Multimedia Planning Worksheet

Complete the Multimedia Presentation Planning Worksheet, in which you will discuss your potential multimedia presentation for Project 3.

Download the Multimedia Presentation Planning Worksheet to help you start Project 3 off on the right foot. Since this course has entailed quite a bit of writing thus far, this assignment provides you with an opportunity to get creative. You have the choice of three tools—Prezi, PowerPoint, or Microsoft Word—to present your opinions and observations on the creation and value of historical inquiry as it relates to the work you have done on your first two projects.

 

As you review the directions for this week’s assignment, you will notice that its critical elements draw from previous learning modules and encourage you to look at the rubric for the final project.  I recommend strongly to take the time to look over these documents carefully, review the applicable past learning modules and plan out how you hope to tackle the project over the next two weeks.

For this week’s worksheet, please note the connection between the Brainstorming section and the Slide Payout section.  The slides ask you to breakdown the various elements you discussed in the Brainstorming section.  Also, please note that the rubric asks you to “develop” ideas.  This means writing more than a brief sentence in each space—you need to provide some details on the content of each slide’s texts and visuals.

The MOST IMPORTANT THING TO REMEMBER about Project 3 is that its focus is on historical methods—how this course has taught you to think historically and why this is a valuable skill that impacts how you see the world.

This is a big project with many parts and will benefit from developing a plan of attack in the next few days.  This is what all big history projects call for.  Every writing project I undertake goes through the same process you are using right now—developing a question, finding sources, creating and revising a research plan, critically analyzing my sources, and then developing a detailed framework of what the final project will look like.  The most important part of the final assault is tackling it one piece at a time.  If at all possible, DO NOT try to do this week’s or next week’s assignment all in one day.  Tackle it one part at a time and it will affect the results in a positive way.

HIS 100: Multimedia Presentation Planning Worksheet Guidelines and Rubric

Prompt: This assignment provides you with an opportunity to brainstorm for and plan your Multimedia Presentation that you will create for Project 3. You have the choice of three tools to use for your presentation—Prezi, PowerPoint, or Microsoft Word. In this presentation, you will choose one of these tools, brainstorm your opinions and observations on the creation and value of historical inquiry as it relates to the work you have done on your first two projects, and plan out text, visual, and audio elements to articulate these ideas to an audience in an engaging manner.

 

To complete this assignment, download the Multimedia Presentation Planning Worksheet. In the first part of the worksheet, you will brainstorm your ideas. In the second part of the worksheet, you will plan the text, visuals, and audio for your presentation slides.

Rubric

Guidelines for Submission: Complete and submit the Multimedia Presentation Planning Worksheet.

Critical Elements Exemplary (100%) Proficient (85%) Needs Improvement (55%) Not Evident (0%) Value

Brainstorming Meets criteria for “Proficient” and includes specific examples as appropriate

Describes thoughts on each question

Describes thoughts on some questions but not all

Does not describe thoughts on any of the questions

30

Slide Text Ideas Meets criteria for “Proficient” and provides details on how audience will be engaged

Develops ideas for each slide’s text

Develops ideas for some slides’ text but not all

Does not develop ideas for any slides’ text

30

Slide Visuals and Audio Ideas

Meets criteria for “Proficient” and provides details on how audience will be engaged

Develop ideas for each slide’s visuals and audio

Develops ideas for some slides’ visuals and audio but not all

Does not develop ideas for any slides’ visuals and audio

30

Articulation of Response

Submission is free of errors related to citations, grammar, spelling, syntax, and organization and is presented in a professional and easy-to- read format

Submission has no major errors related to citations, grammar, spelling, syntax, or organization

Submission has major errors related to citations, grammar, spelling, syntax, or organization that negatively impact readability and articulation of main ideas

Submission has critical errors related to citations, grammar, spelling, syntax, or organization that prevent understanding of ideas

10

Total 100%

 

 

https://learn.snhu.edu/d2l/lor/viewer/view.d2l?ou=6606&loIdentId=22515,3

POLI 113A: East Asian Thought In Comparative Perspective

Price Theater Course Description The purpose of this course is to provide students with an analytic introduction to East Asian political thought and culture from 551 BC to the present. Assignments and Grades Course grades are based on one take home midterm exam (worth 40% of the final grade) and one take home final exam (worth 60%). Both exams must be submitted digitally via the Turnitin assignment link on TritonEd. No hard copy will be required. Plagiarism will not be tolerated. If you have questions about what constitutes plagiarism, please visit the UCSD academic integrity office’s website at http://academicintegrity.ucsd.edu. If you need help writing these essays, you are encouraged to make an appointment with the UCSD writing center (http://commons.ucsd.edu/students/writing/index.html). Specific deadlines, instructions, and submission guidelines will be announced when the exam prompts are posted to TritonEd. The midterm prompts are included on the final page of this document. Course Resources Lectures will be available via podcast at https://podcast.ucsd.edu. Prof. Magagna’s notes from each lecture will be posted to TritonEd as well. Readings Weeks 1 – 5: • Yao, X. 2000. An Introduction to Confucianism. Cambridge University Press. (Read entire book.) • C.C. Tsai. 2018. The Analects: An Illustrated Edition. Princeton University Press. (Read entire book.) Weeks 6 – 10: • de Bary, W.T. et al. 1999. Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume 1: From Earliest Times to 1600. Columbia University Press. (Read sections on Mencius, Xunzi, Confucius and the Analects, plus either Zhu Xi or Wang Yangming sections.) ∗Office: SSB 375; Phone: (858) 337-1926. 1 Teaching Assistants The TAs for this course are Mariana Carvalho Barbosa, Todd Levinson, Stan Oklobdzija, Michael Seese, and Liesel Spangler. The TAs will not hold regular office hours. At least one TA will be present at every lecture; students are encouraged to approach the TA with questions either before or after the class session. Please send all email communication to Michael Seese at mseese@ucsd.edu. 2 Midterm Exam Directions • The midterm exam is due Friday, 9 November at 2:00pm. • You will be required to submit a digital copy of your paper to the Turnitin link on TritonEd. Please retain a copy of your submission confirmation, in case there are any technical issues with your submission. • Please write 6–7 pages for each response, except for Prompt 1. If you select Prompt 1, you must write 8–10 pages. • Use standard formatting with: – Double spacing, – 11 or 12 point font (Times, Helvetica, Calibri, etc.), – 1 inch margins, – No more than 1 inch of space dedicated to title and header, – No extraneous space between paragraphs or headers. • Please include the number of the prompt you are responding to. • Cite lecture and class readings where appropriate; – Include a bibliography and in-text citations, – You may use any standard citation style, (MLA, APA, Chicago, etc.), – Please do not use outside sources, – Plagiarism will not be tolerated. • Please do not include pictures, charts, or figures in your responses. Please do not copy / paste lecture notes into the text of your response. • Please stay on topic. • You must turn your exam in by the deadline to receive full credit. Any late exams (even by 1 minute late) will incur a penalty. – Papers will be penalized by 1 3 of a letter grade for each day late (e.g., A– −→ B+, etc.). – The system will not accept late submissions. If you need to turn your paper in after the deadline, please email a .pdf copy to mseese@ucsd.edu. Prompts Choose and respond to one of the prompts below. 1. Explain the paradox of proper order and illustrate it with the work of the district magistrate. (8-10 pages, source: lectures) 2. Explain the core concepts of East Asian thought. (6-7 pages, sources: Yao and lectures) 3. Explain the Analects used in the lectures and the illustrated Analects. (6-7 page, sources: lectures, Illustrated Analects) 4. Explain the problem of elite regulation. (6-7 pages, sources: lectures, de Bary, Yao) 3

