward Santa Fe to deliver the news that the worst nightmare of the Spanish colonists was now a reality: The Pueblo Indians were rebelling.

How did things arrive at this point, where the Pueblo decided to conduct a coordinated assault and violently expel the Spanish out of New Mexico? Almost as soon as it was clear that the Pueblo were indeed engaged in a full-scale uprising throughout New Mexico, the questions and recriminations among the Spanish began. What had driven the Pueblo to revolt? Why were the Spanish, almost a century after their arrival, being visited with the scourge of native rebellion? For the Pueblo, the answer to that question was simple: The accumulated weight of Spanish oppression had become unbearable. For the Spanish, though, there had to be another reason; after all, they were the “civilizers” of the Americas, who had saved Pueblo souls by introducing Catholicism into the previously “benighted” societies of New Mexico. The rebellion they were faced with had to come from opposition to that divine mandate. By this logic, their presence among the Pueblo was not the problem; it was the Devil—manifested through Pueblo deities and religious practitioners—that had to be at the root of this unnatural uprising.

Spanish North America

The Spanish presence in New Mexico dated from 1598, when an expedition led by Juan de Oñate entered the northern Rio Grande Valley and claimed the land for God and the Spanish King. Previous expeditions had passed through the region, and either traded for or stole foodstuffs from the native Pueblo peoples. The most notable was led by Francisco de Coronado, who was searching for the fabled “seven cities of gold” that he was sure existed in what is now the southern Great Plains region of North America. Oñate had mineral wealth in mind (he was heir to a large Mexican mining fortune), but unlike Coronado, he also envisioned a permanent Spanish settlement to the north. He had been appointed governor by the Spanish viceroy in Mexico City, who was the King’s direct representative in Spanish North America. Thus, the New Mexico colony had a mandate from the Spanish crown to extend the authority of both Spain and the Roman Catholic Church into the northern hinterlands of New Spain.

 

 

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Members of Order of St. Francis—probably the most powerful religious order in colonial Mexico—had themselves been looking at New Mexico by the 1580s. The Franciscans realized, though, that only with financial and military support would an expansion of missionary activity into the Rio Grande region be feasible. Future Spanish ventures to the region would thus be joint undertakings between the Franciscans and colonists who operated from more worldly motivations—particularly a desire for land and mineral wealth. Brief expeditions into the northern frontier of New Spain in 1581 had laid the groundwork for the permanent, proprietary colony established under Oñate’s leadership in 1598. Emphasizing the royal Laws of Discovery, the viceroy enjoined Oñate’s expedition of colonists to make sure they carried plenty of supplies and provisions, to prevent clashes with natives over Spanish seizures of foodstuffs and other commodities (as had occurred in previous Spanish entradas—military and/or exploratory expeditions—to the North). Accompanying the expedition were some 20 Franciscan friars and lay brothers. Oñate’s force arrived at the Rio Grande in April 1598, and he “repossessed” the province of New Mexico in the name of God and King Phillip II.

Figure 1. Routes of Major Expeditions of Juan de Oñate.

As for the Pueblo, memories of previous encounters remained strong enough to condition their response to this latest Spanish incursion into their lands. The first villages the expedition

 

 

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encountered were abandoned, the inhabitants having fled rather than face what they believed would be bitter depredations from the Europeans. Once the Spanish were able to interact with some of them, Oñate ascertained that the Pueblo were indeed loath to impede the Spanish, having experienced retaliation for such efforts previously, during Coronado’s entrada. This lack of resistance remained consistent as the expedition began to create settlements; several Spanish would record their amazement at the apparent docility of the Pueblo. They “are so peaceful and obedient,” wrote one official in amazement.

Not all of the Pueblo were as willing to tolerate the Spanish presence as these early impressions might have conveyed, however. There were challenges to the Spanish that occurred in areas on the periphery of their colony, but these were quickly met and put down, often violently. [See An Earlier Pueblo Rebellion: The Battle of Acoma, 1599] Except for the suppression of indigenous resistance, though, the colony of New Mexico was unsuccessful. As they established their authority over the Indians, the Spanish had instituted a system of tribute obligations whereby Pueblo villages were to produce a certain amount of maize and cotton blankets for the Spanish every year. But this set of obligations did not provide nearly enough to sustain the Spanish, while its burdens destroyed the Pueblo’s ability to produce an agricultural surplus to carry families through winters or seasons of lean harvests. The hoped-for deposits of mineral wealth failed to materialize, food supplies dwindled, and Spaniard and Indian alike found the times extremely difficult. By 1607, many Spanish settlers were ready to abandon New Mexico. Ultimately, though, Franciscan pressure on both the viceroy and the Council of the Indies (the king’s council for colonial policy) kept the colony alive by producing additional royal support for the venture. A new governor was appointed, and New Mexico began to limp along into an uncertain future.

