Morey Unit Hostage Situation Analysis

Assignment Content

  1. Review the Morley Unit Hostage Incident document.
    Write a 1,050- to 1,400-word analysis of the Arizona Department of Corrections’ Morey Unit hostage situation.
    Make recommendations for how the situation could have been avoided and mitigated, based on an analysis of the situation and the response.

    • Identify and assess the function of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan framework
    • Contrast a sampling of public-private partnerships for infrastructure security.
    • Analyze and identify the basic steps of a vulnerability assessment

Format your analysis consistent with APA guidelines.

The Morey Unit Hostage Incident While there were no escapes or fatalities, the taking of hostages and the seizure of the tower reveal critical

– and correctable – flaws in Arizona’s prison system

IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS of Sunday, January 18,

2004, inmates Ricky K. Wassenaar, serving 26 years in prison,

and Steven J. Coy, serving a life sentence, attempted to escape

from the Morey Unit of the Lewis Prison Complex located near

Buckeye, Arizona, 50 miles southwest of Phoenix.

The Morey Unit, which opened in January 1999, is a

cellblock-style facility that houses 840 inmates (designed

capacity: 800). The unit houses a diverse population of Level 2,

3 and 4 inmates, including “protective segregation” inmates, i.e.,

those who are considered dangerous or in personal danger are

segregated from the general prison population. The protective

segregation population, and the number of inmates serving life

sentences (100), at Morey is the largest of any unit in Arizona’s

corrections system.

The two inmates subdued the two correctional officers on

duty and seized the unit’s tower triggering a 15-day standoff, the

longest prison hostage situation in the nation’s history.

An account of the hostage taking and the negotiations that

led to the inmates’ surrender and the safe release of both hostages

follows, along with a summary of findings and recommendations

aimed at preventing future crises and addressing significant

operational, administrative and fiscal issues related to the

Arizona Department of Corrections.

T H E H O S T A G E T A K I N G

At 2:30 a.m. on January 18, the 19 members of an inmate kitchen work crew at the Morey Unit were released from their housing units to report for duty at the Morey kitchen.

At approximately 3:15 a.m., the kitchen office was occupied by Correctional Officer Kenneth MARTIN and a female civilian kitchen employee.1 A member of the kitchen work crew, inmate Ricky K. Wassenaar, entered the kitchen office through the open door. Another inmate, Steven J. Coy, followed him in, positioning himself in the kitchen office doorway and blocking the only exit.

1

MARTIN was the only officer assigned on duty in the kitchen, consistent with facility operations and procedures.

Wassennar and Coy seize the kitchen

Wassenaar was armed with a “shank,” a homemade knife-like weapon. Wassenaar approached MARTIN, produced the shank,2 and told him that “this is an escape” and “I’ve got nothing to lose.” He ordered MARTIN to remove his uniform shirt (to which MARTIN’s Department of Corrections identification card was attached) and boots. After MARTIN complied, Wassenaar handcuffed MARTIN to a cage in the tool room inside the kitchen office. The other inmate, Coy, who also possessed a shank, brought the female worker into the tool room, ordered her to lie down on her stomach, and tied her hands and feet together with electrical wire.

With MARTIN and the female kitchen worker immobilized, Wassenaar and Coy left the tool room for a short time and then returned. Coy removed 2 The two inmates underwent a pat-down search by Correctional Officer John COOPER before they left their housing unit. However, they were not patted down, as required by post order, upon arriving at the kitchen. Further, at the time this report was prepared, it was not known whether or not the two inmates were escorted from their housing unit to the dining facility.

Morey Unit, Lewis Prison Complex, Buckeye, Arizona

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2

MARTIN’s pants and gave them to Wassenaar, who put on MARTIN’s uniform, boots and jacket and then shaved off his beard with an electric razor.3 Wassenaar asked MARTIN for the kitchen telephone number, and MARTIN complied.

Wassenaar went to the kitchen work area, where he advised the other inmate kitchen workers of his escape attempt and invited them to join him. When none of them, including the inmates working outside on the loading dock, accepted his invitation, he locked them in the kitchen dry storage area.

At about 4:15 a.m., an hour after he first entered the kitchen office, Wassenaar left the kitchen carrying a 30-inch stainless steel stirring paddle. Coy remained in the kitchen office. Wassenaar walked through the dining area and exited into the Morey Unit’s Red Yard, using MARTIN’s key to unlock the door. Shortly after Wassenaar left the kitchen area, inmate Coy sexually assaulted the female kitchen worker.

Wassenaar seizes the tower

At about 4:20 a.m., Wassenaar approached the Red Yard gate area that surrounds the 20-foot tower and pressed the access buzzer in the intercom box at the gate. Upstairs in the tower were Correctional Officers Jason N. AUCH and Jane DOE.4 AUCH looked at the monitor and, seeing what he believed to be a fellow correctional officer, buzzed the gate open, allowing Wassenaar to enter the tower area. Wassenaar then approached the lower tower door, which, like the entrance gate, was also locked and remotely controlled by AUCH. AUCH buzzed the door open.5

AUCH went to the stairs to meet his presumed colleague. Wassenaar kept his head down as he climbed the stairs. As he neared the top he looked up, and AUCH realized that he did not recognize the individual approaching him. Before AUCH could react, Wassenaar struck him with the stirring paddle, fracturing AUCH’s orbital bone and temporarily incapacitating him.

Unarmed, Officer DOE attacked Wassenaar, who overpowered DOE and cuffed her hands behind her. Wassenaar forced DOE and Auch to tell him where the

3 The razor belonged to Wassenaar. At the time this report was prepared, it was not determined how the razor made its way into the kitchen.

4 “Jane Doe” is a fictitious name used to protect the female officer’s identity.

5 The post order for the tower (PO 051) did not require positive identification procedures.

weapons were, how to operate them, and how to operate the control panel. Wassenaar then ordered AUCH to the lower part of the tower.6

Coy remains in the kitchen

At about 4:45 a.m., with the escape attempt still unknown to Morey Unit authorities, Correctional Officer Robert D. CORNETT arrived in the kitchen to relieve MARTIN, 45 minutes ahead of CORNETT’s scheduled 5:30 a.m. shift. It struck him as odd that food was on the counters but he did not see any inmate kitchen workers. He saw Coy standing by the “food trap,” a pass-through that is used to slide trays between the kitchen and the dining area. Coy’s head was in the trap, and he seemed to be talking with someone. CORNETT and Coy had a brief conversation, and CORNETT walked past Coy toward the kitchen office. As CORNETT made his way up the ramp to the kitchen office, Coy approached him from behind, pressed a shank against CORNETT’s waist and ordered CORNETT to keep going. CORNETT did so.

Entering the tool room, CORNETT saw the bound female worker face down on the floor and MARTIN handcuffed to the front of the tool rack. Coy took away CORNETT’s handcuffs and radio, handcuffed CORNETT to the right side of the tool rack, and went to the dining area. A few minutes later, the kitchen phone rang. Coy returned, picked up the receiver, said, “CO II Martin,” and hung up. (It is possible that Wassenaar placed the call from the tower.)

A few minutes later, a call came in on MARTIN’s radio from Correctional Officer Coy C. KELLEY,

6 Tower personnel have access to weapons (an AR-15 assault rifle, a 12-gauge shotgun, and a 37mm launcher), but the weapons were neither loaded nor readily available to the officers.

The Lewis Prison Complex. The 800-bed Morey Unit (circled) opened in January 1999.

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3

checking on MARTIN’s welfare. Coy held the radio to MARTIN’s mouth and, complying with Coy’s instruction, MARTIN responded by saying “Code Four” (indicating “situation normal”).

KELLEY also radioed the tower requesting clearance to move inmates across the yard. DOE, following Wassenaar’s orders, advised KELLEY that the yard was not clear, effectively denying KELLEY’s request.

Officer observes “horseplay”

Nevertheless, at about 4:50 a.m., Correctional Officers KELLEY and Elizabeth M. DEBAUGH escorted inmates Jack R. Hudson, Jr., and Michael Sifford from Building Two to early recreation and chow. Their route took them past the tower where Wassenaar held his two captives.

As the officers and inmates walked past the tower on the Blue Yard side of the “spline” (a protected walkway) that separates the two yards, KELLEY looked in the window at the base of the tower. The lights were out, and KELLEY saw two correctional officers wrestling or engaged in what he later termed “horseplay.” In fact, what he unknowingly witnessed was Officer AUCH lying handcuffed on the floor of the lower tower.

KELLEY later told investigators that he tried to get into the Blue Yard tower gate but that the gate was not operational, and that he tried to contact the officers in the tower via the speaker box. KELLEY and DEBAUGH proceeded toward the kitchen (Hudson had already continued to the dining area, and Sifford, who did not wish to eat, went directly to his job in the recreational area.).

KELLEY and DEBAUGH entered the dining facility at 4:53 a.m. Hudson placed his personal items on one of the tables and went to the food trap. Hudson knocked on the door of the food trap, and when no food appeared KELLEY and DEBAUGH also knocked. The officers then tried to radio MARTIN, telling him to open the kitchen door. There was no response.

At approximately 4:54 a.m. KELLEY again knocked on the food trap and DEBAUGH sat at the first table in the chow hall. After no response at the food trap, KELLEY joined DEBAUGH at the first table. Inmate Coy opened the food trap and said something that sounded like, “Heidi, Heidi, Ho.” KELLEY told Inmate Coy he needed to talk to MARTIN. Inmate Coy said, “Alright,” and closed the trap. KELLEY told DEBAUGH he believed he saw something through the tower

window and did not feel right about it. DEBAUGH attempted to contact the tower via her radio and received no response. After waiting a few minutes, KELLEY radioed MARTIN again and received no response.

* * * * *

The chase from the dining facility

Five minutes after arriving at the dining facility, KELLEY and DEBAUGH, who were standing just outside the kitchen door, heard the rattle of keys from the other side of the door.

At approximately 4:59 a.m., CORNETT opened the kitchen door at the direction of Inmate Coy, who was standing behind CORNETT. CORNETT believed he was opening the kitchen door for Inmate Thunderhorse but found KELLEY and DEBAUGH instead. Officer CORNETT later stated that he decided to try to get away from Inmate Coy to get help for the other staff in the kitchen.

CORNETT ran into the dining area past KELLEY and DEBAUGH, yelling “Call IMS, call IMS.” (An “Incident Management System” report alerts staff of a situation requiring attention.) Coy followed and pinned KELLEY against a wall. When KELLEY tried to jerk the shank from Coy’s hand, Coy slashed KELLEY’s face with the shank and pushed him to the floor.

Coy then followed CORNETT, who fled through the exit door onto the Blue Yard. DEBAUGH radioed an alert on her radio advising that an officer was down and an inmate was chasing another officer on the yard. Her report activated the unit’s IMS. KELLEY and DEBAUGH then pursued Coy.7

The chase took them near the tower, to a point close to the blue gate entrance to the tower area, where Coy was stopped by several officers responding to DEBAUGH’s IMS. Coy threatened the officers with his shank. The officers ordered Coy to drop his weapon and lie on the ground. After initially refusing to comply with their orders, Coy finally lay down with his arms spread, but he did not release the shank. As the officers approached him, he got back to his feet and again swung his shank at the officers. A couple of

7 Immediately after DeBaugh issued the IMS, a male voice on the radio replied, “Negative, negative, negative.” It is possible that the voice belonged to Wassenaar, trying to discourage responses to the IMS. Whether it was Wassenaar or a correctional officer, the “negative” response may have contributed to the belief among some officers that the IMS was a drill instead of an actual alert .

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4

corrections officers attempted to subdue Coy with pepper spray, but, it was ineffective.

Wassenaar foils Coy’s capture

Before the officers could take further action, Wassenaar, standing 20 to 25 feet away behind the blue gate near the base of the tower, fired through the blue gate an undetermined number of rounds (most estimates ranged from nine to ten) from an AR-15 rifle toward JONES and the other officers. Seeing what appeared to be a uniformed correctional officer holding the rifle, JONES asked the shooter whom he was firing at. Wassenaar shouted, “You, (expletive).” JONES directed all officers to clear the yard. Coy, standing alone in the yard, went to the Blue tower gate, from where Wassenaar let him into the tower. Wassenaar and Coy were now in control of the tower and of their hostages, AUCH and DOE. Shortly after entering the tower, Coy sexually assaulted Officer DOE.

In all, Wassenaar fired approximately 14 rifle rounds during the early stage of the incident – approximately nine from the lower tower and at least five from the upper tower. While it may seem remarkable that Wassenaar’s shots, from relatively close range, failed to hit any human targets, it is likely that firing through the gate restricted his ability to effectively aim the weapon.

As the other officers withdrew to the Administration building, KELLEY, DEBAUGH, JONES and Sgt. Andrew J. KNEIDEL ran to the dining facility, locked the outer door and went to the kitchen. KNEIDEL found MARTIN and the female worker in the kitchen office. The officers also found and performed a head count of the inmates who had been locked in the dry storage area. All officers and inmates were removed from the dining facility by the Tactical Support Unit.

At the Administration building, JONES went into the Deputy Warden’s conference room and started to account for his staff. Two officers were missing: AUCH and DOE.

D O C R E S P O N S E

Captain Michael FORBECK was conducting perimeter checks at the Lewis Complex when he heard the shots fired by Wassenaar. After being briefed on the situation, FORBECK believed there was a risk of the two inmates rushing the Administration area, armed

with weapons stored in the tower, in an attempt to escape. He organized a defense of the Administration area, with shotguns loaded with birdshot. He also contacted the other Lewis units; ordered a Complex- wide shutdown; ordered Tactical Support Unit (TSU) assistance for the Morey Unit; and notified the Buckeye Police Department, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and the local fire department.

At 5:25 a.m. on January 18, approximately 25 minutes after DEBAUGH issued her IMS from the Morey dining facility, Department of Corrections (DOC) Southern Regional Operations Director MEG SAVAGE received a page from the Lewis Complex, advising her of a serious, unspecified inmate disturbance. Within the hour:

The duty officer at the Lewis Complex was advised of the hostage situation, as was DOC Division Director Jeff HOOD, who, in turn, notified Lewis Complex Warden William GASPAR.

The DOC Tactical Support Unit (TSU), based at Perryville, was activated and placed on standby.

DOC contacted the Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) to request the assignment of hostage negotiators.

Shortly after 6:30 a.m., Dennis Burke, Chief of Staff to Governor Janet Napolitano, was notified of the incident. He in turn notified the Governor and other key staff members. DOC Director Dora SCHRIRO, who was out of state at the time of the incident, returned to Arizona and arrived at the Command Center at 11:30 a.m. The Command Center had been established earlier in the morning at DOC headquarters in Phoenix.

The DOC Inmate Management System (IMS) policy establishes a command structure to respond to critical incidents. The incident is managed locally by the on-site Incident Commander (IC) and, depending on the seriousness of the situation, also from Central Office by the agency Incident Commander. During the Morey hostage situation, three command centers were established: two on-site command centers (one to manage the events occurring in the tower and another to manage the day-to-day complex operation, complex perimeter security, and coordinate tactical maneuvers occurring at the Lewis Complex Rast Unit), in addition to the agency command center.

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5

At the Lewis Complex, by 7:45 a.m. TSU snipers were positioned on buildings surrounding the tower, and DPS hostage negotiators, operating under DOC authority, and a DPS SWAT team were on site. A Command Post was set up in the Warden’s conference room. (By the time the incident was resolved, a total of 30 negotiators had been deployed – 10 of whom actually conducted negotiations – from DPS, DOC, the Phoenix, Tempe and Glendale police departments, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and the FBI.)

Over 16 law enforcement agencies provided support and assistance during the course of the incident:

DPS deployed over 230 officers, with a core element during the incident of about 75 detectives and officers and surveillance specialists.

The Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office provided over 100 field force personnel.

The FBI assigned approximately 100 personnel.

One FBI commander noted that at any given time at Lewis there was over 300 years of experience in seeking negotiated and/or tactical solutions.

From the moment they were deployed, the tactical teams were authorized to utilize their use-of-force policies.

Timeline. The following summary chronology and timeline of the 15 days of the hostage situation contains approximate times, and the panel will continue to examine the various accounts and will supplement any significant discrepancies as they are discovered.

Sunday, January 18 7:00 a.m. Wassenaar phones Captain BARBARA

SAVAGE, Morey Unit Chief of Security, to advise her that AUCH has a head injury and needs medical attention. Wassenaar wants to trade AUCH for a lieutenant or sergeant. SAVAGE refuses. Wassenaar demands a helicopter and a pizza. He also warns that if either of the inmates is killed, the other will kill the hostage officers.

8:05 a.m. A DPS negotiator makes phone contact with Wassenaar. The call lasts seven minutes.

8:20 a.m. Wassenaar demands that he receive handcuff keys and that he be allowed to talk to Warden Gaspar and Governor Napolitano. He repeats his demand for a helicopter.

8:20-11:20 a.m. Negotiators have various conversations with Wassenaar, in which he backs off from his demand for a helicopter, demands an AM/FM radio, describes the hostages’ injuries, and allows officers to speak briefly to one hostage.

11:19 a.m. Negotiators on the phone with Wassenaar play a tape-recorded message from his sister, pleading for him to end the situation peacefully.

11:38 a.m. Negotiators share with Wassenaar the plan to deliver a handcuff key in exchange for bullets.

12:36 p.m. Wassenaar demands to talk to a television news crew.

12:30-5:30 p.m. Various phone conversations occur between negotiators and Wassenaar.

5:25 p.m. A DPS robot delivers an AM/FM radio to the inmates.

Throughout the day, the Special Operations Unit of the Arizona Department of Public Safety developed a series of detailed, comprehensive tactical resolutions of the hostage situation, based on a variety of scenarios.

Evening: Negotiations continue on conditions for delivering a key to the inmates.

Monday, January 19

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

6:52 a.m. DPS robot delivers a radio battery for the two-way radio already in the tower, plus one handcuff key, a radio charger, and cookies.

7:52 a.m. Inmates return the handcuff key along with three shotgun shells and non-lethal rubber ball rounds used for crowd control.

1:08 p.m. DPS robot delivers cigarettes, hygiene supplies, bottled water and styrofoam cups.

1:18 p.m. Inmates turn in wooden, non-lethal projectiles.

3:00 p.m. At the Command Center, Governor Napolitano and key staff members receive their daily briefing from DOC Director SCHRIRO, key DOC staff and interagency personnel (Governor’s daily briefing) along with periodic phone updates throughout the day and night.

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6

Tuesday, January 20

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

12:30 p.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

1:22-1:38 p.m. DPS robot delivers one handcuff key, bottled water, soap, coffee and cigarettes. In return, inmates allow negotiators to visually confirm the correctional officers being held.

9:51 p.m. DPS robot delivers cheeseburgers, french fries, soft drinks, cigarettes and coffee. In return, inmates turn in numerous types of prescription drugs, two hand-made shanks, a canister of Mace and a cartridge for a 37mm firearm.

11:00 p.m. A health and welfare check is conducted with hostages via two-way radio.

Wednesday, January 21

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

8:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

12:20 p.m. DPS robot delivers Tylenol and three small cups. In return, inmates return two pepper spray gas canisters.