Constellations Volume 10, No 3, 2003. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in

the Core of Europe

Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida

It is the wish of Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas to be co-signatories of what is both an analysis and an appeal. They regard it as necessary and urgent that French and German philosophers lift their voices together, whatever disagreements may have separated them in the past. The following text was composed by Jürgen Habermas, as will be readily apparent. Though he would have liked to very much, due to personal circumstances Jacques Derrida was unable to compose his own text. Nevertheless, he suggested to Jürgen Habermas that he be the co-signatory of this appeal, and shares its definitive premises and perspectives: the determination of new European political responsibilities beyond any Eurocentrism; the call for a renewed confirmation and effective transformation of international law and its institutions, in particular the UN; a new conception and a new praxis for the distri- bution of state authority, etc., according to the spirit, if not the precise sense, that refers back to the Kantian tradition.

We should not forget two dates: not the day the newspapers reported to their astonished readers the Spanish prime minister’s invitation to the other European nations willing to support the Iraq war to swear an oath of loyalty to George W. Bush, an invitation issued behind the back of the other countries of the European Union. But we should also remember February 15, 2003, as mass demonstrations in London and Rome, Madrid and Barcelona, Berlin and Paris reacted to this sneak attack. The simultaneity of these overwhelming demonstrations – the largest since the end of the Second World War – may well, in hindsight, go down in history as a sign of the birth of a European public sphere.

During the leaden months prior to the outbreak of the war in Iraq, a morally obscene division of labor provoked strong emotions. The large-scale logistical operation of ceaseless military preparation and the frenetic activity of humanitarian aid organizations meshed together as precisely as the teeth of a gear. Moreover, the spectacle took place undisturbed before the eyes of the very population which – robbed of their own initiative – was to be its victim. The precautionary mustering of relief workers, relief services, and relief goods dressed itself in the rash rhetoric of alleviation of suffering yet to be inflicted; the planned reconstruction of cities and administrations yet to be ruined. Like searchlights, they picked out the civil- ized barbarism of coolly planned death (of how many victims?), of torments long

 

 

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since totted up (of how many injured and mutilated, how many thirsty and hungry?), of the long-planned destruction (of how many residential districts and hospitals, how many houses, museums, and markets?). As the war finally began, the Ernst Jünger aesthetic of the skyline of the nighttime Baghdad, illuminated by countless explosions, seemed almost harmless.

A Common European Foreign Policy: Who First?

There is no doubt that the power of emotions has brought European citizens jointly to their feet. Yet at the same time, the war made Europeans conscious of the failure of their common foreign policy, a failure that has been a long time in the making. As in the rest of the world, the impetuous break with international law has ignited a debate over the future of the international order in Europe as well. But here, the divisive arguments have cut deeper, and have caused familiar faultlines to emerge even more sharply. Controversies over the role of the American superpower, over a future world order, over the relevance of international law and the United Nations – all have caused latent contradictions to break into the open. The gap between continental and Anglo-American countries on the one side, and “the old Europe” and the Central and East European candidates for entry into the European Union on the other side, has grown deeper.

In Great Britain, while the special relationship with the United States is by no means uncontested, the priorities of Downing Street are still quite clear. And the central and eastern European countries, while certainly working hard for their admission into the EU, are nevertheless not yet ready to place limits on the sover- eignty that they have so recently regained. The Iraq crisis was only a catalyst. In the Brussels constitutional convention, there is now a visible contrast between the nations that really want a stronger EU, and those with an understandable interest in freezing, or at best cosmetically changing, the existing mode of intergovern- mental governance. This contradiction can no longer be finessed. The future con- stitution will grant us a European foreign minister. But what good is a new political office if governments don’t unify in a common policy? A Fischer with a changed job description would remain as powerless as Solana.

For the moment, only the core European nations are ready to endow the EU with certain qualities of a state. But what happens if these countries can only find agreement on the definition of “self-interest”? If Europe is not to fall apart, these countries will have to make use of the mechanisms for “strengthened cooperation” created in Nice as a way of taking a first step toward a common foreign policy, a common security policy, and a common defense policy. Only such a step will succeed in generating the momentum that other member states – initially in the Euro zone – will not be able to resist in the long run. In the framework of the future European constitution, there can and must be no separatism. Taking a leading role does not mean excluding. The avant-gardist core of Europe must not wall itself off into a new Small Europe. It must – as it has so often – be the locomotive.

 

 

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It is from their own self-interest, to be sure, that the more closely-cooperating member states of the EU will hold the door open. And the probability that the invited states will pass through that door will increase the more capable the core of Europe becomes of effective action externally, and the sooner it can prove that in a complex global society, it is not just divisions that count, but also the soft power of negotiating agendas, relations, and economic advantages.

In this world, the reduction of politics to the stupid and costly alternative of war or peace simply doesn’t pay. At the international level and in the framework of the UN, Europe has to throw its weight on the scale to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States. At global economic summits and in the institutions of the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF, it should exert its influence in shaping the design for a coming global domestic policy.

Political projects that aim at the further development of the EU are now collid- ing with the limits of the medium of administrative steering. Until now, the func- tional imperatives for the construction of a common market and the Euro-zone have driven reforms. These driving forces are now exhausted. A transformative politics, which would demand that member states not just overcome obstacles for competitiveness but form a common will, must take recourse to the motives and the attitudes of the citizens themselves. Majority decisions on highly consequential foreign policies can only expect acceptance assuming the solidarity of outnum- bered minorities. But this presupposes a feeling of common political belonging on both sides. The population must so to speak “build up” their national iden- tities, and add to them a European dimension. What is already a fairly abstract form of civic solidarity, still largely confined to members of nation-states, must be extended to include the European citizens of other nations as well.

This raises the question of “European identity.” Only the consciousness of a shared political fate, and the prospect of a common future, can halt outvoted minorities from the obstruction of a majority will. The citizens of one nation must regard the citizens of another nation as fundamentally “one of us.” This desider- atum leads to the question that so many skeptics have called attention to: are there historical experiences, traditions, and achievements offering European citizens the consciousness of a political fate that has been shared together, and that can be shaped together? An attractive, indeed an infectious “vision” for a future Europe will not emerge from thin air. At present it can arise only from the disquieting perception of perplexity. But it well can emerge from the difficulties of a situation into which we Europeans have been cast. And it must articulate itself from out of the wild cacophony of a multi-vocal public sphere. If this theme has so far not even gotten on to the agenda, it is we intellectuals who have failed.

