unable to retain private counsel, may be unable to escape more serious consequences for acts that may be less serious. The dilemma facing reformers of the juvenile court revolves around the obvious: Avoid labeling juveniles who do not deserve the label of delinquent and, at the same time, prevent the juvenile court from becoming so informal that those who are a threat to the community remain at large. This is a much bigger challenge than it might initially appear to be. Juvenile court systems throughout the nation have struggled with this issue historically and at present.

Maintaining the Family Unit The concept that a child should remain in the family unit whenever possible is another basic element of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act. The child and family are not to be separated unless there is a serious threat to the welfare of the child or society. However, once there is an established necessity for removing the child, the juvenile court must have the power to move swiftly in that direction. Determining exactly when it is necessary to remove the child is not, of course, an easy task. Child protective service (CPS) employees and the juvenile court system are typically very careful not to label acts as child abuse and intervene in family dynamics unless all efforts to maintain the family unit have failed and/or the circumstances are clearly harmful to the child. Careful investigation of the total family environment and its effect on the juvenile is typically required in cases of suspected abuse, neglect, and delinquency. Removal may be permanent or may include an option to return the child if circumstances improve. Careful consideration is given to the family’s attitudes toward the child and the past record of relationships among other family members.

Although most of us would agree that it is generally desirable to maintain the family unit, there are certainly circumstances when removal is in the best interests of both the minor and society (see In Practice 6.2). The welfare of the child is clearly jeopardized by keeping him or her in a family where gross neglect, abuse, or acts of criminality occur. The emphasis placed on maintaining the integrity of the family unit at times seems to be taken so seriously by juvenile court judges and other juvenile justice practitioners that they maintain family ties even when removal is clearly the better alternative.

Preserving Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court Proceedings The Uniform Juvenile Court Act provides judicial procedures so that all parties are assured of fairness and recognition of legal rights. The early philosophy of informal hearings void of legal procedures and evidentiary standards has a limited place in the modern juvenile justice system. The application of due process standards has not deterred the court from its rehabilitative pursuits. If the issue is delinquency and the act for which the child has been accused is theft, the procedural rules of evidence should support the allegation, and the result would be an adjudication of delinquency. If the evidence does not support the allegation, no adjudication of delinquency should occur. In an informal hearing where there is an absence of established guilt and where an adjudication of delinquency is based on the attitude of the child, the types of peers with whom that child associates, or his or her family’s condition, the rights of the juvenile and perhaps other parties have been violated. The philosophy of a fair hearing, where constitutional rights are recognized and enforced and where a high standard of proof for establishing delinquency is strictly imposed, has been generally established in juvenile court acts since 1967, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided in the Gault case (In re Gault, 1967) that due process (observing constitutional guarantees and rules of exclusion) was generally required in juvenile court adjudicatory proceedings. Informality is generally accepted in postadjudicatory hearings on disposition of the juvenile and is often permitted in prehearing stages. The adjudicatory hearing for delinquency must, however, be based on establishing beyond a reasonable doubt (with as little doubt as possible) that the allegations are supported by the admissible evidence.

In Practice 6.2: Woman Arrested for Starving Her Children A Dawsonville woman was arrested early last month for reportedly starving her children and allowing her toddler to wander away from

her residence.

The woman, Susan Diane Neeley, 34, was arrested Dec. 8 on three counts of cruelty to children and one count of reckless conduct.

According to Sheriff Jeff Johnson, Neeley is accused of willingly depriving her three children of necessary sustenance to the extent that the children’s health and well-being were jeopardized. Johnson said the arrest stemmed from a missing juvenile call that occurred on Dec. 7.

The ages of the children were not released.

Neeley is also accused of allowing her toddler daughter to wander approximately 1 1/2 miles away from the residence, Johnson said.

“The child was out after dark on an evening with a temperature of 52 degrees,” Johnson said. “The child’s two siblings, who went to search for the toddler, were also missing. All were located at another residence.”

When located, the toddler was found soaking wet, apparently from falling into a creek. Neeley was released on a $30,000 bond on Dec. 12.

S o u rc e :S o u rc e : Dean, A. (2017, January 4). Woman arrested for starving her children. Dawson County News.

