TWO

Democratizing China?

PERHAPS THE MOST intriguing question regarding political development

in the post-Mao era is why China has not taken significant steps toward

democratization despite more than two decades of unprecedented eco-

nomic modernization. Indeed, during the mid-1980s, with economic

reform barely off the ground and encountering strong resistance from

conservatives inside the regime, senior CCP leaders appeared more tol-

erant and permitted more public discussion on sensitive issues such as

political reform. In contrast, since the mid-1990s, when economic reform

became irreversible and its impact had raised the standard of living sev-

eral fold, the regime has adopted an even more conservative political

stance toward democratization, permitting no public discussion on po-

litical reform and maintaining a policy of zero-tolerance toward dissent.

On the surface, the CCP’s experience with the Tiananmen debacle and

the impact of the collapse of the communist regimes in the former

Soviet bloc seemed to have hardened the leadership’s stance against po-

litical reform. 1 But there were deeper causes behind the CCP’s renewed

resistance to political liberalization. The short-term impact of rapid

economic growth on democratization may be negative because such

growth increases the value of political power (hence making it harder

for the rulers to relinquish it), reduces the pressure for political open-

ing, and provides rulers with more resources to co-opt new social

groups and repress the opposition.

In this chapter, this analytical framework will be applied to an examination

of the history of political reform during the Mao era. The chapter will

45

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

46 China’s Trapped Transition

first address the question of how the ruling elites viewed the issue of

political reform; it then will review and evaluate the three most impor-

tant institutional reforms-the strengthening of the National People’s

Congress (NPC), legal reform, and village elections-that have been

viewed as essential steps toward democratization. I will finally examine

the CCP’s strategy of illiberal adaptation, which relies both on the state’s

repressive capacity and the regime’s growing economic resources in

containing societal challenges and maintaining its political monopoly

in a rapidly modernizing society.

Political Reform: The Ruling Elites’ Views

Many senior Chinese leaders recognized the need for political reform

during the initial phase of economic reform for two reasons. First, as

survivors of the Cultural Revolution, they were determined to prevent

a similar event from happening. Second, they recognized that restruc-

turing the political system would be needed to ensure the success

of economic reform and modernization. 2 To be sure, there was a sub-

tle difference, even among those who viewed political reform as an

instrument of advancing economic reform. Deng Xiaoping, for exam-

ple, understood the benefits of political reform mainly in terms of re-

ducing bureaucracy and increasing efficiency. Zhao Ziyang, however,

believed that as Chinese economic reform deepened, the redistribu-

tion of power and interests would inevitably trigger conflicts. If such

conflicts were not resolved timely, they would accumulate and produce

serious consequences. Therefore, Zhao’s plan was to use political re-

form to resolve such conflicts and pave the way for deepening eco-

nomic reform. Neither Deng nor Zhao sufficiently appreciated that

political reform itself would initiate new conflict because the power

to block economic reforms was entrenched within the political system

itself. 3

Political Reform According to Deng Xiaoping

Deng articulated the most consistent-and restrictive-views on politi-

cal reform. He was the first to raise the issue of political reform in a fa-

mous speech on August 18,1980; six years later, Deng’s call for political

reform as a means to speed up economic reform led to the most seri-

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 47

ous and systematic examination of political reform as a strategy by the

top Chinese leadership.4 In Deng’s diagnosis, China’s political system

had four major flaws: bureaucraticism, overcentralization of power in

the CCP’s leaders, lifetime tenure of cadres, and (official) privileges. To

deal with bureaucraticism, official privileges, and lifetime tenure, Deng

called for some of the party’s routine administrative power to be di-

vested, a younger and more professional generation of officials to be

cultivated, and a discipline inspection committee to be established

within the party.

Apparently, Deng was most concerned about the dangers of over-

centralization of power within the party, as this could lead to another

Cultural Revolution. His solution was to introduce constitutional re-

forms, which he did not specify, and strengthen collective leadership

within the party, a prescription he himself failed to follow later. 5 But

Deng left no doubt about the ultimate objective of political reform. In

the same speech, he declared,

The purpose of reforming the system of the Party and state leadership

is precisely to maintain and further strengthen Party leadership and dis-

cipline, and not to weaken or relax them. In a big country like ours, it

is inconceivable that unity of thinking could be achieved among several

hundred million people … In the absence of a Party whose members

have a spirit of sacrifice and a high level of political awareness and dis-

cipline … Without such a Party, our country would split up and ac-

complish nothing. 6

Deng’s fear of political chaos that may arise as a result of democracy

and his resolve to maintain the party’s supremacy have since then re-

mained the two constant refrains in his-and the CCP’s-views on

political reform.