The Treacheries of a European Identity

It is easy to find unity without commitment. The image of a peaceful, cooperative Europe, open toward other cultures and capable of dialogue, floats like a mirage

 

 

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before us all. We welcome the Europe that found exemplary solutions for two problems during the second half of the twentieth century. The EU already offers itself as a form of “governance beyond the nation-state,” which could set a precedent in the postnational constellation. And for decades, European social welfare sys- tems served as a model. Certainly, they have now been thrown on the defensive at the level of the national state. Yet future political efforts at the domestication of global capitalism must not fall below the standards of social justice that they established. If Europe has solved two problems of this magnitude, why shouldn’t it issue a further challenge: to defend and promote a cosmopolitan order on the basis of international law against competing visions?

Such a Europe-wide discourse, of course, would have to match up with exist- ing dispositions, which are waiting, so to speak, for the stimulation of a process of self-understanding. Two facts would seem to contradict this bold assumption. Haven’t the most significant historical achievements of Europe forfeited their identity-forming power precisely through the fact of their worldwide success? And what could hold together a region characterized more than any other by the ongoing rivalries between self-conscious nations?

Insofar as Christianity and capitalism, natural science and technology, Roman law and the Code Napoleon, the bourgeois-urban form of life, democracy and human rights, the secularization of state and society have spread across other continents, these legacies no longer constitute a proprium. The Western form of spirit, rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition, certainly has its characteristic fea- tures. But the nations of Europe also share this mental habitus, characterized by individualism, rationalism, and activism, with the United States, Canada, and Australia. The “West” encompasses more than just Europe. Moreover, Europe is composed of nation-states that delimit one another polemically. National conscious- ness, formed by national languages, national literatures, and national histories, has long operated as an explosive force.

However, in response to the destructive power of this nationalism, values and habits have also developed which have given contemporary Europe, in its incom- parably rich cultural diversity, its own face. This is how Europe at large presents itself to of non-Europeans. A culture which for centuries has been beset more than any other by conflicts between town and country, sacred and secular author- ities, by the competition between faith and knowledge, the struggle between states and antagonistic classes, has had to painfully learn how differences can be communicated, contradictions institutionalized, and tensions stabilized. The acknow- ledgement of differences – the reciprocal acknowledgement of the Other in his otherness – can also become a feature of a common identity.

The pacification of class conflicts within the welfare state, and the self-limitation of state sovereignty within the framework of the EU, are only the most recent examples of this. In the third quarter of the twentieth century, Europe on this side of the Iron Curtain experienced its “golden age,” as Eric Hobsbawm has called it. Since then, features of a common political mentality have taken shape, so that

 

 

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others often recognize us as Europeans rather than as Germans or French – and that happens not just in Hong Kong, but even in Tel Aviv. And isn’t it true? In European societies, secularization is relatively far advanced. Citizens here regard transgressions of the border between politics and religion with suspicion. Europeans have a relatively large amount of trust in the organizational and steering capaci- ties of the state, while remaining skeptical toward the achievements of markets. They possess a keen sense of the “dialectic of enlightenment”; they have no naïvely optimistic expectations about technological progress. They maintain a preference for the welfare state’s guarantees of social security and for regulations on the basis of solidarity. The threshold of tolerance for the use of force against persons lies relatively low. The desire for a multilateral and legally regulated international order is connected with the hope for an effective global domestic policy, within the framework of a reformed United Nations.

The fortunate historical constellation in which West Europeans developed this kind of mentality in the shadow of the Cold War has changed since 1989–90. But February 15 shows that the mentality has survived the context from which it sprang. This also explains why “old Europe” sees itself challenged by the blunt hegemonic politics of its ally. And why so many in Europe who welcome the fall of Saddam as an act of liberation also reject the illegality of the unilateral, pre-emptive, and deceptively justified invasion. But how stable is this mentality? Does it have roots in deeper historical experiences and traditions?

Today we know that many political traditions that command their authority through the illusion of “naturalness” have in fact been “invented.” By contrast, a European identity born in the daylight of the public sphere would have something constructed about it from the very beginning. But only what is constructed through an arbitrary choice carries the stigma of randomness. The political-ethical will that drives the hermeneutics of processes of self-understanding is not arbi- trary. Distinguishing between the legacy we appropriate and the one we want to refuse demands just as much circumspection as the decision over the interpreta- tion through which we appropriate it for ourselves. Historical experiences are only candidates for self-conscious appropriation; without such a self-conscious act they cannot attain the power to shape our identity. To conclude, a few notes on such “candidates,” in light of which the European postwar consciousness can win a sharper profile.

Historical Roots of a Political Profile

In modern Europe, the relation between church and state developed differently on either side of the Pyrennees, differently north and south of the Alps, west and east of the Rhine. In different European countries, the idea of the state’s neutrality in relation to different worldviews has assumed different legal forms. And yet within civil society, religion overall assumes a comparably unpolitical position. We may have cause to regret this social privatization of faith in other respects, but

 

 

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it has desirable consequences for our political culture. For us, a president who opens his daily business with open prayer, and associates his significant political decisions with a divine mission, is hard to imagine.

Civil society’s emancipation from the protection of an absolutist regime was not connected with the democratic appropriation and transformation of the modern administrative state everywhere in Europe. But the spread of the ideals of the French Revolution throughout Europe explains, among other things, why politics in both of its forms – as the organization of power and as a medium for the insti- tutionalization of political liberty – has been welcomed in Europe. By contrast, the triumph of capitalism was bound up with sharp class conflicts, and this fact has prevented an equally unprejudiced appraisal of the market. That different evalu- ation of politics and market may back Europeans’ trust in the civilizing power of the state, and their expectations for its capacity to correct “market failures.”

The party system that emerged from the French Revolution has often been copied. But only in Europe does this system also serve an ideological competition that subjects the socio-pathological results of capitalist modernization to an ongo- ing political evaluation. This fosters the sensitivity of citizens to the paradoxes of progress. The contest between conservative, liberal, and socialist agendas comes down to the weighing of two aspects: Do the benefits of a chimerical progress outweigh the losses that come with the disintegration of protective, traditional forms of life? Or do the benefits that today’s processes of “creative destruction” promise for tomorrow outweigh the pain of modernization losers?

In Europe, those who have been affected by class distinctions and their endur- ing consequences understood these burdens as a fate that could be averted only through collective action. In the context of workers’ movements and the Christian socialist traditions, an ethics of solidarity, the struggle for “more social justice,” with the goal of equal provision for all, asserted itself against the individualistic ethos of market justice that accepts glaring social inequalities as part of the bargain.

Contemporary Europe has been shaped by the experience of the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century and through the Holocaust – the persecution and the annihilation of European Jews in which the National Socialist regime made the societies of the conquered countries complicit as well. Self-critical controversies about this past remind us of the moral basis of politics. A heightened sensitivity to injuries to personal and bodily integrity is reflected, among other ways, in the fact that both Europarat and EU made the ban on capital punishment a condition for entrance.

A bellicose past once entangled all European nations in bloody conflicts. They drew a conclusion from that military and spiritual mobilization against one another: the imperative of developing new, supranational forms of cooperation after the Second World War. The successful history of the European Union may have confirmed Europeans in their belief that the domestication of state power demands a mutual limitation of sovereignty, on the global as well as the national- state level.