But the initial phase of permanent Spanish settlement in New Mexico was of crucial significance; it set the patterns that would decisively shape the colony’s development through the 1600s and ultimately converge in the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. First, Oñate’s tactic of rendering the Pueblo docile by intimidation and force became standard operating procedure for subsequent Spanish administrators. When faced with resistance, the first inclination of the Spanish would be violence. Second, the establishment of the encomienda (a grant of control over designated lands and the produce of the natives who resided upon them) created a class of Spanish landholders who—though technically prohibited from doing so—held Indians (both Pueblo and members of tribes further north and west) in a state of de facto slavery. The expectations and demands of this class would be powerful elements in shaping the policies of future governors, who were themselves landowners and aspirants to the control of native labor. Third, the expropriation of labor, goods, and even people begun in New Mexico’s early colonial period would, as it continued and increased, profoundly disrupt trade networks between the Pueblo and the Athapaskan peoples (nomadic Apache and Ute) to the north. The Athapaskan depended on this trade to augment their restricted food supply; when Spanish demands upon Pueblo agriculture diverted these foodstuffs away from the established channels of indigenous trade, the northern tribes would be forced to resort to such desperate and disruptive tactics as raids and plundering. Finally, the Pueblo, already inclined from experience to expect the worst from Spanish colonists, were stretched to the breaking point by pressures upon their resources and by harsh treatment and cultural prejudice at the hands of the Spaniards. During the period of the Oñate entrada, this Spanish pressure—though still high—had been kept to at least manageable levels because of the

 

 

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paucity of colonists (less than two hundred). In later years, when the number of Spanish settlers increased, this pressure would prove unmanageable.

The Struggle for Control

New Mexico’s Spanish population through the bulk of the 17th century was an unwieldy combination of a small, dedicated core of Franciscans (and a few associated lay brothers) and a larger number (approximately 1,100 by 1670) of settlers concerned with matters more of this world. The two groups often worked at cross-purposes—but not always. The Franciscans were not above accumulating wealth and labor as they spread the word of God; documents from the colony’s records are rife with complaints from civil officials about the friars’ abuse of indigenous labor. Of course, these complaints were motivated not by concern for the Indians’ own welfare, but from resentment over the Franciscans’ use of labor that the governors and other colonists sought to employ themselves. This is the issue that splintered the Spanish into opposing factions throughout the 1600s: The battle to control and exploit Indian labor and tribute. And it is here where the divergence between the stated goals of the Franciscans and the other settlers became more evident. For if natives were to be converted into good practicing Catholics, they could not be bound to labor on the hacienda of a secular colonist. Rather, the Franciscans wanted the Indians to reside in their own communities, with the friars enjoying full access to them and other colonists being left out of the matter altogether.

This ideal came into direct conflict with the wealth-producing goals of the other settlers, dependent as they were upon Indian labor and produce for their fulfillment. If the physical conquest of the Pueblo was harsh, then the attempts at spiritual conquest by the Spaniards were even more so. The Franciscans’ initial efforts at conversion undertaken during the Oñate entrada were only marginally successful. In the early years of the 17th century, those Indians that accepted Catholic baptism seemed to have done so more out of a desire to have access to missions’ food supplies during times of famine or to avail themselves of Spanish military protection in the face of raids from the Athapaskan peoples to the north. As the Franciscans continued their efforts, more Pueblo accepted conversion, though they seem to have done so with less of a wholehearted embrace than the friars would have liked. From the Pueblo perspective, accepting the teachings of Catholicism was often a strategic choice. The appearance of embracing Catholicism brought access to Spanish food reserves and military protection, while still offering enough wiggle room for those so inclined to covertly practice their own faith traditions. The Franciscans, however, were all too aware of this set of motivations. Scholars disagree over the extent to which the Franciscans tacitly allowed the Pueblo to practice their own religious rituals and observances, but even if the clergy winked at some token remnants of the Pueblo’s “idolatry,” the documentary record suggests that to a significant degree, the Franciscans not only sought to suppress expressions of indigenous religion, but often did so forcefully and even violently.

Seeds of Rebellion

As the burdens of the physical world became heavier, the Pueblo turned increasingly to the world of their native religious traditions for solace. The 1660s and 1670s were disastrous ones for many Pueblo. This 20-year span saw rising average temperatures combined with dramatically lower

 

 

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amounts of rainfall, even by the meager standards of arid New Mexico. These climatic changes led to waves of poor harvests—or no harvests at all in some years—resulting in famines that devastated the Pueblo population. The Athapaskan peoples to the north—especially the Apache—were also stricken by famine, and resorted to violent raids on Pueblo villages to take by force what they otherwise did not have. In this unsettled state of affairs marked by drought and warfare, the Pueblo turned increasingly toward their ancient religious rites and rituals to restore balance to their world. This entailed significant risk, however. In the atmosphere of renewed repression and strife that pervaded the 1660s and 1670s, assertions of native religious traditions on the part of Pueblo were bound to bring forceful responses from the Franciscan clergymen.