After the success of agricultural decollectivization provided Deng

with the momentum he needed to launch further economic reform,

he stopped talking about the need for political reform. Deng put po-

litical reform on the agenda only in mid-1986 when economic reform

in the urban areas, especially in the state-owned sector, encountered

resistance. Deng’s numerous speeches on political reform from June

to November 1986 revealed his increasing appreciation of the comple-

mentary role of political reform in the implementation of his eco-

nomic reform strategy. His views, however, were remarkably consistent

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

48 China’s Trapped Transition

In that his concept of political reform was restricted to efficiency-

boosting administrative streamlining because he believed that “China’s

fundamental flaw is bureaucraticism.”7 This perspective led Deng to

maintain his firm opposition to institutional checks and balances and

to the dilution of the CCP’s power. This is clear in his speech in June

1986-the first time Deng mentioned political reform in almost six

years. While being briefed on the economic situation, he said:

As it stands, our political structure is not adapted to the current situa-

tion. Political restructuring should be included in the reform-indeed,

it should be regarded as the hallmark of progress in the reform as a

whole. We must streamline the administration, delegate real powers to

lower levels and broaden the scope of socialist democracy, so as to bring

into play the initiative of the masses and the grass-roots organizations. 8

Deng followed up his call for political reform with similar public pro-

nouncements during the September-November 1986 period. In his re-

marks, Deng expressed his frustrations with the resistance to economic

reform coming from within the party and warned that economic re-

form would fail without accompanying political reform.

Our reform of the economic structure is going smoothly on the whole.

Nevertheless, as it proceeds we shall inevitably encounter obstacles. It is

true that there are people, both inside and outside our Party, who are

not in favour of the reform, but there are not many who strongly op-

pose it. The important thing is that our political structure does not

meet the needs of the economic reform.

When we first raised the question of reform we had in mind, among

other things, reform of the political structure. Whenever we move a

step forward in economic reform, we are made keenly aware of the

need to change the political structure. If we fail to do that, we shall be

unable to preserve, and build, the gains we have made in the economic

reform. The growth of the productive forces will be stunted and our

drive for modernization will be impeded.9

Deng was also aware of the risks posed by political reform. He

cautioned:

The content of the political reform is still under discussion, because

this is a very difficult question. Since every reform measure will involve

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China?

a wide range of people, have profound repercussions in many areas and

affect the interests of countless individuals, we are bound to run into

obstacles, so it is important for us to proceed with caution. First of all we

have to determine the scope of the political restructuring and decide

where to begin. We shall start with one or two reforms and try not to do

everything at once, because we don’t want to make a mess of things. In

a country as vast and complex as ours, reform is no easy task. We must

be very cautious about setting policies and make no decision until we

are quite sure it is the right one. lO

49

However, Deng left no doubt that political reform would be narrowly

defined and not be allowed to weaken the dominance of the party.

The first objective is to ensure the continuing vitality of the Party and

the state … The second objective of political structural reform is to

eliminate bureaucratism and increase efficiency … The third objective

of political reform is to stimulate the initiative of grass-roots units and

of workers, peasants and intellectuals … We must uphold leadership by

the Party and never abandon it, but the Party should exercise its lead-

ership effectively.ll

To be sure, Deng himself also talked about democracy, but his views

were colored by his traumatic experience during the Cultural Revolu-

tion and by his belief that democracy was an instrument to promote

economic development. For example, in December 1978, shortly after

he consolidated his power, he said, “During the current period, we es-

pecially need to stress democracy because for quite a long period of

time in the past, the system of democratic centralism was not really im-

plemented … There was too little democracy” within the party. He put

special emphasis on “economic democracy,” which he defined as de-

centralization to promote incentives. Politically, democracy has to be

institutionalized and written into law, so as to make sure that institu-

tions and laws do not change whenever the leadership changes, or

whenever the leaders change their views or shift the focus of their at-

tention. Moreover, in promoting democracy and a legal system, we

must concentrate on enacting criminal and civil codes, procedural laws

and other necessary laws concerning factories, people’s communes,

forests, grasslands and environmental protection, as well as labour laws

and a law on investment by foreigners. 12

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

50 China’s Trapped Transition

Political Reform: A Liberal Alternative

In retrospect, the most comprehensive and sustained examination of

political reform was conducted by a task force set up by Zhao under

Deng’s direct orders. Led by Zhao’s trusted aide, Bao Tong, the task

force, called “zhongyang zhengzhi tizhi gaige yantao xiaozu bangong-

shi” (the office of the central small group for studying and discussing

the reform of the political system), consisted of mostly young and

middle-aged liberal intellectuals and officials. It convened more than

thirty seminars on various aspects of political reform from October

1986 to August 1987, including seven attended by Zhao, Hu Qili, Bo Yibo, TianJiyun, and Peng Chong, the five members of the small group.13

At that time, Deng was committed to implementing some form of po-

litical reform to overcome the systemic obstacles to his economic re-

form. He told the party’s central secretariat to “spend about a year to

investigate and study [political reform], think through the issues,

make up our mind, and then implement” the plan. 14

The sense that China’s economic reform could not move forward

without complementary political reform was widely shared by the rul-

ing elites, especially among those associated with the liberal wing. Hu

Qili, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee who was later

purged during the Tiananmen crisis in 1989 along with Zhao, said in April 1986 that “economic reform cannot make progress without polit- ical and cultural reforms … We should not cede the ideas of freedom,

democracy, and human rights to capitalism.” Wang Zhaoguo, a protege

of Deng, declared, “When we implement the reform of the economic

system, we must adopt accompanying reforms targeting some aspects

of the political system.” Wan Li, a vice premier known for spearheading

the agricultural reform in Anhui in 1979, echoed the same view. Zhao himself was even more blunt in his criticism of the existing system.