 

 

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Each of the great European nations has experienced the bloom of its imperial power. And, what in our context is more important still, each has had to work through the experience of the loss of its empire. In many cases this experience of decline was associated with the loss of colonial territories. With the growing dis- tance of imperial domination and the history of colonialism, the European powers also got the chance to assume a reflexive distance from themselves. They could learn from the perspective of the defeated to perceive themselves in the dubious role of victors who are called to account for the violence of a forcible and uproot- ing process of modernization. This could support the rejection of Eurocentrism, and inspire the Kantian hope for a global domestic policy.

(Translated by Max Pensky)

NOTE

This article originally appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 May 2003.

The Assassination of Abraham Lincoln

Sample Topic #1: The Assassination of Abraham Lincoln

On April 14, 1865, five days after the Confederate surrender at Appomattox effectively ended the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln was fatally shot as he and his wife were watching a play at Ford’s Theatre in Washington, DC.

Depiction of John Wilkes Booth leaning forward to shoot President Abraham Lincoln as he watches Our American Cousin at Ford’s Theater in Washington, D.C. (Click button for citation) 

Lincoln’s assassin was John Wilkes Booth, a well-known actor and Confederate sympathizer. Booth headed a conspiracy that aimed to decapitate the Union government; Vice President Andrew Johnson and Secretary of State William Seward, the next two figures in the line of Presidential succession, were also marked for death that night, but both survived.

Lincoln’s death had profound implications for post-Civil War America. In elevating to the Presidency Andrew Johnson, a poorly educated Southern populist Democrat who clashed repeatedly with Congressional Republicans over the course of Reconstruction, it set the stage for another century of political and legal conflicts over the civil rights of African Americans.

The following sources will give you some background on Lincoln’s assassination and its aftermath. Read them over—along with any other articles on this subject that you might like to consult—and then formulate research questions that would be appropriate for an analysis of some aspect of this historical event:

Module 1 Short Responses – Question 5

If you had to write a paper on the Lincoln assassination, what would you like to know more about? Create three research questions that would be appropriate for a historical analysis essay, keeping in mind the characteristics of a critical research question. The three questions can be related, or they can address different aspects of the topic.

2)

Sample Topic #2: The Passage of Title IX

On June 23, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon signed into law a bill called the Education Amendments of 1972. One little-noticed section of that bill—called, in accordance with standard legislative terminology, Title IX (Nine)—addressed the issue of gender discrimination in higher education:

Senator Birch Bayh exercises with Title IX athletes at Purdue University. (Click button for citation) “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”

Although hardly anyone foresaw it at the time, those 37 words would trigger a revolution in women’s athletics. The principal intent of Title IX’s sponsors was to prohibit sex discrimination in programs and activities at any college or university that received federal funds, but the law’s long-term effect has been to foster the explosive growth of women’s sports.

Back in 1972, only about 300,000 girls played high-school and college sports; in 2010, more than three million did. The clear reason: Title IX and the dramatic expansion of college-level athletic opportunities that it brought about.

The law has created its share of controversy. Critics claim that, by requiring a proportional increase in the number of women’s sports programs, the law has forced some schools to compensate by eliminating non-revenue producing men’s programs, such as wrestling and swimming. Others argue that, as women’s sports have “gone big time,” more coaching positions have gone to men rather than to women.

What cannot be argued is that Title IX radically changed the nature of women’s athletics in America. The following sources will give you some background on Title IX; read them over (along with any other articles on this subject that you might like to consult) and then formulate research questions that would be appropriate for an analysis of some aspect of this topic:

What cannot be argued is that Title IX radically changed the nature of women’s athletics in America. The following sources will give you some background on Title IX; read them over (along with any other articles on this subject that you might like to consult) and then formulate research questions that would be appropriate for an analysis of some aspect of this topic:

Module 1 Short Responses – Question 6

If you had to write a paper on Title IX, what would you like to know more about? Create three research questions that would be appropriate for a historical analysis essay, keeping in mind the characteristics of a critical research question. The three questions can be related, or they can address different aspects of the topic.

Empires in World History, Chapter 5 “Beyond the Mediterranean

Four questions to three readings: read and then briefly respond to each of these questions in three or four sentences.

Below are the questions and the reading that will be associated to that question.

Empires in World History, Chapter 1 “Imperial Trajectories” 

Bodies in Contact, (Introduction only)

Empires in World History, Chapter 5 “Beyond the Mediterranean

  1. [Empires in World History, Introduction “Imperial Trajectories”] In your own words, how do Burbank and Cooper characterize and justify using empires as a way to view world history?
  2. [Bodies in Contact, “Introduction: Bodies, Empires, and World Histories”] In your own words, why do the authors (Ballantyne and Burton) feel that by focusing on bodies (specifically colonial encounters with female bodies) we can provide more depth to our understanding of world history?
  3. [Bodies in Contact, “Introduction: Bodies, Empires, and World Histories”] In your view, what are some of the benefits of viewing world history through the lens of empires? Bodies? What are some of the limitations?
  4. [Empires in World History, “Beyond the Mediterranean”] Briefly compare and contrast the Spanish and Ottoman Empires as discussed in this chapter.  In what ways were they similar?  How were they different? 

    Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton

    Introduction: Bodies, Empires,

    and World Histories

    We live in a world profoundly shaped by cross-cultural en-counters, slavery, colonization, and migration. These forceshave not only been central in determining the distribution of wealth and power at a global level, but they have also molded the world’s demographic profile, dictated where national boundaries have been inscribed, influenced the legal regimes that govern people’s lives, and shaped the ways di√erent ethnic, religious, racial, and national com- munities relate to each other. The impact of colonialism and the results of empire building are not restricted to ‘‘high politics’’ and state practices, but also shape everyday life at a global level, influencing the languages we speak, the clothes we wear, the food we eat, the music we listen to, and the arts and culture we are inspired by. The legacies of slavery, empires, and mobility are frequently painful, but they are inescapable: in many ways, these legacies are at the heart of what it is to be modern, what it is to be human, at the start of the twenty-first century.

    As a distinctive approach to the past, one that focuses on cross-cultural encounters, institutions, and ideologies and the integrative power of vari- ous types of networks, world history allows us to scrutinize the diverse forces that have brought various communities into contact, concert, and conflict. World history has enjoyed renewed popularity in recent years, in part because economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and other stu- dents of the present moment are increasingly interested in how areas of the globe that were once thought to be distinct have actually been inter- connected for a very long time. It is no longer possible, or even desirable,

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    2 Introduction

    to uncritically think in terms of ‘‘the West,’’ ‘‘Asia,’’ ‘‘Europe,’’ or ‘‘the Third World’’—not only because each of those categories tends to ho- mogenize the geographical region it evokes, but equally because all of those places have been interdependent from the fourteenth century on- ward, if not before. Scholars have been at work investigating what many of us in the first decades of the twenty-first century take for granted in the present: that because of trade, migration, revolution, war, religion, and travel, goods, people, ideas, and civilizations themselves are all the result of transnational processes. In other words—and to use a common buzz- word of the moment—they are the result of ‘‘globalization.’’ Here we agree with Laura Briggs that the term globalization is often ‘‘a placeholder, a word with no exact meaning that we use in our contested e√orts to describe the successors to development and colonialism.’’∞ Current de- bates on globalization emphasize some of the same processes of intercon- nection and mutual dependence that practitioners of world history have examined in the past twenty years. Their teaching and research have sug- gested that far from being fixed within borders or limited to local commu- nities and national states, many of the world’s most important com- modities, political systems, and spiritual practices are the consequence of diverse cultural encounters over time and space—so much so that we now have to rethink terms like ‘‘European progress,’’ ‘‘Chinese trade,’’ and ‘‘Western Christianity.’’ Coming to these subjects from the perspective of world history allows us to appreciate how they came to be identified with such geographical precision. It also underscores the limits of understand- ing them merely as insular national or territorially based phenomena. World history, in short, enables us to take a global view of ostensibly local events, systems, and cultures and to reevaluate the histories of connection and rupture that have left their mark, in turn, on our contemporary condition.