In 1675, a major Pueblo religious revival spread throughout the Rio Grande Valley. Dancing of the kachina, and gatherings in the villages’ sacred kivas (below-ground ceremonial rooms that were the functional center of the Pueblo faith tradition) multiplied, as the Indians sought to find a way to reassert control over an increasingly dangerous environment. From the Spanish capital of Santa Fe, Governor Juan Francisco de Treviño issued a decree banning all forms of native religious expression. To enforce the measure, he dispatched soldiers to the Pueblo with orders to arrest those identified as religious leaders. Forty-seven shamans were rounded up, charged with witchcraft and sorcery, and brought to trial. The verdict in these proceedings was foreordained; the purpose of the trials was to extract and isolate these religious leaders from the native community. To reinforce the point, four Pueblo accused of “bewitching” a Franciscan priest were sentenced to death. Three were hanged in Santa Fe’s central plaza; the fourth committed suicide in his jail cell before the Spanish could carry out the sentence. The other 43 were publicly flogged and then jailed while arrangements were made to sell them into slavery.

Figure 2. Interior of a Reconstructed Kiva at Mesa Verde National Park

The Pueblo’s response to these proceedings was a powerful tipping point in the balance of power in New Mexico. A large, armed band of Tewa Pueblo came to Santa Fe and demanded that Treviño release the captives, promising to kill him and every other Spaniard in Santa Fe if their people remained imprisoned. The governor attempted to negotiate, offering pardons if the Indians swore to “forsake idolatry and iniquity.” The Tewa refused to bargain and restated their demands. Treviño thus faced the choice of freeing the captives or triggering a slaughter of the outnumbered Spanish. He freed the captives. With this confrontation, there was a seismic shift in the balance of power between the Spanish and the Pueblo. The myth of Spanish superiority was

 

 

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decisively punctured, and the Pueblo’s decision to collectively challenge the Spanish yoke had produced the desired results. For the Spanish colonists, this was an ominous precedent.

Figure 3. Popé

The roots of the 1680 Pueblo Revolt were within this struggle over spiritual and cultural dominance. One of the medicine men arrested and whipped in Treviño’s campaign was Popé, a shaman from San Juan pueblo. Those Pueblo caught in the 1675 dragnet doubtlessly carried their share of resentment away from the experience, but Popé’s animosity toward the Spaniards was of a surpassing degree. The events of 1675, despite the eventual Tewa “victory” that had released him from Santa Fe’s jail, convinced Popé that the time had ended when the Pueblo people could maintain their traditions yet coexist with the Spanish. Still suspicious in the eyes of the Spanish, Popé relocated from San Juan to Taos, on the northern fringe of the colony, far from the main centers of Spanish population. Popé was already a man of significant spiritual power among the Pueblo, and the pronouncements issuing from the kiva in Taos, where he spent most of his time, only added to that reputation. Caudi, Tilini, and Tleume were katsinas (Pueblo divine beings) who resided in the Taos kiva, who came out into the open after prayers, offerings, and summons from Popé. According to Spanish accounts of subsequent Indian testimony,

it happened that in an estufa [kiva] of the pueblo of Los Taos there appeared to the said Popé three figures of Indians.… They gave the said Popé to understand that they were going underground to the lake of Copola. He saw these figures emit fire from all the extremities of their bodies.… They told him to make a cord of maguey fiber and tie some knots in it which would signify the number of days that they must wait before the rebellion.

 

 

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The knotted cord was taken from pueblo to pueblo throughout the Rio Grande valley, as Popé and a few trusted lieutenants gathered allies in their planned expulsion of the Spanish. The uprising of 1680 would not be a series of unconnected attacks on specific individuals, it would be a simultaneous uprising on a scale and scope that would have simply been impossible a generation before. Disparate Pueblo groups were united—and even some Apache groups as well, antagonized by Spanish slaving raids—in what would be a concerted effort to not just retaliate, but to eliminate the Spanish from their lands. Popé, as the carrier of the sacred katsinas’ message, promised the Pueblo rebels that after they eliminated the Spanish oppressors, they would be able to live “free from the labor they performed for the religious and the Spaniards.” This message of liberation was coupled with threats of dire consequences for those Indians who did not undertake this sacred work of rebellion and restoration.

Rebellion and the Expulsion of the Spanish

In August 1680, as runners fanned out from Taos bearing the knotted cords counting down the days to rebellion (which was to begin on August 11, the first night of the new moon), foreboding rumors began to reach the Spanish at Santa Fe. While these reports created a sense of anxiety among the Spanish, initially there was not enough specific information to allow for preventive measures. That changed on August 9. Three leaders from pueblos close to Santa Fe and loyal to the Spanish notified Governor Antonio de Otermín (who had replaced Treviño in 1677) that they had been approached by two messengers from the Tesuque pueblo with orders from Taos for the villages to participate in the uprising; the messengers also carried the knotted cords that served as the conspiracy’s timetable. Otermín immediately sent a detachment to Tesuque and had these two couriers arrested. They confessed to carrying the cord to the three villages, and that one town refused to participate in the rebellion, despite Popé’s threats of death for those who did not rise against the Spanish. The messengers pled ignorance of anything further about the plot, averring that they were not from the northlands where the councils had been held and thus knew nothing more about the plans that had emanated from Taos.