“Fundamentally speaking,” he said, “we do not have a tradition of the

rule of law … We want discretion but no constraints; China overem-

phasizes the role of the core leadership; this type of system cannot

guarantee stability.”15

Many provincial-level leaders invited by the task force to participate

in these discussions expressed similar views on the flaws of the Chinese

political system and the necessity of reform. Wen Shizhen, deputy gov-

ernor of Liaoning, pointed out that the main flaw of the political

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 51

system was “feudalism and the lack of democracy and rule by law …

Democratization should be the principal direction of reform. The fo-

cus of the reform should be on the redistribution of the power of the

state.” He called for ending the party’s control of all decision making,

strengthening the NPC, and making the state administration more

efficient. Wang Jiangong, a deputy party secretary of Shanxi, con-

curred: “The flaws of the current system are the overcentralization of

power, the duplication of functions between the party and the state,

the lack of rule by law and democracy, and the unscientific manage-

ment of cadres.” Some also considered political reform as absolutely

necessary to push forward economic reform. Xu Shijie, party chief of

Guangzhou, said, “Political reform must work in concert with eco-

nomic reform and promote economic development.” Sheng Shuren,

deputy commissioner of the State Economic Commission, believed

that the time was ripe for political reform. In his view, without political

reform, economic reform could not proceed. I6

On the issue of democracy, a consensus emerged among the more

liberal officials as well. WangJiangong proposed to redistribute power

between the party and the state; strengthen the Standing Committee of

the NPC; change how the deputies are elected; and institute checks

and balances among the legislative, judicial, and executive branches.

Xu argued that the key to political reform was “the gradual improve-

ment in democracy and the legal system” and that “the greatest democ-

racy is election.” Liao Bokang, party secretary of Chongqing, agreed:

“The mechanism for people to participate in politics is the key mea-

sure of a country’s democratization.” He suggested introducing direct

popular nominations of candidates for the People’s Congress as one

step to democratize political participation. Wen Shizhen thought that

democratization should be the principal direction of political reform

and that its focus should be on the redistribution of the power of

the state. I7

The task force identified six major aspects of political reform: the

separation of the party from the state (dangzheng jenkai); inner-party

democracy (dangnei minzhu); decentralization and administrative re-

forms; personnel system reform; socialist democracy; and legal reform. I8

Of these, the task force focused on three: separating the party from

the state, establishing inner-party democracy, and the development of

socialist democracy.

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

52 China’s Trapped Transition

Political Reform: Content, Goals, and Dilemmas

The deliberations on political reform by the Chinese elites of all ideo-

logical stripes showed that they all recognized the fundamental source

of the inefficiency of the existing political system: the party-state in

general, and the overcentralization of administrative power in the party

in particular. In Zhao’s vision, the first and most crucial step of politi-

cal reform was the separation of the party from the state. This would be

followed by inner-party democracy, which should be implemented at

the very top of the party’s leadership (the Politburo Standing Commit-

tee and the Politburo). For the task force, dominated by the liberals,

dangzheng fenkai, the separation of the party from the state, meant di-

vesting some of the party’s power to the state, thus strengthening the

state while improving the authority and leadership of the party.19 Zhao

believed dangzheng fenkai would solve the problem of yidang daizheng, or “replacing the government with the party.” In practical terms, Zhao

thought dangzheng fenkai meant that the party would cease to issue orders or handle administrative affairs directly.20 Implicitly, the separa-

tion would most likely create institutional checks and balances because

the divestiture of the party’s power would lead to a limited form of sep-

aration of powers in a one-party regime-a view shared by Zhao him-

self, who affirmed dangzheng fenkai as “division of power between the

party and the government.” Indeed, institutionally, dangzheng fenkai would consist, according to Zhao, of three aspects: separating the party

from the government, separating the party from the NPC, and sepa-

rating the NPC from the government. 21

Despite the lofty expectations the liberals had for dangzheng fenkai and the importance they attributed to it, only a small number of spe-

cific institutional reforms were proposed. Wen Jiabao, the director of

the Central Committee’s General Office who became the premier in

2003, was asked to head a separate group to work on the issue of dang- zheng fenkai. But the report he produced was described by Zhao as

