What Can You Say About Mao Zedong’s Vision Of A Revolutionary Movement?

Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung

ANALYSIS OF THE CLASSES IN CHINESE SOCIETY

March 1926

This article was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to combat two deviations then to be found in the Party. The exponents of the first deviation, represented by Chen Tu-hsiu, were concerned only with co-operation with the Kuomintang and forgot about the peasants; this was Right opportunism. The exponents of the second deviation, represented by Chang Kuo-tao, were concerned only with the labour movement, and likewise forgot about the peasants; this was “Left” opportunism. Both were aware that their own strength was inadequate, but neither of them knew where to seek reinforcements or where to obtain allies on a mass scale. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the peasantry was the staunchest and numerically the largest ally of the Chinese proletariat, and thus solved the problem of who was the chief ally in the Chinese revolution. Moreover, he saw that the national bourgeoisie was a vacillating class and predicted that it would disintegrate during the upsurge of the revolution, with its right-wing going over to the side of imperialism. This was borne out by the events of 1927.

Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution. The basic reason why all previous revolutionary struggles in China achieved so little was their failure to unite with real friends in order to attack real enemies. A revolutionary party is the guide of the masses, and no revolution ever succeeds when the revolutionary party leads them astray. To ensure that we will definitely achieve success in our revolution and will not lead the masses astray, we must pay attention to uniting with our real friends in order to attack our real enemies. To distinguish real friends from real enemies, we must make a general analysis of the economic status of the various classes in Chinese society and of their respective attitudes towards the revolution.

What is the condition of each of the classes in Chinese society?

The landlord class and the comprador class.[1] In economically backward and semi-colonial China the landlord class and the comprador class are wholly appendages of the international bourgeoisie, depending upon imperialism for their survival ant growth. These classes represent the most backward and most reactionary relations of production in China and hinder the development of her productive forces. Their existence is utterly incompatible with the aims of the Chinese revolution. The big landlord and big comprador classes in particular always side with imperialism and constitute an extreme counterrevolutionary group. Their political representatives are the Étatistes [2] and the right-wing of the Kuomintang.

The middle bourgeoisie. This class represents the capitalist relations of production in China in town and country. The middle bourgeoisie, by which is meant chiefly the national bourgeoisie, [3] is inconsistent in its attitude towards the Chinese revolution: they feel the need for revolution and favour the revolutionary movement against imperialism and the warlords when they are smarting under the blows of foreign capital and the oppression of the warlords, but they become suspicious of the revolution when they sense that, with the militant participation of the proletariat at home and the active support of the international proletariat abroad, the revolution is threatening the hope of their class to attain the status of a big bourgeoisie. Politically, they stand for the establishment of a state under the rule of a single class, the national bourgeoisie. A self-styled true disciple of Tai Chi-tao [4] wrote in the Chen Pao, [5] Peking, “Raise your left fist to knock down the imperialists and your right to knock down the Communists.” These words depict the dilemma and anxiety of this class. It is against interpreting the Kuomintang’s Principle of the People’s Livelihood according to the theory of class struggle, and it opposes the Kuomintang’s alliance with Russia and the admission of Communists [6] and left-wingers. But its attempt to establish a state under the rule of the national bourgeoisie is quite impracticable, because the present world situation is such that the two major forces, revolution and counter-revolution, are locked in final struggle. Each has hoisted a huge banner: one is the red banner of revolution held aloft by the Third International as the rallying point for all the oppressed classes of the world, the other is the white banner of counterrevolution held aloft by the League of Nations as the rallying point for all the counter-revolutionaries of the world. The intermediate classes are bound to disintegrate quickly, some sections turning left to join the revolution, others turning right to join the counter-revolution; there is no room for them to remain “independent”. Therefore the idea cherished by China’s middle bourgeoisie of an “independent” revolution in which it would play the primary role is a mere illusion.

The petty bourgeoisie. Included in this category are the owner-peasants, [7] the master handicraftsmen, the lower levels of the intellectuals–students, primary and secondary school teachers, lower government functionaries, office clerks, small lawyers–and the small traders. Both because of its size and class character, this class deserves very close attention. The owner-peasants and the master handicraftsmen are both engaged in small-scale production. Although all strata of this class have the same petty-bourgeois economic status, they fall into three different sections. The first section consists of those who have some surplus money or grain, that is, those who, by manual or mental labour, earn more each year than they consume for their own support. Such people very much want to get rich and are devout worshipers of Marshal Chao; [8] while they have no illusions about amassing great fortunes, they invariably desire to climb up into the middle bourgeoisie. Their mouths water copiously when they see the respect in which those small moneybags are held. People of this sort are timid, afraid of government officials, and also a little afraid of the revolution. Since they are quite close to the middle bourgeoisie in economic status, they have a lot of faith in its propaganda and are suspicious of the revolution. This section is a minority among the petty bourgeoisie and constitutes its right-wing. The second section consists of those who in the main are economically self-supporting. They are quite different from the people in the first section; they also want to get rich, but Marshal Chao never lets them. In recent years, moreover, suffering from the oppression and exploitation of the imperialists, the warlords, the feudal landlords and the big comprador-bourgeoisie, they have become aware that the world is no longer what it was. They feel they cannot earn enough to live on by just putting in as much work as before. To make both ends meet they have to work longer hours, get up earlier, leave off later, and be doubly careful at their work. They become rather abusive, denouncing the foreigners as “foreign devils”, the warlords as “robber generals” and the local tyrants and evil gentry as “the heartless rich”. As for the movement against the imperialists and the warlords, they; merely doubt whether it can succeed (on the ground that the foreigners and the warlords seem so powerful), hesitate to join it and prefer to be neutral, but they never oppose the revolution. This section is very numerous, making up about one-half of the petty bourgeoisie.

The third section consists of those whose standard of living is falling. Many in this section, who originally belonged to better-off families, are undergoing a gradual change from a position of being barely able to manage to one of living in more and more reduced circumstances. When they come to settle their accounts at the end of each year, they are shocked, exclaiming, “What? Another deficit!” As such people have seen better days and are now going downhill with every passing year, their debts mounting and their life becoming more and more miserable, they “shudder at the thought of the future”. They are in great mental distress because there is such a contrast between their past and their present. Such people are quite important for the revolutionary movement; they form a mass of no small proportions and are the left-wing of the petty bourgeoisie. In normal times these three sections of the petty bourgeoisie differ in their attitude to the revolution. But in times of war, that is, when the tide of the revolution runs high and the dawn of victory is in sight, not only will the left-wing of the petty bourgeoisie join the revolution, but the middle section too may join, and even tight-wingers, swept forward by the great revolutionary tide of the proletariat and of the left-wing of the petty bourgeoisie, will have to go along with the “evolution.” We can see from the experience of the May 30th Movement [9] of 1925 and the peasant movement in various places that this conclusion is correct.

The semi-proletariat. What is here called the semi-proletariat consists of five categories: (1) the overwhelming majority of the semi-owner peasants, [10] (2) the poor peasants, (3) the small handicraftsmen, (4) the shop assistants [11] and (5) the pedlars. The overwhelming majority of the semi-owner peasants together with the poor peasants constitute a very large part of the rural masses. The peasant problem is essentially their problem. The semi-owner peasants, the poor peasants and the small handicraftsmen are engaged in production on a still smaller scale than the owner-peasants and the master handicraftsmen. Although both the overwhelming majority of the semi-owner peasants and the poor peasants belong to the semi-proletariat, they may be further divided into three smaller categories, upper, middle and lower, according to their economic condition. The semi-owner peasants are worse off than the owner-peasants because every year they are short of about half the food they need, and have to make up this deficit by renting land from others, selling part of their labour power, or engaging in petty trading. In late spring and early summer when the crop is still in the blade and the old stock is consumed, they borrow at exorbitant rates of interest and buy grain at high prices; their plight is naturally harder than that of the owner-peasants’ who need no help from others, but they are better off than the poor’ peasants. For the poor peasants own no land, and receive only half the harvest or even less for their year’s toil, while the semi-owner` peasants, though receiving only half or less than half the harvest of land rented from others, can keep the entire crop from the land they own. The semi-owner peasants are therefore more revolutionary than the owner-peasants, but less revolutionary than the poor peasants. The poor peasants are tenant-peasants who are exploited by the landlords. They may again be divided into two categories according to their economic status. One category has comparatively adequate farm implements and some funds. Such peasants may retain half the product of their year’s toil. To make up their deficit they cultivate side crops, catch fish or shrimps, raise poultry or pigs, or sell part of their labour power, and thus eke out a living, hoping in the midst of hardship and destitution to tide over the year. Thus their life is harder than that of the semi-owner peasants, but they are better off than the other category of poor peasants. They ate more revolutionary than the semi-owner peasants, but less revolutionary than the other category of poor peasants. As for the latter, they have neither adequate farm implements nor funds nor enough manure, their crops are poor, and, with little left after paying rent, they have even greater need to sell part of their labour power. In hard times they piteously beg help from relatives and friends, borrowing a few tou or sheng of grain to last them a few days, and their debts pile up like loads on the backs of oxen. They are the worst off among the peasants and are highly receptive to revolutionary propaganda. The small handicraftsmen are called semi-proletarians because, though they own some simple means of production and moreover are self-employed, they too are often forced to sell part of their labour power and are somewhat similar to the poor peasants in economic status. They feel the constant pinch of poverty and dread of unemployment, because of heavy family burdens and the gap between their earnings and the cost of living; in this respect too they largely resemble the poor peasants. The shop assistants are employees of shops and stores, supporting their families on meagre pay and getting an increase perhaps only once in several years while prices rise every year. If by chance you get into intimate conversation with them, they invariably pour out their endless grievances. Roughly the same in status as the poor peasants and the small handicraftsmen, they are highly receptive to revolutionary propaganda. The pedlars, whether they carry their wares around on a pole or set up stalls along the street, have tiny funds and very small earnings, and do not make enough to feed and clothe themselves. Their status is roughly the same as that of the poor peasants, and like the poor peasants they need a revolution to change the existing state of affairs.