Questions to Consider 1. True or False: The abuse would not have been discovered if the police had not received a missing child call. 2. Multiple Choice: In this situation, the toddler child would be classified by juvenile court as which of the following?

a. Delinquent b. Abused/neglected c. Status offender d. Child in need of supervision

3. In your opinion is removal of the child appropriate? Would you remove all children in the home or only the toddler?

The general purpose of juvenile court acts, then, is to ensure the welfare of juveniles while protecting their constitutional rights in such a way that removal from the family unit is accomplished only for a reasonable cause and in the best interests of the juvenile and society. A review of your state’s juvenile court act should reflect these basic goals.

Scope In addition to the basic themes discussed previously, all juvenile court acts define the ages and subject matter (conduct) within the scope of the court.

Age Section 2 of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act defines a child as a person who is under the age of 18 years, who is under the age of 21 years but who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 18 years, or who is under the age of 21 years and committed an act of delinquency after becoming 18 years of age but who is transferred to the juvenile court by another court having jurisdiction over him or her (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1968, sec. 2).

As stated in Chapter 2, both upper and lower age limits vary among the states (see your state’s code). The Uniform Juvenile Court Act establishes the age of 18 as the legal age at which actions of an illegal nature will be considered criminal and the wrongdoer will be considered accountable and responsible as an adult. Prior to the 18th birthday, illegal activities will be considered acts of delinquency, with the wrongdoer processed by the juvenile court in a way that removes the taint of criminality and punishment and substitutes treatment, training, and rehabilitation in its place. The Uniform Juvenile Court Act allows two exceptions regarding the legal jurisdictional age of 18 years. Section 2(1)(iii) states that a person under the age of 21 years who commits an act of delinquency after becoming 18 years of age can be transferred to the juvenile court by another court having jurisdiction and, therefore, would be

accorded all of the protection and procedural guidelines of the juvenile court. Section 34 allows for a transfer to other courts of a child under 18 years of age if serious acts of delinquency are alleged and the child was 16 years of age or older at the time of the alleged conduct (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1968, sec. 34). There are stringent guidelines to follow before a waiver to adult court jurisdiction may be permitted. Waivers of juvenile jurisdiction are occurring more frequently and are discussed later in this chapter.

In establishing the age of 18 years as the legal break point between childhood and adulthood, almost all states are consistent with the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, as noted in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3 Upper Age of Original Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 2015

State Age 15 Age 16 Age 17

Number of States 2 7 42

Alabama X

Alaska X

Arizona X

Arkansas X

California X

Colorado X

Connecticut X

Delaware X

District of Columbia X

Florida X

Georgia X

Hawaii X

Idaho X

Illinois X

Indiana X

Iowa X

Kansas X

Kentucky X

Louisiana X

Maine X

Maryland X

Massachusetts X

Michigan X

Minnesota X

Mississippi X

Missouri X

Montana X

Nebraska X

Nevada X

New Hampshire X

New Jersey X

New Mexico X

New York X

North Carolina X

North Dakota X

Ohio X

Oklahoma X

Oregon X

Pennsylvania X

Rhode Island X

South Carolina X

South Dakota X

Tennessee X

Texas X

Utah X

Vermont X

Virginia X

Washington X

West Virginia X

Wisconsin X N o t e :N o t e : Table information is as of the end of the 2015 legislative session. • A juvenile is a youth at or below the upper age of original jurisdiction in a state. • The upper age of jurisdiction is the oldest age at which a juvenile court has original jurisdiction over an individual for law-violating behavior. • State statutes define which youth are under the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court. These definitions are based primarily on age criteria. In most states, the juvenile court has original jurisdiction over all youth charged with a criminal law violation who were below the age of 18 at the time of the offense, arrest, or referral to court. Many states have higher upper ages of juvenile court jurisdiction in status offense, abuse, neglect, or dependency matters—often through age 20. • Many states have statutory exceptions to basic age criteria. The exceptions, related to the youth’s age, alleged offense, and/or prior court history, place certain youth under the original jurisdiction of the criminal court. This is known as statutory exclusion. • In some states, a combination of the youth’s age, offense, and prior record places the youth under the original jurisdiction of both the juvenile and criminal courts. In these situations where the courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the prosecutor is given the authority to decide which court will initially handle the case. This is known as concurrent jurisdiction, prosecutor discretion, or direct filing. • Since 1975 eight states have changed their age criteria. Alabama raised its upper age from 15 to 16 in 1976 and from 16 to 17 in 1977; Wyoming lowered its upper age from 18 to 17 in 1993; New Hampshire and Wisconsin lowered their upper age from 17 to 16 in 1996; Rhode Island lowered its upper age from 17 to 16 and then raised it back to 17 again 4 months later in 2007; Connecticut passed a law in 2007 to raise its upper age from 15 to 17 gradually from 2010 to 2012; Illinois raised its upper age for misdemeanors from 16 to 17 in 2010; Massachusetts raised its upper age from 16 to 17 in 2013; Illinois raised its upper age for most felonies from 16 to 17 in 2014; and New Hampshire raised its upper age from 16 back to 17 in 2015. S o u rc e :S o u rc e : Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (2016).