12:22 p.m. Inmates fire pepper spray gas into the yard after they discover that a nearby fence had been cut.

7:29 p.m. Negotiators receive voice confirmation of the alertness of both hostages.

Thursday, January 22

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

9:30 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

10:29 a.m. Wassenaar asks to speak to a television reporter, answering questions the reporter would fax to him.

12:15 p.m. Negotiators give inmates Interstate Compact letters from other states to review.

3:20 p.m. Both correctional officers appear briefly on the roof, allowing for a visual welfare inspection.

9:30 p.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

Friday, January 23

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

9:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

4:50 p.m. Wassenaar demands to speak to a reporter on live radio.

8:45 p.m. Negotiators discuss with Wassenaar the terms of releasing one correctional officer.

Saturday, January 24

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

10:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

3:15 p.m. DPS robot delivers roast beef, dried beans, summer sausages, tortillas, potato chips, soft drinks, cheese, tuna, mayonnaise, and candy bars. This represents half of the food the inmates requested. The other half would be delivered after the safe release of an officer.

3:20 p.m. First hostage release. The inmates release Correctional Officer AUCH from the tower (negotiators had made several overtures to the inmates to release Officer Doe first). He is examined by medical personnel and interviewed by TSU members before being transported by ground ambulance and helicopter to Good Samaritan Hospital in Phoenix. AUCH was treated for injuries, including an orbital fracture that required surgery. He was also interviewed at the hospital by members of the DOC Criminal Investigation Unit, who were gathering information to support the eventual criminal referral against the two inmates.

3:38 p.m. SWAT team members deliver second half of the food request: cheeseburgers, french fries, pizzas, cigarettes, and cheese.

7:15 p.m. Negotiators hear the voice of Correctional Officer DOE voice during a conversation with Coy, confirming her alertness.

Sunday, January 25

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

Family members of one inmate arrive in Arizona to serve as

third-party intermediaries.

10:00 a.m. At the Command Center, Governor Napolitano and key staff members receive their daily briefing from DOC Director SCHRIRO, key DOC staff and interagency personnel.

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7

Monday, January 26

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

10:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

Tuesday, January 27

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

10:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

5:05-5:10 p.m. SWAT team members deliver towels, blankets and washcloths. In return, inmates move DOE to the observation deck, making her visible to negotiators for a welfare check.

5:32 p.m. Wassenaar asks to be interviewed on radio as a term of his release, as confirmation that the State will make good on the terms.

Wednesday, January 28

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue on and off

throughout the day.

Family members of the other inmate arrive in Arizona to

assist in negotiations.

9:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

12:28 p.m. SWAT team members deliver hygiene products for the inmates and DOE in return for a health and welfare check of DOE.

2:21 p.m. Negotiators hear DOE in the background of a phone call with Wassenaar, confirming her alertness.

Thursday, January 29

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

9:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

3:40 p.m. SWAT team members deliver cinnamon rolls, tortillas and cigarettes, in return for a health and welfare check of DOE conducted by a paramedic.

10:00 p.m. Governor and key staff meet with Director SCHRIRO and key DOC staff regarding the progress of negotiations, including a demand by Wassenaar to be interviewed on radio. The Governor recommends that the radio interview of Wassenaar not be played live without an agreement by the inmates to surrender and release Officer Doe safely.

Friday, January 30

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

10:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

3:36 p.m. SWAT team members deliver cinnamon rolls, Pedialite, Gatorade and cigarettes, in return for a health and welfare check of DOE.

7:16 p.m. DOE is interviewed by a physician for a health and welfare check.

Saturday, January 31

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

10:00 a.m. Key staff to the Governor receive the daily briefing at the Command Center from Director SCHRIRO and key Corrections staff and interagency personnel.

3:56 p.m. SWAT team members deliver an onion, bread and Gatorade.

5:22 p.m. Wassenaar appears on the observation deck holding a shotgun backwards in his right hand.

7:17 p.m. DOE is interviewed via phone by a physician for a health and welfare update.

8:08 p.m. SWAT team members deliver tuna, Pedialite and cigarettes.

Sunday, February 1 9:20 a.m. A third-party intermediary, an uncle of

inmate Coy, is on the phone.

10:04 a.m. Wassenaar identifies the negotiator with whom he wants to deal and discusses surrender demands. Additional demands are made once the designated negotiator is on site.

10:14 a.m. DOE’s voice is heard; she says that she is “fine.”

11:04 a.m. Cigarettes are delivered to inmates.

11:29 a.m. Inmates make demands:

Turn on power for bathroom access.

Wassenaar: talk to his sister.

Coy: hear a tape of his ex-wife.

Property in van

Paperwork confirming no DOC or county custody for future court proceedings

Clothing

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8

Steak, beer and pizza

11:52 a.m. Governor Napolitano arrives at Central Command.

12:35 p.m. Negotiators play a tape of Coy’s ex-wife.

12:51 p.m. DOE is observed on the roof of the tower with Wassenaar. She does not leave hatch area.

1:26 p.m. Call with Wassenaar’s sister.

2:04 p.m. Wassenaar calls to say that the power is not turned on, there will be no contact with DOE, and he will have additional demands in 24 hours. If, by that time, the power is not turned on and the additional demands are not met, there will be no contact for 48 hours, and he will have additional demands.

2:39 p.m. The power is switched on.

2:46 p.m. Wassenaar fires 37mm multiple baton rounds (non-lethal).

2:57 p.m. Wassenaar reports no power.

3:13 p.m. Two inmate uniforms, including underwear, socks and shoes, and copies of revised paperwork are delivered to the inmates. Wassenaar states that he may have disabled the power in the tower. Steaks, baked potatoes, beer and soft drinks are delivered to the tower.

3:39 p.m. DOC Director SCHRIRO gives the Governor a status report.

3:41 p.m. A key is delivered to the inmates to allow them inmates to access the first floor to use the bathroom and to clear obstacles and traps to facilitate opening the door and the exit of the inmates and hostage.

3:47-4:18 p.m. The key is determined to be unusable, and a second key is delivered.

4:25 p.m. Coy is seen at the hatch.

4:39 p.m. Governor Napolitano calls for an update.

5:16 p.m. Contact is initiated to discuss specifics of the surrender process. Coy says to call back.

5:19 p.m. Governor returns to Central Command.

5:31 p.m. Contact is initiated to discuss specifics of the surrender process. Coy says to call back.

5:45 p.m. Contact is initiated to discuss specifics of the surrender process. Coy says to call back.

5:52 p.m. Wassenaar calls. There is discussion about the specifics of exiting the tower.

6:17 p.m. Wassenaar appears on the roof in an orange uniform, signifying that the door is clear for opening by the tactical team.

6:20 p.m. The tactical team approaches the tower, opens the door and props it open with a sandbag. The team then retreats approximately 10 yards.

6:25 p.m. Hostage situation comes to an end. Wassenaar walks out with his hands up. He complies with the order to turn around and lay on the ground and is restrained. DOE exits the tower next; she is recovered by a tactical team and removed to the Administration building and an awaiting ambulance. Coy exits the tower and is taken into custody and restrained.

6:32-7:08 p.m. DOE is examined and treated in the ambulance. She is then flown by helicopter to Good Samaritan Hospital in Phoenix, where she is treated for injuries sustained during the hostage incident, interviewed by DOC Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU) investigators, and reunited with her family.

6:51 p.m. Governor Napolitano and Director SCHRIRO depart the Lewis Complex for Good Samaritan Hospital.

7:34 p.m. Wassenaar and Coy are taken to the Morey Unit’s Blue side visitation strip area/non- contact visitation area, where they are photographed by DOC CIU investigators, strip- searched by Bureau of Prison (BOP) personnel, and provided with BOP jumpsuits. Their clothing and other evidence seized from the inmates are placed in containers and maintained by a CIU special investigator.

Medical staff check the inmates’ vital signs prior to transportation to the federal corrections institution in Phoenix, where they are isolated from each other.

Wassenaar and Coy are served with search warrants for personal characteristics by a DOC criminal investigator. The search warrant is executed by SANE (Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner) staff from Scottsdale Health Care, who collect the sexual assault protocol as directed by the search warrant.

Wassenaar and Coy are advised of their Miranda rights. Wassenaar invokes his right to counsel, and Coy declines to be questioned.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9

Governor Napolitano’s February 10, 2004, action plan for investigating the incident at the Morey Unit included the appointment of an Administrative Review Panel made up of law enforcement and corrections professionals to: (a) reconstruct the sequence of events leading up to the inmates’ seizure of the Morey Unit tower, (b) identify issues that directly or indirectly contributed to the incident or could give rise to similar incidents, and (c) recommend practices to improve security and staff safety.

The Administrative Review Panel was comprised of:

ROBERTO VILLASEÑOR, Assistant Chief, Tucson Police Department;

JOHN PHELPS, Deputy Director, Arizona Office of Homeland Security; and

MICHAEL SMARIK, Division Director, Support Services, Arizona Department of Corrections.

The Administrative Review Panel consulted with the following subject matter experts throughout the review process: Lt. John Stamatopoulos, SWAT and Bomb Commander, Tucson Police Department; Thomas McHugh, Administrator, Criminal Investigations Bureau, Arizona Department of Corrections; and Greg Lauchner, Administrator, Special Services Bureau, Arizona Department of Corrections.

Many of that panel’s recommendations are incorporated into this section, and the Blue Ribbon Panel acknowledges, with deep gratitude, the painstaking and professional manner in which the Administrative Review Panel fulfilled its mission.

Contents. This preliminary report’s findings and 68 recommendations are presented in an order that parallels the chronology of the attempted escape and hostage taking. The issues discussed are:

A. Inmate Security (page 9)

B. Yard Security (page 10)

C. Kitchen Security and Procedures (page 10)

D. Tower Security, Procedures and Usage (page 11)

E. Defensive Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (page 12)

F. Communications (page 12)

G. Individual and Unit Response (page 12)

H. Inter-Agency Delivery of Tactical, Intelligence Gathering and Negotiation Activities (page 13)

I. Resolution of the Hostage Situation (page 13)

J. Administrative, Policy and Budget Issues (page 14)

A. Inmate Security

Lethal weapons in the possession of inmates constituted a

leading causative factor in the hostage situation.

Finding: Inmates were searched upon departure from their housing unit, but the kitchen security post order requiring a pat-down search of the inmate kitchen crew upon arrival was not followed. This provided an opportunity for inmates to retrieve weapons or other contraband secreted in the yard and to go undetected at the kitchen.8

Finding: Officers conducted hurried and less than adequate pat-down searches of Wassenaar, Coy and the other members of the inmate kitchen crew. The panel concluded from other officer statements and indicators that the quality of this pat-down search was not unusual.

Finding: Same-sex pat-down searches are preferable but not mandated.

Finding: Although the panel could not determine how the shanks in this incident were made or brought into the dining facility, it is clear that without their use Wassenaar and Coy’s effectiveness would have been greatly reduced.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Review and enforce search procedures upon arrival at the kitchen. Determine where other gaps in search coverage may exist that would provide inmates opportunities to pick up contraband and weapons as they transit areas.

2. DOC should continue to practice cross-gender pat-down searches when necessary.

3. Establish a Special Contraband Squad (SCS), either statewide or with one squad in each of the two regions, the sole function of which would be to conduct random, unannounced searches of prison units for contraband and weapons. SCS searches would be supported by the latest available detection equipment technology and trained canines. The SCS would be specially

8 It is possible that the shanks were hidden in the kitchen. Although records indicate that a contraband search of the kitchen occurred at 1:00 a.m., there is no evidence as to the quality and extent of the search. The inmates may have had their weapons when they left the housing unit (which would indicate that the pat-down was insufficient), or the weapons were in the yard, or the weapons were in the kitchen – possibly implicating an absent civilian kitchen worker.

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10

trained in the latest detection methods, uses of equipment, and methods employed by inmates to secret contraband. The selected unit would be placed on lockdown as soon as the SCS arrives onsite, and the SCS would be accompanied by unit mid-level and base-level supervisory staff during the search. All areas of the selected unit would be searched during the lockdown. No shift change or movement of inmates would be permitted during the search. Only those officials with an absolute need to know would be informed of the pending search and then only at the last minute.

4. All incoming staff, contractors and visitors and their possessions should be scanned and/or searched for contraband prior to gaining access to the unit. If contraband is detected, discretion- ary progressive punitive measures should be imposed, ranging from a warning to dismissal and/or prosecution.

5. All post orders should be reviewed to assure that explicit direction is given relative to inmate search requirements prior to movement within the unit perimeter and when the inmate returns from travel outside the unit. The review should focus on minimizing the ability of inmates to access hidden contraband prior to entering less secure areas. Consideration should be given to changing search methods on a random rotational basis to disrupt predictability. Search require- ments should be strictly enforced by supervisory personnel, including personal unannounced oversight.

6. Shanks are a continual and recurring problem in the corrections world. Current procedures and methods for preventing the manufacture and uncovering the concealment of fabricated weap- ons must be emphasized and regularly tested. Additionally, DOC should consider whether state-of-the-art detection systems not already employed could be brought to bear in this area. Technology notwithstanding, the last line of de- fense for the detection of fabricated weapons is the individual vigilance and competence of cor- rectional officers and their leaders.

7. DOC should review protocols for unit contra- band searches to emphasize thoroughness, unpredictability and consistency.

B. Yard Security

Finding: Inmates may hide weapons or contraband under gravel.

RECOMMENDATION

8. Consider removing gravel or other soft materials from the yards and replacing them with a more stable ground cover that is less likely to provide cover for weapons or contraband.

C. Kitchen Security and Procedures

The following factors created conditions in the kitchen area

that significantly compromised security and, thus, contributed to

the incident:

Finding: The inmates were too familiar with officer routines.

Finding: Kitchen duty was inappropriate for the two violent offenders.

Finding: Kitchen office door was left unsecure. Open access to the kitchen provided the opportunity for inmates to take control of unit personnel, communications systems and weapons.

Finding: Delivery of kitchen utensils required hand- to-hand delivery via open kitchen office door. The doors to the kitchen and tool room must be opened to pass kitchen tools to inmates. It became impractical and inconvenient to repeatedly open and lock those doors when the kitchen was active.

Finding: Kitchen post required only one officer. Inmates could easily overpower the solitary officer on duty during the graveyard shift, unobserved by the rest of the unit. When the incident began, Correctional Officer MARTIN by himself was in charge of 19 inmates.

Finding: The kitchen area was unmonitored. Although the dining halls outside the kitchen areas were monitored by video cameras, there were no audio or video monitors in the kitchen area.

Finding: A contract kitchen worker was absent without explanation on the morning of the incident and has refused to cooperate with the investigation

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. Rotate inmates’ work assignments and schedules so that they have less opportunity to familiarize themselves with officers’ routines and work habits.

10. Dangerous inmates should be limited in their work assignments, and inmates with life or long- term sentences should be strictly limited in their range of job duties.

11. DOC or other appropriate authorities should interview the contracted kitchen staffers who worked at the Morey Kitchen for at least six

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11

months preceding the hostage incident. Any potential complicity should be thoroughly investigated.

12. The door to the Kitchen Office should remain locked at all times unless it is opened to allow a correctional officer to enter or exit. A standoff distance should be established in the kitchen that an inmate cannot cross. If this area is occupied, the door should remain locked until it is clear (e.g., a line painted red at the entrance to the ramp that leads up to the office).

13. DOC should consider methods that will eliminate the need to pass kitchen utensils in a hand-to-hand manner. For example, a pass- through security drawer to deliver utensils, operated by the kitchen officer, could be installed.

14. Utensils and tools should be secured. This action may be less necessary at low-level units, but the administration at such units should utilize caution before implementing such a policy.

15. Two correctional officers should be posted in the kitchen area at all times.

16. Place high-resolution video cameras in the kitchen area to provide visibility of inmate activities from the facility’s main control area. Camera feed should be live-monitored instead of merely being recorded for after-the-fact review.

D. Tower Security, Procedures and Usage

The following factors created conditions regarding access to

the central tower that significantly compromised security:

Finding: Excessive tower access points exist. Multiple entryways into the tower provided inmates opportunities for access. (Wassenaar entered from the Red Yard, Coy from the Blue.)

Finding: There were no established positive identification protocols.

Finding: The tower was subject to multiple uses for which it was not intended. Uses included storage of a variety of items, including medicine for distribution to inmates. The panel believes that this offered inmates opportunities to gather intelligence about the tower,

such as design, and layout, the function of the spline gates and doors, etc.

Finding: Inmate movements were not observed from the tower. There is no evidence to indicate that the movement of Wassenaar, Coy and other kitchen crew inmates was observed by officers as they moved from their housing units to the kitchen. Wassenaar’s exit from the kitchen and movement to the tower was also unobserved. Such lack of observation provided opportunities for inmates to circumvent security and reduced the unit’s situational awareness.

Finding: Tower post duties were inadequately defined. Post order duties lacked specificity and did not clearly require observation of the yard at all times, particularly when inmates were present.

Finding: Post order instructions regarding weapons deployment were not followed. Officer Doe reported that she could not reach the AR-15 to defend herself from Wassenaar. Even if she had reached it, the weapon was unloaded as directed by unit supervisors.

RECOMMENDATIONS

17. DOC should review the need to staff the central towers at Lewis and other architecturally similar institutions in the DOC system.

Recommendations 17-26 should be considered if a decision to staff the central tower is continued:

18. Non-removable listening devices should be installed in the tower.

19. DOC should improve cameras, camera location and lighting at all controlled entry points to the tower to allow for positive identification of persons seeking entry.

20. The tower should be accessed only at one entry point. The panel recommends limiting access from the Administration building spline. Lewis Post Order 051 should be revised to include specific instructions on entry and exit from the tower. The practice of “buzzing in” people from the upper floors or not confirming identification on a face-to-face basis should be considered a serious breach of performance standards.

21. On the longer term, DOC should review the operational and tactical merits of maintaining lethal and less-than-lethal weapons and munitions in a central tower location within a secured perimeter.

22. DOC should require post-specific training pertaining to the tower.

23. Only shift-assigned tower staff, tower relief staff and shift supervisors should be allowed to access

Adult Prison Population

There are approximately 32,000 inmates in the DOC system.

There are 6,146 CO IIs.

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12

the tower without the shift commander’s direct approval.

24. DOC should review tower design and make modifications necessary to allow full operations from the second level.

25. DOC should review, modify as needed, and strictly enforce tower post orders to ensure consistency of tower operation, with emphasis on security.

26. The tower should always be staffed with two qualified officers, both armed with sidearms at all times. When granting access to the tower, one officer should remain at the observation level while the second officer acquires positive identification.

27. Tower and munitions should be kept at “at-the- ready” at all times when the tower is staffed. Weapons stands are probably the most effective way of keeping weapons ready accessible.

E. Defensive Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

Finding: Correctional officers were unable to defend themselves or others using individual or small unit defensive tactics. This was a major factor in the ability of the inmates to subdue officers, escape capture and seize the tower.

Finding: Use of OC pepper spray canisters was ineffective. Studies have shown that it is nearly impossible to use pepper spray to thwart an attack by an individual armed with an edged weapon, where the attacker is closer than 21 feet from the intended victim. Further, an OC canister is an ineffective tool against a knife because it is not possible to get close enough to produce the desired results.