The proletariat. The modern industrial proletariat numbers about two million. It is not large because China is economically backward. These two million industrial workers are mainly employed in five industries–railways, mining, maritime transport, textiles and shipbuilding–and a great number are enslaved in enterprises owned by foreign capitalists. Though not very numerous, the industrial proletariat represents China’s new productive forces, is the most progressive class in modern China and has become the leading force in the revolutionary movement. We can see the important position of the industrial proletariat in the Chinese revolution from the strength it has displayed in the strikes of the last four years, such as the seamen’s strikes, [12] the railway strike, [13] the strikes in the Kailan and Tsiaotso coal mines, [14] the Shameen strike [15] and the general strikes in Shanghai and Hong Kong [16] after the May 30th Incident. The first reason why the industrial workers hold this position is their concentration. No other section of the people is so concentrated. The second reason is their low economic status. They have been deprived of all means of production, have nothing left but their hands, have no hope of ever becoming rich and, moreover, are subjected to the most ruthless treatment by the imperialists, the warlords and the bourgeoisie. That is why they are particularly good fighters. The coolies in the cities are also a force meriting attention. They are mostly dockers and rickshaw men, and among them, too, are sewage carters and street cleaners. Possessing nothing but their hands, they are similar in economic status to the industrial workers but are less concentrated and play a less important role in production. There is as yet little modern capitalist farming in China. By rural proletariat we mean farm labourers hired by the year, the month or the day. Having neither land, farm implements nor funds, they can live only by selling their labour power. Of all the workers they work the longest hours, for the lowest wages, under the worst conditions, and with the least security of employment. They are the most hard-pressed people in the villages, and their position in the peasant movement is as important as that of the poor peasants.

Apart from all these, there is the fairly large lumpen-proletariat, made up of peasants who have lost their land and handicraftsmen who cannot get work. They lead the most precarious existence of all. In every part of the country they have their secret societies, which were originally their mutual-aid organizations for political and economic struggle, for instance, the Triad Society in Fukien and Kwangtung, the Society of Brothers in Hunan, Hupeh, Kweichow and Szechuan, the Big Sword Society in Anhwei, Honan and Shantung, the Rational Life Society in Chihli [17] and the three northeastern provinces, and the Green Band in Shanghai and elsewhere [18] One of China’s difficult problems is how to handle these people. Brave fighters but apt to be destructive, they can become a revolutionary force if given proper guidance.

To sum up, it can be seen that our enemies are all those in league with imperialism–the warlords, the bureaucrats, the comprador class, the big landlord class and the reactionary section of the intelligentsia attached to them. The leading force in our revolution is the industrial proletariat. Our closest friends are the entire semi-proletariat and petty bourgeoisie. As for the vacillating middle bourgeoisie, their right-wing may become our enemy and their left-wing may become our friend but we must be constantly on our guard and not let them create confusion within our ranks.

NOTES

1 A comprador, in the original sense of the word, was the Chinese manages or the senior Chinese employee in a foreign commercial establishment. The compradors served foreign economic interests and bad close connection with imperialism and foreign capital.

2 The Étatistes were a handful of shameless fascist politicians who at that time formed the Chinese Étatiste Youth League, later renamed the Chinese Youth Party. They made counter-revolutionary careers for themselves by opposing the Communist Party and the Soviet Union and received subsidies from the various groups of reactionaries in power and from the imperialists.

3 For further discussion of the role of the national bourgeoisie, see “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party”, Chapter 2, Section 4, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II.

4 Tai Chi-tao joined the Kuomintang in his youth and for a time was Chiang Kai-shek’s partner in stock exchange speculation. After Sun Yat-sen’s death in 1925 he carried on anti-Communist agitation and prepared the ground ideologically for Chiang Kai-shek’s counter-revolutionary coup d’état in 1927. For years be was a faithful running dog to Chiang Kai-shek in the counter-revolution. He committed suicide in February 1949, driven to despair by the imminent doom of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime.

5 The Chen Pao was the organ of the Association for the Study of Constitutional Government, a political group which supported the rule of the Northern warlords.

6 In 1923 Sun Yat-sen, with the help of the Chinese Communist Party, decided to reorganize the Kuomintang bring about Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and admit members of the Communist Party into the Kuomintang. In January 1924 he convened in Canton the Kuomintang’s First National Congress at which he laid down the Three Great Policies–alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers. Mao Tse-tung, Li Ta-chao, Lin Po-chu, Chu Chiu-pai and other comrades attended the Congress and played an important part in helping the Kuomintang to take the road of revolution. Some of these comrades were elected members, and others alternate members, of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.

7 By owner-peasants Comrade Mao Tse-tung means the middle peasants.

8 Marshal Chao is Chao Kung-ming, God of Wealth in Chinese folklore.

9 The May 30th Movement was the nation-wide anti-imperialist movement in protest against the massacre of the Chinese people by the British police in Shanghai on May 30 1925. Earlier that month, major strikes had broken out in Japanese-owned textile mills in Tsingtao and Shanghai, which the Japanese imperialists and the Northern warlords who were their running dogs proceeded to suppress. On May 15 the Japanese textile mill-owners in Shanghai shot and killed the worker Ku Cheng-hung and wounded a dozen others. On May 28 eight workers were slaughtered by the reactionary government in Tsingtao. On May 30 more than two thousand students in Shanghai agitated in the foreign concessions in support of the workers and for the recovery of the foreign concessions. They rallied more than ten thousand people before the British police headquarters, shouting such slogans as “Down with imperialism!” and “People of China, unite!” The British imperialist police opened fire, killing and wounding many students. This became known as the May 30th Massacre. It immediately aroused country-wide indignation, and demonstrations and strikes of workers, students and shopkeepers were held everywhere, forming a tremendous anti-imperialist movement.

10 By “the overwhelming majority of the semi-owner peasants”, Comrade Mao Tse-tung is here referring to the impoverished peasants who worked partly on their own land and partly on land rented from others.

11 There were several strata of shop assistants in old China. Here Comrade Mao Tse-tung is referring to the largest. There was also the lower stratum of shop assistants who led the life of proletarians.

12 The seamen’s strikes were staged by the seamen at Hongkong and by the crews of the Yangtse River steamers early in 1922. The Hongkong seamen held out for eight weeks. After a bitter and bloody struggle, the British imperialist authorities in Hongkong were finally forced to raise wages, lift the ban on the Seamen’s Union, release the arrested workers and indemnify the families of the martyrs. The crews of the Yangtze steamers went on strike soon afterwards, carried on the struggle for two weeks and also won victory.

13 Immediately after its founding in 1922-23 the Chinese Communist Party set about organizing the railway worker. In 1922-23 strikes took place under the Party’s leadership on all the trunk lines. The best known was the general strike on the Peking-Hankow Railway which began on February 4, 1923. It was a fight for the freedom to organize a general trade union. On February 7 the Northern warlords Wu Pei-fu and Hsiao Yao-nan, who were backed by British imperialism, butchered the strikers. This became known as the February 7th Massacre.

14 The Kailan Coal Mines was an inclusive name for the large contiguous Kaiping and Luanchow coalfields in Hopei Province, then employing over fifty thousand workers. During the Yi Ho Tuan Movement of 1900 the British imperialists seized the Kaiping mines. Subsequently the Chinese organized the Luanchow Coal Mining Company, which was later incorporated into the Kailan Mining Administration. Both coalfields thus came under the exclusive control of British imperialism. The Kailan strike took place in October 1922. The Tsiaotso Coal Mines, situated in Honan Province, are also well known in China. The Tsiaotso strike lasted from July 1 to August 9, 1925

15 Shameen, a section of the city of Canton, was held on lease by British imperialism. In July 1924 the British imperialists who ruled it issued a new police regulation requiring all Chinese to produce passes with photos on leaving or entering the area. But foreigners were exempt. On July 15 the workers in Shameen went on strike to protest against this preposterous measure, which the British imperialists were finally forced to cancel.