States may also establish higher age limits in cases of status offenders and abuse, neglect, and dependency—typically through the age of 20 years. In addition, courts may retain jurisdiction after the age of adulthood if the child is serving a disposition in juvenile court. Some states also exclude married or emancipated youth from juvenile court jurisdiction. A total of 36 states allow juvenile court to maintain jurisdiction until the child’s 21st birthday in cases where the child is under juvenile court supervision for delinquency at the time of the 18th birthday (OJJDP, 2003) (as noted in Table 6.4). As we have indicated elsewhere, there is no clearly established minimum age set by juvenile courts with respect to their jurisdiction, although 16 states have attempted to identify a limit. In Table 6.5, we see that children as young as 6 years of age are allowed into the juvenile justice system in North Carolina.

Table 6.4 Extended Age of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 2015

State Age18 Age 19

Age 20

Age 21

Age 22

Age 24

Full Term ofDisposition Order

Number of States 2 4 36 1 1 4 3

Alabama X

Alaska X

Arizona* X

Arkansas X

California X

Colorado X

Connecticut X

Delaware X

District of Columbia X

Florida X

Georgia X

Hawaii X

Idaho X

Illinois X

Indiana X

Iowa X

Kansas X

Kentucky X

Louisiana X

Maine X

Maryland X

Massachusetts X

Michigan X

Minnesota X

Mississippi X

Missouri X

Montana X

Nebraska X

Nevada** X

New Hampshire X

New Jersey X

New Mexico X

New York X

North Carolina X

North Dakota X

Ohio X

Oklahoma X

Oregon X

Pennsylvania X

Rhode Island X

South Carolina X

South Dakota X

Tennessee X

Texas X

Utah X

Vermont X

Virginia X

Washington X

West Virginia X

Wisconsin X

Wyoming X N o t e s :N o t e s : Extended jurisdiction may be restricted to certain offenses or juveniles.

* Arizona statute extends jurisdiction through age 20, but a 1979 state supreme court decision held that juvenile court jurisdiction terminates at age 18.

*** The Nevada statute extends jurisdiction until the full term of the disposition order for sex offenders.Table information is as of the end of the 2015 legislative session. • Juvenile court authority over a youth for dispositional purposes in delinquency matters may extend beyond the upper age of original jurisdiction. • Through extended jurisdiction mechanisms, legislatures enable the court to provide sanctions and services for a duration of time that is in the best interests of the juvenile and the public, even for older juveniles who have reached the age at which original juvenile court jurisdiction ends. • An upper age of 18 means that the juvenile court loses jurisdiction over a child when they turn 19; an upper age of 19 means that a juvenile court loses jurisdiction when a child turns 20; and an upper age of 20 means that a juvenile court loses jurisdiction over a child when they turn 21. • Extended jurisdiction may be restricted to certain offenses or juveniles (such as violent offenses, habitual offenders, and juveniles under correctional commitment). • In some states, the juvenile court may actually impose adult correctional sanctions on certain adjudicated delinquents that extend the term of confinement well beyond the upper age of juvenile jurisdiction. Such sentencing options are included in the set of dispositional options known as blended sentencing. • In Alaska, jurisdiction can extend for an additional one-year period if it is in the best interests of the person and the person consents. • Mississippi law states that juveniles charged with robbery, arson, and drug offenses can remain in the juvenile justice system. S o u rc e :S o u rc e : Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (2016).