Finding: Post Order #051 is inconsistent with Department Order 804 – Inmate Behavior Control. Six sections specify when an officer is authorized to use lethal force. Section 1.2.6 is the only section that discusses serious bodily harm;9 all other authorized uses of lethal force have to be predicated on a belief that an inmate is attempting to use lethal force or attempting escape. Unfortunately, “serious bodily harm” is not contained in PO 051. Section 051.06.8.1 reads, “Deadly force is justified when it is immediately necessary to protect any person from attempted use of unlawful deadly physical force by another and to prevent an escape.” As the “ultimate safeguard, ” the tower officer and all staff must have confidence and

9 “… when it is necessary to prevent an inmate from taking another person hostage or causing serious bodily harm to another person …”

trust in each other. They must trust that, if they are attacked by an inmate posing a threat and showing intent of serious bodily harm, lethal force will be authorized.

RECOMMENDATIONS

28. Modify PO #051.06.8.1 to include Department Order 804.07.1.2.6. Reinforce the knowledge and understanding of that order in training and exercises.

29. Consider adding other, more effective less-than- lethal weapons for day-to-day operations of correctional officers. This consideration should be to integrate such systems into standard operations rather than limiting those capabilities to special situations.

30. All DOC employees and contractors who directly interface with inmates should receive realistic training in self-defense tactics. Such training should be integrated into in-services refresher training programs.

31. Correctional officers should receive enhanced and realistic training in hand-to-hand, weapons, and small-unit defensive tactics. Such training should be integrated into in-services training. Consider requiring minimum qualification standards and recognition/certification programs for advanced proficiency, which would be considered in assignment decisions and operational planning.

F. Communications

Finding: Monitoring throughout the facility does not appear to take full advantage of technology.

Finding: Officers have little ability to covertly request assistance. After they were taken hostage, Officers MARTIN and DOE were forced to respond over unit communications systems to other officers in the facility. Their forced responses falsely indicated that they were secure.

RECOMMENDATIONS

32. DOC should review current communication systems with the emphasis on improving performance. Such review should include reducing dead areas, the benefits of encryption, specialized distress capability, battery dependency, and radio durability.

33. DOC should review units’ audio and visual monitoring capabilities and consider retrofitting key facilities with embedded sensors and cameras for regular monitoring of activities.

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13

34. Establish a simple distress signal. Evidence suggests that inmates had gathered intelligence on communication procedures and radio codes. A distress signal would therefore need to sound natural and part of a routine response.

35. DOC should also consider investment in personnel monitoring – “man down” or personal alarm – systems.

G. Individual and Unit Response

Finding: Correctional officers lacked situational awareness. The collective lack of awareness regarding this incident not only affected facility security but exposed officers and facility employees to harm.

Finding: There was ineffective response to an armed inmate in the dining area. When Coy exited the kitchen, there were three officers in the dining area. Officers were not equipped or trained to respond effectively as a team to an armed inmate.

Finding: Many officers failed to respond appropriately to IMS calls. The frequency and manner in which IMS simulations occur led to complacency on the part of most officers on duty at the time of this incident. No codes or practices exist to differentiate between an IMS simulation and actual occurrence.

Finding: Many officers in the Morey Unit have less than a year in uniform.

RECOMMENDATIONS

36. Training (IMS simulations) should not occur during duty hours. Occasionally, if supervisors want to test the performance of their staff on a fire drill or lockdown, on-unit training would be recommended. However, training designed to test and evaluate tactical responses, arrest procedures, use of lethal and less-than-lethal force, and even medical response should never be conducted where it could compromise security or be viewed by inmates. Exceptions may be made only with the written approval of the DOC Director. Training should be as realistic as possible, but there should be no doubt in any staff member’s mind about whether a situation is a simulation or a real event. This is accomplished by never blending duty assignments with training scenarios.

37. DOC sergeants must be recognized as a focal point of the agency and given the power to address issues immediately. The first-line supervisor is the unit’s eyes and ears and can identify training deficiencies, operational issues and performance problems. The sergeant should

be highly visible as he or she moves about the unit and conducts surprise inspections at various posts; this would help to eliminate reported unauthorized visits to the tower and the leaving of assigned posts. It would also help address the allegations of officers bringing food into the unit from outside the prison, propping doors open, conducting quick and ineffective pat searches, etc.

38. On-duty training opportunities should be explored, such as daily training items that are presented and discussed at briefings or when supervisors conduct inspections. These training items can consist of incident scenarios that are read or presented, requiring officers to discuss their answers with their supervisors.

H. Inter-Agency Delivery of Tactical, Intelligence Gathering and Negotiation Activities

Finding: State and local law enforcement agencies regularly convene to practice tactical maneuvers. DOC does not routinely participate in those activities, nor do those activities regularly occur on the grounds of a State prison complex.

Finding: State and local law enforcement agencies do not regularly convene to practice negotiations. DOC does not participate in those activities when they do occur, nor do those activities occur on the grounds of a State prison complex.

Finding: DOC and State and local law enforcement agencies do not know enough about State correctional facilities’ amenability to intelligence gathering tech- nologies and tactical maneuvers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

39. DOC and State and local law enforcement agencies should regularly convene to practice tactical maneuvers. Some scenarios should be conducted regularly on the grounds of a State prison complex.

40. DOC and State and local law enforcement agencies should regularly convene to practice negotiations.

41. DOC, with assistance from federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, should evaluate DOC’s physical structures to identify in advance of untoward events their amenability to intelligence collection and tactical maneuvers. This information should be kept onsite at each institution and updated regularly.

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14

I. Resolution of the Hostage Situation

Finding: It is the policy of DOC that there are no negotiations with hostage takers. Despite that policy, in the situation at the Morey Unit there were ongoing negotiations during the entire 15 days.

Finding: With regard to the tactical response, the panel received testimony from correctional employees (who were not part of the tactical teams) that they had heard of opportunities to use lethal force toward the two inmates during the standoff, but they were foregone due to alleged counter-instructions from superiors. This testimony was later refuted by numerous members of tactical teams, including both lead commanders of the tactical operation, DPS Colonel Norm Beasley and Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office Assistant Chief Jesse Locksa. Indeed, Beasley categorically stated to the panel, “There was never an opportunity to tactically resolve this situation through sniper fire.”

Finding: DOC’s decision to transfer the inmates out of their system is a common corrections management practice after hostage situations. This practice preserves the integrity of the statewide security system; diminishes the inmates’ status in the prisoner society; and reduces potential legal liability. Indeed, DOC houses approximately 100 inmates from other state systems, including several as a result of the Lucasville, Ohio, prison hostage incident in the early 1990s.

RECOMMENDATIONS

42. DOC should review the communications that occurred between negotiators and tactical staff

relating to the cutting of the fence at the base of the Morey tower.

43. Due to the uniqueness of the situation and the virtually impenetrable characteristics of the tower, the lack of acceptable tactical solutions available to authorities made negotiations a practical necessity. To be consistent with other law enforcement and correctional agencies, DOC should eliminate its non-negotiation policy.

44. The use-of-force provisions of the rules of engagement (above) were appropriate and should be applied to future situations where their use may be applicable.10 At the Morey Unit, circumstances did not permit the exercise of those provisions.

J. Administrative, Policy and Budget Issues

Finding: Inmate classification.11 The DOC inmate classification system is cumbersome and unreliable and has not been evaluated since the 1980s. Other correctional jurisdictions have developed more effective and efficient systems.

RECOMMENDATIONS

45. DOC should assess its inmate classification needs and seek national assistance in the enhancement, overhaul or replacement of its present system. DOC’s policies and procedures regarding protective segregation should be reviewed as part of the assessment.

46. Public and Institutional (P&I) scores should be more closely examined, and the officers who work with an inmate should have meaningful input into that inmate’s score.

47. Classification scores should be less vulnerable to override.

48. Create a system that better ensures that more dangerous inmates do not work in sensitive areas.

* * * * *

Finding: Inmate Assessment, Programming and Reentry. Good prison security and management require more than just good correctional officers; it takes a team approach.

10

After the first hostage was released, the tactical rules of engagement were revised to reflect the change of circumstances.

11 Classification determines an inmate’s housing situation, work assignments, recreational opportunities and supervision levels.

Tactical Rules of Engagement For Double Hostage Situations

1. Both inmates on roof, 100% positive identification, clear shot: Green light, shoot to kill.

2. One inmate with both hostages on roof, 100% positive identification, clear shot: Green light, shoot to kill.

3. Inmate, 100% positive identification, appears with lethal force directed at hostage(s): Green light, shoot to kill.

4. Inmate appears with lethal force, non-threatening: Red light, do not shoot.

5. Inmate appears on roof with one hostage: Red light, do not shoot.

In options 2 and 3, activation will also initiate the assault on

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15

RECOMMENDATION

49. DOC should evaluate the methods by which, upon intake, it assesses offenders’ criminogenic and programming needs. It should further endeavor to provide appropriate levels of programming in areas such as mental health treatment, drug treatment and education. Programming should also be enhanced to assist offenders in successfully reentering society upon release from prison.

* * * * *

Finding: Training. Testimony received from DOC employees strongly suggests that uniformed and civilian staff are undertrained and, in some cases, untrained in many areas, some critical.

RECOMMENDATIONS

50. As appropriate to carry out their responsibilities and ensure their personal safety, officers, super- visors and civilian employees should receive continuing education and practical training in areas that include, but are not limited to, the following: self defense, weapons training, hos- tage situations, post-specific training, weapons and contraband searches, Fire Arms Training Simulator (FATS), cross-training with other law enforcement agencies, Arizona Peace Officer Standards & Training (POST) certification, and structured on-the-job training and mentoring.

51. At the Correctional Officer Training Academy (COTA), cadets should receive one full additional week of training dedicated to self- dfense and receive additional training in hostage situations, rape prevention, and weapons.

52. Standards for admission to and graduation from COTA must not be compromised in response to vacancy rates or other temporary situations.

53. New COTA graduates should enter service as a CO I. After a defined probationary period, and additional on-the-job training, they should become eligible for promotion to CO II.

54. DOC should implement a comprehensive and systematic “Back to Basics” (B2B) program to ensure that core elements of security are being adhered to across the board. The B2B initiative should be designed to enable every prison to review security in regard to layout, personnel, habits, traditions, training and other issues. B2B should include interviews with line staff to find out how they actually do the job and how they should do the job, so that it can be determined whether security is being compromised by not

adhering to post orders, or whether officers have devised a better way to get desired results.

55. Civilian employees should receive training to help them understand and function safely in a prison work environment.

* * * * *

Finding: Experience and Staffing. Inexperienced officers, when placed together in high-risk settings, are more likely to fail in the performance of their core functions than if they are teamed with more experienced officers.

Finding: Correctional facilities are understaffed. Correctional officer positions remain unfilled while the prison population grows every month. At the Lewis prison complex, of which the Morey Unit is a part, about 200 (or 19%) of the 1,029 officer positions are vacant, on some days forcing management to scramble to provide the minimum coverage. Of the 800-plus positions that are filled, half of the officers have two years or less of service (including their seven weeks of training at COTA). In many instances, junior officers are led by other junior officers who have been prematurely promoted in order to meet pressing needs. At the time of the hostage taking, 14 of the 20 officers on duty were hired in 2003 (i.e., had one year or less of experience).

Correctional Officer Turnover

A DOC SURVEY covering the two-year period from November 2001 through October 2003 reveals the following:

There are 6,146 CO IIs in the DOC system.

There were 1,721 CO II resignations during the survey period.

Not adjusting for multiple resignations from the same position, the two-year turnover rate was approximately 28%.

570 of the 1,721 resignations (33%) occurred during the employeesÊ first 12 months on the job.

1,008 of the resignations (58%) occurred during the first two years.

1,268 of the resignations (73%) occurred during the first three years.

Only one in four CO IIs had more than three years of experience.

Source: GovernorÊs Office of Strategic Planning & Budgeting

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 16

RECOMMENDATIONS

56. DOC should formalize the blending of experienced and inexperienced officers, leading to “mentor/student” bonding that can enhance long-term officer success and retention. The mentoring program should be formalized as a structured, agency-wide Correctional Training Officer (CTO) program that features formal training and rewards for experienced officers, at all levels and positions, who act as mentors.

57. Additional staffing is necessary for all assignments within DOC in order to combat fatigue and burn-out and to foster proper employee in-service training needs. Current “bare bones” staffing does not allow for the remediation of any of the above.

* * * * *

Finding: Pay, Recruitment and Retention. DOC officers are underpaid, both in absolute terms and in comparison to the pay scales of other jurisdictions. The DOC pay scale leads to family hardships, low morale and high attrition. A sergeant with ten years of experience testified at a public forum that he would be eligible for Food Stamps and AHCCCS benefits if his annual income were only $933 less. He also suffered a pay cut when he was promoted (most sergeants are paid less than the officers they supervise).

Finding: The Nevada Department of Corrections, which offers higher officer pay, recently set up a recruiting station at a Circle K near the COTA facility outside of Tucson to lure academy graduates. After being trained at a cost to Arizona taxpayers, half of the class went to work for the State of Nevada.

Finding: There is pay inequity between new recruits and experienced officers. Elimination of the “Correctional Officer I” position during the previous Administration created a situation in which a recent academy graduate enters service as a CO II, perhaps earning as much as a veteran officer at the same grade.

Finding: Standards have been lowered. Qualifications for sergeant have been diminished in recent years in order to fill vacancies at that level.

RECOMMENDATIONS

58. DOC should undertake a comprehensive analysis of its pay scale, including a comparison with the pay scales of federal, county and municipal correctional entities in Arizona and of surrounding states.

59. DOC should consider the reinstatement of merit increases and longevity pay.

60. DOC should restore the CO I position, reexam- ine the qualifications for Sergeant, and undertake a comprehensive review of DOC’s promotional policies to ensure they are based on merit and performance, not “good old boy” relationships.

61. Pay must be comensurate with experience and merit, and any promotion should result in higher pay.

62. DOC should consider ways of communicating to the public the difficulty of and danger associated with correctional service.

63. Survivors of officers killed in the line of duty should receive benefits comparable to the families of police officers and fire fighters.

* * * * *

Finding: Professionalism. At the time of the hostage situation, the Morey unit suffered from complacency and a general lack of professionalism. While most staff performed admirably during the incident, there were many administrative errors in the preceding months and years. During the panel’s investigation it became evident that numerous deficiencies in supervision and performance contributed to the hostage situation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

64. The DOC Director should utilize all available information to determine what, if any, disciplinary action or change of assignment is appropriate for those staff involved.

65. A system-wide review should take place to determine whether this problem is pervasive in the system and, if so, to identify and implement steps that could remedy the problem.

* * * * *

Finding: Operational audits. In 2000, DOC discontinued the practice of conducting comprehensive operational audits of prison facilities.

Starting Compensation for Correctional Officers

Base Pay Hiring Bonus1

Incentive Bonus2

Total

DOC $24,950 $2,600 $2,495 $30,045

Maricopa County

$31,000 $0 $0 $31,000

1Generally expires after the second year of service. 2Available only to CO IIs at Lewis, Florence and Eyman.

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17

RECOMMENDATION

66. Operational audits should be reinstated to help ensure effective management of prison facilities.

* * * * *

Finding: Staff/Inmate Communication. Good staff/inmate communication is important to maintaining good prison security and operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

67. DOC is encouraged to take steps to review current policies, practices and protocols that promote indirect, as opposed to direct, supervision of offenders and that inhibit good communication between officers and offenders.

68. DOC should consider piloting a prison management system, such as “Unit Management, ” at a prison that is architecturally and operationally receptive to such a concept.

* * * * *

Finding: Sentencing. The DOC system suffers from overcrowding. In the last year, DOC has set the highest records of overcapacity and the Lewis facility has regularly housed inmates in excess of its design capacity.

RECOMMENDATION

69. The State of Arizona should undertake a comprehensive review of its sentencing statutes.

C O N C L U S I O N

The hostage-taking incident that occurred at the Morey Unit was a tragic event that resulted in serious physical and emotional injury to correctional officers and facility employees. Like other prison crisis situations in Arizona and elsewhere, it demonstrated the incredible dangers and challenges faced by corrections professionals every day.

The two inmates exploited a series of small but critical gaps in security that were further compounded by institutional complacency and a collective lack of situational awareness. Once faced with the reality of the deadly situation inside the tower – the facility’s most secure and impenetrable feature – correctional officers and their leaders responded quickly and effectively to establish the conditions that ultimately led to the successful release of hostages and recapture of inmates without loss of life.

The lessons learned from this incident revalidate the necessity of adequately and properly resourcing corrections operations. Of equal importance is the need to acquire the essential qualities of a competent and proud organization. Such qualities can be obtained only by investing in the people that dedicate themselves to the corrections mission. They must be well trained and well led; and recognized often and fairly compensated. Although one can never guarantee that such an incident will not occur again, the panel believes that much can be done to reduce that risk.

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18

Incident Command

Director Schriro

PIO: Jim Robideau

Victim Rights: Dan Levey

Legal/Legislative Liaison: Amy Bejeland

Law Enforcment Liaison: Bill Lackey

Jerry Dunn

SUPPORT

Sally Delbridge

Joy Swanson

Christinia Cooper

Dumi Erno

Vanessa English

Heather Price

Judi Book

RECORDER

Inv. Buchanan

Inv. Morris

Inv. Tokosh

Inv. Kelleigh

Jeff Nordaune

OPERATIONS

Day: Charles Moorer

Swing: David Cluff

GY: Judy Frigo

PLANNING

Day: James Kimble

Swing: Donna Clement

GY: Lyle Broadhead

ADMINISTRATION

Day: Mike Smarik

Swing: Todd Gerrish

GY: John Martinez

Rich Bluth

Ed Encinas

LOGISTICS

Day: James Kimble

Swing: Chuck McVicker

GY: Judy Frigo

DOC Central Office United Command Structure

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 19

BIBLICAL WORLDVIEW ASSIGNMENT

For the Biblical Worldview Assignment in this course, you are to write a short essay that critically examines the literature review that you submitted in Module/Week 3 and constructively identifies the gaps and omissions in the literature where a biblical worldview should be internalized and expressed in the life of the criminal justice professional. Your paper must be at least 2 pages. For the first page, it is important that you make the distinction of where and on what grounds the literature comes up short as it relates to what the research has for us versus what God has for us. For the second page, you must demonstrate how you might integrate the biblical worldview into the problem you are studying. Organize and format your paper according to current APA style and cite your references as you would in current APA style. If you need more help understanding how to analyze scholastic literature, consult the corresponding section in your APA manual. Your short essay will be due by 11:59 p.m. (ET) on Sunday of Module/Week 5.

Include the following elements in your short essay:

  • A page that critically exposes the gaps or omissions in the literature regarding a biblical worldview
  • A page that constructively integrates the biblical worldview into the problem you are studying
  • Bibliography of the sources you cited in the short essay

Review the Biblical Worldview Grading Rubric to see how this assignment will be evaluated.

Note: Your assignment will be checked for originality via the SafeAssign plagiarism tool.

Running Head: INCARCERATION 1

INCARCERATION 3

INCARCERATION

Liberty University

Alfreda Dunlap

June 2, 2019

Mass Incarceration

Proposed topic

I am going to be researching mass incarceration.