16 Following the May 30th Incident in Shanghai, general strikes broke out on June 1, 1925 in Shanghai and on June 19 in Hong Kong. More than 200,000 workers took part in Shanghai and 250,000 in Hong Kong. The big Hong Kong strike, with the support of the people throughout the country, lasted sixteen months. It was the longest strike in the history of the world labour movement.

17 Chihli was the old name for Hopei Province.

18 The Triad Society, the Society of Brothers, the Big Sword Society, the Rational Life Society and the Green Band were primitive secret organizations among the people. The members were mainly bankrupt peasants, unemployed handicraftsmen and other lumpen-proletarians. In feudal China these elements were often drawn together by come religion or superstition to form organizations of a patriarchal pattern and bearing different names and some possessed arms. Through these organizations the lumpen-proletarians sought to help each other socially and economically, and sometimes fought the bureaucrats and landlords who oppressed them. Of course, such backward organizations could not provide a way out for the peasants and handicraftsmen. Furthermore, they could easily be controlled and utilized by the landlords and local tyrants and, because of this and of their blind destructiveness, come turned into reactionary forces. In his counter-revolutionary coup d’etat of 1927 Chiang Kai-shek made use of them to disrupt the unity of the labouring people and destroy the revolution. As the modern industrial proletariat arose and grew from strength to strength, the peasants, under the leadership of the working class, gradually formed themselves into organizations of an entirely new type, and these primitive, backward societies lost their raison d’etre.

Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project. HTML revised 2004 by Marxists.org

Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung

Dropping The Atomic Bomb

Harper’s Magazine

THE DECISION TO USE THE ATOMIC BOMB

HENRY L. STIMSON

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War 1911–13, Secretary of State 1929–33, Secretary of War 1940–45,

was the man who had to make the recommendation to the President. In recent months there has been much comment about the decision to use atomic bombs in attacks on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This decision was one of the gravest made by our government in recent years, and it is entirely proper that it should be widely discussed. I have therefore decided to record for all who may be interested my understanding of the events which led up to the attack on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, on Nagasaki on August 9, and the Japanese decision to surrender, on August 10. No single individual can hope to know exactly what took place in the minds of all of those who had a share in these events, but what follows is an exact description of our thoughts and actions as I find them in the records and in my clear recollection.

Plans and Preparations, September 1941–June 1945

It was in the fall of 1941 that the question of atomic energy was first brought directly to my attention. At that time President Roosevelt appointed a committee consisting of Vice President Wallace, General Marshall, Dr. Vannevar Bush, Dr. James B. Conant, and myself. The function of this committee was to advise the President on questions of policy relating to the student of nuclear fission which was then proceeding both in this country and in Great Britain. For nearly four years thereafter I was directly connected with all major decisions of policy on the development and use of atomic energy, and from May 1, 1943, until my resignation as Secretary of War on September 21, 1945, I was directly responsible to the President for the administration of the entire undertaking; my chief advisers in this period were General Marshall, Dr. Bush, Dr. Conant, and Major General Leslie R. Groves, the officer in charge of the project. At the same time I was the President’s senior adviser on the military employment of atomic energy. The policy adopted and steadily pursued by President Roosevelt and his advisers was a simple one. It was to spare no effort in securing the earliest possible successful development of an atomic weapon. The reasons for this policy were equally simple. The original experimental achievement of atomic fission had occurred in Germany in 1938, and it was known that the Germans had continued their experiments. In 1941 and 1942 they were believed to be ahead of us, and it was vital that they should not be the first to bring atomic weapons into the field of battle. Furthermore, if we should be the first to develop the weapon, we should have a great new instrument for shortening the war and minimizing destruction. At no time, from 1941 to 1945, did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or by any other responsible member of the government, that atomic energy should not be used in war. All of us of course understood the terrible responsibility involved in our attempt to unlock the doors to such a devastating new weapon; President Roosevelt particularly spoke to me many times of his own awareness of the catastrophic potentialities of our work. But we were at war, and the work must be done. I therefore emphasize that it was our common objective, throughout the war, to be the first to produce an atomic weapon and use it. The possible atomic weapon was considered to be a new and tremendously powerful explosive, as legitimate as any other of the deadly explosive weapons of modern war. The entire purpose was the production of a military weapon; on no other ground could the wartime expenditure of so much time and money have been justified. The exact circumstances in which that weapon might be used were unknown to any of us until the middle of 1945, and when that time came, as we shall presently see, the military use of atomic energy was connected with larger questions of national policy. The extraordinary story of the successful development of the atomic bomb has been well told elsewhere. As time went on it became clear that the weapon would not be available in time for use in the

 

 

 

 

European Theater, and the war against Germany was successfully ended by the use of what are now called conventional means. But in the spring of 1945 it became evident that the climax of our prolonged atomic effort was at hand. By the nature of atomic chain reactions, it was impossible to state with certainty that we had succeeded until a bomb had actually exploded in a full-scale experiment; nevertheless it was considered exceedingly probable that we should by midsummer have successfully detonated the first atomic bomb. This was to be done at the Alamogordo Reservation in New Mexico. It was thus time for detailed consideration of our future plans. What had begun as a well-founded hope was now developing into a reality. On March 15, 1945 I had my last talk with President Roosevelt. My diary record of this conversation gives a fairly clear picture of the state of our thinking at that time. I have removed the name of the distinguished public servant who was fearful lest the Manhattan (atomic) project be “a lemon”; it was an opinion common among those not fully informed. The President . . . had suggested that I come over to lunch today . . . . First I took up with him a memorandum which he sent to me from––who had been alarmed at the rumors of extravagance in the Manhattan project. ––suggested that it might become disastrous and he suggested that we get a body of “outside” scientists to pass upon the project because rumors are going around that Vannevar Bush and Jim Conant have sold the President a lemon on the subject and ought to be checked up on. It was rather a jittery and nervous memorandum and rather silly, and I was prepared for it and I gave the president a list of the scientists who were actually engaged on it to show the very high standing of them and it comprised four Nobel Prize men, and also how practically every physicist of standing was engaged with us in the project. Then I outlined to him the future of it and when it was likely to come off and told him how important it was to get ready. I went over with him the two schools of thought that exist in respect to the future control after the war of this project, in case it is successful, one of them being the secret close-in attempted control of the project by those who control it now, and the other being the international control based upon freedom both of science and of access. I told him that those things must be settled before the first projectile is used and that he must be ready with a statement to come out to the people on it just as soon as that is done. He agreed to that . . . . This conversation covered the three aspects of the question which were then uppermost in our minds. First, it was always necessary to suppress a lingering doubt that any such titanic undertaking could be successful. Second, we must consider the implications of success in terms of its long-range postwar effect. Third, we must face the problem that would be presented at the time of our first use of the weapon, for with that first use there must be some public statement. I did not see Franklin Roosevelt again. The next time I went to the White House to discuss atomic energy was April 25, 1945, and I went to explain the nature of the problem to a man whose only previous knowledge of our activities was that of a Senator who had loyally accepted our assurance that the matter must be kept a secret from him. Now he was President and Commander-in-Chief, and the final responsibility in this as in so many other matters must be his. President Truman accepted this responsibility with the same fine spirit that Senator Truman had shown before in accepting our refusal to inform him. I discussed with him the whole history of the project. We had with us General Groves, who explained in detail the progress which had been made and the probable future course of the work. I also discussed with President Truman the broader aspects of the subject, and the memorandum which I used in this discussion is again a fair sample of the state of our thinking at the time.

MEMORANDUM DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT TRUMAN APRIL 25, 1945

1. Within four months we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city.

 

 

 

 

2. Although we have shared its development with the U.K., physically the U.S. is at present in the position of controlling the resources with which to construct and use it and no other nation could reach this position for some years. 3. Nevertheless it is practically certain that we could not remain in this position indefinitely. a. Various segments of its discovery and production are widely known among many scientists in many countries, although few scientists are now acquainted with the whole process which we have developed. b. Although its construction under present methods requires great scientific and industrial effort and raw materials, which are temporarily mainly within the possession and knowledge of U.S. and U.K., it is extremely probable that much easier and cheaper methods of production will be discovered by scientists in the future, together with the use of the materials of much wider distribution. As a result, it is extremely probable that the future will make it possible for atomic bombs to be constructed by smaller nations or even groups, or at least by a larger nation in a much shorter time. 4. As a result, it is indicated that the future may see a time when such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a willful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power. With its aid even a very powerful unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a very much smaller one . . . .1 5. The world in its present state of moral advancement compared with its technical development would be eventually at the mercy of such a weapon. In other words, modern civilization might be completely destroyed. 6. To approach any world peace organization of any pattern now likely to be considered, without an appreciation by the leaders of our country of the power of this new weapon, would seem to be unrealistic. No system of control heretofore considered would be adequate to control this menace. Both inside any particular country and between the nations of the world, the control of this weapon will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty and would involve such thoroughgoing rights of inspection and internal controls as we have never theretofore contemplated. 7. Furthermore, in the light of our present position with reference to this weapon, the question of sharing it with other nations and, if so shared, upon what terms, becomes a primary question of our foreign relations. Also our leadership in the war and in the development of this weapon has placed a certain moral responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk without very serious responsibility for any disaster to civilization which it would further. 8. On the other hand, if the problem of the proper use of this weapon can be solved, we would have the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved. 9. As stated in General Groves’ report, steps are under way looking towards the establishment of a select committee of particular qualifications for recommending action to the executive and legislative branches of our government when secrecy is no longer in full effect. The committee would also recommend the actions to be taken by the War Department prior to that time in anticipation of the postwar problems. All recommendations would of course be first submitted to the President.