Table 6.5 Upper and Lower Age of Juvenile Court Delinquency and Status Offense Jurisdiction, 2015

State Delinquency Jurisdiction Status Jurisdiction

Lower Age Upper Age Lower Age Upper Age

Alabama NS 17 NS 17

Alaska NS 17 NS 17

Arizona 8 17 NS 17

Arkansas 10 17 Birth 17

California NS 17 NS 17

Colorado 10 17 NS 17

Connecticut 7 17 7 17

Delaware NS 17 NS 17

District of Columbia NS 17 NS 17

Florida NS 17 NS 17

Georgia NS 16 NS 17

Hawaii NS 17 NS 17

Idaho NS 17 NS 17

Illinois NS 17 NS 17

Indiana NS 17 NS 17

Iowa NS 17 NS 17

Kansas 10 17 NS 17

Kentucky NS 17 NS 17

Louisiana 10 16 NS 17

Maine NS 17 NS 17

Maryland 7 17 NS 17

Massachusetts 7 17 6 17

Michigan NS 16 NS 17

Minnesota 10 17 NS 17

Mississippi 10 17 7 17

Missouri NS 16 NS 17

Montana NS 17 NS 17

Nebraska NS 17 NS 17

Nevada NS 17 NS 17

New Hampshire NS 17 NS 17

New Jersey NS 17 NS 17

New Mexico NS 17 NS 17

New York 7 15 NS 17

North Carolina 6 15 6 17

North Dakota 7 17 NS 17

Ohio NS 17 NS 17

Oklahoma NS 17 NS 17

Oregon NS 17 NS 17

Pennsylvania 10 17 NS 17

Rhode Island NS 17 NS 17

South Carolina NS 16 NS 16

South Dakota 10 17 NS 17

Tennessee NS 17 NS 17

Texas 10 16 10 16

Utah NS 17 NS 17

Vermont 10 17 NS 17

Virginia NS 17 NS 17

Washington* NS 17 NS 17

West Virginia NS 17 NS 17

Wisconsin 10 16 NS 17

Wyoming NS 17 NS 17 N o t e s :N o t e s : Table information is as of the end of the 2015 legislative session. NS = lower age not specified.

* In Washington the lower age of delinquency jurisdiction is applied through a state juvenile court rule, which references a criminal code provision establishing the age youth are presumed to be incapable of committing crime. • The upper age of jurisdiction is the oldest age at which a juvenile court has original jurisdiction over an individual for law-violating behavior. An upper age of 15 means that the juvenile court loses jurisdiction over a child when they turn 16; an upper age of 16 means that a juvenile court loses jurisdiction when a child turns 17; and an upper age of 17 means that a juvenile court loses jurisdiction over a child

when they turn 18. • State statutes define which youth are under the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court. These definitions are based primarily on age criteria. In most states, the juvenile court has original jurisdiction over all youth charged with a criminal law violation who were below the age of 18 at the time of the offense, arrest, or referral to court. Some states have higher upper ages of juvenile court jurisdiction in status offense, abuse, neglect, or dependency matters—often through age 20. • Many states have statutory exceptions to basic age criteria. The exceptions, related to the youth’s age, alleged offense, and/or prior court history, place certain youth under the original jurisdiction of the criminal court. This is known as statutory exclusion. • In some states, a combination of the youth’s age, offense, and prior record places the youth under the original jurisdiction of both the juvenile and criminal courts. In these situations where the courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the prosecutor is given the authority to decide which court will initially handle the case. This is known as concurrent jurisdiction, prosecutor discretion, or direct filing. • Since 1975 eight states have changed their age criteria. Alabama raised its upper age from 15 to 16 in 1976 and from 16 to 17 in 1977; Wyoming lowered its upper age from 18 to 17 in 1993; New Hampshire and Wisconsin lowered their upper age from 17 to 16 in 1996; Rhode Island lowered its upper age from 17 to 16 and then raised it back to 17 again 4 months later in 2007; Connecticut passed a law in 2007 to raise its upper age from 15 to 17 gradually from 2010 to 2012; Illinois raised its upper age for misdemeanors from 16 to 17 in 2010; Massachusetts raised its upper age from 16 to 17 in 2013; Illinois raised its upper age for most felonies from 16 to 17 in 2014; and New Hampshire raised its upper age from 16 back to 17 in 2015. S o u rc e :S o u rc e : Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (2016).

Other states rely on case law or common law in determining the lower age limit. They presume that children under a certain age cannot form mens rea and are exempt from prosecution and sentencing (OJJDP, 2003). Just as there have been few clear guidelines for processing youth in matters of delinquency, there have been vague guidelines for determining the age youth may be found to be abused or neglected.