Proposed thesis statement

Mass incarceration has a negative effect on the nation.

References

Alexander, M. (2015). The new Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the age of colorblindness. Academic Search Complete. Web. 28 July 2016.

The author explains the significance of being alert about mass incarceration. Moreover, the author says that most of the people are not aware of the high statistics as well as the high rate that occurs with minors being incarceration. In the book, the writer mentions the reasons as to why African American are put in prisons and jails in the nation. Some of the reasons why African Americans are put into prison include the race, lack of adequate resources as well as the economic system.

This article is important since it is related to mass incarceration that happens in most countries. The information in the article was written in the last five years; therefore, it is credible. Jim laws legalized the segregation or separation of white people and African Americans.

Austin, J., Cadora, E., Clear, T. R., Dansky, K., Greene, J., Gupta, V. & Young, M. C. (2017). Ending mass incarceration: Charting a new justice reinvestment. Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project.

In the book, the writers describe some of the answers that could be used to finish mass incarceration. According to the authors, prison systems are a no longer correctional institution or rehabilitation system; instead, the system has become a way to reduce the number of prisoners that are currently in jail or prison. The suggestions that the authors made aims at decreasing the number of prisoners

The article connects to the main topic since it describes some of the ways to end mass incarceration. The article provides information from the National Criminal Justice Reference Services. Also, the article provides data on how to decrease the number of reoccurring prisoners.

Mass incarceration, (2017). American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation. Retrieved from https://www.aclu.org/issues/mass-incarceration

This book describes the amount of money that citizen pays as tax to support the prison system that has more than 2 million prisoners. America represents around 5% of the world’s people. Also, America prisons represent 25% of the world’s imprisonment rate. The writer further states the amount that is spent yearly to keep prisoner incarceration as well as the amount that the criminal justice system is making from every prisoner.

The book relates to the topic since it gives the exact amount of many that taxpayers spend in keeping one prisoner as well as the amount that the criminal justice system gets per prisoners. Also, the article also provides accurate data that can be used to analyze and evaluate the rate of mass incarceration. The article was written in 2017.

Pelaez, V., (2014). The prison industry in the United States: Big business or a new form of slavery? Global Research Centre for Research on Globalization.

In the book, the author describes the historical perspective of the prison system in the United States. The author further says that prison has always been a way of acquiring free labor; most people refer to this as slavery.

There are a lot of stakeholders that invest in prisons. The more people are incarceration, the more the income that stakeholders get. This article relates to the topic in that it provides the historical view of the prison system. The author has also written a lot of articles about inequities in the prison system

Reiman, J., & Leighton, P., (2015). The rich get richer, and the poor get prison: Ideology, class, and criminal justice. Routledge.

The authors explain incarcerating in urban society. The writers explain that the prison system has become a business whereby prison stakeholders gain from every inmate through taxpayers. Many people working in the government become richer. Poor people are being put in prison.

In the book, the author describes the race, criminal justice, as well as the class. The book relates to mass incarceration. Research shows that most people in prison are poor; only a few people are from rich families. If nothing is done, the prison system will keep attacking the poor community. The book further explains the ideology, as well as statistics as to why the poor are in prison and the rich, are becoming richer.

Wagner, P., & Rabuy, B., (2016). Mass incarceration: The whole pie 2016. Prison Policy Initiative, 14. Retrieved from http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Wagner_Rabuy_14mar17.pdf

The number of prisoners in America is more than 2 million. The prisoners are in the 1719 state prisons, 3163 local prisons, 76 Indian country jail and 901 are in the juvenile facilities. Majority of the people are locked up due to drug abuse. A few people are in prison due to murder or serial killers. Also, the author compares some of the states that have ended the war on drugs. The author demonstrates this through the use of charts.

Moreover, the writer or author demonstrates gender disparities in jail and prison. There are more men in prison as compared to women. According to the ethnic and racial disparities in jail and prison. The writer states that there are more black people in prison as compared to white people. This can be due to the economic class of black people. The author further says that 16,000 people are in the federal prison due to immigration-related issues. 41,00 people have been separated from criminal proceedings. Most imprisoned youth are in prison because of non-violence crimes. More than one million people are arrested every year due to drug possessions. Statistics also show that most of the people in prison are from poor backgrounds.

The article is related to the topic since it gives accurate statistics about the reasons for imprisonment. According to the article, more than half of the people in prison are accused of drug possessions. The statistics also show the majority of people in prison are black. Also, the article has graphs that represent statistics in prison. There were many men as compared to women who were in prison. The article states that if drug policies were reviewed, then this would end mass incarceration. The number of prisoners in some countries has reduced due to the reform of drug policies. The author further says that we should focus our energy on the role of federal law in ending or stopping incarceration, prosecutors and state officials should rethink about the war on drugs, and the government should also implement reforms that reduce ethnicity and racial disparities.

Reassessment Of Client Risks And Needs

Read the “Risk-Need-Responsivity Model for Offender Assessment and Rehabilitation 2007-06” article.

Review the following scenario:

· The client is a 32-year-old male who was released from incarceration 6 months ago. The client had previously been incarcerated for 2 years for two felony drug offenses due to possession and distribution of methamphetamine. He received treatment while incarcerated, but he relapsed and used methamphetamine 2 months after he was released. The client is positive for Hepatitis C, which he contracted while he was in prison. He was receiving medication for his condition until last month when he did not supply a required document to the Medicaid office on time. As a result, he lost his medical coverage.
The client has been married for 5 years, and he has a 3-year-old child. The client was diagnosed with bipolar disorder at age 28. The client has exhibited emotional outbursts and episodes of perpetrating domestic violence with his wife since his release from incarceration. The client obtained his GED at age 25, but he never attended college. The client also had a learning disorder of dyslexia during his adolescent years. He has minimal job skills, as he only worked at one job as a dishwasher for 2 months during his adult life. He primarily obtained income from selling drugs prior to incarceration.
The client is currently seeking employment, but he is experiencing difficulty obtaining employment due to his prior criminal conviction.

Create a mind map of the needs of the client that fit in each category. Specify 3 needs in each of the following categories:

· Health needs

· Social or relationship needs

· Problem-solving needs

· Emotional needs

· Belief or value needs

· Education or career needs

Create a second mind map of the risks of the client that fit in each category. Specify 3 risks in each of the following categories:

· Health risks

· Social or relationship risks

· Problem-solving risks

· Emotional risks

· Belief or value risks

· Education or career risks

Answer the following questions in a 700-word essay:

· Why is it important to reassess the needs of a client after he or she is released from incarceration?

· What are some ways by which a person’s needs and risks can be mitigated to reduce the rate of recidivism once an offender is released from incarceration?

Format any citations according to APA guidelines.

  Title

ABC/123 Version X

1

 

  Reassessment of Client Risks and Needs

CPSS/300 Version 2

1

 

 

University of Phoenix Material

 

Reassessment of Client Risks and Needs

 

Read the “Risk-Need-Responsivity Model for Offender Assessment and Rehabilitation 2007-06” article.

 

Review the following scenario:

 

The client is a 32-year-old male who was released from incarceration 6 months ago. The client had previously been incarcerated for 2 years for two felony drug offenses due to possession and distribution of methamphetamine. He received treatment while incarcerated, but he relapsed and used methamphetamine 2 months after he was released. The client is positive for Hepatitis C, which he contracted while he was in prison. He was receiving medication for his condition until last month when he did not supply a required document to the Medicaid office on time. As a result, he lost his medical coverage. The client has been married for 5 years, and he has a 3-year-old child. The client was diagnosed with bipolar disorder at age 28. The client has exhibited emotional outbursts and episodes of perpetrating domestic violence with his wife since his release from incarceration. The client obtained his GED at age 25, but he never attended college. The client also had a learning disorder of dyslexia during his adolescent years. He has minimal job skills, as he only worked at one job as a dishwasher for 2 months during his adult life. He primarily obtained income from selling drugs prior to incarceration. The client is currently seeking employment, but he is experiencing difficulty obtaining employment due to his prior criminal conviction.

 

Create a mind map of the needs of the client that fit in each category. Specify 3 needs in each of the following categories:

 

Health needs

Social or relationship needs

Problem-solving needs

Emotional needs

Belief or value needs

Education or career needs

 

Create a second mind map of the risks of the client that fit in each category. Specify 3 risks in each of the following categories:

 

Health risks

Social or relationship risks

Problem-solving risks

Emotional risks

Belief or value risks

Education or career risks

 

Answer the following questions in a 700-word essay:

 

Why is it important to reassess the needs of a client after he or she is released from incarceration?

What are some ways by which a person’s needs and risks can be mitigated to reduce the rate of recidivism once an offender is released from incarceration?

 

Format any citations according to APA guidelines.

Copyright © XXXX by University of Phoenix. All rights reserved.

Copyright © 2017 by University of Phoenix. All rights reserved.

Covert Action And Intelligence

  • Textbook: Chapter 1, 2
  • Lecture 1, 2
  • Link (website): ProQuest Guide
  • Link (PDF): Relations between intelligence services and policymakers: An analysis of challenges and their causes
  • Link (website): Wanted: A definition of “intelligence”

Introduction
Choose a covert operation from those listed in chapter 2 and refer to the ProQuest Guide listed in the resources above.

Activity Instructions
Write an essay and analyze the operation you chose according to the categories listed on pages 20 and 21, technology, secrecy, oversight, and managing the community. How does the operation fit with the descriptions of the text and relate to the working concept of intelligence on page 10 in chapter 1?

Writing Requirements (APA format)

  • 2-3 pages (approx. 300 words per page), not including title page or references page
  • 1-inch margins
  • Double spaced
  • 12-point Times New Roman font
  • Title page with topic and name of student
  • References page

Grading and Assessment
This activity will be graded based on the Written Analysis Grading Rubric.

Learning Outcome(s): 6

Intelligence

Seventh Edition

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Intelligence

From Secrets to Policy

Seventh Edition

Mark M. Lowenthal

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FOR INFORMATION:

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Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

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Names: Lowenthal, Mark M.

Title: Intelligence : from secrets to policy / Mark M. Lowenthal.

Description: Seventh edition. | Los Angeles : CQ Press, [2017] | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016030817| ISBN 978-1-5063-4256-6

Subjects: LCSH: Intelligence service—United States. | Intelligence service.

Classification: LCC JK468.I6 L65 2016 | DDC 327.1273—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016030817

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Senior Acquisitions Editor: Carrie Brandon

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Marketing Manager: Amy Whitaker

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https://lccn.loc.gov/2016030817

 

For

Michael S. Freeman

1946–1999

Historian, Librarian, Friend

&

My Parents

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Contents

Tables, Figures, and Boxes Preface Acronyms Chapter 1. What Is “Intelligence”?

Why Have Intelligence Agencies? What Is Intelligence About? Key Terms Further Readings

Chapter 2. The Development of U.S. Intelligence Major Themes Major Historical Developments Key Terms Further Readings

Chapter 3. The U.S. Intelligence Community Alternative Ways of Looking at the Intelligence Community The Many Different Intelligence Communities Intelligence Community Relationships That Matter The Intelligence Budget Process Key Terms Further Readings

Chapter 4. The Intelligence Process—A Macro Look: Who Does What for Whom? Requirements Collection Processing and Exploitation Analysis and Production Dissemination and Consumption Feedback Thinking About the Intelligence Process Key Terms Further Readings

Chapter 5. Collection and the Collection Disciplines Overarching Themes Strengths and Weaknesses Conclusion Key Terms Further Readings

Chapter 6. Analysis Major Themes Analytical Issues

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Intelligence Analysis: An Assessment Key Terms Further Readings

Chapter 7. Counterintelligence Internal Safeguards External Indicators and Counterespionage Problems in Counterintelligence Leaks Economic Espionage National Security Letters Conclusion Key Terms Further Readings

Chapter 8. Covert Action The Decision-Making Process The Range of Covert Actions Issues in Covert Action Assessing Covert Action Key Terms Further Readings

Chapter 9. The Role of the Policy Maker The U.S. National Security Policy Process Who Wants What? The Intelligence Process: Policy and Intelligence Key Term Further Readings

Chapter 10. Oversight and Accountability Executive Oversight Issues Congressional Oversight Issues in Congressional Oversight Internal Dynamics of Congressional Oversight The Courts Conclusion Key Terms Further Readings

Chapter 11. The Intelligence Agenda: Nation-States The Primacy of the Soviet Issue The Emphasis on Soviet Military Capabilities The Emphasis on Statistical Intelligence The “Comfort” of a Bilateral Relationship Collapse of the Soviet Union Intelligence and the Soviet Problem

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The Current Nation-State Issue Key Terms Further Readings

Chapter 12. The Intelligence Agenda: Transnational Issues U.S. National Security Policy and Intelligence After the Cold War Intelligence and the New Priorities Cyberspace Terrorism Proliferation Narcotics Economics Demographics Health and the Environment Peacekeeping Operations Support to the Military Conclusion Key Terms Further Readings

Chapter 13. Ethical and Moral Issues in Intelligence General Moral Questions Issues Related to Collection and Covert Action Analysis-Related Issues Oversight-Related Issues Whistle-Blowers The Media Conclusion Further Readings

Chapter 14. Intelligence Reform The Purpose of Reform Issues in Intelligence Reform Conclusion Key Terms Further Readings

Chapter 15. Foreign Intelligence Services Britain China France Israel Russia Other Services Other Services in Brief Conclusion

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Further Readings Appendix 1. Additional Bibliographic Citations and Websites Appendix 2. Major Intelligence Reviews or Proposals Author Index Subject Index

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Tables, Figures, and Boxes

Tables

5.1 A Comparison of the Collection Disciplines 156 10.1 U.S. Intelligence Budget, 2007–2014 331

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Figures

3.1 The Intelligence Community: An Organizational View 45 3.2 Alternative Ways of Looking at the Intelligence Community: A Functional Flow View 46 3.3 Alternative Ways of Looking at the Intelligence Community: A Functional View 50 3.4 Alternative Ways of Looking at the Intelligence Community: A Budgetary View 69 3.5 The Intelligence Budget: Four Phases Over Three Years 70 4.1 Intelligence Requirements: Importance Versus Likelihood 80 4.2 The Intelligence Process: A Central Intelligence Agency View 88 4.3 The Intelligence Process: A Schematic 88 4.4 The Intelligence Process: Multilayered 89 5.1 Intelligence Collection: The Composition of the INTs 155 8.1 The Covert Action Ladder 257

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Boxes

The Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001: Another Pearl Harbor? 3 Policy Versus Intelligence: The Great Divide 6 “And ye shall know the truth . . . ” 8 Intelligence: A Working Concept 10 The Simplicity of Intelligence 47 Eight Simultaneous Budgets 67 Why Classify? 100 The Need for Photo Interpreters 116 Does GEOINT Have to Be an Image? 117 SIGINT Versus IMINT 127 Some Intelligence Humor 149 Metaphors for Thinking About Analysis 188 How Right How Often 210 Who Spies on Whom? 222 Why Spy? 226 Assassination: The Hitler Argument 268 The Assassination Ban: A Modern Interpretation 269 Policy Makers and Intelligence Collection 290 Intelligence Uncertainties and Policy 291 The Limits of Intelligence and Policy: Hurricane Katrina 292 Setting the Right Expectations 293 A Linguistic Aside: The Two Meanings of Oversight 304 Congressional Humor: Authorizers Versus Appropriators 314 Intelligence Budget Disclosure: Top or Bottom? 328 Iraq’s Nuclear Program: A Cautionary Tale 414 Analysts’ Options: A Cultural Difference 455

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Preface

In years past, when academics who taught courses on intelligence got together, one of the first questions they asked one another was, “What are you using for readings?” They asked because there was no standard text on intelligence. Available books were either general histories that did not suffice as course texts or academic discussions written largely for practitioners and aficionados, not for undergraduate or graduate students. Like many of my colleagues, I had long felt the need for an introductory text. I wrote the first edition of this book in 2000 to fill this gap in intelligence literature.

Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy is not a how-to book: It will not turn readers into competent spies or even better analysts. Rather, it is designed to give readers a firm understanding of the role that intelligence plays in making national security policy and insight into its strengths and weaknesses. The main theme of the book is that intelligence serves and is subservient to policy and that it works best—analytically and operationally— when tied to clearly understood policy goals.

The book has a U.S.-centric bias. I am most familiar with the U.S. intelligence establishment, and it is the largest, richest, and most multifaceted intelligence enterprise in the world. At the same time, readers with interests beyond the United States should derive from this book a better understanding of many basic issues in intelligence collection, analysis, and covert action and of the relationship of intelligence to policy.

This volume begins with a discussion of the definition of intelligence and a brief history and overview of the U.S. intelligence community. The core of the book is organized along the lines of the intelligence process as practiced by most intelligence enterprises: requirements, collection, analysis, dissemination, and policy. Each aspect is discussed in detail in terms of its role, strengths, and problems. The book’s structure allows the reader to understand the overall intelligence process and the specific issues encountered in each step of the process. The book examines covert action and counterintelligence in a similar vein. Three chapters explore the issues facing U.S. intelligence in terms of both nation-states and transnational issues and the moral and ethical issues that arise in intelligence. The book also covers intelligence reform and foreign intelligence services.

Intelligence has grown primarily out of courses that I have taught for many years: “The Role of Intelligence in U.S. Foreign Policy,” at the School for International and Public Affairs, Columbia University from 1994 to 2007; “Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy,” at the Zanvyl Krieger School of Arts and Sciences, the Johns Hopkins University since 2008; and “U.S. Intelligence” at the Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po), beginning in 2015. As I tell my students, I provide neither a polemic against intelligence nor an apology for it. This volume takes the view that intelligence is a normal function of government:

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Sometimes it works well; sometimes it does not. Any intelligence service, including that of the United States, can rightly be the recipient of both praise and criticism. My goal is to raise important issues and to illuminate the debate over them, as well as to provide context for the debate. I leave it to professors and students to come to their own conclusions. As an introduction to the subject of intelligence, the book, I believe, takes the correct approach in not asking readers to agree with the author’s views.

As an introductory text, the book is not meant to be the last word on the subject. It is intended instead as a starting point for a serious academic exploration of the issues inherent in intelligence. Each chapter concludes with a list of readings recommended for a deeper examination of relevant issues. Additional bibliographic citations and websites are provided in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 lists some of the most important reviews and proposals for change in the U.S. intelligence community since 1945.

This is the seventh edition of Intelligence. The major changes in each edition reflect the changes that have confronted the intelligence community since 2000. The second edition added material about the September 11 attacks and the beginning of the war on terrorists. The third edition covered the investigations into the September 11 attacks, the Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) estimate and its aftermath, and the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the most substantial change in U.S. intelligence since 1947. The fourth edition reflected several new areas: the actual implementation of the DNI reforms and their successes and strains; the ongoing legal, operational, and ethical issues raised by the war against terrorists; the growth of such transnational issues as WMD; and the growing politicization of intelligence in the United States, especially through the declassified use of national intelligence estimates (NIEs). In the fifth edition, many of the issues raised by the war against terrorists continued to be at issue as did the management of the overall community and the role of the DNI. At the same time, new issues such as cyberspace were more prominent. The sixth edition reflected an ongoing shift in U.S. intelligence priorities, as policy makers begin to de-emphasize terrorism to a degree, and the widespread repercussions of the Manning and Snowden leaks. This leaked intelligence remains and should be considered classified, despite the fact that it has been leaked. Therefore, I cannot discuss the details of some of these leaks or comment on their veracity unless there are official comments on the subject.