“empty” and lacking specific measures. Even for Bao, the most liberal

member of the group, the only specific measures of dangzheng fenkai

were abolishing the positions of the deputy party secretaries responsible

for specific policy areas, reforming the party’s organization departments

and propaganda departments, and separating the party’s disciplinary

committee from the procuratorate and courts. Another measure of

dangzheng fenkai was the strengthening of the NPC. Bao thought that

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 53

the key was to strengthen the NPC Standing Committee by raising the

number of committee members to more than 250 and by establishing

specialized committees within the Standing Committee. 22

Promoting inner-party democracy was considered a crucial step of

political reform. Zhao believed that instituting inner-party democracy

would be the key to establishing social democracy. He called for more

inner-party democracy at the central level, perhaps reflecting his own

difficult political position as a result of the concentration of decision-

making power in the hands of Deng. Zhao would have liked to give

the full Central Committee more power. 23 Other measures proposed by

the task force to democratize the party included instituting a majority

rule in decision making; increasing the transparency of the party’s

activities; strengthening collective leadership; holding competitive elec-

tions within the party; and protecting the freedom of speech within the

party. Institutionally, the task force recommended reforming the party

congress by establishing a system of permanent party deputies and con-

vening the party congress annually, instead of once every five years. 24

Another sensitive issue discussed by the task force was how to under-

take democratic reforms under the slogan of “building socialist democ-

racy.” Zhao believed that democratization was inevitable, although he

thought that Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika were “very

risky” strategies. In implementing democratic reforms, Zhao said, China

should “talk less but do more. Do not make that many promises. But in

practice give people more freedom. Democracy is not something so-

cialism can avoid.” He warned that “the people’s demand for democ-

racy is a trend. We must meet their demand to the fullest extent.” For

Zhao, socialist democracy consisted of grassroots democracy, dialogue

among various social groups (including the CCP and labor unions),

and protection of civil liberties, the key of which is the freedom of

speech. Specifically, Zhao emphasized the need to hold elections as a

means of expanding democracy. He argued that “to build a highly

democratic socialist society, we must put on the agenda the issues of

grassroots democracy, people’s participation in administration, and

people’s self-administration, especially in the cities.” And “the electoral

system must also be improved.”25

Although Zhao thought it was premature to hold direct elections for

the NPC, he suggested that competitive elections for the deputies to

the provincial People’s Congress should be held. He saw no reason

why “we cannot open up the elections for the chairman, vice chairmen,

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

54 China’s Trapped Transition

provincial governor, and vice governors.” Bao shared the same view

and insisted that elections could increase political accountability for

cadres, and that the democratic elections of government officials

would be the prerequisite for instituting “democracy in other areas.”26

Even among the liberal-leaning senior officials, there were divergent

views about the ultimate goal of political reform. Zhao, for example,

believed that such reform would strengthen the party and enable it to

maintain power. He pointed out, “we must solve not the problem of

whether the CCP will rule, but how it will rule.” Hu Qili expressed the

same thinking even more explicitly. “The goal for us is to have it both

ways. We want both a high level of democracy and a high level of effi-

ciency. The first and foremost principle is to maintain the party’s lead-

ership and improve it. Political reform must strengthen the authority

of the party, not undermine it.”27

Other participants in the discussions thought differently, however. Liao

Gailong, an eminent party historian, envisioned a set of goals that were

more radical. He said that political reform should lead to judicial inde-

pendence and equality under law; a more powerful role of the NPC; an

autonomous civil society; the separation of the party from the state; and

inner-party democracy.28 Bao presented perhaps the most articulate ar-

gument on the objectives of political reform and a strategy to accomplish

them. The short-term goal of political reform was institutionalization

(zhiduhua). The long-term goal was democratization. Institutionalization,

mainly through restructuring the party’s leadership system and the ad-

ministrative system of the government, would create a more pluralist,

though not necessarily democratic, system of interest representation un-

der the current political order. Introducing inner-party democracy would

create favorable conditions for political democracy. Additionally, with le-

gal reforms, China could build “a normal political order.”29

It was also clear from the debate among the Chinese elites in the late

1980s that they were acutely aware of the risks and dilemmas of exper-

imenting with political reform. First, they were worried about both an

unsustainable status quo and the possibility that the existing system was

too fragile to withstand reform, especially at the initial stage. Zhao cau-

tioned, “If the status quo is not changed, it won’t do; but if the steps are

too big, that won’t do either. To ensure the smooth and healthy process

of democratization, no problem must occur at the beginning. If there

is a problem, we must step back.”30

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 55

The second practical dilemma for the liberals was how to deal with

the difficulties created by institutional checks and balances that would

inevitably result from the reforms. Zhao openly worried about how

strengthening the NPC would reduce the party’s control and the gov-

ernment’s ability to make policy. “If the NPC grows more powerful and

really becomes the supreme organ of power, it will be very difficult for

the government to run things,” Zhao mused. “There ought to be checks

and balances, but how to let the NPC play its role” without tying up the

governing process? Zhao did not have an answer to the question he

raised. 31 Citing examples of Western democracies, he said, “In capital-

ist countries, the government must spend a lot of energy dealing with

the parliament. We cannot go down this path and spend a lot of energy and time internally.”32

Political Reform: A Stillborn Plan

After almost a year of deliberations, the task force submitted its final re-

port, titled “Zhengzhi tizhi gaige zongti shexiang” (A General Outline

on the Reform of the Political System), to the Politburo and laid out its

case for political reform. The report included a discussion on the ne-

cessity and urgency of political reform and set the goals and principles

for such reform. It recommended the separation of the party from the

state; reform of the People’s Congress; administrative reform; reform of

the legal system; the establishment of a civil service system; the develop-

ment of socialist democracy; and reform of the CCP. However, the re-

port failed to provide a detailed action plan. Zhao complained that

“there is not enough of a sense of action” in the report. For different

reasons, Deng was not entirely satisfied with the report, even though he

endorsed it at the end of September 1987. He thought the proposals of reform copied “some elements of checks and balances” and he reiter-

ated his mantra that “the main goal [of political reform] is to ensure

that the administrative branch can work efficiently; there cannot be too

much interference. We cannot abandon our dictatorship. We must not

accommodate the sentiments of democratization.” In a meeting with

Zhao toward the end of the task force’s work, Deng emphasized, ”You

have a bit of checks and balances [in your proposal]. The Western type

of checks and balances must never be practiced. We must not be influ-

enced by that kind of thinking. Efficiency must be guaranteed.”33 It was

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

56 China’s Trapped Transition

very clear that Deng’s notion of political reform was fundamentally dif-

ferent from that of the liberal vision.