Delinquent Acts The Uniform Juvenile Court Act clearly limits the definition of delinquency by stating, in essence, that a delinquent act is an act designated as a crime by local ordinance, state law, or federal law. Excluded from acts constituting delinquency are vague activities, such as incorrigibility, ungovernability, habitual disobedience, and other status offenses, which are legal offenses applicable only to children and not to adults. At the time when the Uniform Juvenile Court Act was drafted in 1968, many states legally defined delinquency as encompassing a broad spectrum of behaviors. The proposal by the drafters of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act excluded the broader definition of activities labeled as delinquent and focused only on violations of laws that are applicable to both adults and children. This narrow interpretation was consistent with the legalistic trend occurring during the latter 1960s. By narrowing the legal definition of delinquency, the Uniform Juvenile Court Act did not ignore other types of activities that fall within the court’s jurisdiction but placed these activities outside the realm of delinquent acts. A child who is “beyond the control of his parents,” “habitually truant from school,” or “habitually disobedient, uncontrolled, wayward, incorrigible, indecent, or deports himself or herself as to injure or endanger the morals or health of themself [sic] or others” was at one time considered to be delinquent in some states (Indiana Code Annotated, 31-37-1-1 to 31-37-2-6, 1997). The number of states with such a broad definition of delinquency is decreasing. A major difficulty with including these vague activities within the delinquent behavior category concerns the issue of who defines what is incorrigible, indecent, or habitual misconduct and the nature of the standard used to determine this behavior. These statutory expressions and a number of others like them have invited challenge on the grounds that they are unconstitutionally vague. There are no standardized definitions for habitual, wayward, incorrigible, and so on. As a result, such charges in conjunction with delinquency are inevitably challenged in the courts.

It is interesting to note that prior to the development of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act in 1968, several states had already started restricting the definition of delinquency to include only those activities that would be punishable as crimes if committed by adults. For example, in New York under the pre-1962 Children’s Court Act, the term juvenile delinquency included ungovernability and incorrigibility. However, in 1962, the Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization, which drafted the Family Court Act (New York Sessions Laws, vol. 2, 3428, 3434, McKinney, 1962), developed the concept of a person in need of supervision to cover noncriminal status offenses, and the term juvenile delinquent was narrowed to include only persons over 7 and under 16 years of age who commit any act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime. With a more specific definition of delinquency, it was inevitable that due process procedures, rules of evidence, and constitutional rights would emerge as important issues in Supreme Court decisions involving the rights of juveniles in delinquency proceedings. As the states moved toward a

more specific definition of delinquency, additional appellate decisions were rendered regarding “due process and fair treatment.” The effect of this narrow interpretation of delinquency has been the advent of an adjudicatory process that is more formalized and that ensures and protects the juvenile’s procedural and constitutional rights. This trend is clearly consistent with the spirit behind the creation of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act. Some states even list all forms of conduct subject to juvenile court jurisdiction in one general category (Louisiana Law, Children’s Code, 2012; Montana Code Annotated, Title 41, 2011; Wisconsin Code, ch. 938, 2011).

Section 2(3) of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act indicates that an adjudicated delinquent is in need of “treatment or rehabilitation.” The development of narrower definitions of delinquency and more formalized “due process models” is not intended to cause the juvenile court to abandon rehabilitation and treatment. This philosophy was stated as early as 1909, when it was pointed out that “the goal of the juvenile court is not so much to crush but to develop, not to make the juvenile a criminal but a worthy citizen” (Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated, bk. 29A, art. 7; McKinney, 1975). This initial concept of rehabilitation and treatment has been affirmed in many decisions and is summarized briefly by the Supreme Court case In re Gault, where the Court reaffirms the original juvenile court philosophy that “the child is to be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, are to be ‘clinical’ rather than ‘punitive’” (Faust & Brantingham, 1974, pp. 369–370). It is important to remember that although the juvenile court operates under the “treatment and rehabilitation” concept, the court is also charged with protecting the community against unlawful and violent conduct. To fulfill this obligation, the court may resort to incarceration or imprisonment. This clash between the rehabilitative ideal and the clear, present necessity to protect the community in certain situations has been described as the “schizophrenic nature” of the juvenile court process (Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated, bk. 29A, art. 7; McKinney, 1975).