While the Spanish authorities in Santa Fe spent the afternoon and evening of August 9 attempting to discern the outlines of the apparent plot, the Pueblo of Tesuque sent a host of messengers speeding toward Taos and the other villages alerting the Indians that their plans for commencing their uprising on August 11 had been compromised. In the flurry of communication that ran between the villages, a consensus to begin the attack as soon as possible emerged. Thus, at daybreak on August 10, the Pueblo began their war of extermination against the Spanish. And Pedro Hidalgo and Fray Juan Pío, on their way to Mass at Tesuque that morning, rode directly into it.

When Pedro Hidalgo rode into Santa Fe and reported what had befallen him and the now- martyred Fray Pío, Governor Otermín knew that every Spanish settler in the entire New Mexico colony was in mortal danger. Slightly less than 1,000 Spanish men, women, and children were several hundred miles north of the more settled portions of New Spain, over 1,100 miles from the viceregal capital of Mexico City, and surrounded by over 17,000 Pueblo Indians who were now acting in almost complete concert with one another to exterminate them. Otermín immediately dispatched messengers to the alcaldes mayors (the heads of the Spanish towns in the colony) to muster their male residents into militias to defend their settlements, especially the churches.

 

 

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Otermín then ordered a detachment of troops to attempt to verify some of the reports he had already received through a reconnaissance of nearby pueblos, and took measures to establish contact with his lieutenant governor, who was in one of the colony’s southern districts. With these actions, Otermín had basically done as much as he could to deal with a situation whose overall scope and contours were still unknown to him. The Pueblo of New Mexico had the initiative, and as Popé’s plans unfolded, they were the ones who would control events. All that the governor and the townspeople of Santa Fe could do was barricade themselves in the governor’s palace (except for a cluster of soldiers defending the town’s church) and wait; Otermín knew that it was not a matter of if, but rather when, the Pueblo would descend upon the colonial capital.

Over the next 48 hours, piece after piece of bad news for the Spanish made its way into Santa Fe. Late in the afternoon of August 10, two Spanish soldiers arrived in the villa of Santa Fe after escaping from the rebellious Indians of the Tegua pueblos; they had come through that region from further north, where the Taos and Picurís pueblos had also taken up arms against the Spanish. The soldiers also carried a message from the alcalde mayor of Santa Clara, warning of “a large number of the rebellious Christians [Indians who had earlier accepted conversion]” from the surrounding villages who had massed in Santa Clara, using the pueblo as a base from which they were “going out in mounted squadrons and gathering up the cattle and property from the fields and houses of the Spaniards, committing such iniquities, atrocities, and robberies quite shamelessly.”

Otermín’s reconnaissance patrol returned to the villa on August 12, and its commander recounted the evidence of a litany of violence against not only settlers, but symbols of Spanish ecclesiastical authority as well: “all the people of the pueblos from Tesuque to San Juan are in rebellion … [and] have robbed the holy temples and the cattle haciendas of the countryside, and sacked the houses of the Spaniards.” The soldier described an encounter with one of the Indians, where the Spanish had asked him to surrender peacefully, promising safety in return. The Indian “said pertinaciously and rebelliously that he wished to die and go to hell.” The commander, as well as other Spaniards who straggled into Santa Fe in these chaotic hours, also revealed that much of the Franciscan clergy of the countryside had been killed by the Pueblo. “They were saying that God and Santa Maria were dead, that they were the ones whom the Spaniards worshiped, and that their God whom they obeyed never died.” For the Spanish, this bloody rejection of Christian faith and authority must have added a chilling dimension to an already- developing feeling of being forsaken in a mortally dangerous frontier wilderness.

By August 13, Otermín was able to conclude that those Spanish clergy and settlers from Taos to Isleta who had not made their way to Santa Fe were dead. Thus, Santa Fe had become a lonely enclave of European refugees in a land that was raging with insurrection. The next day, news arrived that over five hundred Indians were only one league away from Santa Fe, waiting to join bands from several other Pueblo as well as a detachment of Apache, “so as to sack the said villa all together and kill within it the señor governor and captain-general [Otermín], the religious [Franciscan clergy], and all the citizens.” Early the next morning, lookouts reported that this army had arrived outside Santa Fe.

 

 

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Barricaded inside the villa, the Spanish were able to see the Natives’ army move into the surrounding maize fields, looting and destroying Spanish houses on the outskirts of Santa Fe. A squadron of Spanish cavalrymen was dispatched to survey the proceedings, whereupon they encountered a native leader who returned with them to parley with Otermín. Otermín recognized this Indian; he was a Tagno Pueblo named Juan who had previously been one of the messengers sent on August 10 to investigate events in the outlying villages. He now wore part of the raiment of a Franciscan priest, and was heavily armed with Spanish weapons. Juan offered a choice to the Spaniards by demanding they choose from one of two crosses carried by the Indians—one red and the other white; the red meant war, the white meant surrender and the Spanish leaving New Mexico. Otermín attempted to stall, offering general amnesty if the Pueblo laid down their arms, but he was dealing from a position of weakness and both he and the Indians knew it. When Juan rode back to the Pueblo army and conveyed Otermín’s offer, the natives’ response was clear: “[t]hey derided and ridiculed this reply and received the said Indian [Juan] in their camp with trumpets and shouts, ringing the bells of the hermitage of San Miguel,” a friary outside of Santa Fe that they were in the process of ransacking. The Pueblo then set the hermitage on fire and continued to destroy Spanish houses and property closer and closer to the town’s perimeter.