In the seventh edition, in addition to reassessing the still evolving cyberspace issue, including the issue of cyber as a new collection discipline, several major events have important intelligence implications: the Senate Intelligence Committee’s staff report on enhanced interrogation techniques, which has important implications for operations and for congressional oversight; the rise of the Islamic State, which is more than a terrorist group but less than a state; and the nuclear agreement with Iran. New sections have been added offering a brief summary of the major laws governing U.S. intelligence; domestic intelligence collection; a discussion of whistle-blowers, as opposed to leakers; and the growing field of financial intelligence. The chapter on foreign intelligence services has been

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extensively revised. The bibliographies have been updated; wherever possible, I have added World Wide Web links for ease of access.

Given the dynamic nature of intelligence, any textbook on the subject runs the risk of containing dated information. This may be an even greater problem here, given the fluid situation created by the leaks and the overall international situation. This replicates the intelligence analyst’s dilemma of needing to produce finished intelligence during changing circumstances. The risk cannot be avoided. However, I am confident that most aspects of intelligence—and certainly the main issues discussed—are more general, more long- standing, and less susceptible to being outdated rapidly than the ever-changing character of intelligence might suggest.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Office of the DNI or any other U.S. government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or DNI endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by the intelligence community to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

Several words of thanks are in order: first, to my wife, Cynthia, and our children—Sarah and Adam—who have supported my part-time academic career despite the missed dinners it means. Cynthia also has been immensely supportive during the entire lengthy revision process. Next, thanks go to three friends and colleagues—the late Sam Halpern, Loch Johnson, and Jennifer Sims—who reviewed early drafts and made substantial improvements. The following scholars also provided extremely helpful comments for the previous editions: William Green, California State University at San Bernardino; Patrick Morgan, University of California, Irvine; Donald Snow, University of Alabama; James D. Calder, University of Texas at San Antonio; and Robert Pringle, University of Kentucky. Anthony Spadaro and Jim Barnett provided me and many other colleagues with a constant stream of updated articles across the range of intelligence issues. Hayden Peake kept me apprised of new books and articles on foreign intelligence services. Jason Healey provided useful comment and discussion about intelligence and cyberspace. None of these individuals is responsible for any remaining flaws or any of the views expressed. I would also like to thank the reviewers for the sixth and previous editions: L. Larry Boothe, Utah State University; Matthew Donald, Ohio State University; John Syer, California State University, Sacramento; John Comiskey, Monmouth University; Peter Hickman, Arizona State University; Paul M. Johnson, Auburn University; Michael Bogart, University of Maryland University College; Alan More, Notre Dame College; Michael Siler, California State University; Peter Olesen, University of Maryland University College; Loch Johnson, University of Georgia; Gary Kessler, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; Greg Moore, Notre Dame College; and James Calder and Glen Schaffer, University of Texas–San Antonio. Moreover, I have been most fortunate to collaborate with the following at CQ Press: Carrie Brandon, senior acquisitions editor; Duncan Marchbank, editorial assistant;

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David Felts, production editor; and Jared Leighton, copy editor. Working with them has been most enjoyable. Thanks to Space Imaging, Inc., for supplying the series of overhead images of San Diego.

As I have in past editions, I continue to thank all of my colleagues across the intelligence community for all they have taught me and for their dedication to their work. Finally, thanks to all of my students over the years, whose comments and discussions have greatly enriched my courses and this book. Again, I am solely responsible for any shortcomings in this volume.

Mark M. Lowenthal

Reston, Virginia

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Acronyms

ABI Activity-based intelligence ABM Antiballistic missile ACH Alternative competing hypothesis ADDNI Assistant deputy director of national intelligence AGI Advanced geospatial intelligence AIDS Acquired immune deficiency syndrome AIPAC American Israel Public Affairs Committee Aman Agaf ha-Modi’in (Military Intelligence) (Israel) AOR Area of responsibility ARC Analytic Resources Catalog ASAT Anti-satellite ASIO Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation ASIS Australian Secret Intelligence Service BDA Battle damage assessment BfV Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) (Germany) BND Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service) (Germany) BW Biological weapons CBW Chemical and biological weapons CCP Consolidated Cryptologic Program CDA Congressionally directed action CEO Chief executive officer CESG Communications Electronics Security Group (Britain) CI Counterintelligence CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIARDS CIA Retirement and Disability System CIC Counterintelligence Center CIG Central Intelligence Group CISEN Center for Investigation and National Security (Mexico) CMA Community Management Account CMC Central Military Commission (China) CNA Computer network attack CNC Counternarcotics Center CNE Computer network exploitation CNI National Intelligence Center (Mexico) CNR (1) coordonnateur national du renseignement (national intelligence coordinator); (2) conseil national du renseignement (national intelligence council) (both France)

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COCOM Combatant Command COI Coordinator of Information COIN Counterinsurgency COMINT Communications intelligence COO Chief operating officer COS Chief of station CRS Congressional Research Service CSE Communications Security Establishment (Canada) CSIS Canada’s Security Intelligence Service CSRS Counter Surveillance Reconnaissance System CTC Counterterrorism Center CT Counterterrorism CW Chemical weapons D&D Denial and deception DARP Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program DBA Dominant battlefield awareness DC Deputies Committee (NSC) DCI Director of central intelligence DCIA Director of the Central Intelligence Agency DCP Defense Cryptologic Program DCRI Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (France) DCS Defense Clandestine Service DEA Drug Enforcement Administration DGIAP Defense General Intelligence Applications Program DGSE Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (General Directorate for External Security) (France) DHS Department of Homeland Security DI Directorate of Intelligence DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DICP Defense Intelligence Counterdrug Program DIS Defence Intelligence Staff (Britain) DISTP Defense Intelligence Special Technologies Program DITP Defense Intelligence Tactical Program DMZ Demilitarized zone DNI Director of national intelligence DO Directorate of Operations (CIA) DOD Department of Defense DOE Department of Energy DPSD Directoire de la Protection et de la Sécurité de la Défense (Directorate for Defense Protection and Security) (France) DRM Directoire du Renseignement Militaire (Directorate of Military Intelligence) (France)

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DS&T Directorate of Science and Technology (CIA) DSRP Defense Space Reconnaissance Program ELINT Electronic intelligence EO Electro-optical; Executive order EOD Entry on duty EU European Union ExCom Executive Committee FAPSI Federalnoe Agenstvo Pravitelstvennoi Svyazi I Informatsii (Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information) (Russia) FARC Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (Colombia) FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service FIA Future Imagery Architecture FININT Financial intelligence FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act FISC Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court FISINT Foreign instrumentation intelligence FMV Full motion video FSB Federal’naya Sluzba Besnopasnoti (Federal Security Service) (Russia) GAO Government Accountability Office GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (Britain) GEO Geosynchronous orbit GDIP General Defense Intelligence Program GDP Gross domestic product GEOINT Geospatial intelligence GNP Gross national product GRU Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (Main Intelligence Administration) (Russia) HEO Highly elliptical orbit HPSCI House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence HSI Hyperspectral imagery HSINT Homeland security intelligence HSIP Homeland Security Intelligence Program HUMINT Human intelligence I&A Intelligence and Analysis I&W Indications and warning IAEA International Agency for Atomic Energy IC Intelligence community IG Inspector general IMINT Imagery (or photo) intelligence INF Intermediate nuclear forces INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Department of State)

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INTs Collection disciplines (HUMINT, GEOINT, MASINT, OSINT, SIGINT) IR Infrared imagery IRA Irish Republican Army IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act ISC Intelligence and Security Committee (Britain) ISID Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistan) (usually called ISI) ISG Iraq Survey Group ISR Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance IT Information technology JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JIC Joint Intelligence Committee (Britain) JICC Joint Intelligence Community Council JIO Joint Intelligence Organisation (Britain) JIOC Joint Intelligence Operations Center JMIP Joint Military Intelligence Program JTAC Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (Britain) JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee of State Security) (Russia) KJs Key Judgments LEO Low earth orbit MAD Mutual assured destruction MASINT Measurement and signatures intelligence MEO Medium earth orbit MI5 Security Service (Britain) MI6 Secret Intelligence Service (Britain) MIP Military Intelligence Program MOIS Ministry of Intelligence and Security (Iran) MON Memo of notification Mossad Ha-Mossad Le-Modin Ule Tafkidim Meyuhadim (Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks) (Israel) MSI Multispectral imagery NAB National Assessment Bureau (New Zealand) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCPC National Counterproliferation Center NCS National Clandestine Service NCSC National Counterintelligence and Security Center NCTC (1) National Counterterrorism Center; (2) National Counter-Terrorism Committee (Australia) NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

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NIA National Intelligence Agency (South Africa) NIC National Intelligence Council NIE National intelligence estimate NIM National intelligence manager NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency NIO National intelligence officer NIP National Intelligence Program NIPF National Intelligence Priorities Framework NOC Nonofficial cover NRO National Reconnaissance Office NRP National Reconnaissance Program NSA National Security Agency NSC National Security Council NSL National security letters NTM National technical means NTRO National Technical Research Organization (India) OCO Overseas contingency operations ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence OMB Office of Management and Budget ONA Office of National Assessments (Australia) ORCON Originator controlled OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense OSE Open Source Enterprise OSINT Open-source intelligence OSS Office of Strategic Services P&E Processing and exploitation PC Principals Committee (NSC) PCLOB Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board PCO Privy Council Office (Canada) PDB President’s Daily Brief PFIAB President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PHIA Professional head of intelligence analysis (Britain) PHOTINT Photo intelligence PIAB President’s Intelligence Advisory Board PIOB President’s Intelligence Oversight Board PIPs Presidential Intelligence Priorities QFR Question for the record RAW Research and Analysis Wing (India) RMA Revolution in military affairs S&T Science and technology SAC (1) Special agent in charge (FBI); (2) Strategic Air Command (now called

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STRATCOM) SALT Strategic arms limitation talks SAM Surface-to-air missile SARS Severe acute respiratory syndrome SAS Special Air Service (Britain) SBS Special Boat Service (Britain) SBSS Space-based surveillance satellite SCIFs Sensitive compartmented information facilities SDI Strategic Defense Initiative SGAC Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Shin Bet Sherut ha-Bitachon ha-Klali (General Security Service) (Israel) SIGINT Signals intelligence SIS Secret Intelligence Service (Britain) SMO Support to military operations SNIE Special national intelligence estimate SOCOM Special Operations Command SPA Special political action SRA Systems and Research Analyses SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty STRATCOM Strategic Forces Command SVR Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki (External Intelligence Service) (Russia) SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications TacSat Tactical satellite TECHINT Technical intelligence TELINT Telemetry intelligence TIARA Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities TOR Terms of reference TPEDs Tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination TUAVs Tactical unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs Unmanned aerial vehicles UCR Unanimous consent request UIS Unifying intelligence strategies UN United Nations UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission USDI Undersecretary of defense for intelligence VoIP Voice-over-Internet Protocol WIRe Worldwide Intelligence Review WMD Weapons of mass destruction

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Chapter One What Is “Intelligence”?

What is intelligence? Why is its definition an issue? Virtually every book written on the subject of intelligence begins with a discussion of what “intelligence” means, or at least how the author intends to use the term. This editorial fact reveals much about the field of intelligence. If this were a text on any other government function—defense, housing, transportation, diplomacy, agriculture—there would be little or no confusion about, or need to explain, what was being discussed.

Intelligence is different from other government functions for at least two reasons. First, much of what goes on is secret. Intelligence exists because governments seek to hide some information from other governments, who, in turn, seek to discover hidden information by means that they wish to keep secret. All of this secrecy leads some authors to believe that issues exist about which they cannot write or may not have sufficient knowledge. Thus, they feel the need to describe the limits of their work. Although numerous aspects of intelligence are—and deserve to be—kept secret, this is not an impediment to describing basic roles, processes, functions, and issues.

Second, this same secrecy can be a source of consternation to citizens, especially in a democratic country such as the United States. The U.S. intelligence community is a relatively recent government phenomenon. Since its creation in 1947, the intelligence community has been the subject of much ambivalence. Some Americans are uncomfortable with the concept that intelligence is a secret entity within an ostensibly open government based on checks and balances. Moreover, the intelligence community engages in activities —spying, eavesdropping, covert action—that some people regard as antithetical to what they believe the United States should be as a nation and as a model for other nations. Some citizens have difficulty reconciling American ideals and goals with the realities of intelligence.

To many people, intelligence seems little different from information, except that it is probably secret. However, distinguishing between the two is important. Information is anything that can be known, regardless of how it is discovered. Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs. Intelligence is a subset of the broader category of information. Intelligence and the entire process by which it is identified, obtained, and analyzed responds to the needs of policy makers. All intelligence is information; not all information is intelligence.

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Why Have Intelligence Agencies?

The major theme of this book is that intelligence exists solely to support policy makers in myriad ways. Any other activity is either wasteful or illegal. The book’s focus is firmly on the relationship between intelligence, in all of its aspects, and policy making. The policy maker is not a passive recipient of intelligence but actively influences all aspects of intelligence. (This concept of the policy maker–intelligence relationship would also be true for business as well as government. The focus in this book is on governments.)

Intelligence agencies exist for at least four major reasons: to avoid strategic surprise; to provide long-term expertise; to support the policy process; and to maintain the secrecy of information, needs, and methods.

To Avoid Strategic Surprise.

The foremost goal of any intelligence community must be to keep track of threats, forces, events, and developments that are capable of endangering the nation’s existence. This goal may sound grandiose and far-fetched, but several times over the past 112 years, nations have been subjected to direct military attacks for which they were, at best, inadequately prepared—Russia was surprised by Japan in 1904, both the Soviet Union (by Germany) and the United States (by Japan) in 1941, and Israel (by Egypt and Syria) in 1973. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States are another example of this pattern, albeit carried out on a much more limited scale. (See box, “The Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001: Another Pearl Harbor?”)

Strategic surprise should not be confused with tactical surprise, which is of a different magnitude and, as Professor Richard Betts of Columbia University pointed out in his article, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” cannot be wholly avoided. To put the difference between the two types of surprise in perspective, suppose, for example, that Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones are business partners. Every Friday, while Mr. Smith is lunching with a client, Mr. Jones helps himself to money from the petty cash. One afternoon Mr. Smith comes back from lunch earlier than expected, catching Mr. Jones red-handed. “I’m surprised!” they exclaim simultaneously. Mr. Jones’s surprise is tactical: He knew what he was doing but did not expect to get caught; Mr. Smith’s surprise is strategic: He had no idea the embezzlement was happening.

Tactical surprise, when it happens, is not of sufficient magnitude and importance to threaten national existence, although it can be psychologically devastating. To some extent, the 9/11 attacks were tactical surprises. Repetitive tactical surprise, however, suggests some significant intelligence problems.

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The Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001: Another Pearl Harbor? Many people immediately described the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon as a “new Pearl Harbor.” This is understandable on an emotional level, as both were surprise attacks. However, important differences exist.

First, Pearl Harbor was a strategic surprise. U.S. policy makers expected a move by Japan but not against the United States. The Soviet Union was seen as a possible target, but the greatest expectation and fear was a Japanese attack on European colonies in Southeast Asia that by passed U.S. possessions, thus allowing Japan to continue to expand its empire without bringing the United States into the war.

The terrorist attacks were more of a tactical surprise. The enmity of Osama bin Laden and his willingness to attack U.S. targets had been amply demonstrated in earlier attacks on the East African embassies and on the USS Cole. Throughout the summer of 2001, U.S. intelligence officials had warned of the likelihood of another bin Laden attack. What was not known—or guessed—were the target and the means of attack.

Second, Japan and the Axis powers had the capability to defeat and destroy U.S. power and the U.S. way of life. The terrorists do not pose a threat on the same level.

To Provide Long-Term Expertise.

Compared with the permanent bureaucracy, all senior policy makers are transients. The average time in office for a president of the United States is five years. Secretaries of state and defense serve for less time than that, and their senior subordinates—deputy, under, and assistant secretaries—often hold their positions for even shorter periods. Although these individuals usually enter their respective offices with an extensive background in their fields, it is virtually impossible for them to be well versed in all of the matters with which they will be dealing. Inevitably, they will have to call upon others whose knowledge and expertise on certain issues are greater. Much knowledge and expertise on national security issues reside in the intelligence community, where the analytical cadre is more stable than the political office holders. (This has changed in the United States since 2001. See chap. 6.) Stability tends to be greater in intelligence agencies, particularly in higher-level positions, than in foreign affairs and defense agencies. Also, intelligence agencies tend to have far fewer political appointees than do the State and Defense Departments. However, these two personnel differences (stability and nonpolitical) have diminished somewhat over the past decade. As will be discussed later, the senior position in U.S. intelligence, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), had been extremely volatile, with four DNIs in the first five years (2005–2010). Gen. James Clapper, who was appointed in 2010, has offered some continuity by remaining in the position longer than all of his predecessors combined.

To Support the Policy Process.

Policy makers have a constant need for tailored (meaning written for their specific needs), timely intelligence that will provide background, context, information, warning, and an

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assessment of risks, benefits, and likely outcomes. Policy makers also occasionally need alternative means to achieve specific policy ends. Both of these needs are met by the intelligence community.

In the ethos of U.S. intelligence, a strict dividing line exists between intelligence and policy. The two are seen as separate functions. The government is run by the policy makers. Intelligence has a support role and may not cross over into the advocacy of policy choices. Intelligence officers who are dealing with policy makers are expected to maintain professional objectivity and not push specific policies, choices, or outcomes. To do so is seen as threatening the objectivity of the analyses they present. If intelligence officers have a strong preference for a specific policy outcome, their intelligence analysis may display a similar bias. This is what is meant by politicized intelligence, one of the strongest expressions of opprobrium that can be leveled in the U.S. intelligence community. This is not to suggest that intelligence officers do not have preferences about policy choices. They do. However, they are trained not to allow these preferences to influence their intelligence analysis. If intelligence officers were allowed to make policy recommendations, they would then have a strong urge to present intelligence that supported the policy they had first recommended. At that point, all objectivity would be lost.

Three important caveats should be added to the distinction between policy and intelligence. First, the idea that intelligence is distinct from policy does not mean that intelligence officers do not care about the outcome and do not influence it. One must differentiate between attempting to influence (that is, inform) the process by providing intelligence, which is acceptable, and trying to manipulate intelligence so that policy makers make a certain choice, which is not acceptable. Second, senior policy makers can and do ask senior intelligence officials for their opinions, which are given. Third, this separation works in only one direction, that of intelligence advice to policy. Nothing prevents policy makers from rejecting intelligence out of hand or offering their own analytic inputs. When doing so, however, policy makers cannot present their alternative views as intelligence per se, in part because they lack the necessary objectivity. There are no hard-and-fast rules here, but there is an unwritten and generally agreed standard. This became an issue in 2002, when Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith created an office that, to many observers, appeared to offer alternative intelligence analyses even though it was in a policy branch. Assuming that policy makers stay within their bounds, they will likely see their offering alternative views as being different from imposing their views on the intelligence product per se. This would also politicize intelligence, which is an accusation policy makers as well as intelligence officials hope to avoid, because it calls into question the soundness of their policy and the basis on which they have made decisions. The propriety of a policy maker rejecting intelligence was central to the 2005 debate over the nomination of John Bolton to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Critics charged that Bolton, as undersecretary of state, had engaged in this type of action when intelligence did not provide the answers he preferred. (See box, “Policy Versus

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Intelligence: The Great Divide.”)