    The influence of societies on each other across regions and, in some cases, across the globe does not mean, of course, that they have been uniform or anything like united, even at the same moments in history. This is in large part because empires and imperial ambitions have been among the most powerful sponsors of ‘‘cultural contact’’—and of the processes of intermixture, borrowing, fusion, and appropriation that such contact has given rise to over the course of centuries. So, for exam- ple, European cultures have been immeasurably shaped by their encoun- ters with African, Indian, and Mesoamerican peoples in ways that make

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    Bodies, Empires, and World Histories 3

    Europe itself one of the greatest examples of transnationality in the world. But the often violent imposition of European modernity on ‘‘subject peoples’’ in the form of technology, capitalist labor practices, and the Christian civilizing mission has meant that cultures on the receiving end of such contact have been in a reactive and at times defensive posture with respect to dominant forms of ‘‘global’’ influence. Nor are such imperial strategies unique to the ‘‘West.’’ Both the Han and the Mughal empires produced similar forms of colonial encounter with the indigenous com- munities they came into contact with, models of which later, Western imperial advocates (notably the British) were acutely aware. The impact of empires on global processes and transformations has thus been con- siderable, as well as historically significant. That is why this collection focuses on the role of imperial ideologies—their agents and their en- emies, their collaborators and their resisters—in helping to shape world history.

    A few caveats are in order. We use the term ‘‘empire’’ quite loosely here, intending it to mean webs of trade, knowledge, migration, military power, and political intervention that allowed certain communities to assert their influence and sovereignty over other groups.≤ In other words, these ‘‘imperial webs’’ functioned as systems of exchange, mobility, ap- propriation, and extraction, fashioned to enable the empire-building power to exploit the natural resources, manufactured goods, or valued skills of the subordinated group. In o√ering the image of the web, we want to emphasize interconnected networks of contact and exchange without downplaying the very real systems of power and domination such networks had the power to transport. The web’s intricate strands carried with them and helped to create hierarchies of race, class, religion, and gender, among others, thereby casting the conquerors as superior and the conquered as subordinate, with important and lingering conse- quences for the communities they touched. We do not wish to suggest that empires functioned as colossal juggernauts, razing everything in their paths and putting into place systems of domination that were una√ected by ‘‘native’’ agency or uncontested by indigenous interests. Indeed, the image of the web also conveys something of the double nature of the imperial system. Empires, like webs, were fragile and prone to crises where important threads were broken or structural nodes destroyed, yet also dynamic, being constantly remade and reconfigured through con- certed thought and e√ort.

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    4 Introduction

    As the essays that follow amply demonstrate, empires have not simply been carriers or enablers of global processes, they have in turn spawned new hybrid forms of economic activity, political practice, and cultural performance that take on lives of their own—in part because of the ways colonized peoples and cultures have acted on or resisted imperial political and social forms. Nor do we want to imply that all world history can be reduced simply to the fact of empires. Not only does such a claim stake too much ground for imperial histories, but it is in danger of blinding us to stories large and small which cannot always be glimpsed through the archives that empires leave behind. But we do believe that targeting em- pires is one way of making sense of world history because it requires us to pay attention to big structural events and changes as well as to ask what impact they had on microprocesses and the historical subjects who lived with and through them. Tracking empires in a global context is, in other words, one way of reimagining the world’s history so that both its monu- mental quality and its ultimately fragmented character can be captured simultaneously.

    Why the focus on bodies as a means of accessing the colonial encoun- ters in world history? Quite simply, we are seeking a way to dramatize how, why, and under what conditions women and gender can be made visible in world history—a challenge on many levels. Women do not tend to enter the primary source materials that remain from imperial and colo- nial archives because, for the most part, they did not hold positions of o≈cial power. This absence has meant that it is di≈cult to see them, and to understand their historical roles, in world civilizations. There are ex- ceptions, of course. Queens and elite women can be recaptured from obscurity through texts and visual images; they dot the landscape of world history textbooks and even some books devoted to women of the past across the globe. But this leaves us with a less than satisfying view of how women experienced the movement of history, how dominant and indigenous regimes saw them, and what role gender has played in helping to shape civilizational attitudes as well as transnational movements and processes.

    What is striking, however, is the extent to which women’s bodies (and, to a lesser degree, men’s) have been a subject of concern, scrutiny, anxiety, and surveillance in a variety of times and places across the world. Whether it was native Indian women’s sexuality that caused concern for a coloniz- ing Catholic Church in colonial Mexico or that of Japanese women under

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    Bodies, Empires, and World Histories 5

    postwar U.S. military occupation, the female body has gotten—and kept—the attention of imperial o≈cials in ways that demonstrate how crucial its management was believed to be for social order and political stability. The stakes of this stability were perhaps especially high for impe- rial powers, which were de facto trying to impose specific political forms and cultural practices on often unwilling populations. What this means is that the body can be read by us as evidence of how women were viewed by, and how gender assumptions undergirded, empires in all their com- plexity. Some of the essays in this collection focus on the body very ex- plicitly, as in Patrick McDevitt’s essay on contact sport as a national pas- time in colonial Ireland and Hyun Sook Kim’s on the fate of ‘‘comfort women’’ in the context of World War II. Other essays use the body as a metaphor for citizenship and the nation, as in Elisa Camiscioli’s work on interwar French immigration controls as expressions of concern about the racial purity of the ‘‘national body.’’ Others focus on examples of cultural contact through bodies literally in motion, like Siobhan Lambert Hurley’s essay on the begam of Bhopal and Carter Vaughn Findley’s research on the Ottoman traveler and writer Ahmed Midhat. Still others, like Melani McAlister’s essay that begins with Muhammad Ali, show how famous bodies can be used as a jumping-o√ point for seeing connections between local communities (African Americans during the cold war) and transnational events with global significance (the Arab-Israeli War and the international Islamicist movement).