In a desperate attempt to blunt the Pueblo’s assault, Otermín led a band of soldiers (less than 100 men) in a charge upon the Indians. The clash lasted most of the day; though many of them were themselves wounded, the Spanish inflicted much more damage on the Pueblo. Just as the Spanish began to seize momentum, however, Indian reinforcements from the northern pueblos (including Taos) arrived. The day thus ended with a frantic Spanish retreat back to the confines of the governor’s palace, where they were surrounded by hundreds of hostile Pueblo. Then followed a standoff, which lasted several days. Huddled inside the palace, the Spanish could only watch as the number of Pueblo surrounding Santa Fe swelled to over 2,500. The natives cut the aqueduct outside of the town, and the Spanish spent the standoff without water. Deciding to make one last attempt at fighting rather than die of starvation and thirst, the Spanish—led by Otermín— charged out of the palace on the morning of August 20, catching the Pueblo by surprise and routing most of them out of Santa Fe entirely. By midday, the Spanish had killed more than 300 natives, captured almost 50, and sent the remaining couple thousand into a retreat. Otermín, despite wounds to his head and chest, interrogated the captured Pueblo before having them shot as traitors to the King.

The Spanish realized, though, that their victory was destined to be short-lived. Other than those present in Santa Fe, there were no Spaniards alive in the 150-mile span between Taos and Isleta. Additionally, the Santa Fe refugees were nearly out of provisions, they had no access to water, most of the colony’s horses had been seized by the native rebels, and those Pueblo were bound to return sooner rather than later. The situation for the Spanish was bleak indeed. There were, however, reports that some survivors had made their way to Isleta, and Otermín believed that the best course of action was for the Spanish in Santa Fe to retreat south to join forces with whatever compatriots they could find near Isleta. Accordingly, Otermín and some 2,000 refugees commenced their retreat south from Santa Fe on August 21.

This southward retreat revealed the extent of the rebellion’s destruction. Pueblo were abandoned, haciendas were smoldering, churches that had been razed contained artifacts and vestments that had been defaced in ways that shocked the Spaniards. Along the road to Isleta, numerous

 

 

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unburied corpses lay, testament to the Pueblo’s animosity. The pueblo of Isleta was abandoned when Otermín’s caravan arrived, a devastating blow to the hungry, sick, exhausted, and demoralized Spaniards. Desperate and out of supplies, Otermín sent riders ahead to catch the Isleta refugees, whom he knew were led by the lieutenant governor Alonso García. In early September, some two weeks after the Spanish retreat from Santa Fe had begun, the advance riders caught up to García’s party approximately 50 miles south of the Socorro pueblo. The forced exodus was over.

Figure 4. Pueblo Rebellion

 

 

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The Case that the Spanish Were Justified in Their Rule over the Pueblo

The Spanish presence in New Mexico—and the resulting oppression of the Pueblo peoples— seems impossible to justify by modern standards. Indeed, the Pueblo Revolt proves that this presence was impossible to justify by native standards as well. How could such brutal colonial rule, with its attendant violence toward native peoples, be undertaken in the name of God and the Roman Catholic Church? After all, the Spanish had couched their arguments for the expansion of their American empire in primarily religious terms. By the standards of 16th-century European Christianity, though, the Spaniards had compelling reasons—moral imperatives, as they saw them—to justify their occupation of the Pueblo lands.

Foremost in the Spanish rationale for subjugation of the natives was the Indians’ supposed childlike nature; “incompetent” in the legal sense of the term, these benighted “savages” needed the Christian stewardship that the Spanish provided in order to prevent a relapse into their barbarous natures. [See Antonio de Otermín, Auto, August 13–20, 1680 (primary source)] Just as mankind in general had to overcome the burdens of the Original Sin, so too did Indians have to escape the “original sin” of their uncivilized and heathen natures. Viewing the Indians as a dangerous and inferior “Other” came naturally to the Spanish; during their centuries-long reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula, Spaniards employed the same characterization towards the North African Muslims (the “Moors”) who they overran and ultimately sought to expel from their borders. As the “barbaric” and “heathen” Muslim ultimately had to give way to the superior nature of Spanish Catholic civilization, so too did the Indian. This persistent cultural framework was a key part of the Spanish rationale for empire over the Pueblo peoples, as well as a primary motivation for those who favored a counterattack on the Pueblo rebels. Pedro de Leiva, governor of El Paso de Norte, for example, informed the viceroy of New Spain, Payo Enriquez de Rivera Manrique, that he and his men were ready to “attempt to liberate our governor [Otermín], the religious, and the Christians … and to restore everything, as did those of [Iberia] against the Moorish dogs.” [See Pedro de Leiva, Letter to Payo Enriquez de Rivera Manrique, Viceroy of New Spain, August 29, 1680 (primary source)]