Nevertheless, the Central Committee approved the “outline” in Octo-

ber 1987. Shortly afterward, the CCP’s 13th Congress officially endorsed

the essence of the task force’s report and declared that the goal of politi-

cal reform was to “build socialist democratic politics.” But few specific

measures were taken to follow up on the party’s declarations. Zhao im-

plemented one symbolic reform-announcing the convening of each

Politburo meeting in the media. The party’s control on the media was re-

laxed as well, making 1988 a year of lively debate about Chinese culture.

But as the economic conditions deteriorated in the summer of 1988,

mainly as a result of surging inflation caused by Deng’s premature plan to

lift price controls, the regime’s focus shifted to economic stabilization.

Political reform was put on hold. Mter the outbreak and suppression of

the prodemocracy Tiananmen Square movement from April to June

1989, the regime imposed a ban on political reform discussions. Al-

though the official pronouncements kept mentioning “socialist democ-

racy,” “reforming the political system,” and “ruling the country according

to law,” none of the reforms proposed in principle by the task force was

adopted. Bao, the head of the task force, was imprisoned for seven years

following the Tiananmen crackdown-a tragic, but perhaps fitting

metaphor for the political reform attempted by the party’s liberal wing.

To the extent that the aftermath of the Tiananmen crisis determined

the course of political evolution in China after 1989, asJoseph Fewsmith

shows in his study of the policies of the Chinese leadership in the

decade following the crackdown, one is tempted to ask: What if the

1989 political crisis had not happened or had been resolved in a dif-

ferent way?34 Few would dispute that the near-death experience of the

CCP during the crisis and its bloody aftermath had turned the Chinese

leadership toward a more conservative direction. In the context of the

collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the

disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, it would be hard to envision

the CCP leadership-besieged, insecure, and isolated-to have favored

a strategy of political liberalization for survival. In addition, the Tianan-

men crisis gravely weakened the liberal wing inside the CCP, as top

leaders such as Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili were purged. Needless to say,

the limited political reform program they had planned to implement

never came to fruition. Had the crisis been resolved peacefully and

the liberal leaders triumphed, China’s post-1989 history would have

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 57

been different, and it most probably would have made more progress

in political liberalization. Even then, however, the strong conservative

forces within the CCP, Deng’s own hostility toward democracy (if he

himself had retained power under this scenario), and the CCP’s insti-

tutional interest in maintaining its political monopoly would have made

a dramatic democratic breakthrough unlikely, if not impossible.

This also appears to be the assessment of Zhao Ziyang. When a

friend asked Zhao in 2004 whether he “could have pushed political re-

form hadJune 4 not occurred,” Zhao reportedly paused and then said

he could not because he “did not have enough power.” Because “there

was such a large government, there was such a huge number of cadres,

and so many people’s interests were involved, I did not have the power,”

Zhao repeated. The only person who had the power and ability to do

so, said Zhao, was Deng himself. But while Deng would give free reign

to economic reforms, he was “very vigilant against the reform of the

political system,” Zhao commented. When pressed to elaborate further

what he would have done hadJune 4 not happened, Zhao said that he

“would have practiced enlightened politics. I had thought about allow-

ing democratic parties to grow … If I were to have started political re-

form, I would have pushed democratic politics slowly.”35 Even without

Tiananmen, China would have been much more liberal than it is today,

but not necessarily as fully democratic as one might hope.

Institutional Reforms: Promise and Disappointment

The emergence of the NPC and, to a lesser extent, Local People’s Con-

gresses (LPCs), as major actors in decision making in China in the re-

form era have been hailed by many scholars as a sign of political

institutionalization or even pluralization. 36 Based on Western experi-

ence, a stronger legislature can constrain the power of the executive

branch and create institutional checks and balances conducive to

democracy and the rule of law. Yet, in a political system dominated by

the CCP, China’s legislative branch has long been regarded as no more

than a rubber stamp, whose sole function is to provide pro forma legit-

imacy for the decisions already made by the ruling party.37 Therefore,

the extent to which the NPC and LPCs assert their constitutional au-

thority and influence in decision making should be a key measurement

of political reform. This section will assess the institutional develop-

ment and political empowerment of the NPC and LPCs.

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

58 China’s Trapped Transition

The growth of the NPC as one of the most important political insti-

tutions in China has been extensively documented. But major studies

of the growth of the NPC reached different conclusions regarding the

institution’s influence during the reform era. In his study of the institu-

tional development of the NPC during the 1980s, Kevin O’Brien argues

that NPC reforms during the decade did little to increase competition

or institutionalize responsiveness. Through procedural rationalization,

the legislators of the NPC sought to improve one-party rule, instead of

pursuing genuine political liberalization. As a result, NPC reforms

were limited to the organizational changes in the NPC that strength-

ened the Standing Committee, increased specialization and proce-

dural regularity, and improved internal organization. 38

In a major study of the passage of administrative laws, several leading

Chinese legal scholars also found that the executive branch dominated

the legislative process. Because the executive branch does not want to

have legal constraints, “the legislation on administrative law in China, es-

pecially since the 1980s, is marked by a strong pro-administration bias.”