To Maintain the Secrecy of Information, Needs, and Methods.

Secrecy does make intelligence unique. That others would keep important information from you, that you need certain types of information and wish to keep your needs secret, and that you have the means to obtain information that you also wish to keep secret are major reasons for having intelligence agencies.

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Policy Versus Intelligence: The Great Divide One way to envision the distinction between policy and intelligence is to see them as two spheres of government activity that are separated by a semipermeable membrane. The membrane is semipermeable because policy makers can and do cross over into the intelligence sphere, but intelligence officials cannot cross over into the policy sphere.

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What Is Intelligence About?

The word “intelligence” largely refers to issues related to national security—that is, defense and foreign policy and certain aspects of homeland and internal security, which has been increasingly important since the terrorist attacks of 2001. In U.S. law (the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act, 2004) all intelligence is now defined as national intelligence, which has three subsets: foreign, domestic, and homeland security. This specification was written to overcome the past divide between foreign and domestic intelligence, which had come to be seen as an impediment to intelligence sharing, especially on issues like terrorism, which overlaps both areas. It is important to note that practitioners are experiencing some difficulty distinguishing among homeland, internal, and domestic security.

The actions, policies, and capabilities of other nations and of important non-state groups (international organizations, terrorist organizations, and so on) are primary areas of concern. But policy makers and intelligence officers cannot restrict themselves to thinking only about enemies—those powers that are known to be hostile or whose policy goals are in some way inimical. They must also keep track of powers that are neutrals, friends, or even allies who are rivals in certain contexts. For example, the European Union is made up largely of nations that are U.S. allies. However, the United States competes with many of them for global resources and markets, so in that sense they are rivals. This type of relationship with the United States is also true of Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, circumstances may arise in which a country would need to keep track of the actions and intentions of friends. For example, an ally might be pursuing a course that could involve it in conflict with a third party. Should this not be to a country’s liking—or should it threaten to involve that country as well—it would be better to know early on what this ally was doing. Adolf Hitler, for example, might have been better served had he known in advance of Japan’s plans to attack the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941. He had no interest in seeing the United States become an active combatant and might have argued against a direct attack by Japan (as opposed to a Japanese attack to the south against European colonies but avoiding U.S. territories). In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries it has become increasingly important for the United States to keep track of non- state actors—terrorists, narcotics traffickers, freelance proliferators, and others.

Information is needed about these actors, their intentions, their likely actions, and their capabilities in a variety of areas, including economic, military, and societal. The United States built its intelligence organizations in recognition of the fact that some of the information it would like to have is either inaccessible or being actively denied. In other words, the information is secret as far as the United States is concerned, and those who have the information would like to keep it that way.

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The pursuit of secret information is the mainstay of intelligence activity. At the same time, reflecting the political transformation brought about by the end of the cold war, increasing amounts of once secret information are now accessible, especially in states that were satellites of or allied with the Soviet Union. The ratio of open to secret information has shifted dramatically. One former senior intelligence official estimated that during the cold war, 80 percent of the intelligence the U.S. needed was secret, and 20 percent was open, but in the post–cold war world, those ratios had reversed. Still, foreign states and actors harbor secrets that the United States must pursue. And not all of this intelligence is in states that are hostile to the United States in the sense that they are enemies.

Most people tend to think of intelligence in terms of military information—troop movements, weapons capabilities, and plans for surprise attack. This is an important component of intelligence (in line with avoiding surprise attack, the first reason for having intelligence agencies), but it is not the only one. Many different kinds of intelligence (political, economic, social, environmental, health, and cultural) provide important inputs to analysts. Policy makers and intelligence officials must think beyond foreign intelligence. They must consider intelligence activities focused on threats to internal security, such as subversion, espionage, and terrorism.

Other than the internal security threats, domestic intelligence, at least in the United States and kindred democracies, had been treated as a law enforcement issue, although this has become an issue of contention in the United States when it comes to terrorism and the treatment of potential terrorists. However, this nexus between domestic intelligence and law enforcement differentiates the practice of intelligence in Western democracies from that in totalitarian states. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ State Security Committee (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, or KGB), for example, served a crucial internal secret police function that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) does not. Thus, in many respects, the two agencies were not comparable.

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“And ye shall know the truth . . .” Upon entering the old entrance of the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters, one will find the following inscription on the left-hand marble wall:

And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.

John VIII–XXXII

It is a nice sentiment, but it overstates and misrepresents what is going on in that building or any other intelligence agency.

What is intelligence not about? Intelligence is not about truth. If something were known to be true—or false—states would not need intelligence agencies to collect the information or analyze it. Truth is such an absolute term that it sets a standard that intelligence rarely would be able to achieve. It is better—and more accurate—to think of intelligence as proximate reality. Intelligence agencies face issues or questions and do their best to arrive at a firm understanding of what is going on. They can rarely be assured that even their best and most considered analysis is true. Their goals are intelligence products that are reliable, unbiased, and honest (that is, free from politicization). These are all laudable goals, yet they are still different from truth. (See box, “And ye shall know the truth . . .”)

Is intelligence integral to the policy process? The question may seem rhetorical in a book about intelligence, but it is important to consider. At one level, the answer is yes. Intelligence should and can provide warning about imminent strategic threats, although, as noted, several nations have been subjected to strategic surprise. Intelligence officials can also play a useful role as seasoned and experienced advisers. The information their agencies gather is also of value given that it might not be available if agencies did not undertake secret collection. Therein lies an irony: Intelligence agencies strive to be more than just collectors of secret information. They emphasize the value that their analysis adds to the secret information, although equally competent analysts can be found in policy agencies. The difference is in the nature of the work and the outcomes for which the two types of analysts are responsible—intelligence versus policy decisions.

At the same time, intelligence suffers from a number of potential weaknesses that tend to undercut its function in the eyes of policy makers. Not all of these weaknesses are present at all times, and sometimes none is present. They still represent potential pitfalls.

First, a certain amount of intelligence analysis may be no more sophisticated than current conventional wisdom on a given issue. Conventional wisdom is usually—and sometimes mistakenly—dismissed out of hand. But policy makers expect more than that, in part justifiably.

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Second, analysis can become so dependent on data that it misses important intangibles. For example, a competent analysis of the likelihood that thirteen small and somewhat disunited colonies would be able to break away from British rule in the 1770s would have likely concluded that defeat was inevitable. After all, Britain was the largest industrial power; it already had trained troops stationed in the colonies; colonial opinion was not united (nor was Britain’s); and Britain could use the Native Americans as an added force, among other reasons. A straightforward political–military analysis would have missed several factors—the strength of British divisiveness, the possibility of help from royalist France—that turned out to be of tremendous importance.

Third, mirror imaging, or assuming that other states or individuals will act just the way a particular country or person does, can undermine analysis. The basis of this problem is fairly understandable. Every day people make innumerable judgments—when driving, walking on a crowded street, or interacting with others at home and at the office—about how other people will react and behave. They assume that their behavior and reactions are based on the golden rule. These judgments stem from societal norms and rules, etiquette, and experience. Analysts too easily extend this commonplace thinking to intelligence issues. However, in intelligence it becomes a trap. For example, no U.S. policy maker in 1941 could conceive of Japan’s starting a war with the United States overtly (instead of continuing its advance while bypassing U.S. territories), given the great disparity in the strength of the two nations. In Tokyo, however, that same disparate strength argued compellingly for the necessity of starting war sooner rather than later. The other problem with mirror imaging is that it assumes a certain level of shared rationality. It leaves no room for the irrational actor, an individual or nation whose rationality is based on something different or unfamiliar—for example, suicidal terrorists viewed through the eyes of Western culture.

Fourth, and perhaps most important, policy makers are free to reject or to ignore the intelligence they are offered. They may suffer penalties down the road if their policy has bad outcomes, but policy makers cannot be forced to take heed of intelligence. Thus, they can dispense with intelligence at will, and intelligence officers cannot press their way (or their products) back into the process in such cases.

This host of weaknesses seems to overpower the positive aspects of intelligence. It certainly suggests and underscores the fragility of intelligence within the policy process. How, then, can it be determined whether intelligence matters? The best way, at least retrospectively, is to ask, Would policy makers have made different choices with or without a given piece of intelligence? If the answer is yes, or even maybe, then the intelligence mattered. The answer to this can still be elusive because much intelligence may not be related to a specific event or decision. Richard Kerr, a former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, reviewed fifty years of CIA analysis across a range of issues and concluded that, despite highs and lows of performance, intelligence helped reduce policy makers’ uncertainty and provided them with understanding and with warning on a fairly consistent basis. That should be seen as a

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valuable service even if one admits that intelligence will not always be correct. (See box, “Intelligence: A Working Concept.”)

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Intelligence: A Working Concept Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policy makers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.

We return to the question: What is intelligence? Alan Breakspear, a veteran Canadian intelligence officer, defines intelligence as a capability to forecast changes—either positive or negative—in time to do something about them. We often tend to think about intelligence-related events in the negative. Breakspear’s addition of “positive” is important and is akin to “opportunity analysis.” (See chap 6.)

In this book, we will think about intelligence in several ways, sometimes simultaneously.

Intelligence as process: Intelligence can be thought of as the means by which certain types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated, and as the way in which certain types of covert action are conceived and conducted. Intelligence as product: Intelligence can be thought of as the product of these processes—that is, as the analyses and intelligence operations themselves. Intelligence as organization: Intelligence can be thought of as the units that carry out its various functions.

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Key Terms

intelligence mirror imaging national intelligence politicized intelligence

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Further Readings

Each of these readings grapples with the definition of intelligence, either by function or by role, in a different way. Some deal with intelligence on its own terms; others attempt to relate it to the larger policy process.

Betts, Richard. “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable.” World Politics 31 (October 1978). Reprinted in Power, Strategy, and Security. Ed. Klaus Knorr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Breakspear, Alan. “Intelligence: The Unseen Instrument of Governance.” In Governance and Security as a Unitary Concept. Eds. Tom Rippon and Graham Kemp. Victoria, British Columbia: Agio, 2012.

Hamilton, Lee. “The Role of Intelligence in the Foreign Policy Process.” In Essays on Strategy and Diplomacy. Claremont, Calif.: Claremont College, Keck Center for International Strategic Studies, 1987.

Herman, Michael. Intelligence Power in Peace and War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Heymann, Hans. “Intelligence/Policy Relationships.” In Intelligence: Policy and Process. Ed. Alfred C. Maurer and others. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985.

Hilsman, Roger. Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958.

Kent, Sherman. Strategic Intelligence for American Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949.

Kerr, Richard J. “The Track Record: CIA Analysis from 1950 to 2000.” In Analyzing Intelligence. Eds. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008.

Laqueur, Walter. A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence. New York: Basic Books, 1985.

Scott, Len, and Peter Jackson. “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice.” Intelligence and National Security 19 (summer 2004): 139–169.

Shulsky, Abram N., and Gary J. Schmitt. Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence. 2d rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1993.

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Shulsky, Abram N., and Jennifer Sims. What Is Intelligence? Washington, D.C.: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1992.

Troy, Thomas F. “The ‘Correct’ Definition of Intelligence.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5 (winter 1991–1992): 433–454.

Warner, Michael. “Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence.” Studies in Intelligence 46 (2002): 15–23.

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Chapter Two The Development of U.S. Intelligence

Each nation practices intelligence in ways that are specific—if not peculiar—to that nation alone. This is true even among countries that have a common heritage and share a great deal of their intelligence, such as Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States. A better understanding of how and why the United States practices intelligence is important because the U.S. intelligence system remains the largest and most influential in the world—as model, rival, or target. (The practices of several foreign intelligence services are discussed in chap. 15.) Therefore, this chapter discusses the major themes and historical events that shaped the development of U.S. intelligence and helped determine how it continues to function.

The phrase “intelligence community” is used throughout the book as well as in most other discussions of U.S. intelligence. The word “community” is particularly apt in describing U.S. intelligence. The community is made up of agencies and offices whose work is often related and sometimes combined, but they serve different needs or different policy makers and work under various lines of authority and control. The intelligence community grew out of a set of evolving demands and without a master plan. It is highly functional and yet sometimes dysfunctional. One director of central intelligence (DCI), Richard Helms (1966–1973), testified before Congress that, despite all of the criticisms of the structure and functioning of the intelligence community, if one were to create it from scratch, much the same community would likely emerge. Helms’s focus was not on the structure of the community but on the services it provides, which are multiple, varied, and supervised by a number of individuals. This approach to intelligence is unique to the United States, although others have copied facets of it. The 2004 legislation that created a director of national intelligence (DNI; see chap. 3) made changes in the superstructure of the intelligence community but not to the functions of the various agencies.

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Major Themes

A number of major themes contributed to the development of the U.S. intelligence system.

The Novelty of U.S. Intelligence.

Of the major powers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the United States has the briefest history of significant intelligence beyond wartime emergencies. The great Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, wrote about the importance of intelligence in the fifth century BCE. British intelligence dates from the reign of Elizabeth I (1558–1603), French intelligence from the tenure of Cardinal Richelieu (1624–1642), and Russian intelligence from the reign of Ivan the Terrible (1533–1584). Even given that the United States did not come into being until 1776, its intelligence experience is brief. The first glimmer of a national intelligence enterprise did not appear until 1940. Although permanent and specific naval and military intelligence units date from the late nineteenth century, a broader U.S. national intelligence capability began to arise only with the creation of the Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1940, the predecessor of the World War II–era Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

What explains this nearly 170-year absence of organized U.S. intelligence? For most of its history, the United States did not have strong foreign policy interests beyond its immediate borders. The success of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine (which stated that the United States would resist any European attempt to colonize in the Western Hemisphere), abetted by the acquiescence and tacit support of Britain, solved the basic security interests of the United States and its broader foreign policy interests. The need for better intelligence became apparent only after the United States achieved the status of a world power and became involved in wide-ranging international issues at the end of the nineteenth century.

Furthermore, the United States faced no threat to its security from its neighbors, from powers outside the Western Hemisphere, or—with the exception of the Civil War (1861– 1865)—from large-scale internal dissent that was inimical to its form of government. This benign environment, so unlike that faced by all European states, undercut any perceived need for national intelligence.

Until the cold war with the Soviet Union commenced in 1945, the United States severely limited expenditures on defense and related activities during peacetime. Intelligence, already underappreciated, fell into this category. (Historians have noted, however, that intelligence absorbed a remarkable and anomalous 12 percent of the federal budget under President George Washington. This was the high-water mark of intelligence spending in the federal budget, a percentage that was never approached again. In 2010, national intelligence accounted for roughly 2.3 percent of the federal budget—for a total intelligence budget of $80.1 billion, according to figures declassified by the director of national

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intelligence. These data—which probably represent the peak for intelligence spending for many years to come—suggest that although there has been a great increase in intelligence spending in terms of dollars since the 2001 attacks, intelligence has not increased substantially as a national priority since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, going from 1.6 percent of the federal budget during the pre- and post-attack period and increasing slightly thereafter. In other words, intelligence spending has increased as has the rest of the federal budget, but intelligence has increased only barely the share of the federal budget that it consumes, which is a more important indicator than dollar-spending levels.)

Intelligence was a novelty in the 1940s. At that time, policy makers in both the executive branch and Congress viewed intelligence as a newcomer to national security. Even within the Army and Navy, intelligence developed relatively late and was far from robust until well into the twentieth century. As a result, intelligence did not have long-established patrons in the government, but it did have many rivals with competing departments, particularly the military and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), neither of which was willing to share its sources of information. Furthermore, intelligence did not have well-established traditions or modes of operation and thus was forced to create these during two periods of extreme pressure: World War II and the cold war.

A Threat-Based Foreign Policy.

With the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States assumed a vested interest in the international status quo. This interest became more pronounced after the Spanish-American War in 1898. With the acquisition of a small colonial empire, the United States achieved a satisfactory international position—largely self-sufficient and largely unthreatened. However, the twentieth century saw the repeated rise of powers whose foreign policies were direct threats to the status quo: Kaiserine Germany in World War I, the Axis in World War II, and then the Soviet Union during the cold war.

Responding to these threats became the mainstay of U.S. national security policy. The threats also gave focus to much of the operational side of U.S. intelligence, from its initial experience in the OSS during World War II to broader covert actions in the cold war. Intelligence operations were one way in which the United States countered these threats.

The terrorism threat in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries fits the same pattern of an opponent who rejects the international status quo and has emerged as an issue for U.S. national security. However, now the enemy is not a nation-state—even when terrorists have the support of nation-states or appear to be quasistates, like the Islamic State —which makes it more difficult to deal with the problem. The refusal to accept the status quo could be more central to terrorists than it was to nation-states such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, for whom the international status quo was also anathema. Such countries can, when necessary or convenient, forgo those policies, temporarily accept the status quo, and continue to function. Terrorists, however, cannot accept the status quo

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without giving up their raison d’être.

The Influence of the Cold War.

Historians of intelligence often debate whether the United States would have had a large- scale intelligence capability had there been no cold war. The view here is that the answer is yes. The 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, not the cold war, prompted the initial formation of the U.S. intelligence community.

Even so, the prosecution of the cold war became the major defining factor in the development of most basic forms and practices of the U.S. intelligence community. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the cold war was the predominant national security issue, taking up to half of the intelligence budget, according to former Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates (1991–1993). Moreover, the fact that the Soviet Union and its allies were essentially closed targets had a major effect on U.S. intelligence, forcing it to resort to a variety of largely remote technical systems to collect needed information from a distance.

The Global Scope of Intelligence Interests.

The cold war quickly shifted from a struggle for predominance in postwar Europe to a global struggle in which virtually any nation or region could be a pawn between the two sides. Although some areas always remained more important than others, none could be written off entirely. Thus, U.S. intelligence began to collect and analyze information about, and station intelligence personnel in, every region.

A Wittingly Redundant Analytical Structure.

Intelligence can be divided into four broad activities: collection, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence. The United States developed unique entities to handle the various types of collection (imagery, signals, espionage) and covert action; counterintelligence is a function that is found in virtually every intelligence agency. But, for analysis, U.S. policy makers purposely created three agencies whose functions appear to overlap: the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Directorate of Analysis (until 2015, the Directorate of Intelligence), the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Each of these agencies is considered an all-source analytical agency; that is, they have access to the full range of collected intelligence, and they work on virtually the same issues, although with differing degrees of emphasis, reflecting the interests of their primary policy customers.

Two major reasons explain this redundancy, and they are fundamental to how the United States conducts analysis. First, different consumers of intelligence—policy makers—have different intelligence needs. Even when the president, the secretary of state, the secretary of

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defense, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are working on the same issue, each has different operational responsibilities and concerns. The United States developed analytical centers to serve each policy maker’s specific and unique needs. Also, each policy agency wanted to be assured of a stream of intelligence dedicated to its needs.