1 A brief reference to the estimated capabilities of other nations is here omitted; it in no way affects the course of the argument.

 

 

 

 

The next step in our preparations was the appointment of the committee referred to in paragraph (9) above. This committee, which was known as the Interim Committee, was charged with the function of advising the President on the various questions raised by our apparently imminent success in developing an atomic weapon. I was its chairman, but the principal labor of guiding its extended deliberations fell to George L. Harrison, who acted as chairman in my absence. It will be useful to consider the work of the committee in some detail. Its members were the following, in addition to Mr. Harrison and myself: James F. Byrnes (then a private citizen) as personal representative of the president. Ralph A. Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy. William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State. Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development, and president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington. Dr. Karl T. Compton, Chief of the Office of Field Service in the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. James B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee, and president of Harvard University. The discussions of the committee ranged over the whole field of atomic energy, in its political, military, and scientific aspects. That part of its work which particularly concerns us here relates to its recommendations for the use of atomic energy against Japan, but it should be borne in mind that these recommendations were not made in a vacuum. The committee’s work included the drafting of the statements which were published immediately after first bombs were dropped, the drafting of a bill for the domestic control of atomic energy, and recommendations looking toward the international control of atomic energy. The Interim Committee was assisted in its work by a Scientific Panel whose members were the following: Dr. A. H. Compton, Dr. Enrico Fermi, Dr. E. O. Lawrence, and Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer. All four were physicists of the first rank; all four had held positions of great importance in the atomic project from its inception. At a meeting with the Interim Committee and the Scientific Panel on May 31, 1945 I urged all those present to feel free to express themselves on any phase of the subject, scientific or political. Both General Marshall and I at this meeting expressed the view that atomic energy could not be considered simply in terms of military weapons but must also be considered in terms of a new relationship of man to the universe. On June 1, after its discussions with the Scientific Panel, the Interim Committee unanimously adopted the following recommendations: (1) The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible. (2) It should be used on a dual target plant surrounded by or adjacent to houses and other buildings most susceptible to damage, and (3) It should be used without prior warning [of the nature of the weapon]. One member of the committee, Mr. Bard, later changed his view and dissented from recommendation. In reaching these conclusions the Interim Committee carefully considered such alternatives as a detailed advance warning or a demonstration in some uninhabited area. Both of these suggestions were discarded as impractical. They were not regarded as likely to be effective in compelling a surrender of Japan, and both of them involved serious risks. Even the New Mexico test would not give final proof that any given bomb was certain to explode when dropped from an airplane. Quite apart from the generally unfamiliar nature of atomic explosives, there was the whole problem of exploding a bomb at a predetermined height in the air by a complicated mechanism which could not be tested in the static test of New Mexico. Nothing would have been more damaging to our effort to obtain surrender than a warning or a demonstration followed by a dud––and this was a real possibility. Furthermore, we had no bombs to waste. It was vital that a sufficient effect be quickly obtained with the few we had.

 

 

 

 

The Interim Committee and the Scientific Panel also served as a channel through which suggestions from other scientists working on the project were forwarded to me and to the President. Among the suggestions thus forwarded was one memorandum which questioned using the bomb at all against the enemy. On June 16, 1945, after consideration of that memorandum, the Scientific Panel made a report, from which I quote the following paragraphs: The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designated to induce surrender. Those who advocate a purely technical demonstration would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use, and believe that such use will improve the international prospects, in that they are more concerned with the prevention of war than with the elimination of this special weapon. We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use. [Italics mine] With regard to these general aspects of the use of atomic energy, it is clear that we, as scientific men, have no proprietary rights. It is true that we are among the few citizens who have had occasion to give thoughtful consideration to these problems during the past few years. We have, however, no claim to special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic power. The foregoing discussion presents the reasoning of the Interim Committee and its advisers. I have discussed the work of these gentlemen at length in order to make it clear that we sought the best advice that we could find. The committee’s function was, of course, entirely advisory. The conclusions of the committee were similar to my own, although I reached mine independently. I felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisers, they must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the Empire. Such an effective shock would save many times the number of lives, both American and Japanese, that it would cost. The facts upon which my reasoning was based and steps taken to carry it out now follow.

U.S. Policy toward Japan in July 1945

The principal political, social, and military objective of the United States in the summer of 1945 was the prompt and complete surrender of Japan. Only the complete destruction of her military power could open the way to lasting peace. Japan, in July 1945, had been seriously weakened by our increasingly violent attacks. It was known to us that she had gone so far as to make tentative proposals to the Soviet government, hoping to use the Russians as mediators in a negotiated peace. These vague proposals contemplated the retention by Japan of important conquered areas and were therefore not considered seriously. There was as yet no indication of any weakening in the Japanese determination to fight rather than accept unconditional surrender. If she should persist in her fight to the end, she had still a great military force. In the middle of July 1945, the intelligence section of the War Department General Staff estimated Japanese military strength as follows: in the home islands, slightly under 2,000,000; in Korea, Manchuria, China proper, and Formosa, slightly over 2,000,000; in French Indochina, Thailand, and Burma, over 200,000;in the East Indies area, including the Philippines, over 500,000; in the by-passed Pacific islands, over 100,000. The total strength of the Japanese Army was estimated at about 5,000,000 men. These estimates later proved to be in very close agreement with official Japanese figures. The Japanese Army was in much better condition than the Japanese Navy and Air Force. The Navy had practically ceased to exist except as a harrying force against an invasion fleet. The Air Force has been

 

 

 

 

reduced mainly to reliance upon Kamikaze, or suicide, attacks. These latter, however, had already inflicted serious damage on our seagoing forces, and their possible effectiveness in a last ditch fight was a matter of real concern to our naval leaders. As we understood it in July, there was a very strong possibility that the Japanese government might determine resistance to the end, in all the areas of the Far East under its control. In such an event the Allies would be faced with the enormous task of destroying an armed force of five million men and five thousand suicide aircraft, belonging to a race which had already amply demonstrated its ability to fight literally to the death. The strategic plans of our armed forces for the defeat of Japan, as they stood in July, had been prepared without reliance upon the atomic bomb, which had not yet been tested in New Mexico. We were planning an intensified sea and air blockade, and greatly intensified strategic air bombing, through the summer and early fall, to be followed on November 1 by an invasion of the southern island of Kyushu. This would be followed in turn by an invasion of the main island of Honshu in the spring of 1946. The total U.S. military and naval force involved in this grand design was of the order of 5,000,000 men; if all those indirectly concerned are included, it was larger still. We estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan to its conclusion, the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. I was informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone. Additional large losses might be expected among our allies, and, of course, if our campaign were successful and if we could judge by previous experience, enemy casualties would be much larger than our own. It was already clear in July that even before the invasion we should be able to inflict enormously severe damage on the Japanese homeland by the combined application of “conventional” sea and air power. The critical question was whether this kind of action would induce surrender. It therefore became necessary to consider very carefully the probable state of mind of the enemy, and to asses the accuracy the line of conduct which might end his will to resist. With these considerations in mind, I wrote a memorandum for the President, on July 2, which I believe fairly represents the thinking of the American government as it finally took shape in action. This memorandum was prepared after discussion and general agreement with Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, and when I discussed it with the President, he expressed his general approval.

July 2, 1945 Memorandum for the President.

PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR JAPAN 1. The plans of operation up to and including the first landing have been authorized and the preparations for the operation are now actually going on. This situation was accepted by all members of your conference on Monday, June 18. 2. There is reason to believe that the operation for the occupation of Japan following the landing may be a very long, costly, and arduous struggle on our part. The terrain, much of which I have visited several times, has left the impression on my memory of being one which would be susceptible to a last ditch defense such as has been made on Iwo Jima and Okinawa and which of course is very much larger than either of those two areas. According to my recollection it will be much more unfavorable with regard to tank maneuvering than either the Philippines or Germany. 3. If we once land on one of the main islands and begin a forceful occupation of Japan, we shall probably have cast the die of last ditch resistance. The Japanese are highly patriotic and certainly susceptible to calls for fanatical resistance to repel an invasion. Once started in actual invasion, we shall

 

 

 

 

in my opinion have to go through with an even more bitter finish fight than in Germany. We shall incur the losses incident to such a war and we shall have to leave the Japanese islands even more thoroughly destroyed than was the case with Germany. This would be due both to the differences in the Japanese and German personal character and the differences in the size and character of the terrain through which the operations will take place. 4. A question then comes: Is there any alternative to such a forceful occupation of Japan which will secure for us the equivalent of an unconditional surrender of her forces and a permanent destruction of her power again to strike an aggressive blow at the “peace of the Pacific”? I am inclined to think that there is enough such chance to make it well worthwhile our giving them a warning of what is to come and a definite opportunity to capitulate. As above suggested, it should be tried before the actual forceful occupation of the homeland islands is begun and furthermore the warning should be given in ample time to permit a national reaction to set in. We have the following enormously favorable factors on our side––factors much weightier than those we had against Germany: Japan has no allies. Her navy is nearly destroyed and she is vulnerable to a surface and underwater blockade which can deprive her of sufficient food and supplies for her population. She is terribly vulnerable to our concentrated attack on her crowded cities, industrial and food resources. She has against her not only the Anglo-American forces but the rising forces of China and the ominous threat of Russia. We have inexhaustible and untouched industrial resources to bring to bear against her diminishing potential. We have great moral superiority through being a victim of her first sneak attack. The problem is to translate these advantages into prompt and economical achievement of our objectives. I believe Japan is susceptible to reason in such a crisis to a much greater extent than is indicated by our current press and other current comment. Japan is not a nation composed wholly of mad fanatics of an entirely different mentality from ours. On the contrary, she has within the past century shown herself to possess extremely intelligent people, capable in an unprecedented short time of adopting not only the complicated technique of Occidental civilization but to a substantial extent their culture and their political and social ideas. Her advance in all these respects during the short period of sixty or seventy years has been one of the most astounding feats of national progress in history––a leap from isolated feudalism of centuries into the position of one of the six or seven great powers of the world. She has not only built up powerful armies and navies. She has maintained an honest and effective national finance and respected position in many of the sciences in which we pride ourselves. Prior to the forcible seizure of power over her government by the fanatical military group in 1931, she had for ten years lived a reasonable responsible and respectable international life. My own opinion is in her favor on two points involved in this question: a. I think the Japanese nation has the mental intelligence and versatile capacity in such a crisis to recognize the folly of a fight to the finish and to accept the proffer of what will amount to an unconditional surrender; and b. I think she has within her enough liberal leaders (although now submerged by the terrorists) to be depended upon for her reconstruction as a responsible member of the family of nations. I think she is better in this last respect than Germany was. Her liberals yielded only at the point of he pistol and, so far as I am aware, their liberal attitude has not been personally subverted in the way which was so general in Germany.

 

 

 

 

On the other hand, I think that the attempt to exterminate her armies and her population by gunfire or other means will tend to produce a fusion of race solidity and antipathy which has no analogy in the case of Germany. We have a national interest in creating, if possible, a condition wherein the Japanese nation may live as a peaceful and useful member of the future Pacific community. 5. It is therefore my conclusion that a carefully timed warning be given to Japan by the chief representatives of the United States, Great Britain, China, and if then a belligerent, Russia by calling upon Japan to surrender and permit the occupation of her country in order to insure its complete demilitarization for the sake of the future peace. This warning should contain the following elements: The varied and overwhelming character of the force we are about to bring to bear on the islands. The inevitability and completeness of the destruction which the full application of this force will entail. The determination of the Allies to destroy permanently all authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the country into embarking on world conquest. The determination of the Allies to limit Japanese sovereignty to her main islands and to render them powerless to mount and support another war. The disavowal of any attempt to extirpate the Japanese as a race or to destroy them as a nation. A statement of our readiness, once her economy is purged of its militaristic influence, to permit the Japanese to maintain such industries, particularly of a light consumer character, as offer no threat of aggression against their neighbors, but which can produce a sustaining economy, and provide a reasonable standard of living. The statement should indicate our willingness, for this purpose, to give Japan trade access to external raw materials, but no longer any control over the sources of supply outside her main islands. It should also indicate our willingness, in accordance with our now established foreign trade policy, in due course to enter into mutually advantageous trade relations with her. The withdrawal from their country as soon as the above objectives of the Allies are accomplished, and as soon as there has been established a peacefully inclined government, of a character representative of the masses of the Japanese people. I personally think that if in saying this we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add to the chances of acceptance. 6. Success of course will depend on the potency of the warning which we give her. She has an extremely sensitive national pride and, as we are now seeing every day, when actually locked with the enemy will fight to the very death. For that reason the warning must be tendered before the actual invasion has occurred and while the impending destruction, though clear beyond peradventure, has not yet reduced her to fanatical despair. If Russia is a part of the threat, the Russian attack, if actual, must not have progressed too far. Our own bombing should be confined to military objectives as far as possible. It is important to emphasize the double character of the suggested warning. It was designed to promise destruction if Japan resisted, and hope, if she surrendered. It will be noted that the atomic bomb is not mentioned in this memorandum. On grounds of secrecy the bomb was never mentioned except when absolutely necessary, and furthermore, it had not yet been tested. It was of course well forward in our minds, as the memorandum was written and discussed, that the bomb would be the best possible sanction if our warning were rejected.

 

 

 

 

 

The Use of the Bomb

The adoption of the policy outlined in the memorandum of July 2 was a decision of high politics; once it was accepted by the President, the position of the atomic bomb in our planning became quite clear. I find that I stated in my diary, as early as June 19, that “the last chance warning . . . must be given before an actual landing of the ground forces in Japan, and fortunately the plans provide for enough time to bring in the sanctions to our warning in the shape of heavy ordinary bombing attack and an attack of S-1.” S-1 was a code name for the atomic bomb. There was much discussion in Washington about the timing of the warning to Japan. The controlling factor in the end was the date already set for the Potsdam meeting of the Big Three. It was President Truman’s decision that such a warning should be solemnly issued by the U.S. and the U.K. from this meeting, with the concurrence of the head of the Chinese government, so that it would be plain that all of Japan’s principal enemies were in entire unity. This was done, in the Potsdam ultimatum of July 26, which very closely followed the above memorandum of July 2, with the exception that it made no mention of the Japanese Emperor. On July 28 the Premier of Japan, Suzuki, rejected the Potsdam ultimatum by announcing that it was “unworthy of public notice.” In the face of this rejection we could only proceed to demonstrate that the ultimatum had meant exactly what it said when it stated that if the Japanese continued the war, “the full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of these Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.” For such a purpose the atomic bomb was an eminently suitable weapon. The New Mexico test occurred while we were at Potsdam, on July 16. It was immediately clear that the power of the bomb measured up to our highest estimates. We had developed a weapon of such a revolutionary character that its use against the enemy might well be expected to produce exactly the kind of shock on the Japanese ruling oligarchy which we desired, strengthening the position of those who wished peace, and weakening that of the military party. Because of the importance of the atomic mission against Japan, the detailed plans were brought to me by the military staff for approval. With President Truman’s warm support I struck off the list of suggested target mine. We determined the city of Kyoto. Although it was a target of considerable military importance, it had been the ancient capital of Japan and was a shrine of Japanese art and culture. We determined that it should be spared. I approved four other targets including the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hiroshima was bombed on August 6, and Nagasaki on August 9. These two cities were active working parts of the Japanese war effort. One was an army center; the other was naval and industrial. Hiroshima was the headquarters of the Japanese Army defending southern Japan and was a major military storage and assembly point. Nagasaki was a major seaport and it contained several large industrial plants of great wartime importance. We believed that our attacks had struck cities which must certainly be important to the Japanese military leaders, both Army and Navy, and we waited for a result. We waited one day. Many accounts have been written about the Japanese surrender. After a prolonged Japanese cabinet session in which the deadlock was broken by the Emperor himself, the offer to surrender was made on August 10. It was based on the Potsdam terms, with a reservation concerning the sovereignty of the Emperor. While the Allied reply made no promises other than those already given, it implicitly recognized the Emperor’s position by prescribing that his power must be subject to the orders of the Allied Supreme Commander. These terms were accepted on August 14 by the Japanese, and the instrument of surrender was formally signed on September 2, in Tokyo Bay. Our great objective was thus

 

 

 

 

achieved, and all the evidence I have seen indicates that the controlling factor in the final Japanese decision to accept our terms of surrender was the atomic bomb.2 The two atomic bombs which we had dropped were the only ones we had ready, and our rate of production at the time was very small. Had the war continued until the projected invasion on November 1, additional fire raids of B-20’s would have been more destructive of life and property than the very limited number of atomic raids which we could have executed in the same period. But the atomic bomb was more than a weapon of terrible destruction; it was a psychological weapon. In March 1945 our Air Force had launched its first great incendiary raid on the Tokyo area. In this raid more damage was done and more casualties were inflicted than was the case at Hiroshima. Hundreds of bombers took part and hundreds of tons of incendiaries were dropped. Similar successive raids burned out a great part of the urban area of Japan, but the Japanese fought on. On August 6 one B-29 dropped a single atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Three days later a second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki and the war was over. So far as the Japanese could know, our ability to execute atomic attacks, if necessary by many planes at a time, was unlimited. As Dr. Karl Compton has said, “it was not one atomic bomb, or two, which brought surrender; it was the experience of what an atomic bomb will actually do to a community, plus the dread of many more, that was effective.” The bomb thus served exactly the purpose we intended. The peace party was able to take the path of surrender, and the whole weight of the Emperor’s prestige was exerted in favor of peace. When the Emperor ordered surrender, and the small but dangerous group of fanatics who opposed him were brought under control, the Japanese became so subdued that the great undertaking of occupation and disarmament was completed with unprecedented ease.