The administrative branch is the biggest beneficiary of the passage of ad-

ministrative laws in the last twenty years. The administrative branch

ceaselessly uses the legislative process to expand its power and, through

this process, legalizes certain illegitimate powers. This has resulted in im-

balances between the rights of citizens and the power of the administra-

tive branch … This problem also stems from the lack of democracy in

the legislative process; there is not enough participation by the people. 39

Such criticism is shared by Stanley Lubman, who believes that the lan-

guage of Chinese legislation and rules is intentionally designed to max-

imize flexibility and discretion. As a result, arbitrariness is embedded

in Chinese laws and rules. 40

In The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China, Murray Scot Tanner tries to provide a more positive assessment of the NPC’s institutional

development. In his case study of the passage of several laws, Tanner

suggests that the political monopoly of the CCP in policy-making was

waning and that the NPC was gaining influence as a player in China’s

decision-making process. However, Tanner does not believe that the

NPC’s emergence as a key institutional actor necessarily signals the arrival

of democratic politics or pluralism. Instead, the NPC should be viewed

as a political arena where bureaucratic and factional politics are played

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 59

out as different bureaucratic and interest groups within the CCP seize

the political forum provided by the NPC to express policy preferences.

Tanner identifies several positive trends indicative of the NPC’s grow-

ing influence. Using the data on dissenting votes and the number of

motions put forth by delegates during NPC plenary sessions, he argues

that NPC delegates have continued to shed their rubber-stamp reputa-

tion and become more assertive. The NPC has increased in power and

authority through the leadership of powerful individual politicians,

such as Peng Zhen. In many cases, nominally retired CCP elders were

able to assert their influence through the NPC Standing Committee or

the body’s plenary sessions. Tanner believes that, with the expansion of

the NPC’s professional staff and committee system, the legislative branch

has become more capable of forcing the executive bureaucracy to share

policy-making power.

Tanner concedes, however, that the CCP continues to wield enor-

mous authority in the lawmaking process. For example, the CCP Polit-

buro must approve the candidate list for the NPC Standing Committee.

Through appointments to the chairmen’s group, the party controls

agenda-setting privileges. Additionally, party groups within the NPC,

including the Standing Committee CCP group, communicate legisla-

tive activities to the party Secretariat. CCP Politburo and Secretariat ap-

proval is required for almost all draft laws promulgated by the NPC.

Consequently, Tanner remains uncertain whether reforms in the law-

making process will affect China’s democratic prospects. 41

Despite such divergent assessments of NPC reforms, it is possible to

apply several critical tests to measure whether the NPC and LPCs have

gained real institutional autonomy since the late 1970s.

Legislative Output

The most important achievement of the NPC was its enormous legisla-

tive output (Table 2.1). The several hundred laws and resolutions

passed by the NPC since 1978 have provided the legal framework for

economic reform and rationalized administrative procedures. For ex-

ample, of all the laws and resolutions that were enacted by the NPC

from 1978 to 2002, ninety-five, or about a third, were economic laws. 42

Of the 216 new laws passed fromJune 1979 to August 2000, 126 were

classified as administrative laws. 43

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

60 China’s Trapped Transition

But these numbers should not be taken at face value. In the passage

of most laws, the NPC has largely played a secondary role, endorsing the

bills drafted by the executive branch. On a few rare occasions, the NPC

Standing Committee showed its autonomy by rejecting the bills pro-

posed by the government, such as the Law on Residents’ Committees in

1989 and the Highway Law in April 1999, which was later approved. In

1987, the Draft Law on the Bankruptcy of State-Owned Enterprises al-

most failed to pass due to strong opposition within the NPC. Like the

NPC, LPCs rarely reject bills proposed by local governments. When they

do, it becomes national news, as in the case of the People’s Congress

of Shenzhen, which voted down, in 2004, a law on auditing and super-

vising the local government’s investment, an unprecedented act of po-

litical independence. 44 Official figures also indicate that individual

legislators play an insignificant role in lawmaking. Not a single bill pro-

posed by NPC delegates has been enacted into law. For example, from

1983 to 1995, more than 5,000 bills were proposed by delegates, but

only 933 (18 percent) of them were referred to committees. There is no

record that any of the proposed bills ever became law. 45

Constitutional Oversight Power

On paper, the constitutional oversight power of the NPC has expanded

significantly. The NPC supervises the courts and appoints and removes

officials. It also investigates and oversees the work of the executive

branch; approves the work reports of the State Council, the Supreme

People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate; reviews and

approves budgets; and provides legislative interpretations. The NPC

Table 2.1. Legislative Output of the NPC, 1978-2003

Years

5th NPC (1978-1983) 6th NPC (1983-1988) 7th NPC (1988-1993) 8th NPC (1993-1998) 9th NPC (1998-2003)

Laws Passed

41 47 60 85 74

Resolutions Passed

19 16 27 33

N/A

Sources: Zhongguo falu nianjian (Law Yearbook of China), various years; www.chinanews.com.cn. February 20, 2003.