Second, the United States developed the concept of competitive analysis, an idea that is based on the belief that by having analysts in several agencies with different backgrounds and perspectives work on the same issue, parochial views more likely will be countered—if not weeded out—and proximate reality is more likely to be achieved. Competitive analysis should, in theory, be an antidote to groupthink and forced consensus, although this is not always the case in practice. For example, during the pre-war assessment of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, divisions formed among agencies about the nature of some intelligence (such as the possible role of aluminum tubes in a nuclear program) and whether the totality of the intelligence indicated parts of a nuclear program or a more coherent program. But these differences did not appreciably alter the predominant view with respect to the overall potential Iraqi nuclear capability.

As one would expect, competitive analysis entails a certain cost for the intelligence community because it requires having many analysts in several agencies. During the 1990s, as intelligence budgets contracted severely under the pressure of the post–cold war peace dividend and because of a lack of political support in either the executive branch or Congress, much of the capability to conduct competitive analysis was lost. There simply were not enough analysts. According to DCI George J. Tenet (1997–2004), the entire intelligence community lost some 23,000 positions during the 1990s, affecting all activities. One result was a tendency to do less competitive analysis and, instead, to allow agencies to focus on certain issues exclusively, which resulted in a sort of analytical triage. As the intelligence budget declines again from its 2010 peak, intelligence managers fear being forced back into that same position.

Consumer–Producer Relations.

The distinct line that is drawn between policy and intelligence leads to questions about how intelligence producers and consumers should relate to each other. The issue is the degree of proximity that is desirable.

Two schools of thought have been evident in this debate in the United States. The distance school argued that the intelligence establishment should keep itself separate from the policy makers to avoid the risk of providing intelligence that lacks objectivity and favors or opposes one policy choice over others. Adherents of the distance school also feared that policy makers could interfere with intelligence so as to receive analysis that supported or opposed specific policies. This group believed that too close a relationship increased the risk of politicized intelligence.

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The proximate group argued that too great a distance raised the risk that the intelligence community would be less aware of policy makers’ needs and therefore produce less useful intelligence. This group maintained that proper training and internal reviews could avoid politicization of intelligence.

By the late 1950s to early 1960s, the proximate school became the preferred model for U.S. intelligence. But the debate was significant in that it underscored the early and persistent fears about intelligence becoming politicized.

In the late 1990s, there were two subtle shifts in the policy–intelligence relationship. The first was a greatly increased emphasis on support to military operations, which some believed gave too much priority to this sector—at a time when threats to national security had seemingly decreased—at the expense of other intelligence consumers. The second was the feeling among some analysts that they were being torn between operational customers and analytical customers.

The apotheosis of the proximate relationship may have come under President George W. Bush (2001–2009) who, upon taking office, requested that he receive an intelligence briefing six days a week. DCIs George Tenet and Porter J. Goss (2004–2006) attended these daily briefings, which was unprecedented for a DCI. This greatly increased degree of proximity at the most senior level led some observers to question its possible effects on the DCI’s ability to remain objective about the intelligence being offered. This practice continued under Directors of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte (2005–2007) and Mike McConnell (2007–2009). Although President Barack Obama (2009–) receives a President’s Daily Brief (PDB), it is not necessarily presented to him by the DNI. There is, however, a postbrief meeting that the DNI or his deputy does attend. This suggests that a daily president–DNI meeting has become a standard part of the policy–intelligence relationship.

The Relationship Between Analysis and Collection and Covert Action.

Parallel to the debate about producer–consumer relations, factions have waged a similar debate about the proper relationship between intelligence analysis, on the one hand, and intelligence collection and covert action, on the other.

The issue has centered largely on the structure of the CIA, which includes both analytical and operational components: the Directorate of Analysis (DA) and the Directorate of Operations (DO). (A similar structure exists in DIA with both analysts and a clandestine service, now called the Defense Clandestine Service, or DCS, but DIA has not usually been the focus of these concerns.) The DO is responsible for both espionage and covert action. Again, distance and proximate schools of thought took form. The distance school argued that analysis and the two operational functions are largely distinct and that housing them together could be risky for the security of human sources and methods and for analysis.

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Distance adherents raised concerns about the ability of the DI (as it then was) to provide objective analysis when the DO is concurrently running a major covert action. Will covert operators exert pressure, either overt or subliminal, to have analysis support the covert action? As an example of such a conflict of interest, such stresses existed between some analytical components of the intelligence community and supporters of the counterrevolutionaries (contras) who were fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua in the 1980s. Some analysts questioned whether the contras would ever be victorious, which was seen as unsupportive by some advocates of the contras’ cause.

The proximate school argued that separating the two functions deprives both analysis and operations of the benefits of a close relationship. Analysts gain a better appreciation of operational goals and realities, which can be factored into their work, as well as a better sense of the value of sources developed in espionage. Operators gain a better appreciation of the analyses they receive, which can be factored into their own planning.

Although critics of the current structure have repeatedly suggested separating analytical and operational components, the proximate school has prevailed. In the mid-1990s, the then- DI and DO entered a partnership that resulted in bringing together their front offices and various regional offices. This did not entirely improve their working relationship. One of the by-products of the 2002 Iraq WMD estimate was an effort to give analysts greater insight into DO sources. This was largely a reaction to the agent named CURVE BALL, a human source under German control whose reporting on Iraqi biological weapons proved to be fabricated, unbeknownst to some analysts, who unwittingly continued to use this reporting as part of their supporting intelligence even after the reporting had been recalled. In 2015, Director of the CIA (DCIA) John Brennan announced a major reorganization of the CIA into a series of regional and topical mission centers that would combine analytic and operational staffs and functions. These mission centers, each headed by an assistant director, have become the loci of all CIA activities, with the DA and DO essentially becoming logistical supports for the mission centers. Thus, the proximate model is still the preferred one, although some observers have raised concerns about this new structure homogenizing the unique cultures and attributes of the DA and the DO.

The Debate Over Covert Action.

As discussed in chapter 1, covert action in the United States has always generated some uneasiness among those concerned about its propriety or acceptability as a facet of U.S. policy—secret intervention, perhaps violently, in the affairs of another state. In addition, many debated the propriety of paramilitary operations—the training and equipping of large foreign irregular military units, such as the contras in Nicaragua or the mujaheddin in Afghanistan. Other than assassination, paramilitary operations have been among the most controversial aspects of covert action, and they have an uneven record. The vigor of the debate for and against paramilitary operations has varied widely over time. Little discussion occurred before the Bay of Pigs invasion (1961), and afterward there was little discussion

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until the 1970s, when the Vietnam War fostered a collapse of the bipartisan cold war consensus that had supported an array of measures to counter Soviet expansion. At the same time, a series of revelations about intelligence community misdeeds fostered more skepticism if not opposition to intelligence operations. The debate revived once again during the contras’ paramilitary campaign against Nicaragua’s government in the mid- 1980s. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, however, broad agreement re-emerged on a full range of covert actions—as opposed to a later debate on interrogation techniques.

Two more recent aspects of this continuing debate over covert action are the use of armed UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) to attack terrorists overseas—including U.S. citizens, which has raised questions about propriety and legality, and whether the use of cyberspace as a preemptive or precursor weapon is a military action or a covert action. (Both of these issues are discussed in more detail in chaps. 8 and 12.)

The Continuity of Intelligence Policy.

Throughout most of the cold war, no difference existed between Democratic and Republican intelligence policies. The cold war consensus on the need for a continuing policy of containment vis-à-vis the Soviet Union transcended politics until the Vietnam War, when a difference emerged between the two parties that was in many respects more rhetorical than real. For example, both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan made intelligence policy an issue in their campaigns for the presidency. Carter, in 1976, lumped revelations about the CIA and other intelligence agencies’ misconduct with Watergate and the Vietnam War; Reagan, in 1980, spoke of restoring the CIA, along with the rest of U.S. national security. Although the ways in which the two presidents supported and used intelligence differed greatly, it would be wrong to suggest that one was anti-intelligence and the other pro-intelligence.

A similar broad continuity of intelligence policy may have emerged over the issue of terrorism. As a candidate, Obama pledged to make a number of changes in U.S. policy toward terrorism and terrorists. Although he took steps to signal a changed direction, such as ordering the eventual closure of the prison at Guantanamo, this proved to be difficult to do. The terrorist detention center remained open in 2016. The Obama administration also ordered UAV attacks on terrorist targets four times as often as did the Bush administration and continued to authorize programs to gather data from telephones and computer communications. Interestingly, the Obama administration’s 2011 counterterrorism strategy noted the continuity between the Bush and Obama administrations in this area. There has been more continuity than change overall, especially as the terrorist threat went from larger attacks to more individual ones.

Heavy Reliance on Technology.

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Since the creation of the modern intelligence community in the 1940s, the United States has relied heavily on technology as the mainstay of its collection capabilities. A technological response to a problem is not unique to intelligence. It also describes how the United States has waged war, beginning as early as the Civil War in the 1860s. Furthermore, the closed nature of the major intelligence target in the twentieth century— the Soviet Union—required remote technical means to collect information.

The reliance on technology is significant beyond the collection capabilities it engenders because it has had a major effect on the structure of the intelligence community and how it has functioned. Some people maintain that the reliance on technology has resulted in an insufficient use of human intelligence collection (espionage). No empirical data are available supporting this view, but this perception has persisted since at least the 1970s. The main argument, which tends to arise when intelligence is perceived as having performed less than optimally, is that human intelligence can collect certain types of information (intentions and plans) that technical collection cannot. Little disagreement is heard about the strengths and weaknesses of the various types of collection, but such an assessment does not necessarily support the view that espionage always suffers as compared with technical collection. The persistence of the debate reflects an underlying concern about intelligence collection that has never been adequately addressed—that is, the proper balance (if such balance can be had) between technical and human collection. This debate has arisen again in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in 2001. (See chap. 12 for a discussion of the types of intelligence collection required by the war on terrorists.)

Secrecy Versus Openness.

The openness that is an inherent part of a representative democratic government clashes with the secrecy required by intelligence operations. No democratic government with a significant intelligence community has spent more time debating and worrying about this conflict than the United States. How open can intelligence be and still be effective? At what point does secrecy pose a threat to democratic values? The issue cannot be settled with finality, but the United States has made an ongoing series of compromises between its values—as a government and as an international leader—and the requirements for some level of intelligence activity as it has continued to explore the boundaries of this issue. In the recent debates over the use of UAVs and the National Security Agency (NSA) collection programs, there were frequent calls for more “transparency,” which is simply another way of framing this same debate. In October 2015, DNI James Clapper released principles for transparency, which he noted were important not only to give more insight into what intelligence does but also to build greater support for intelligence based on this greater insight.

The Role of Oversight.

For the first twenty-eight years of its existence, the intelligence community operated with a

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minimal amount of oversight from Congress. One reason was the cold war consensus. Another was a willingness on the part of Congress to abdicate rigorous oversight. Secrecy was also a factor, which appeared to impose procedural difficulties in handling sensitive issues between the two branches. After 1975, congressional oversight changed suddenly and dramatically, increasing to the point where Congress became a full participant in the intelligence process and a major consumer of intelligence. Since 2002, Congress has also become more of an independent intelligence consumer in its own right, in several cases requesting national intelligence estimates (NIEs) on specific topics. Within the larger oversight issue is a second issue: Do the intelligence committees serve well as surrogates for the rest of the Congress, or should this be shared more broadly?

Managing the Community.

The size of U.S. intelligence is a strength, in that it allows for greater breadth and depth across a range of intelligence activities and issues. But the size also poses a challenge when it comes to coordinating the various agencies toward specific goals. From 1947 to 2004, the DCIs (directors of central intelligence) had this responsibility, but they tended to function more as “first among equals” rather than as empowered heads of the community. The DCIs also tended to focus more on their CIA responsibilities, which were the source of most of their bureaucratic clout. The DNI (director of national intelligence) now has this role, minus the CIA function. A major issue, whether under the DCIs or DNIs, is the fact that all of the intelligence components, with the exception of the CIA, belong to a Cabinet department, diminishing the DNI’s ability to give them orders. A succession of staffs have been created to support the DCIs and now the DNIs in their community role, but the effectiveness of these staffs is tied directly to the effectiveness of the DNI. DNI James Clapper (2010–) has made “intelligence integration” his major area of emphasis when it comes to community management, which can best be described as ongoing efforts to foster unity of purpose and of effort.

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Major Historical Developments

In addition to the themes that have run through much of the history of the intelligence community, several specific events played pivotal roles in the shaping and functioning of U.S. intelligence.

The Creation of COI and OSS (1940–1941).

Until 1940, the United States did not have anything approaching a national intelligence establishment. The important precedents were the COI (Coordinator of Information) and the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), both created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The COI and then the OSS were headed by William Donovan, who had advocated their creation after two trips to Britain before the United States entered World War II. Donovan was impressed by the more central British government organization and believed that the United States needed to emulate it. Roosevelt gave Donovan much of what he wanted but in such a way as to limit Donovan’s authority, especially in his relationship to the military, making OSS part of the newly created Joint Chiefs in 1942 rather than making it an independent entity.

In addition to being the first steps toward creating a national intelligence capability, the COI and OSS were important for three other reasons. First, both organizations were heavily influenced by British intelligence practices, particularly their emphasis on what is now called covert action—guerrillas, operations with resistance groups behind enemy lines, sabotage, and so on. For Britain this wartime emphasis on operations was the natural result of being one of the few ways the country could strike back at Nazi Germany in Europe until the Allied invasions of Italy and France. These covert actions, which had little effect on the outcome of the war, became the main historical legacy of the OSS.

Second, although OSS operations played only a small role in the Allied victory in World War II, they served as a training ground—both technically and in terms of esprit—for many people who helped establish the postwar intelligence community, particularly the CIA. However, as former DCI Richard Helms, himself an OSS veteran, points out in his memoirs, most of the OSS veterans had experience in espionage and counterintelligence and not in covert action.

Third, the OSS had a difficult relationship with the U.S. military. The military leadership was suspicious of an intelligence organization operating beyond its control and perhaps competing with organic military intelligence components (that is, military intelligence units subordinated to commanders). The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore insisted that the OSS become part of its structure, refusing to accept the idea of an independent civilian intelligence organization. Therefore, Donovan and the OSS were made part of the Joint Chiefs structure. Tension between the military and nonmilitary intelligence components

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has continued, with varying degrees of severity or cooperation. It was evident as recently as 2004, when the Department of Defense (DOD), and its supporters in Congress, successfully resisted efforts to expand the authority of the new director of national intelligence to intelligence agencies within DOD. (See chap. 3 for details.)

Pearl Harbor (1941).

Japan’s surprise attack in 1941 was a classic intelligence failure. The United States overlooked a variety of signals; U.S. processes and procedures were deeply flawed, with important pieces of intelligence not being shared across agencies or departments; and mirror imaging blinded U.S. policy makers to the reality of policy decisions in Tokyo. The attack on Pearl Harbor was most important as the guiding purpose of the intelligence community that was established after World War II. Its fundamental mission was to prevent a recurrence of a strategic surprise of this magnitude, especially in an age of nuclear-armed missiles.

Magic and Ultra (1941–1945).

One of the Allies’ major advantages in World War II was their superior signals intelligence, that is, their ability to intercept and decode Axis communications. MAGIC refers to U.S. intercepts of Japanese communications; ULTRA refers to British, and later British–U.S., interceptions of German communications. This wartime experience demonstrated the tremendous importance of this type of intelligence, perhaps the most important type practiced during the war. Also, it helped solidify U.S.–British intelligence cooperation, which continued long after the war. Moreover, in the United States the military, not the OSS, controlled MAGIC and ULTRA. This underscored the friction between the military and the OSS. The military today continues to direct signals intelligence, in NSA. NSA is a DOD agency and is considered a combat support agency, a legal status that gives DOD primacy over intelligence support at certain times. Both the secretary of defense and the DNI have responsibility for the NSA.

The National Security Act (1947).

The National Security Act gave a legal basis to the intelligence community, as well as to the position of director of central intelligence, and created a CIA under the director. The act signaled the new importance of intelligence in the nascent cold war and also made the intelligence function permanent, a significant change from the previous U.S. practice of reducing the national security apparatus in peacetime. Implicitly, the act made the existence and functioning of the intelligence community a part of the cold war consensus.

Several aspects of the act are worth noting. Although the DCI could be a military officer, the CIA was not placed under military control, nor could a military DCI have command over troops. The CIA was not to have any domestic role or police powers, either. The

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legislation does not mention any of the activities that came to be most commonly associated with the CIA—espionage, covert action, even analysis. Its stated job, and President Harry S. Truman’s main concern at the time, was to coordinate the intelligence being produced by various agencies.

Finally, the act created an overall structure that included a secretary of defense and the National Security Council; this structure was remarkably stable for fifty-seven years. Although minor adjustments of roles and functions were made during this period, the 2004 intelligence legislation (see chap. 3 for a fuller discussion of this act) and the establishment of a director of national intelligence brought about the first major revision of the structure created in the 1947 act.

Korea (1950).

The unexpected invasion of South Korea by North Korea, which triggered the Korean War, had two major effects on U.S. intelligence. First, the failure to foresee the invasion led DCI Walter Bedell Smith (1950–1953) to make some dramatic changes, including increased emphasis on national intelligence estimates. Second, the Korean War made the cold war global. Having previously been confined to a struggle for dominance in Europe, the cold war spread to Asia and, implicitly, to the rest of the world. This broadened the scope and responsibilities of intelligence.

The Coup in Iran (1953).

In 1953, the United States staged a series of popular demonstrations in Iran that overthrew the nationalist government of Premier Mohammad Mossadegh and restored the rule of the shah, who was friendlier to Western interests. The success and ease of this operation made covert action an increasingly attractive tool for U.S. policy makers, especially during the tenure of DCI Allen Dulles (1953–1961) during the Eisenhower administration.

The Guatemala Coup (1954).

In 1954, the United States overthrew the leftist government of Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán because of concern that this government might prove sympathetic to the Soviet Union. The United States provided a clandestine opposition radio station and air support for rebel officers. The Guatemala coup proved that the success in Iran was not unique, thus further elevating the appeal of this type of action for U.S. policy makers.

The Missile Gap (1959–1961).

In the late 1950s, concern arose that the apparent Soviet lead in the “race for space,” prompted by the launch of the artificial satellite Sputnik in 1957, also indicated a Soviet lead in missile-based strategic weaponry. The main proponents of this argument were

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Democratic aspirants for the 1960 presidential nomination, including Sens. John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts and Stuart Symington of Missouri. The Eisenhower administration knew, by virtue of the U.S. reconnaissance program, that the accusations about a Soviet lead in strategic missiles were untrue, but the administration did not respond to the charges in an effort to safeguard the sources of the intelligence. When the Kennedy administration took office in 1961, it learned that the charges were indeed untrue, but the new secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara (1961–1968), came to believe that intelligence had inflated the Soviet threat to safeguard the defense budget. This was an early example of intelligence becoming a political issue, raised primarily by the party out of power.