    The volume is divided into three sections. The first section, ‘‘Thresh- olds of Modernity: Mapping Genders,’’ focuses on the place of race, gen- der, and sexuality in empire building during the early modern period. Although the essays range over disparate geographic and social contexts, they underscore the centrality of the body in the articulation of imperial ideologies and in the often fraught dynamics of cross-cultural contact. More generally still, the contributions in this first section reveal how the operation of early modern empires began to reconfigure understandings of the body at a global level, as the languages of gender and race grew in authority and imperial systems began to ‘‘globalize’’ and universalize legal regimes, religious beliefs, and understandings of sickness and death. The essays that make up the second section of the volume, ‘‘Global Empires, Local Encounters,’’ examine a wide array of very specific local colonial encounters from the close of the eighteenth century to the middle decades of the twentieth century. These essays chart the diverse locations where

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    6 Introduction

    understandings of the body were defined and contested: from the sports fields of Ireland to Australian courtrooms, from the prairies of the Ameri- can Midwest to the clubs of colonial India, from swimming holes in Mozambique to the British Columbia frontier. The contributions to this section foreground the ways the boundaries of race and gender were negotiated, policed, and reinforced in an age of colonial modernity and demonstrate the processes that increasingly undermined the flexibility and fluidity that characterized many earlier social formations.

    The third section of the volume, ‘‘The Mobility of Politics and the Politics of Mobility,’’ focuses on the battles over empire from the final decade of the nineteenth century to the late twentieth century. While many of the essays examine the politics of anticolonialism and national- ism, they all reflect on the ways our modern world was shaped by greater mobility, whether in travel, migration, the flow of ideas and information, war, or imperial expansion itself. The fierce debates over imperialism reconstructed in this section turn on the body, how it was managed, how it could be represented, and how the brutalities visited on particular types of bodies should be remembered or understood. The collection closes with a final essay that reflects on the volume as a whole and that uses the notion of ‘‘bodies in contact’’ to map some future directions for both world history research and teaching.

    the essays collected here have, then, a dual purpose. First, they emphasize the centrality of bodies—raced, sexed, classed, and ethnicized bodies—as sites through which imperial and colonial power was imag- ined and exercised. By thus foregrounding the body, this volume marks a fundamental reconception of the nature and workings of empires: we focus on the material e√ects of geopolitical systems in everyday spaces, family life, and on-the-ground cultural encounters. Rather than privileg- ing the operations of the Foreign O≈ce or gentlemanly capitalists, for example, this attention to bodies means that the plantation, the theater, the home, the street, the school, the club, and the marketplace are now visible as spaces where people can be seen to have experienced modes of imperial and colonial power. Although the past two decades have wit- nessed a tremendous boom in scholarly production on colonialism and empire, with feminist historians taking the lead in the project of recover- ing the experiences of women and other ‘‘others,’’ this research has not received the attention it should in world history textbooks and hence in

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    Bodies, Empires, and World Histories 7

    world history courses. There, high politics and commerce still dominate accounts of empire in ways that certainly remain useful. Women and gender are now scrupulously attended to but most often not in ways that underscore their constitutive role in the shaping of global power or cross- cultural social organization.≥ Long after women’s history has moved be- yond the ‘‘add women and stir’’ formula, world history surveys still tend to take an additive approach, so that each unit ‘‘covers’’ women, but discretely; rare enough is the approach taken by Peter Stearns, which emphasizes ‘‘particular historical episodes’’ in tension with ‘‘higher-level analysis of patterns over time.’’∂ And, as shall be discussed in more detail below, scarcely any attention is paid to masculinity as a cultural (let alone a political) category.∑ This is especially regrettable because colonial proj- ects and their processes were frequently believed to throw white male bodies into crisis (making them vulnerable to disease, insanity, and hy- bridization), and the supposed ‘‘femininity’’ of colonized men was fre- quently used as a political tool to justify their exclusion from positions of power and as a means of justifying their colonization in the first place.∏

    The abstractions, omissions, and facile categorizations that tend to follow from a historiographical literature that overlooks gendered subjectivities and experiences need qualification and elaboration. This is all the more important because the quest for generalization can take people—espe- cially women, children, and ‘‘natives’’—out of the story, thereby often relegating human agency in its particulars to the margins of historical understanding.

    This is not to say, of course, that women, gender, and sexuality repre- sent the full extent of what bodies in history can and do signify. Bodies evoke birth and death, work and play, disease and fitness; they carry germs and fluids as well as a variety of political, social, and cultural mean- ings; they are the grounds of political economies and the pretext for intrusion, discipline, and punishment at both the individual and the col- lective levels. Although the essays that make up this collection treat sub- jects as diverse as slavery and travel, ecclesiastical colonialism and military occupation, marriage and property, nationalism and football, immigra- tion and temperance, we do not propose to o√er anything like a global history of the body.π For our purposes, the gendered bodies invoked by the authors collected here serve as entrées into larger discussions of how the body can give shape to themes of relevance to world history, as well as how they can reorient that project so that it encompasses di√erent bodies

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    8 Introduction

    of evidence.∫ Of equal importance is the opportunity to bring into view research published in venues that may be ignored or underutilized by European or American audiences, such as the Indian Journal of Gender Studies, the Journal of African History, and Australian Feminist Studies. In doing so we can better appreciate both the applicability of Euro- American theoretical models of gender and the body to diverse geograph- ical sites and the very real limits of those frameworks for historicizing ‘‘global’’ realities. Bodies in Contact, in short, enables readers to access some of the most recent and significant scholarship on women, gender, and the colonial encounter so that students with a variety of disciplinary interests can appreciate the tensions between macro and micro perspec- tives on the globe—and so that the constitutive impact of gender and sexuality in all their historical complexity can be more fully appreciated.

    Second, the volume insists on the centrality of imperial and colonial bodies in the circuits of global politics, capital, and culture. This commit- ment stems from our conviction that historically, empires have been con- stitutive of global systems, but that in contemporary debates about how to think and teach world history and globalization the centrality of impe- rial power and knowledge is often excised or downplayed or occluded, a situation that may or may not change with the arrival of new forms of U.S. imperialism at work in the global arena. Collectively these essays map the transformative power of imperial systems and the ways in which the development of global empires have been entwined historically with bodies in contact: that is, bodies not just involved in intimate personal, sexual, or social relations but bodies in motion, bodies in subjection, bodies in struggle, bodies in action. This move e√ectively recasts readers’ understanding of the contemporary world, where empires are clearly not over, even and especially in this particular global moment. Each of the essays we have chosen makes visible the ideological work of imperial or colonial mentalities in a specific moment and a specific set of locations, demonstrating both the need for historical contingency when creating global narratives and the fundamentally transnational operation of colo- nial power. Once again, feminist scholarship has been crucial to recent developments in comparative, imperial, and world histories, but in ways that have not been easily accessible to students in the classroom.Ω Bodies in Contact thereby o√ers students of globalization an opportunity to appre- ciate the role of empires in shaping world systems by tracking embodied experiences across historical time and cultural space. It also makes recent

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    Bodies, Empires, and World Histories 9

    scholarship available to instructors, who can then test it against the over- arching claims and theories made in the textbooks that are inevitably used in large courses. This, we hope, creates a series of heretofore unavailable pedagogical opportunities by setting up supposedly ‘‘small’’ histories that may ratify some established syntheses, question others, and perhaps even chip away at the long-standing distinction between big and small pro- cesses of historical continuity and change.∞≠ In the process, Bodies in Con- tact also enables students to interrogate the totalizing narratives that can arise under the rubric of ‘‘world history’’ and to ask when, why, and under what conditions the global is a desirable category of historical analysis.∞∞