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 61

can review the constitutionality of laws; inspect the implementation of

specific laws by supervising individual court cases; hold hearings; con-

duct special investigations; and impeach and dismiss government offi-

cials. 46 But in reality, the NPC has seldom asserted its formal oversight

power. For example, the NPC has never declared a law unconstitutional

or rejected a work report by the State Council, the Supreme People’s

Court, or the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. It has never refused to

approve a budget, and has never launched its own special investiga-

tions or initiated proceedings of dismissal against a single government

official. The NPC’s inspection tours or hearings do not appear to have

had any impact on policy, either. The most visible expression of the

NPC’s oversight power is rather symbolic: each year, about 20 percent

of the NPC delegates vote against the work reports of the Supreme

People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. 47

By comparison, in some provinces, cities, and counties, the LPCs oc-

casionally have tried to be more assertive. 48 Playing what O’Brien called

the role of remonstrators, LPC members sometimes take local bureau-

cracies to task for poor performance and corruption. 49 In 2000, in a

well-publicized case, the Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress held

a hearing on the work of the provincial environmental protection

agency. Unhappy with the agency’s work, the deputies voted, 23 to 5,

on a resolution to express dissatisfaction with the agency’s response

given at the hearing and demanded a second hearing. Even after

agency officials gave an improved performance at the second hearing,

the deputies remained unsatisfied, although such expressions of dis-

satisfaction did not appear to have any substantive political effects. 5o

LPC deputies have demanded audits of the expenditures of local

governments and criticized local governments’ commercial deals and

corrupt activities. 51 In 2002, members of the Guangdong Provincial

People’s Congress aggressively questioned the provincial government

about its 22 billion yuan budget and demanded explanations for many

line-item expenditures. Afterward, the Guangdong provincial govern-

ment became more forthcoming in providing more detailed budgetary

information to the congress. 52 In wielding one of its most controversial

oversight powers, LPCs also began to monitor judicial proceedings,

mainly as a response to rampant corruption in the judicial system. LPCs’

oversight of judicial proceedings in both civil and criminal cases can

force courts to conduct trials with greater transparency and integrity.

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

62 China’s Trapped Transition

Typically, LPC delegates would review files, interview witnesses, and sit

in on trial proceedings. In one instance, such intervention helped free

a peasant wrongly convicted of drug trafficking. 53

For many NPC delegates, the passage ofa “supervision law” (jiandufa),

which would explicitly grant the legislative branch broad-ranged over-

sight power, attracted a great deal of interest even though legislative in-

tervention in judicial proceedings is considered harmful to judicial

independence. From 1993 to 1999, more than 1,600 NPC delegates pro-

posed 51 pieces of legislation to legalize judicial oversight. 54 While the

NPC insists that such oversight, in cases involving major violations of

law, does not constitute interference in legal proceedings, however, it

has yet to enact a law formally granting itself and LPCs the power of

judicial and executive oversight.

Power of Appointment and Removal

Another noteworthy development is that LPCs have become an arena

in which bureaucratic and factional politics begin to influence, in a

very limited way, the appointment of local officials. Because Chinese

law mandates “competitive elections” (cha’e xuanju) for senior local of-

ficials, LPC delegates have an opportunity to use such indirect “elec-

tions” to foil the appointment of official candidates and elect their own

choices. Under Chinese law, an official candidate cannot be appointed

if he or she fails to gain half the votes of the delegates. LPC delegates

can also write in their nominees. In Liaoning in the late 1990s, for ex-

ample, the CCP’s provincial organization department (POD) reported

that an increasing number of official candidates could not be con-

firmed by LPCs due to factionalism, poor lobbying by the party, and

unattractive nominees. Local legislators occasionally were successful in

nominating and electing their own candidates to local offices. In five

cities in Liaoning, twelve independent candidates were elected to local

offices. 55 Similar incidents occurred in Hangzhou’s twelve counties in

the 1990s. Each time the county LPC appointed officials nominated by

the party, an average of six to nine official nominees would fail to be

appointed, while the same number of unofficial candidates nominated

by the delegates themselves would get elected. In the counties where

the LPC delegates were the most assertive, about 10 to 15 percent of

the official nominees would fail to get elected. 56

In practice, however, such revolts by LPC delegates are rare, and nearly

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 63

all the candidates nominated by the CCP are appointed. According to a

senior NPC official, Qiao Xiaoyang, from the mid-1980s to the mid-

1990s, only 2 percent of the candidates nominated by the provincial CCP

Committee failed to win elections at the provincial People’s Congress. 57

Nevertheless, the CCP has taken numerous measures to prevent such

procedural setbacks. For example, the CCP’s POD in Liaoning proposed

a set of measures to ensure the appointment of the party’s candidates.

They include making local party chiefs the chairmen of the LPC Stand-

ing Committee, appointing the local CCP organization department

chiefs to be the heads of the personnel committee of the LPCs, packing

the presidium of the LPCs with loyalists, and appointing loyalists to be

the heads of local delegations to the LPCS.58 In Hangzhou, the provincial

party committee took similar steps prior to the convening of the munic-

ipal People’s Congress in 1996. These tactics were so effective that

98 percent of the official nominees won. 59 Nationally, similar measures,

some illegal or questionable, contributed to the dominance of the CCP

over the LPCs. In 1997 and 1998, the election of the chairmen of the

provincial People’s Congress Standing Committee was not competitive,

contrary to law. 60 By 2003, in twenty-three of the thirty-one provinces, the

party chief was also the chairman of the provincial People’s Congress

Standing Committee. This shows that the CCP has maintained almost

complete control over the legislative branch in the provinces.