Given their view of Indian peoples as savage, uncivilized “Others,” the level of contempt exhibited by the Spanish towards the Pueblo rebels is unsurprising—since these were Indians who refused to recognize their subordinate roles and dared to upset the Spanish order, which was in turn mandated by heaven. One provincial governor argued that the Pueblo rebels ought to be subdued and then enslaved, even though Indian slavery had been illegal for almost a century and a half by that point. [See Don Bartolomé de Estrada, Letter to Payo Enriquez de Rivera Manrique, Viceroy of New Spain, July 22, 1680 (primary source)] This proposal, drastic in its remedy, to deal with the Indian “problem” reflected the Spanish conception of natives as childlike and barbarous, and their especial contempt for the “idolatries and superstitions” of Pueblo religious practices. [See Antonio de Otermín, Report, September 13 or 14, 1680 (primary source)]. What better proof of the ultimate inferiority of the natives than their benighted spiritual state? The only way these people could survive—and have any hope of avoiding eternal damnation—was for them to accept the yoke of Spanish dominion and the one true Catholic Church. This was the fundamental precept the Spanish justification for their appropriation of indigenous labor and their often violent means of religious conversion: These heathens needed a firm hand to keep them on the proper path. Indeed, Spanish officials believed, the natives ought

 

 

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to be thankful for what, after all, amounted to a light burden compared with the alternative of lapsing back into savagery and infidelity. [See Antonio de Otermín, Letter to Payo Enriquez de Rivera Manrique, Viceroy of New Spain, November 20, 1680 (primary source)] The Spanish clung tightly to this justification—and the larger worldview that lay behind it—to the point where Indian rebelliousness became inconceivable. Small wonder that the Pueblo Revolt came as such a surprise, and that the Spanish nurtured a furious contempt for the ungrateful, traitorous “devils” who defied their carefully crafted and divinely justified order.

Figure 5. San Miguel Church

The Case that the Spanish Presence in New Mexico Was Intolerable and Rebellion Was Necessary

The Pueblo who followed Popé left no written record; what we know about their motives and actions comes from Spanish records—testimony collected from either captured rebels or “Christian” Pueblo who remained loyal to the Spanish. Thus, significant filters are in place between indigenous motivations and the Spanish interpretation thereof, and that must be borne in mind as one approaches these documents. Nevertheless, several key points clearly emerge regarding the motivations of both leaders and rank and file in the Pueblo rebellion.

 

 

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Figure 6. Kachina Dolls

Religion was perhaps the most contested area of Spanish-Pueblo interactions. The behaviors mandated by the Spanish imposition of Catholicism conflicted directly with the Pueblo’s cultural norms in areas from dress to labor practices to relations between the genders. The actual behavior of the Spanish, both regular settlers and the Franciscan clergy, exacerbated this cognitive dissonance for the Pueblo—it became apparent quite early that the Spanish injunctions regarding moral behavior exemplified the proverbial “do as I say, not as I do.” For example, despite their demands for Pueblo males to practice monogamy and adopt the Catholic sacrament of marriage, several friars had sexual relations—sometimes consensual, often times coerced— with native women (despite the Catholic church’s longstanding rule regarding clerical celibacy). All the while, expressions of indigenous religiosity were suppressed, with transgressors receiving brutal punishments for their “idolatry.” Unsurprisingly, then, the rebels were unsparing in their violence towards any and all expressions of the hated Spanish religion. Franciscan demands for labor and obedience had created a festering resentment among many natives, manifested in the executions of numerous Spanish clergy during the rebellion. [See Pedro Garcia (of Tagno Pueblo), Testimony, August 25, 1680 (primary source)] Moreover, that resentment had grown over the decades of Spanish dominion in Pueblo country. Punishments for those caught practicing their native traditions increased in their appalling brutality over the years [See Pedro Nanboa (of Alameda Pueblo), Testimony, September 6, 1680 (primary source)]; as we have seen, this was a direct impetus for Popé himself to foment rebellion. Testimony from native and Spanish alike describes the extent to which the Pueblo rebels sought to slake their thirst for revenge on Spanish religion, often with jarring levels of violence borne out of years of bitterness towards the Catholic regime. [See Juan and Francisco Lorenzo (from near San Felipe Pueblo), Testimony, December 20, 1681 (primary source)]

The campaign to expunge any trace of Spanish religion from Pueblo lands was duplicated in other areas. Indeed, the defining characteristic of the Pueblo Revolt was the systematic effort to eradicate anything—tangible or abstract—that smacked of Spanish influence. Catholic iconography and practices were a prominent part—but not the whole—of the rebels’ focus. They also destroyed Spanish haciendas and killed their owners, who were also sources of irksome

 

 

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demands for labor and tribute. [See Pedro Naranjo (of San Felipe Pueblo), Testimony, December 19, 1691 (primary source)] Popé himself went so far as to order the uprooting of Spanish crops and abandonment of Spanish trade goods (like certain textiles and metal implements), an extent to which even many of his followers were unwilling to go. But the rebels’ unity was unshaken when it came to cultural cleansing; casting off Spanish authority led to a reassertion of Pueblo identity. The stark levels of violence in the Pueblo Revolt were no accident—the violence was targeted at what the natives saw as the principal supports for the odious Spanish regime. [See Cabildo of Santa Fe, Opinion, October 3, 1680 (primary source)] With their selection of these targets—churches, clergy, icons, haciendas—the Pueblo spoke volumes about their intentions. The Spanish could no longer be tolerated in Indian lands; the Pueblo’s survival depended upon removing every last vestige of the Spanish presence from among them.