The way in which the missile gap is customarily portrayed in intelligence history is incorrect. According to legend, the intelligence community, perhaps for base and selfish motives, overestimated the number of Soviet strategic missiles. But the legend is untrue. The overestimate came largely from political critics of the Eisenhower administration, not the intelligence agencies themselves. Not only did these critics overestimate the number of strategic-range Soviet missiles, but the intelligence community underestimated the number of medium- and intermediate-range missiles that the Soviets were building to cover their main theater of concern, Europe. McNamara’s distrust of what he perceived as self-serving Air Force parochialism moved him to create the Defense Intelligence Agency.

This was one of the earliest instances of intelligence being used for political purposes. It also underscored the problem of secrecy, in that President Eisenhower did not believe he was able to reveal the true state of the strategic missile balance, which he knew. He did not want to be asked how he knew, which might have led to a discussion of the U-2 program, in which manned aircraft equipped with cameras penetrated deep into Soviet territory in violation of international law. U-2 flights over the Soviet Union continued until May 1960, when Francis Gary Powers, on contract with the CIA, was shot down over Sverdlovsk. Powers survived and was put on trial. Eisenhower was initially reluctant to admit responsibility for the overflights. (The Soviet Union knew about the U-2 flights and also knew the true state of the strategic balance, as the size of U.S. forces was not classified.)

The Bay of Pigs (1961).

The Eisenhower administration planned an operation in which Cuban exiles trained by the CIA would invade Cuba and force leader Fidel Castro from power. The operation was not launched until Kennedy had assumed the presidency, and he took steps to limit overt U.S. involvement to preserve the fiction that the Bay of Pigs invasion was a Cubans-only exercise. The abysmal failure of the invasion showed the limits of large-scale paramilitary operations in terms of their effectiveness and of the United States’s ability to mask its role in them. It was a severe setback for the Kennedy administration and for the CIA, several of whose top leaders—including DCI Allen Dulles—were retired as a result, as were all of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962).

Although now widely interpreted as a success, the confrontation with the Soviet Union over its planned deployment of medium- and intermediate-range missiles in Cuba was initially a failure in terms of intelligence analysis. All analysts, with the notable exception of DCI John McCone (1961–1965), had argued that Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev would not be so bold or rash as to place missiles in Cuba. Analysts also assumed that no Soviet tactical nuclear missiles were in Cuba and that local Soviet commanders did not have authority to use nuclear weapons without first asking Moscow—both of which turned out to be false, although this was not known until 1992. The missile crisis was a success in that U.S. intelligence discovered the missile sites before they were completed, giving President Kennedy sufficient time to deal with the situation without resorting to force. U.S. intelligence was also able to give Kennedy firm assessments of Soviet strategic and conventional force capabilities, which bolstered his ability to make difficult decisions. It was an excellent example of different types of intelligence collection working together to support one another and to provide tips to other potential collection opportunities. The intelligence community’s performance in this instance went a long way toward rehabilitating its reputation after the failure of the Bay of Pigs.

The Vietnam War (1964–1975).

The war in Vietnam had three important effects on U.S. intelligence. First, during the war concerns grew that frustrated policy makers were politicizing intelligence to be supportive of policy. The Tet offensive in 1968 is a case in point. U.S. intelligence picked up Viet Cong preparations for a large-scale offensive in South Vietnam. President Lyndon B. Johnson had two unpalatable choices. He could prepare the public for the event, but then face being asked how this large-scale enemy attack was possible if the United States was winning the war. Or he could attempt to ride out the attack, confident that it would be defeated. Johnson took the second choice. The Viet Cong were defeated militarily in Tet after some bitter and costly fighting, but the attack and the scale of military operations that the United States undertook to defeat them turned a successful intelligence warning and a military victory into a major political defeat. Many wrongly assumed that the attack was a surprise.

Second, often-heated debates on the progress of the war took place between military and nonmilitary intelligence analysts. This was seen most sharply in the order of battle debate, which centered on how many enemy units were in the field. Military leaders believed that intelligence analysis (primarily from the CIA) was not accurately reporting the progress being made on the battlefield. The argument on the enemy order of battle centered on CIA analysis that showed more enemy units than the military believed to be operating. Or, to put it conversely, if the United States was making the progress being reported by the military, how could the enemy have so many units in the field? Third, the more long- lasting and most important result of the war was to undercut severely the cold war

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consensus under which intelligence operated.

The ABM Treaty and SALT I Accord (1972).

The Nixon administration negotiated limits on antiballistic missiles (ABMs) and strategic nuclear delivery systems (the land-based and submarine-based missile launchers and aircraft, not the weapons on them) with the Soviet Union. These initial strategic arms control agreements—the ABM treaty and the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT I) accord—explicitly recognized and legitimized the use of national technical means, or NTM (that is, a variety of satellites and other technical collectors), by both parties to collect needed intelligence, and they prohibited overt interference with NTM. Furthermore, these agreements created the new issue of verification—the ability to ascertain whether treaty obligations were being met. (Monitoring, or keeping track of Soviet activities, had been under way since the inception of the intelligence community, even before arms control. Verification consists of judgments or evaluations based on monitoring.) U.S. intelligence was central to these activities, with new accusations by arms control advocates and opponents that intelligence was being politicized. Those concerned that the Soviets were cheating held that cheating was either being undetected or ignored. Arms control advocates argued that the Soviets were not cheating or, if they were, the cheating was minimal and therefore inconsequential, regardless of the terms of the agreements, and they maintained that some cheating was preferable to unchecked strategic competition. Either way, the intelligence community found itself to be a fundamental part of the debate.

Intelligence Investigations (1975–1976).

In the wake of revelations late in 1974 that the CIA had violated its charter by spying on U.S. citizens, a series of investigations examined the entire intelligence community. A panel chaired by Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller concluded that violations of law had occurred. Investigations by House and Senate special committees went deeper, discovering a much wider range of abuses.

Coming so soon after the Watergate scandal (which involved political sabotage and criminal cover-ups and culminated in the resignation of President Richard M. Nixon in 1974) and the loss of the Vietnam War, these intelligence hearings further undermined the public’s faith in government institutions, in particular the intelligence community, which had been largely sacrosanct. Since these investigations, intelligence has never regained the latitude it once enjoyed and has had to learn to operate with much more openness and scrutiny. Also, Congress faced the fact of its own lax oversight. Both the Senate and the House created permanent intelligence oversight committees, which have taken on much more vigorous oversight of intelligence and, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, are now major taskers of intelligence themselves.

Iran (1979).

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In 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s revolution forced the shah of Iran from his throne and into exile. U.S. intelligence, in part because of policy decisions made by several administrations that severely limited collection, was largely blind to the growing likelihood of this turn of events. Successive administrations had restricted U.S. contacts with opposition groups lest the shah would be offended. In addition to these limits placed on collection, some intelligence analysts failed to grasp the severity of the threat to the shah once public demonstrations began. The intelligence community took much of the blame for the result despite the restrictions within which it had been working. Some people even saw the shah’s fall as the inevitable result of the 1953 coup that had restored him to power.

One ramification of the shah’s fall was the closure of two intelligence collection sites in northern Iran that the United States used to monitor Soviet missile tests, thus impairing the ability to monitor the SALT I agreement and the SALT II agreement then under negotiation.

Iran-Contra (1986–1987).

The Reagan administration used proceeds from missile sales to Iran (which not only contradicted the administration’s own policy of not dealing with terrorists but also violated the law) to sustain the contras in Nicaragua fighting against the pro–Soviet Sandinista government—despite congressional restrictions on such aid. The Iran-contra affair provoked a constitutional crisis and congressional investigations. The affair highlighted a series of problems, including the limits of oversight in both the executive branch and Congress, the ability of executive officials to ignore Congress’s intent, and the disaster that can result when two distinct and disparate covert actions become intertwined. The affair also undid much of President Reagan’s efforts to rebuild and restore intelligence capabilities.

The Fall of the Soviet Union (1989–1991).

Beginning with the collapse of the Soviet satellite empire in 1989 and culminating in the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, the United States witnessed the triumph of its long-held policy of containment, first postulated by George Kennan in 1946–1947 as a way to deal with the Soviet menace. The collapse was so swift and so stunning that few can be said to have anticipated it.

Critics of the intelligence community argued that the inability to see the Soviet collapse coming was the ultimate intelligence failure, given the centrality of the Soviet Union as an intelligence community issue. Some people even felt that this failure justified radically reducing and altering the intelligence community. Defenders of U.S. intelligence argued that the community had made known much of the inner rot that led to the Soviet collapse.

This debate has not ended. Significant questions remain not only about U.S. intelligence

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capabilities but also about intelligence in general and what can reasonably be expected from it. (See chap. 11 for a detailed discussion.)

The Ames (1994) and Hanssen Spy Cases (2001).

The arrest and conviction of Aldrich Ames, a CIA employee, on charges of spying for the Soviet Union and for post–Soviet Russia for almost ten years shook U.S. intelligence. Espionage scandals had broken before. For example, in the “year of the spy” (1985), several cases came to light—the Walker family sold Navy communications data to the Soviet Union, Ronald Pelton compromised NSA programs to the Soviet Union, and Larry Wu-tai Chin turned out to be a sleeper agent put in place in the CIA by China.

Ames’s unsuspected treachery was, in many respects, more searing. Despite the end of the cold war, Russian espionage against the United States had continued. Ames’s career revealed significant shortcomings in CIA personnel practices (he was a marginal officer with a well-known alcohol problem), in CIA counterespionage and counterintelligence, and in CIA–FBI liaison to deal with these issues. The spy scandal also revealed deficiencies in how the executive branch shared information bearing on intelligence matters with Congress.

The arrest in 2001 of FBI agent Robert Hanssen on charges of espionage underscored some of the concerns that first arose in the Ames case and added new ones. Hanssen and Ames apparently began their espionage activities at approximately the same time, but Hanssen went undetected for much longer. It was initially thought that Hanssen’s expertise in counterintelligence gave him advantages in escaping detection, but subsequent investigations revealed a great deal of laxness at the FBI that was crucial to Hanssen’s activities. Hanssen, like Ames, spied for both the Soviet Union and post–Soviet Russia. Hanssen’s espionage also meant that the damage assessment done after Ames was arrested would have to be revised, as both men had access to some of the same information. Finally, the Hanssen case was a severe black eye for the FBI, which had been so critical of the CIA’s failure to detect Ames.

In addition to the internal problems that both scandals revealed, the two cases served notice that espionage among the great powers continued despite the end of the cold war. Some people found this offensive, in terms of either Russian or U.S. activity. Others accepted it as an unsurprising and normal state of affairs.

The Terrorist Attacks and the War on Terrorists (2001–).

The terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001 were important for several reasons. First, although al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s enmity and capabilities were known, the nature of these specific attacks had not been anticipated. Some critics called for the resignation of DCI George Tenet, but President George W. Bush supported him. Congress, meanwhile, began a broad investigation into the performance of the intelligence

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community. Second, in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, widespread political support emerged for a range of intelligence actions to combat terrorists, including calls to lift the ban on assassinations and to increase the use of human intelligence. The first major legislative response to the attacks, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, allowed greater latitude in some domestic intelligence and law enforcement collection and took steps to improve coordination between these two areas. In 2004, in the aftermath of a second investigation (and also prompted by the failure to find WMD in Iraq that intelligence had assessed were there), legislation passed to revamp the command structure of the intelligence community. (See chap. 3 for details.) Third, in the first phase of combat operations against terrorists, dramatic new developments took place in intelligence collection capabilities, particularly the use of UAVs and more real-time intelligence support for U.S. combat forces. (See chap. 5 for details.) The war on terrorists also resulted in an expansion of some CIA and NSA authorities. CIA captured suspected terrorists overseas and then rendered (delivered) them to a third country for incarceration and interrogation. This activity became controversial as some questioned the basis on which people were rendered and the conditions to which they were subjected in these third nations, especially during interrogations. The use of certain techniques became political issues during the 2008 presidential election although, as noted earlier, President Obama’s overall policy toward terrorists is not dramatically different from that of his predecessor. Under authority of the USA PATRIOT Act, NSA greatly expanded its collection of telephone and Internet data, in most cases the metadata (location of calls, time) but not the contents. This program was leaked in 2013 and also became controversial as critics held that NSA had exceeded its legislative authority and failed to keep Congress informed. (See below.)

By 2004, two intensive investigations had taken place of U.S. intelligence performance prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks. Although both resulting reports noted a number of flaws, neither was able to point up the intelligence that could have led to a precise understanding of al Qaeda’s plans. The tactical intelligence for such a conclusion (as opposed to strategic intelligence suggesting the nature and depth of al Qaeda’s hostility) did not exist.

As the terrorist threat seemed to change in 2009 from large-scale attacks to smaller, individual attempts, new concerns arose about the intelligence community’s ability to prevent these threats. The May 2011 operation that resulted in the death of bin Laden helped restore confidence in U.S. intelligence. The operation was also a good example of the use of multiple types of intelligence collection (human, signals, imagery), painstaking analysis over many years, and intelligence sharing both within the intelligence community and with the military.

By 2013, the decade-plus war against terrorists had also begun to cause new strains. As noted above (and discussed in more detail in chap. 8) the continued use of UAVs was subject to increased debate for two reasons: the concern that those being targeted were of lesser importance and that the ongoing campaign was turning people against the United

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States; and the more controversial use of UAVs to target and kill U.S. citizens working with terrorists. The revelation of NSA programs to mine communications data raised concerns among some about the balance between security and liberty and also the degree of oversight being conducted on such programs. Over a decade of concentration on counterterror and counterinsurgency had some larger effects on the analytic community, especially for the CIA, which some felt had become too tactical and too militarized. (See chap. 6.)

Finally, the rise of ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; also known as ISIS or Daesh) further complicated the terrorism war as ISIL has pretentions to being a state, controlling large amounts of territory and people. It demonstrated, in a series of attacks in November 2015 and March 2016, that it had wide geographic reach as a terrorist organization.

Intelligence on Iraq (2003–2008).

The Bush administration was convinced, as was most of the international community, that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein harbored weapons of mass destruction, despite his agreement at the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War to dispose of them and to submit to international inspections. (The Fall 2002 debate at the United Nations was over the best way to determine if Iraq held these weapons and how best to get rid of them—not over whether or not Iraq had them.) However, more than two years after the onset of the military conflict, the WMD had not been found. As a result, the two main issues that arose were how the intelligence could come to such an important conclusion that proved to be erroneous and how the intelligence was used by policy makers. Coupled with the conclusions drawn from the two investigations of the 2001 terrorist attacks, intelligence performance in Iraq led to irresistible calls to restructure the intelligence community. The Senate Intelligence Committee found that groupthink was a major problem in the Iraq analysis, along with a failure to examine previously held premises. At the same time, the committee found no evidence that the intelligence had been politicized. The WMD Commission (formally the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction), established by President George W. Bush, came to the same conclusion regarding politicization but was critical about how the intelligence community handled both collection and analysis on Iraq WMD and on other issues.

In addition to intelligence that may have provided a casus belli (justification for the acts of war), subsequent intelligence on Iraq continued to be controversial. As Iraq descended into a bloody insurgency, former intelligence officials pointed out prewar estimates that suggested such a possible outcome. In 2007, at the request of Congress, the intelligence community produced an estimate on the likely course of events in Iraq and possible indicators of success or failure. The key judgments of this estimate were published in unclassified form, adding additional fuel to the political debate over Iraq.

As terrible as the 2001 terrorist attacks were, the initial Iraq WMD estimate points to much more fundamental questions for U.S. intelligence. The analytical failure in Iraq likely will

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be a burden for U.S. intelligence for many years to come. Subsequent analyses also seemed to point to increased politicization of intelligence, not by those who wrote it but by those in the executive branch and in Congress seeking to gain political advantage by using unclassified versions of intelligence.

The Iraq analytical controversy continued to serve as a touchstone for future intelligence analyses. In 2007, the DNI released unclassified key judgments of an NIE on Iran’s nuclear weapons program, which reversed its earlier (2005) findings and concluded that the weapons aspects of the program had stopped in 2003. This immediately became controversial not only because of the judgments themselves but also as some observers wondered whether this reflected either “lessons learned” from Iraq or some means of compensating for earlier errant estimates, a curious view that betrayed significant misunderstandings of the estimative process. In 2013, the debate over whether to attack Syria for chemical weapons (CW) use again raised issues about the accuracy of current WMD intelligence, given the past problem in Iraq.

Intelligence Reorganization (2004–2005).

Three factors contributed to the 2004 passage of legislation reorganizing the intelligence community: (1) reaction to the 2001 terrorist attack; (2) the subsequent 2004 report of the 9/11 Commission; and (3) the absence of Iraq WMD, despite intelligence community estimates that indicated otherwise. Congress replaced the DCI with a DNI who would oversee and coordinate intelligence but who would be divorced from a base in any intelligence agency. This was the first major restructuring of U.S. intelligence since the 1947 act. (See chap. 3 for details.) In March 2005, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction issued its report, recommending additional changes in intelligence structure and in the management of analysis and collection.

In 2006, CIA director Porter Goss resigned. By 2007, the first DNI, John Negroponte, had stepped down to return to the State Department after less than two years in the DNI position. Retired vice admiral Mike McConnell replaced Negroponte. McConnell resigned at the end of the George W. Bush administration and was replaced by retired admiral Dennis Blair, the third DNI in less than four years. Blair stepped down in 2010, after a little more than a year in the job. His successor, retired general James Clapper, thus became the fourth DNI in just over five years. Several senior jobs on the DNI’s staff proved difficult to fill. Many observers took such staffing problems as evidence that the new structure was not working as smoothly as proponents had hoped. Clapper’s tenure has since offered some stability in the DNI function, but some of the fundamental questions about the nature of the DNI position and its relative authority remain.

The Manning and Snowden Leaks.

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In January 2010, then-Pvt. Bradley Manning downloaded some 700,000 documents from classified systems, which he shared with Wikileaks, a website devoted to publishing classified information. In June 2013, newspapers in the United States and Britain began to publish details of NSA programs to collect metadata from the Internet and telephone lines in the United States and worldwide leaked to them by Edward Snowden, a contract employee working for NSA. Snowden also leaked a great deal of other highly classified intelligence that had nothing to do with those programs. The two leaks were different in content: Manning’s material consisted, in part, of many diplomatic cables; Snowden’s material concerned ongoing intelligence collection programs. The Snowden leaks are, arguably, the worst leaks in U.S. history in terms of both content and effects. Both leaks engendered controversies. Among these have been the following: how individuals could get access to so much material and remove them from secure areas; the adequacy of U.S. laws to deal with leakers and/or vice spies; the future of the emphasis in U.S. intelligence on sharing as much intelligence internally as possible; the effects of the leaks on U.S. diplomatic relations and intelligence capabilities; and, in the case of the NSA leaks, whether NSA had overstepped its authorities and the adequacy of both executive and legislative oversight. As of August 2013, Manning had been found guilty under the Espionage Act and sentenced to thirty-five years in prison; Snowden had been granted temporary asylum in Russia. In January 2014, in a speech addressing the NSA programs that had been revealed, President Obama largely defended these programs, stating that they had been managed lawfully and had not purposely abused their authorities.

The Legal Framework of Intelligence.

U.S. intelligence operates within a legal framework that has evolved over time. Here are some