A Personal Summary

In the foregoing pages I have tried to give an accurate account of my own personal observations of the circumstances which led up to the use of the atomic bomb and the reasons which underlay our use of it. To me they have always seemed compelling and clear, and I cannot see how any person vested with such responsibilities as mine could have taken any other course or given any other advice to his chiefs. Two great nations were approaching contact in a fight to a finish which would begin on November 1, 1945. Our enemy, Japan, commanded forces of somewhat over 5,000,000 men. Men of these armies had already inflicted upon us, in our breakthrough of the outer perimeter of their defenses, over 300,000 battle casualties. Enemy armies still unbeaten had the strength to cost us a million more. As long as the Japanese government refused to surrender, we should be forced to take and hold the ground, and smash the Japanese ground armies, by close-in fighting of the same desperate and costly kind that we had faced in the Pacific islands for nearly four years. In the light of the formidable problem which thus confronted us, I felt that every possible step should be taken to compel a surrender of the homelands, and withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Asiatic mainland and from other positions, before we had commenced an invasion. We held two cards to assist us in such an effort. One was the traditional veneration in which the Japanese Emperor was held by his subjects and he power which was thus vested in him over his loyal troops. It was for this reason that I suggested in my memorandum of July 2 that his dynasty should be continued. The second card was the use of the atomic bomb in the manner best calculated to persuade that Emperor and the counselors about him to submit to our demand for what was essentially unconditional surrender, placing his immense power over his people and his troops subject to our orders.

2 Report of United States Strategic Bombing Survey, “Japan’s Struggle to End the War”; “If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Used,” by K. T. Compton, Atlantic Monthly, December 1946; unpublished material of historical division, War Department Special Staff, June 1946.

 

 

 

 

In order to end the war in the shortest possible time and to avoid the enormous losses of human life which otherwise confronted us, I felt that we must use the Emperor as our instrument to command and compel his people to cease fighting and subject themselves to our authority through him, and that to accomplish this we must give him and his controlling advisers a compelling reason to accede to our demands. This reason furthermore must be of such a nature that his people could understand his decision. The bomb seemed to me to furnish a unique instrument for that purpose. My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise. In the light of the alternatives which, on a fair estimate, were open to us I believe that no man in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face. As I read over what I have written I am aware that much of it, in this year of peace, may have a harsh and unfeeling sound. It would perhaps be possible to say the same things and say them more gently. But I do not think it would be wise. As I look back over the five years of my service as Secretary of War, I see too many stern and heartrending decision to be willing to pretend that war is anything else than what it is. The face of war is the face of death; death is an inevitable part of every order that a wartime leader gives. The decision to use the atomic bomb was a decision that brought death to over a hundred thousand Japanese. No explanation can change that fact and I do not wish to gloss over it. But this deliberate, premeditated destruction was our least abhorrent choice. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put an end to the Japanese war. It stopped the fire raids, and the strangling blockade; it ended the ghastly specter of a clash of great land armies. In this last great action of the Second World War we were given final proof that war is death. War in the twentieth century has grown steadily more barbarous, more destructive, more debased in all its aspects. Now, with the release of atomic energy, man’s ability to destroy himself is nearly complete. The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended a war. They also made it wholly clear that we must never have another war. This is the lesson man and leaders everywhere must learn, and I believe that when they learn it they will find a way to lasting peace. There is no other choice.

In view of the exceptional public importance of this article, permission is given to any newspaper or magazine to reprint it, in part or (preferably, since its effect is cumulative) in full, with credit to Harper’s

Magazine but without charge. ––The Editors

Incarnational Apologetics

1. In reaction to the article on “Incarnational Apologetics” and Chapters 14 – 16, and 22 from the Everyday Series: Evangelism book, how does this impact the way evangelism is taught and acted out in daily life? How do you balance “incarnational” and “informational” approaches to evangelism? Is there a connection? In addition, do your struggle relating to people on an “incarnational” level; or are you afraid on an “informational” level that people might ask a question that you cannot answer?  Be VERY thorough, thought provoking, and honest with your classmates!  (225 words minimum)

2. After watching the interview video with the girl (Lindsay Video), in reference to her approach to life and faith, if she were a neighbor of yours how would you go about reaching her with the Gospel? When answering, consider what we have learned and discussed in class to this point related to the Three V’s of evangelism, your testimonies, servant evangelism, as well as the Share Jesus Without Fear approach and the implications of the two videos this week on the Story and the Three Circles.  Be VERY thorough and thought provoking!  (225 words minimum)

Your initial thread is due by 11:59 p.m. (ET) on Thursday of Module/Week 6.  The initial thread is a minimum of 450 words.

Your TWO replies to classmates are due by 11:59 p.m. (ET) on Sunday of the same module/week. The replies to TWO different classmates are a minimum of 250 words each.

https://learn.liberty.edu/webapps/osv-kaltura-BBLEARN/LtiMashupPlayIframeWrapperResponsive?playUrl=/browseandembed/index/media/entryid/1_hy2ms9wo/showDescription/false/showTitle/false/showTags/false/showDuration/false/showOwner/false/showUploadDate/false/playerSize/400×285/playerSkin/39959781/&course_id=_539258_1&content_id=_34764293_1

EVAN 525

Incarnational Apologetics

by Dr. David Wheeler

Definition :

“Incarnational” Apologetics is the representative public and private lifestyle of a Christian that validates to the world the absolute truths of the Bible. It should be the natural result of a “born again” experience and is communicated to the world through both actions and attitudes of Christians as they consistently live out the tenants of their faith in community with both the redeemed and unredeemed.

Obvious Questions to Consider:

· Is “Incarnational” apologetics a valid expression and study in light of more traditional “informational” forms of apologetics?

From a traditional perspective apologetics is the study of internalizing and perfecting “informational” approaches and arguments to defend the absolute truths of the Bible especially in light of consistent attacks from a pluralistic culture. Considering the fact that one’s Christian faith is totally dependant upon the validity of these truths relating to the biblical claims of Christ as Savior (i.e. Death and Physical Resurrection of Christ, Forgiveness of Sin, the Deity of Christ, etc.), this is obviously an essential issue to protect the integrity of historical Christianity.

Nevertheless, the “incarnational” expressions of one’s faith are equally as important, especially when the goal is to evangelize an unredeemed world. While “informational” apologetics represents the explanation of essential biblical tenants to the Christian faith; “incarnational” apologetics represents the actualization of those same biblical belief systems into the authentic expressions of a believer’s life. It is, in a sense, wrapping one’s faith in the flesh of daily living.

For instance, consider the apologetic claims related to biblical inerrancy. Conservative Evangelicals consider this, rightfully so, imperative to a clear understanding of truth as it relates to all areas of one’s Christian faith. After all, if the Bible is not shown to be trustworthy in every way as it relates to faith and life, how can one know for sure if what they believe is genuine?

The same is true when considering “incarnational” apologetics as it relates to the issue of biblical inerrancy and other equally important foundational beliefs. If one claims to believe the Bible to be inerrant but exemplifies it in the expressions of their life as a contradictory code of ethics and behavior, what should the non-Christian world conclude about this same faith that supposedly came from the Bible? Not that anyone is perfect, but shouldn’t an inerrant Bible that is espoused as the final authority for the Christian faith result in something close to an inerrant lifestyle from it’s proponents?

At some point the real issue of biblical inerrancy boils down to the question of authority. For the Christian, the Bible is authoritative because of its author, the Holy Spirit who spoke the word into being. On the other hand, for the non-Christian the issue of accepting biblical authority as an essential precursor to salvation is in part verified by the consistent “incarnational” expressions of Christians who claim to have experienced a “born again” conversion. Since real authority is never assumed but earned when dealing with the unsaved world, it is imperative that one’s approach to biblical apologetics is validated by a life that exemplifies the person of Christ as found in the Bible.

The same argument can be applied to other areas of traditional apologetics. Consider for a moment the important issues related to the resurrection of Christ. While the historical and biblical aspects are imperative in validating the authenticity of the event, one must never ignore how that miraculous event transforms the individual expressions of a Christian’s daily life.