Outcome and Impact

The survivors of Spain’s now former colony of New Mexico arrived at La Salineta, north of El Paso del Norte, on September 19, 1680, 40 days after the outbreak of the Pueblo rebellion. This was as complete a defeat that any European colony in North America would ever see at the hands of Native Americans. The Spanish colony of New Mexico was no more; the Pueblo had killed or expelled every Spaniard from the Rio Grande Valley. The bedraggled remnant of settlers convalesced for several months in El Paso, until Otermín attempted a reconquest of New Mexico in November 1681. It went poorly. Otermín’s force was too small, the territory too vast, and the Pueblo too buoyed by their successful expulsion of the Spaniards the previous year for this attempted reconquest to have even the remote chance of success. After this unsuccessful entrada, Otermín returned to El Paso in January 1682, bringing with him a few Pueblo converts from Isleta, but leaving the rest of New Mexico firmly within Pueblo control. And there it would remain until the middle of the next decade.

For their part, the Pueblo were engaged in eradicating any trace of the Spanish tenure in their lands. Popé ordered not only the destruction of Spanish haciendas and churches, but even went so far as to mandate the destruction of Spanish crops and a return to exclusively Indian methods of agriculture. This resurgence of Pueblo nativism was appealing to the region’s indigenous inhabitants. Important evidence of the religious dimension to Popé’s nativist mandates is in the number of destroyed churches and defaced artifacts encountered by the Spanish on their retreat from the colony, as well as his admonitions for Pueblo to bathe in the Rio Grande and its tributary streams while scrubbing themselves with yucca root to cleanse themselves of the spiritual corruption visited by the Franciscans (a profoundly symbolic reverse baptism).

The problem for the Pueblo, however, was that once the unifying element provided by the desire to expel the Spanish disappeared with Otermín’s exiles, factionalism and conflict ensued relatively quickly. Not helping matters was the behavior of Popé, of whom it was reported that he wore the vestments of the conquered Spanish (in spite of his orders to burn Spanish relics) and declared himself ruler of all the Pueblo peoples. He demanded tribute from Pueblo villages in much the same manner as the Spanish had, and apparently forfeited the allegiance he had won through his leadership of the 1680 rebellion. By the time of Otermín’s attempt to re-enter New Mexico, Popé had been overthrown. This change in leadership did not improve matters, however. The expulsion of the Spanish had not alleviated the problems of drought and famine

 

 

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that had plagued the Indian peoples of the regions. The Athapaskan who had fought alongside the Pueblo against the Spanish now turned once again on their erstwhile allies and renewed their raids on Pueblo fields and food supplies. Given these difficult circumstances, it is not surprising that word of major dissension amongst the Pueblo had reached the Spanish in El Paso by the summer of 1683.

The wretched circumstances of the Spanish community, as well as other indigenous-Spanish violence in the Nueva Vizcaya region, prevented the Spanish from taking advantage of the Pueblo’s disarray. It was not until the presence of French explorers in the lower Mississippi and Texas regions, as well as English incursions toward Spanish Florida, that the reconquest of New Mexico became a priority once again for the officials of New Spain. Don Diego de Vargas, who became governor in 1692, began a series of expeditions into the Rio Grande Valley that ultimately brought the reimposition of Spanish authority in New Mexico. As if to demonstrate how factionalism and schism had rent Pueblo unity, an attempted revolt against the Spanish in 1696 was smothered almost at its inception. With Vargas’s consolidation of Spanish authority in the once and future colony of New Mexico, the lone chapter of successful indigenous resistance to European colonization came to a close.

But New Mexico after 1696 was different in several important respects from the pre-1680 version of the colony. Gone was the hated institution of the encomienda and much of its attendant tribute obligations. The Franciscan clergy was now keenly aware of the delicacy with which it had to tread when it came to proselytizing among the Pueblo. Even though the power dynamic between Spaniard and Pueblo may have looked on the surface like it had before 1680, in practice things had changed dramatically. While the Spanish still ruled New Mexico, they did so in a chastened manner, more heedful of the potential dangers of a Pueblo population pushed too far.

What if there had not been a leader such as Popé to organize the Pueblo villages for rebellion?

Had there been no leaders such as Popé, would the Pueblo Indians have launched their revolt against the Spanish in August 1680? Would New Mexico have become more integrated into the Spanish Empire? Would the Indians have seen their conditions change any, or would the bleak status quo have continued for them?