It is clear that a majority of the states have moved toward a narrower definition of delinquency. Inherent in this trend is the movement toward formalizing the legal procedures and processes afforded to the accused delinquent. The importance of this trend is twofold. First, legal definitions of delinquency have become more standardized and by law require a violation or attempted violation of the criminal code. Second, the process of proving the allegation of delinquency may include only the same types of evidentiary materials that would be admitted if the same charges were levied against an adult. This is a considerable change from past practices in many juvenile courts, where much of the evidentiary material that was introduced to prove an act of delinquency was basically irrelevant material concerning the juvenile’s family, peers, school behavior, and other information about his or her environment. The establishment of reasonable proof that the juvenile did violate the law was lost in the process. The case was often weighed and decided on factors other than establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile committed the act of which he or she had been accused. The juvenile court is a court of law. The juvenile adjudicatory process and the juvenile court must be totally dedicated to working within a legal framework that is conducive to reaching the truth and serving the ends of justice. To do otherwise would result in what is best described in an often-quoted passage of the Kent decision where the U.S. Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas stated, “There is evidence . . . that the child receives the worst of both worlds; that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children” (Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 546, 1966).

Without a doubt, there is a place in the juvenile justice system for consideration of the adjudicated delinquent’s family and his or her environment. However, such consideration should be given only after an adjudication of delinquency rather than used as the basis for adjudication. For instance, suppose that as an adult you have been accused of “breaking and entering” and that throughout the pretrial process and during the course of the trial nearly all of the evidence and information introduced focuses on your family, your associations, your attitude, and your overall environment. Furthermore, only a minimum amount of court time and effort is devoted to establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that you did in fact violate the law by breaking and entering, and even then most of this evidence is hearsay, not subjected to cross-examination, and based on belief rather than proof. Yet you are convicted. Such cases were fairly common in the juvenile justice system until the Gault decision in 1967. The focus on due process to protect the accused juvenile’s constitutional rights is as important as determining whether the act was committed by the accused. The legal issue of delinquency must be determined not on the basis of a social investigation describing the minor’s environment but rather on the basis of whether the evidence supports or denies the allegation of delinquent acts.

Unruly Children Section 2(4) of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act defines an unruly child as a child who does the following:

1. While subject to compulsory school attendance is habitually and without justification truant from school 2. Is habitually disobedient of the reasonable and lawful commands of his parent, guardian, or other custodian

and is ungovernable 3. Has committed an offense applicable only to a child 4. In any of the foregoing is in need of treatment or rehabilitation

At one time, a majority of states included these activities in the delinquent behavior category, which often resulted in the official label of delinquent and led to the possibility of being incarcerated in a juvenile correctional institution for treatment and rehabilitation. The Uniform Juvenile Court Act recognizes that such activities may require the aid and services provided by the juvenile court but also recognizes that these minors should not be included in the delinquent category. According to Section 32 of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, unruly children cannot be placed in a correctional institution unless the court finds, after a further hearing, that they are not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation under a previous noncorrectional disposition.

The unruly child is generally characterized by activities that are noncriminal or minor violations of law. Types of offenses, such as curfew violations and running away from home, are referred to as status offenses (acts that are offenses only because of the age of the offender). If the same acts were committed by an adult, they would not be violations of law. A substantial number of states have separated the types of activities described as unruly by the Uniform Juvenile Court Act from delinquency and have placed them in the nondelinquent category of in need of supervision (New York Family Court Act, 712[a]; McKinney, 1999; North Carolina Code, 7b-1501, 2010; Ohio Revised Code § 2151.022, 2011; Texas Family Code, Title 3, Juvenile Justice Code, ch. 51[15], 2011). Table 6.6 describes the various titles used to classify unruly children in U.S. states.

Table 6.6 Status Offender Classification, 2013

State In Need of Supervision*

Status Offender

In Need of Services**

In Need of Aid, Assistance or Care***

Unruly No SpecificClassification Other

Number of States 12 11 12 4 3 3 15

Alabama X X

Alaska X

Arizona X

Arkansas X

California X

Colorado X X

Connecticut X

Delaware X

DC X

Florida X

Georgia X

Hawaii X

Idaho X

Illinois X X

Indiana X

Iowa X X

Kansas X

Kentucky X

Louisiana X

Maine X

Maryland X

Massachusetts X

Michigan X

Minnesota X X

Mississippi X

Missouri X