For instance, a Muslim friend who converted to Christianity communicated that it was not the great arguments of traditional “informational” apologetics that finally drew him to examine the claims of Christ. On the contrary, it was the consistent caring actions of a high school friend who lived out a “resurrected” life before him.

It was not that his friend ever stopped verbally sharing the “informational” truths about Christ with him. The truth is that he boldly shared the gospel on many occasions. The bottom line was the simple undeniable fact that his friend’s life “incarnationally” validated the biblical truths he graciously espoused.

In fact, the former Muslim admitted that he regularly abused and embarrassed his schoolmate hoping that he would grow weary and leave him alone. In the end, the former Muslim became a Christian because he could not argue with the evidences of a transformed life that ultimately became a tool of the Holy Spirit prompting his heart to further examine the directions of his faith.

It is here that both the “incarnational” and “informational” approaches combine to create an authentic message that obviously pierced the Muslim’s heart. The holistic combination of a Christian who was well prepared “informationally” to defend his faith, combined with one who actually lived out his beliefs “incarnationally” as a transforming expression of Christ could not be denied. In the end, the Muslim received Christ as personal Savior!

Still, the question begs to be asked; should this “incarnational” approach be considered as the other half of genuine apologetics? It certainly appears to be an important aspect of fully communicating biblical truth. The sad fact is that many people will never understand the reality of biblical ideals such as forgiveness, unconditional love, or even salvation, because they cannot move beyond the inconsistent ways in which Christians communicate their faith through daily living. This must stop! According to scripture, the only stumbling block for unbelievers should be the Cross, not the unbiblical actions of those claiming to have been redeemed through that same cross!

· Is “incarnational” apologetics just another liberal expression of the social gospel?

For over a century many “Evangelicals” have been negative and reactionary to ministry expressions that exemplified a social conscience because of their fears that the “informational” message of the gospel was not being properly communicated. In their defense, their fears were often justified as numerous ministries were developed to meet physical needs to the obvious neglect of the greatest need of unbelievers, which is to be redeemed.

As a result, over time the passionate pursuits of biblical conservatives to evangelize unbelievers often neglected the “incarnational” expressions of their faith to lovingly live out the commands of Christ by meeting simple needs and demonstrating authentic community. Many well-meaning Christians unknowingly contributed to a negative know-it-all stereotype that continues to stifle real evangelism. While this approach values much knowledge, it often misses the point of living out a transformed life and underestimates the impact of an inconsistent lifestyle upon unbelievers.

After all, isn’t the point of real apologetics to convince people in reference to the truths of scripture so as to result in changed lives. For this to occur, one must model truth for the unbelieving world. As the former staff member for Bill Hybels, Deiter Zander once said, “the contemporary world is interested in genuine Christianity, not our version of it” (from a conference in Napa Valley, CA, 2000). He went on to say, “if it is more important to be right then to be in relationship with people, you will never relate to this generation” (ibid.). The key here is the obvious need for the unredeemed world to “incarnationally” experience the truths of Christ being lived out in daily lives of committed believers.

Quite frankly, it does not make sense to espouse the powerful truths of Christ if they are not dynamic enough to impact the ways we manifest Him to the world. In a sense this is what Jesus said in Matthew 9:17, “Nor do they put new wine in old wineskins, or else the wineskins break, the wine is spilled, and the wineskins are ruined. But they put new wine into new wineskins, and both are preserved.”

Even though this passage is referring to the old and new covenant, it is still relevant to the discussion. Consider that one of the miracles of salvation is that one receives “new wine” through the power of the gospel message. Unfortunately, without new “wineskins” the whole batch of wine is perverted and its purpose is never realized. The same is true with many Christians who do not understand the connection between beliefs and behavior.

By understanding the biblical truth that it is impossible to divorce the saving message of Christ from the man he represented to the world then one can grasp the fact that “incarnational” apologetics does not compromise “informational” apologetics in reference to social liberalism. On the contrary, it fully completes the expression of absolute truth and further validates the gospel message to the world.

In the end, this requires a balance between the realms of both “informational” and “incarnational” apologetics. One must never consider it socially liberal to exemplify an authentic Christian lifestyle of servanthood and kindness that validates one’s faith to an unbelieving world. At the same time, one must never remain silent concerning biblical truth and the significant issues relating to faith. As the old saying goes, it represents both sides of the same coin.

· Conclusion: How does one live an “incarnational” life?

In his book, Safely Home, Randy Alcorn tells the story of a fervent Christian named Quan. He was unjustly thrown into jail for publicly proclaiming his faith in China.

Alcorn unwittingly defines “incarnational” apologetics through one of Quan’s heart wrenching experiences with the unbelieving jailer who regularly abused and mocked him. You will want to notice how Quan effectively combined both types of apologetics to achieve an unbelievable outcome to the glory of God! Alcorn shares:

“Quan whispered into the darkness words hidden in his heart. “‘I know that my Redeemer lives and that in the end he will stand upon the earth. And after my skin has been destroyed, yet in my flesh I will see God. I myself will see him with my own eyes-I, and not another. How my heart yearns within me!'”

The guard peered into Quan’s cell through the little barred window, which was two handbreadths across. Long used to the darkness, Quan could see the contempt in his eyes.

“Stop smiling!” he yelled.

“I am not smiling,” Quan said.

“Yes, you are!” shouted the guard. He rattled the door, but moved on to the next cell.

Suddenly, Li Quan stood and pressed his face against the bars. “Guard!”

Quan called. When he didn’t come, he called louder. “Su Gan!”

The guard came back and rattled the door violently. “Who told you my name? Be silent or I will come in and make you silent!”

“Su Gan, sir, please, I have a request for you.”

“Unless you can pay me, I care nothing for your requests.”

“Can I do some labor for you?”

Quan saw in the jailer’s eyes surprise mixed with contempt.

“This prison is so filthy,” Quan said. “There is waste everywhere. The rats and roaches feed on it. You are not a prisoner, but you must feel like you are. Su Gan has to breathe this foul air, to walk carefully because of what oozes out of the cells. Li Quan can help you. Let me go into the cells one by one and clean up this filthy place. Give me water and a brush and soap, and I will show you what I can do! My father, Li Tong, was a street sweeper, a great cleaner of the ground. The finest in China. And I am my father’s son!” (in Safely Home, by Randy Alcorn, Tyndale House, 2001, 273-274)

From this point, Alcorn picks up the story after several weeks in which Quan chooses to serve the jailer by cleaning the nasty cells. Again, you will want to notice how God used his Christlike service. The story picks up with Quan addressing a Christian visitor to the jail named Ben. Alcorn continues:

Ben stood in the chilly winter air. As usual, he waited nervously, trying to keep warm and to will Li Quan out of the black hole. Someone was being led out of the building now, a frail, older man with a pronounced limp and yellow skin, as if he had jaundice or hepatitis.

Ben watched the man, who for some reason was walking toward him. He felt his heart freeze. “Quan?” He tried to disguise his horror. They touched right index fingers through the fence. “You smell like … soap.”

“Yes.” Quan beamed, his face and voice surprisingly animated. “This is better than I smelled last time, yes? I have wonderful news! You must tell my family and house church. God has answered prayer. He has given me a ministry!”

“What?”

“I go from cell to cell, bringing Yesu’s message.” “But I thought you were in an isolated cell.”

“God opened the door. I go to the other men. Most have never had anyone else come into their cell except to beat them. I help and serve them as I clean their cells. I bring them the love of Yesu. Twelve men I have visited. When I left their cells, six I did not leave alone.”

“What do you mean?”

“When I left, Yesu was with them. Three were already believers, one of them a pastor. He had known my father, Li Tong! Three more bowed their knees to Yesu, who promises never to leave or forsake them. When I walk by their cells on ‘the way to clean others, I sing to them, ‘Heaven is my fatherland.’ When I finish cleaning all the cells I will start over. Then I can teach Shengjing to each of them. I will teach as I wash.”

“The guards let you do this?”

“The smell that used to cling to the guards is now almost gone. Their shoes are not ruined. The prisoners are excited to no longer be alone. Excited to realize that even if they die here, they will have etemal life . Excited that God has not forgotten them, that this world is not their home, that they will find release.”

“Sounds more like a revival meeting than a prison.”

“Those in prison are not so distracted as those outside. They think about death more. They ask, ‘Is this the day?’ They do not put so much hope in their plans and successes in this world. I tell them about Yesu and his heaven, and they listen eagerly, much more intently than most free men I speak to in the locksmith’s shop. Please, tell Ming and Shen and Zhou Jin about Li Quan’s ministry.” (ibid., 276-277)

The story of Quan is an amazing picture representing the balance of both “informational” and “incarnational” apologetics. As he served and lived out the life of Christ, his actions validated his faith thus opening a door to share the truths of Christ.