The question of individual leadership is an important one for understanding the Pueblo Revolt. Popé, by all accounts, was powerfully charismatic and a gifted organizer of people. The diplomacy involved in Popé’s conspiracy was complex, as there were some Pueblo villages whose leaders were seen as too close to the Spanish to be trusted, while others would refuse overtures to join the rebellion. Overall, Popé and his associates united some 17,000 Pueblo, dispersed among 24 villages spread throughout the Rio Grande valley behind the rebellion. This was no easy task, as New Mexico’s Pueblo spoke six different languages, and several distinct dialects within these linguistic groups, which were often “mutually unintelligible” across different regions of the valley. To get these disparate groups to act in concert, even when the plans for the rebellion were altered at literally the last minute, was no mean feat.

 

 

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Even without Popé, though, there is ample reason to believe the Pueblo would have rebelled against the Spanish. Conditions were more ripe for an uprising in 1680 than at any other time in New Mexico’s colonial period. Drought and famine had persisted continuously for almost 20 years. Athapaskan raids were intensifying in both number and level of violence. The Pueblo’s world was coming undone, and they saw that process accelerating by the mid-1670s. When these external factors are coupled with the internal dynamics between Spanish and Pueblo, it is clear that the breaking strain was fast approaching in New Mexico. The renewed and intensified crackdowns on Pueblo religious practices by both civil and clerical authorities exacerbated what were already significant resentments on the part of the Pueblo about Spanish conversion efforts. [See The Franciscans’ Conversions by Violence] The 1675 incident was a key development in this regard. Leaving aside Popé’s involvement, the very fact that the Tewa Pueblo were able to force Governor Treviño to release the imprisoned religious leaders demonstrated where the real balance of power lay in the colony if the Pueblo undertook collective resistance. So large-scale rebellion lay not only in the realm of possibility, but also probability, by 1680.

That rebellion, however, might not have possessed the timing, scale, or coherence of the August 1680 revolt without Popé’s leadership. Yet, before we assume the Popé was an indispensable figure, it should be recalled that he was overthrown in 1681 by the very people that he had led in revolt the previous year. It seems reasonable to assume that given the unprecedented levels of tension within New Mexico, that revolt was almost a given, and a leader would have emerged. Perhaps one of the other 40-plus Shamans who were confined in Santa Fe in the wake of the 1675 Spanish crackdown on Pueblo religious practices would have emerged if Popé had not. Popé drew much of his power and reputation from his spiritual abilities and connections; certainly other Pueblo religious leaders could lay claim to these as well. And the conditions in the Rio Grande Valley—famine, threats of war, and Spanish persecution—were variables completely independent of Popé’s presence.

Even though the Spanish were able to “reconquer” New Mexico in the mid-1690s, the circumstances surrounding the renewal of their colony were fundamentally different than had been the case before 1680. The reassertion of Spanish power, in fact, was possible not because the Europeans had grown stronger, but rather the Pueblo people had continued to grow weaker even after the expulsion of the Spanish. Droughts and famine persisted, the unity forged by rebellion devolved into factionalism and strife, and nomadic raids continued to make the Pueblo’s existence a precarious one. Indeed, many outlying Pueblo villages were abandoned due to population decline and fear of attacks. The return of the Spanish, if they conducted themselves better, and provided much-needed protection, looked more and more reasonable to Pueblo by the decade after the rebellion. The Spanish understood these implicit conditions; the Pueblo may have been weakened by the 1690s, but they still outnumbered the Spanish. A 1696 rebellion against the returning Spaniards, though quickly suppressed, also demonstrated just how powerful the combination of difficult conditions and strong leadership had been for the Revolt of 1680. Not all Pueblo welcomed the Spanish back in the 1690s; indeed, it is likely that the majority of New Mexico’s indigenous peoples accepted the Spanish back only grudgingly, if at all. But the 1680 rebellion had altered the colonial dynamic enough to make the Europeans’ presence at least a palatable one. The Spanish remained a small presence numerically, and their figurative “footprint” in New Mexico was a softer one now as well. The harsh labor practices of the colony’s early years were gone; the encomienda was not reinstated when the Spanish returned,

 

 

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and tribute demands were scaled down significantly. Additionally, Spanish interference in Pueblo’s religious lives was also mitigated to a significant degree. Though the Spanish still proclaimed the necessity of conversion to Catholic practices, the enforcement of this mandate lacked the force and violence of the earlier era. The history of colonial New Mexico after 1696 demonstrates the significance an event such as the 1680 Pueblo Revolt could possess in redefining the relationship between colonizer and colonized.

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Hackett, Charles Wilson, ed. Revolt of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and Otermín’s Attempted Reconquest, 1680–1682. Transl. by Charmion Clair Shelby. Cuarto Centennial Ed. 2 vols. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970 [orig. 1942].

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Knaut, Andrew. The Pueblo Revolt of 1680: Conquest and Resistance in Seventeenth-Century New Mexico. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995.

Reff, Daniel T. “The ‘Predicament of Culture’ and Spanish Missionary Accounts of the Tepehuan and Pueblo Revolts.” Ethnohistory 42 (1995): 63–90.

Sando, Joe S. The Pueblo Indians. San Francisco: Indian Historian Press, 1976.

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Weber, David J. Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005.

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