    If this collection brings together a series of essays that foreground race, gender, and sexuality in ways that challenge the traditional foci of global narratives, many of the essays reflect perhaps the most important contri- bution of recent world history research: the critique of long-established narratives of ‘‘the rise of the West.’’ The emergence of world history as a distinctive approach to the past in the early twentieth century coincided with a moment of European paramountcy and a widespread faith in the West’s civilizing mission. Within such a context, it was hardly surprising that early world histories, written by H. G. Wells, Oswald Spengler, and Arnold Toynbee, played a central role in consolidating Europe and North America at the heart of understandings of global history and articulating a powerful narrative that molded the complex, fragmentary, and hetero- geneous nature of the human past into a striking account of the creation, consolidation, and extension of the power of the ‘‘West.’’∞≤ Even as world history slowly became professionalized after World War II, this narrative continued to provide a key framework for understandings of the global past in undergraduate lecture halls, graduate seminar rooms, and faculty lounges. In turn, this model was fortified by sociologists and area studies specialists who promulgated world system and dependency theories that firmly located Europe and North America as the ‘‘core’’ of the modern world.∞≥ In 1963 W. H. McNeill published his paradigmatic The Rise of the West, a work that had sold over 75,000 copies by 1990 and that continues to be widely used in college classrooms and to attract a wide public audience. The subtitle of McNeill’s work (A History of the Human Com- munity) reduces human history to a narrative of the ‘‘rise of the West’’ and underscores the profoundly teleological assumptions that shaped world history in the 1960s and 1970s.∞∂

    Such assumptions do linger today, but research undertaken by world

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    10 Introduction

    historians since the early 1980s has explicitly challenged the primacy at- tached to Europe or the West as the prime historical agent of cross- cultural integration. The work of Janet Abu-Lughod, for example, called into question the belief that Europeans were central in driving cross- cultural exchanges, by drawing attention to the complex circuits of long- distance trade that integrated Eurasia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.∞∑ This emphasis on the importance of changes taking place in central Asia has been extended by other scholars who have identified the ‘‘Mongol explosion’’ in this period as marking the emergence of the first truly ‘‘world empire.’’∞∏ Most important, however, it has been the histo- rians who work on China and its connections with inner Asia, Southeast Asia, the rest of East Asia, and Europe who have transformed our under- standings of the basic pattern of world history. At the same time, research on the economic history of South Asia has both revised an image of a corrupt and weakening Mughal empire inherited from British colonial discourse and has emphasized that the Indian Ocean was the center of a series of interlocking commercial networks that reached out as far as East Africa and Indonesia. Europeans were latecomers to this cosmopolitan commercial world and their arrival caused little concern to the Jewish, Arab, Gujarati, Tamil, Malay, and Chinese traders who dominated the bazaars and shipping routes of the region. It was only as a result of the militarization of trade during the eighteenth century and the growing colonial aspirations of European East India Companies that Europeans gradually came to dominate the long-established markets and commercial hubs around the Indian Ocean.

    In e√ect, this work on Asian economic history and Asia’s trade with Europe has both called into question the exceptional status so frequently accorded to Europe and recast our understandings of the chronology of world history.∞π One of the crucial debates that continues to exercise world historians is the relationship between Europe’s rise, imperialism, and the emergence of global capitalism. While some historians, such as David Landes, continue to attribute Europe’s rise to power to supposedly intrinsically European cultural qualities (‘‘work, thrift, honesty, patience, tenacity’’), recent research has tended to underscore the centrality of im- perialism in the New World in both allowing Europe to escape from its ecological constraints (by making a host of new natural resources and valuable commodities available to Europe) and constituting the very na- ture of European culture itself.∞∫ Moreover, where McNeill might have

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    Bodies, Empires, and World Histories 11

    given shape to history by discerning the rising dominance of the West, what has emerged out of recent world historical research is an image of a multicentered world during the period between 1250 and 1800, when China was perhaps the single most powerful region. In the 1800s, it seems that Europe did exercise increasing power at a global level as a result of the military-fiscal revolution that consolidated its military advantage over non-European nations, its harnessing of its natural resources, especially coal, to its industrial revolution, and a sustained period of imperial expan- sion beginning from the 1760s.∞Ω

    Of course, the spectacular rise of European empires from the middle of the eighteenth century was also intimately connected with the ‘‘hollowing out’’ of the Safavid and Mughal empires and the ability of European agents to turn these older imperial structures to their own advantage.≤≠ At the same time, the consolidation of imperial authority at the margins of Europe (especially in Ireland and the Mediterranean) and the thrust of European powers in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific incorpo- rated vast territories into the political, commercial, and religious ambit of European colonial systems. There is no doubt that this new age of global imperialism marks a profound disjuncture in world history, as the pull of European markets, the practices of imperial/colonial states, the ‘‘univer- sal’’ languages of science and statistics, and the international reach of missionary organizations fashioned new and profoundly uneven forms of interconnection and interdependence.≤∞ Many of the essays in this collec- tion trace these transformations, reconstructing how specific colonial en- counters produced understandings of gender, race, and sexuality and re- vealing the ways these local exchanges were increasingly assimilated into broader imperial debates over cultural di√erence. The tremendous variety of human social arrangements remained a key concern of the scientists, historians, and theorists of empire in the mid-nineteenth century. And although a great range of cultural variation remained, the reach of Euro- pean empires rendered much of this complexity legible through the (dis- torting) languages of race and gender.

    But the thrust of much recent work is that European ascendancy was never uncontested and Europe’s position as the global center of imperial power was relatively short-lived. The United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan emerged as both industrial forces and imperial powers around the turn of the twentieth century, and Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Bombay emerged as new commercial, cultural, technological, and

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    12 Introduction

    migratory centers. World history research on migration, economics, em- pires, and ideologies suggests that history cannot be imagined as an inex- orable march to Western dominance and global homogeneity, but is a more complex and ambiguous set of interwoven and overlapping pro- cesses driven by a diverse array of groups from a variety of di√erent locations.≤≤

    These arguments frame this volume, and in various ways, the essays in this collection reinforce this emergent image of a multicentered, even a de-centered, world, evoking a fluidity that gender and the body, especially when read as performative categories, contingent for its manifestations as much on space as on time, can help us immeasurably to appreciate. While many of the authors pay close attention to the uneven power relations of colonialism and the profound inequalities created by European imperial systems, they explore the imperial projects carried out by non-European powers, reconstruct the ability of subaltern groups to challenge colonial authority and puncture colonial ideologies, and map the sophisticated cultural complexes created by peoples at the supposed ‘‘periphery’’ of empires.