Think about it, “informational” apologetics without “incarnational” validation will often lead to hypocrisy. On the other hand, “incarnational” apologetics without an “informational” foundation of biblical truth will often lead to heresy.

So . . . how does one live an “incarnational” life? It begins by understanding the words of Christ in Mark 10: 43-45, “ . . . whoever desires to become great among you shall be your servant. And whoever of you desires to be first shall be slave of all. For even the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give his life a ransom for many.” An “incarnational” life demands surrender, not only to the words of Christ, but His actions as well. Christians must become servants first!

It is kind of like the way Jesus treated the woman at the well in John 4. He didn’t embarrass or condemn her. On the contrary, he did the unthinkable for a Jew, he actually spoke to her thus acknowledging her basic value as a human soul. In doing so, he gained her confidence and peaked her curiosity. Ultimately, the woman was drawn to spiritual water where according to Christ, she “would never thirst again.”

With this in mind, it is worth noting that Christ was always a perfect blend of both types of apologetics. The simple truth is that the “incarnational” life is merely living as Jesus lived by balancing beliefs with behavior. In the end, Christians must understand that an unbelieving world will not believe what we say about Christ and our faith, until they first see the truth manifested through us. In short, this is “incarnational” apologetics at its best!

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Enviromental World History

You will make an argument and use evidence from 1) the class lecture and 2) reading material to debate whether humans have had a bigger effect on the environment throughout history or whether the environment has had a bigger influence on human development.

 

  • You will write a 750-word paper (approximately three double-spaced pages)
  • Should have an overall argument that addresses the question
  • Present at least three major ideas to organize the paper which draw on material from the lectures and reading assignments
  • Analyze two primary sources within the three main ideas
  • Clear structure how you will organize those ideas
  • Citations are parenthesis with author and page # or my name and my lecture title
    • (Mevissen Neo Europe); (Marks 18); (McNeill 115)

      Understanding GlobalGeography andClimate

      Agenda

          • ◦Tech problems
          • ◦Discuss Marks“Preface” and“Intro”
          • ◦Lesson: Geography& Climate
            1. Finish Chapter 1
            2. ReadingQuiz#2dueTOMORROW at11:59 pm

      Quiz Troubleshooting

            • SUNY Old Westbury Blackboard help:
            • ◦IT Service Desk
            • ◦Open SUNYHelpdesk:1-844-673-6786 (844-OPENSUNY) or go tohttp://open.suny.edu/help

      Monday-Thursday 8am-9pm ESTFriday 8am-5pm ESTSaturday 10am-5pm ESTSunday 1pm-9pm EST

      Divide into groups of 4.

            • 1.I will assign groups a question to answer.
            • 2.Discussonly this question.
            • 3.After5 minutes, I will place you in a group withpeoplewho answered the other questions
            • 4.You will ‘teach’ your group the answer to your question.
            • 5.Be prepared to answer questions that your classmateshave about this.
            • 1.What are the four interrelated themes that Marks studies toexplain the “Origins of the Modern World”?
            • 2.How/why does he disagree with the “rise of the West” or“Eurocentric” narratives? How does that relate to an“ethnocentric” narrative?
            • 3.When is the ‘modern’ era and what features describe it? Howdo historians typically write about the origins of the modernera?
            • 4.How does Marks integrate environment into his history?What are examples of events in history that he points outwhere the environment affected humans?

      Geography and Climate

      Turn to partner–discuss

            • What are two ways that you’ve interacted withthe environment–the physical world–today?(think: weather, transport options, the foods you ate, anydiseases you’ve gotten, encounters with animals)
            • What is your favorite vacation destination? Whatdo you like about it? Does something differentabout the environment affect your decision whereto vacation? How?

      https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9e/Mollweide_projection_SW.jpg

                    Why do we care aboutwhich direction rivers flowor how often rain falls?

                    MINERAL DEPOSITS

                    Mineral deposits

                          • Affects therelative value ofminerals
                          • Also makescertain mineral-rich regions moreprosperous ORdesirable foroutsiders

                    Image result for gold artifactsMineral deposits

                    http://www.treasurenet.com/forums/attachment.php?attachmentid=632007&d=1336013948

                    Image result for iron age artifactsIron age

                    Related imageBone stone

                    Shell Age

                    FOSSIL FUELS

                          • Deposits fromancientbiological matter
                          • Formationdepends onspecificconditions ofheat andpressure

                    Fossil fuels

                    https://slideplayer.com/slide/12767993/77/images/3/Formation+of+fossil+fuels.jpg

                    Fossil fuels

                    http://firesideresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/coal-deposits1.gif

                    https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b3/World_petroleum_systems.png/1280px-World_petroleum_systems.png

                    Fossil fuels

                    Doesanyoneknow whatthis maprepresents?

                    CLIMATE

                    HOW WOULD YOU DEFINE IT?

                    Climate isnotweather (daily meteorologicalconditions like air pressure, humidity,temperature, precipitation, winds, sunshine orcloudiness) but the average weather patternsand behavior over a long period of time

                    WHAT AFFECTS CLIMATE?

                    LATITUDE

                    BODIES OF WATER

                    ALTITUDE

                    TERRAIN

                    WHAT AFFECTS CLIMATE?

                    LATITUDE

                    BODIES OF WATER

                    ALTITUDE

                    TERRAIN

                    LATITUDE

                    https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiRl9eWi7HdAhXtQ98KHdGpDcEQjRx6BAgBEAU&url=http%3A%2F%2Fbwstoa.blogspot.com%2F2014%2F10%2Ffactors-that-influence-climate.html&psig=AOvVaw0GgHLKh8oEI76PWtxwxuz2&ust=1536691256576191

                    Related imageThe sun’senergycausescirculatingcurrents (airand ocean)

                    https://images.slideplayer.com/34/10193608/slides/slide_12.jpg

                    Because ofwinds atequator,seasonsmarked bywet/dryperiods

                    WHAT AFFECTS CLIMATE?

                    LATITUDE

                    BODIES OF WATER

                    ALTITUDE

                    TERRAIN

                    https://images.slideplayer.com/26/8546129/slides/slide_26.jpg

                            • Waterheatsand cools moreslowly thanlanddoes
                            • Less variationof temperaturenear bodies ofwater

                    WHAT AFFECTS CLIMATE?

                    LATITUDE

                    BODIES OF WATER

                    ALTITUDE

                    TERRAIN

                    Image result for mountain kilimanjaro

                              • higher elevations =less pressure(gravity)
                              • less pressure = gasmolecules expand
                              • expanding moleculescool down (volumeand temp of gas haveinverse relationship)

                      https://kestrelinstruments.com/pub/media/wysiwyg/smartwave/porto/kestrel/images/Density_Altitude_-Column_of_Air.png

                      Vector Illustration With High altitude Zones Of TheDifferentelevations,differentecosystems

                      Mid-Class review quiz

                              • Why is it warmer at the equator than at thepoles?
                              • How does water moderate temperature?
                              • How does the ocean current circulation affectthe globe?
                              • Why does the temperature drop as you go upa mountain?

                      WHAT AFFECTS CLIMATE?

                      LATITUDE

                      BODIES OF WATER

                      ALTITUDE

                      TERRAIN

                      Terrain includes elevation andproximity to bodies of water, alsoincludes:

                              • Topography (shape of land)
                              • Vegetation coverage

                      Image result for gobi desert and tibetan plateau from spaceTibetanPlateau

                      Gobi Desert

                      Topography

                      https://2012books.lardbucket.org/books/regional-geography-of-the-world-globalization-people-and-places/section_04/d1fd0cddb141801dff4eac4b548c5113.jpg

                      Related imageValley and Mountain Breezes

                      24-hr convection cycles

                              • During the day, warm mountains cause heat to rise, pulls air up fromvalley
                              • During the night, as mountain cools, cooler air sinks down into the valley
                              • Regional climatic effect

                      Topography

                      Related imagehttps://www.dwd.de/EN/research/climateenvironment/climate_impact/urbanism/urban_heat_island/urbanheatisland_node.html

                      Heat islands

                              • Emissions
                              • Materialscapturesolarradiation

                      Topography

                              • Plant growthdepends on theclimate
                              • Plant/vegetationcoverage canaffect a region’sclimate

                      Temperatureandprecipitation(rainfall)affect whatplants grow

                      Related image

                        Image result for plants affect weatherVEGETATIONAFFECTSCLIMATE-trees/plants absorb warmth

                                • plants part of hydrological cycle(store water, keep in soil)
                                • trees block wind/sun (lessevaporation)
                                • transpiration release moisture intothe air (cooling, clouds, reflection)

                        Image result for trees and their climate effecthttp://theclimatelemon.com/8-amazing-benefits-of-trees/

                        HOW HAVE THESE FACTORSINFLUENCED WORLD HISTORY?

                        Think of three examplescited above think howthey will connect withMarks’ arguments.

                        To Do List

                                1. Finish Chapter 1
                                2. ReadingQuiz#2 dueTOMORROW at 11:59 PM