    Equally important, however, this collection foregrounds the body in a way that world history scholarship to date has resisted. World history, at least in its dominant institutional form, has not only clung to an ‘‘addi- tive’’ view of women’s history but has also generally remained insulated from (if not resistant to) new directions in cultural history, especially gender history. As a result, ‘‘masculinity’’ is an analytical category that remains, for all intents and purposes, unheard of in the field. Reconstruct- ing the variable and culturally contingent historical forms of masculinity, and their relationship to economics, politics, culture, religion, class, and sexuality, is a project that has only just begun. Rosalind O’Hanlon’s essay on imperial masculinities in Mughal north India, Patrick McDevitt’s ex- amination of the place of sports in Catholic masculinity in Ireland, and Joseph Alter’s examination of celibacy and the place of masculine con- straint in Indian nationalist thought suggest the important insights into the place of gendered bodies and embodied subjectivities in empire build- ing, anticolonial resistance and nationalist ideologies that critical histories of masculinity o√er. Much of the pioneering work in the field, especially with regard to modern imperial masculinities, has suggested that the male-dominated archives that are the stock in trade of the world historian can be read in new and interesting ways. Rather than searching only for

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    Bodies, Empires, and World Histories 13

    notable women or seeking to access an unmediated female subjectivity, we can assemble a richer understanding of the operation of gender in world history by examining the ways these archives articulate competing visions of and anxieties about masculinity, while attending equally to the pressures that class, racial, ethnic, and religious a≈liations have histor- ically exerted on it as both an embodied and a performative articulation of identity.

    Whether interpreted broadly or narrowly, then, the category ‘‘bodies in contact’’ can enable us to appreciate histories we might not otherwise have seen and to make visible connections between the colonial and the global that scholars are, in some instances, just beginning to make into ‘‘history.’’ As important, recovering women and gender in world history not only permits us to see them as historical subjects, it also means that we have to understand empires as gendered projects—endeavors in which, it turns out, women and gender mattered tremendously. Our focus on bodies, then, reorients both imperial history and world history by rooting the phenomenon of ‘‘encounter’’ in a gendered, sexualized context, and often throws light on practices of daily life and experience that are other- wise obscured. As important, it allows us to reimagine the global past as a space of contact between women and men, between ‘‘woman’’ and colo- nizer, between colonizing men and cultures that were often considered ‘‘e√eminate’’ by imperial observers. The fact that these gendered relation- ships recur fairly consistently across empires, across the world—as ex- hibited from the early modern period down to the late twentieth century, from China to the Americas and in a variety of locations in between— suggests that it is a subject that undergraduates need to learn about if they are to have as full an understanding of world history as possible. This collection represents a beginning in that direction; we hope it will stimu- late debate, discussion, and even perhaps a new generation of historians interested in further exploring the relations between bodies, empires, and the worlds of the past.

    Notes

    ∞. Laura Briggs, Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 1. ≤. This vision of empires and imperial history is developed in Tony Ballantyne, Orien- talism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave-

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    14 Introduction

    Macmillan, 2001). More recently, a slightly di√erent vision of the ‘‘web’’ has been harnessed to world history in J. R. McNeill and William H. McNeill, The Human Web: A Bird’s-eye View of World History (New York: Norton, 2003). ≥. One recent exception is Robert Tignor et al., Worlds Together, Worlds Apart (New York: Norton 2002). ∂. Peter N. Stearns, Gender in World History (London: Routledge, 2000), 4. ∑. For a discussion of this problem, see Margaret Strobel, ‘‘Women’s History, Gender History, and European Colonialism,’’ in Colonialism and the Modern World: Selected Studies, ed. Gregory Blue, Martin Bunton, and Ralph Crozier (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 51–68. ∏. Many thanks to Adele Perry for this point. π. For an extremely compelling version of this project, see Valerie Traub, ‘‘The Global- Body,’’ in Early Modern Visual Culture: Representation, Race and Empire in Renaissance England, ed. Peter Erickson and Clark Hulse (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 44–97. ∫. We are grateful to Clare Crowston for urging this point. Ω. For one exception, see Sarah Shaver Hughes and Brady Hughes, eds., Women in World History, 2 vols. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). ∞≠. See, for example, Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984). ∞∞. For more on teleologies of globalization from a feminist perspective, see Jean Allman and Antoinette Burton, eds., ‘‘Destination Globalization? Women, Gender and Comparative Colonial Histories in the New Millennium,’’ Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 4, 1 (2003) http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cch/. ∞≤. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (London: Allen and Unwin, 1922); Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, 10 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934– 1954); H. G. Wells, Outline of History (London: Cassell, 1920). Spengler certainly recognized the significance of non-Western civilizations, but for him only ‘‘Western Civilization’’ had fulfilled its potential, and the crisis that he diagnosed in the early twentieth century reflected a crisis born out of the decline of ‘‘Western Civilization.’’ ∞≥. For a bracing account of the stakes of American civilization for 1990s politics, see Thomas C. Patterson, Inventing Western Civilization (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1997), 9–15. For an equally compelling analysis of Western Civ textbooks, see Daniel A. Segal, ‘‘Western Civ and the Staging of History in American Higher Edu- cation,’’ American Historical Review 105, 3 (2000); also available at http://www .historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/105.3/ah000770.html. ∞∂. McNeill reflects critically on the ‘‘Rise of the West’’ model in his essays: ‘‘The Rise of the West after Twenty-five Years,’’ Journal of World History 1, 1 (1990): 1–21 and ‘‘World History and the Rise and Fall of the West,’’ Journal of World History 9, 2 (1998): 215– 236. In J. R. McNeill and William H. McNeill, The Human Web, his work is fashioning a new understanding of the multiple forms of contact and interdependence that have shaped human history. ∞∑. Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System a.d. 1250–1350 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

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    Bodies, Empires, and World Histories 15

    ∞∏. See S. A. M. Adshead, China in World History (Macmillan, 1987) and Central Asia in World History (New York: Macmillan, 1993); David Christian, A History of Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). ∞π. Much of this work is synthesized in the Cambridge History of China. For a collection of work that explores the connections between the development of the Chinese econ- omy and global trade, see Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, eds., Metals and Monies in an Emerging Global Economy (Brookfield, Vt.: Variorum, 1997). Also see the provocative arguments forwarded in Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, ‘‘Born with a ‘Silver Spoon’: The Origin of World Trade in 1571,’’ Journal of World History 6, 2 (1995): 201–221. On South Asia and the Indian Ocean, see Satish Chandra, The Indian Ocean: Explorations in History, Commerce and Politics (New Delhi: Sage, 1987); K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Kenneth McPherson, The Indian Ocean: A History of People and the Sea (Delhi: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1993). ∞∫. David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (New York: Norton, 1998), 523; compare the works listed in the next two notes. ∞Ω. Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, The World That Trade Created: Culture, Society, and the World Economy, 1400–the Present (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); and the essays in the forum on the ‘‘great divergence’’ in Itinerario 24, 3/4 (2000). ≤≠. See C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780–1830 (White Plains, N.Y.: Longman, 1989) and Empire and Information: Intelligence Gather- ing and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996). ≤∞. C. A. Bayly, ‘‘The First Age of Global Imperialism, c. 1760–1830,’’ Journal of Im- perial and Commonwealth History 26, 2 (1998): 28–47; Tony Ballantyne, ‘‘Empire, Knowledge and Culture: From Proto-globalization to Modern Globalization,’’ in Globalization in World History, ed. A. G. Hopkins (London: Pimlico, 2001), 115–140. ≤≤. See, for example, Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990); Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, ‘‘World History in a Global Age,’’ American Historical Review 100, 4 (October 1995): 1034–1060; Akira Iriye, ‘‘The Internationalization of History,’’ Amer- ican Historical Review 94, 1 (February 1989): 1–10; Adam McKeown, Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change: Peru, Chicago, Hawaii, 1900–1936 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

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