Organizational Growth

Organizationally, the NPC has grown considerably as well. The body

had only fifty-four full-time staffers in 1979. By the mid-1990s, the num-

ber had risen to about two thousand. 61 The NPC’s committee system

grew as well. From 1983 to 2003, the number of specialized committees

in the NPC Standing Committee rose from six to nine. Nationwide, the

number of staffers in the People’s Congress system at and above the

county-level reached 70,000 by 1997. 62 As a whole, however, the mem-

bership of the NPC and LPCs does not mirror Chinese society. Rather,

it appears to better represent the bureaucratic interests of the Chinese

state and the ruling CCP. For example, nearly all of the 134 members

of the 9th NPC Standing Committee (average age 63.4) were retired

government and party officials. 63

CCP members make up about two-thirds of the delegates to the NPC

and LPCs. In the NPC, the percentage of delegates who were CCP

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

64 China’s Trapped Transition

members was 73 in 1981 and 72 in 1998. The situation is similar in LPCs.

In 1998, 72 percent of the delegates to provincial people’s congresses

and 75 percent of the delegates to municipal people’s congresses were

CCP members. In fact, the party’s presence in the NPC and LPCs was

less domineering during the early years of the People’s Republic. In

1954, for example, 55 percent of the NPC delegates were CCP mem-

bers, and 58 percent of the delegates to the provincial people’s con-

gresses were CCP members. 64

As a group, members of the NPC and LPCs are among China’s po-

litical and social elites, based on their educational attainment and oc-

cupations. Seventy-three percent of the NPC delegates and 62 percent

of the delegates to municipal people’s congresses in 1998 had college

degrees or college-equivalent education, compared to the average of

the national population of about 3 percent. Twenty-one percent of the

NPC delegates were “intellectuals” and professionals. In addition, while

the percentage of peasants and workers declined steadily from the

1980s, the share of officials rose significantly. In 1983, workers and

peasants made up 27 percent of NPC delegates. By 1999, their com-

bined share had fallen to 19 percent. By comparison, the share of offi-

cials among NPC delegates increased from 21 percent in 1983 to 33

percent in 1999. Together with the military (9 percent), representa-

tives of the Chinese party-state accounted for 42 percent of NPC dele-

gates. The share of officials in the delegates to provincial people’s

congresses was even higher. From 1983 to 1999, it rose from 24 percent

to 43 percent, while the combined share of workers and peasants fell

from 33 percent to 24 percent. 65

In retrospect, the failure of the Chinese NPC and LPCs to grow into

genuine autonomous legislative institutions capable of checking the

power of the CCP and the Chinese state is fully predictable. It is clear,

both from elite-level discussions and the CCP’s actual policy, that the

party has never intended for the legislative branch to acquire its own

institutional identity or power because the CCP recognizes the huge

risks that an autonomous legislative branch would entail. As Barrett

McCormick argues, genuine institutional pluralism embodied in an

autonomous legislative branch such as the NPC would fundamentally

endanger the survivability of Leninist states. The fear of such a danger

led Chinese leaders to restrict the power of the NPC, even as they tried

to make the institution an instrument of popular legitimization. 66

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 65

Consequently, the NPC and LPCs, which are not directly elected through

competitive elections, lack their own power base and popular legiti-

macy and must depend on the support of the executive branch-the

Chinese party-state-for their institutional existence and relevance. 67

Legal Reform

The efforts by the Chinese government to develop a modern legal sys-

tem in the post-Mao era are viewed as crucial steps toward political re-

form. 68 To the extent that a modern legal system will foster the rule of

law and constrain the power of the ruling CCP, such reforms constitute

one of the most basic requirements of the commitments of the post-

Mao regime to genuine political reform. Yet, the record in legal reform

since the late 1970s has been mixed. While the Chinese government

has made unprecedented progress in many areas of legal reform, the

Chinese legal system remains structurally flawed and ineffective be-

cause the CCP is fundamentally unwilling to allow real judicial con-

straints on the exercise of its power. In his survey of China’s legal

reform, Randall Peerenboom observes:

There is considerable direct and indirect evidence that China is in the

midst of a transition toward some version of rule of law that measures up

favorably to the requirements of a thin theory … but the reach of the law

is still clearly limited. The party’s actual role in governing the country is at

odds with or not reflected in the Constitution or other legal documents.

As a result, one can see “little evidence of a shift toward a rule of law

understood to entail democracy and a liberal version of human rights

that gives priority to civil and political rights.”69

Another comprehensive review of China’s legal reform reached a

similar conclusion. “In general, the reform of the judicial system has not

kept pace with the rapid economic reforms and social changes in China”

because the Chinese government adopted a piecemeal approach to

law reform and lacked full commitment to real reform. 70 This section

will briefly review the major achievements in China’s legal reform and

analyze the political factors that lie behind the limits of such reform.

The motivations to undertake even limited legal reform were com-

pelling for the CCP in the post-Mao era. To restore political order and

create a new legal framework for economic reforms, reforming and

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

66 China’s Trapped Transition

strengthening the legal system was a top priority for the Deng regime.

In the speech that marked his return to power in December 1978, Deng called for the strengthening of the legal system and identified, as the

new leadership’s top priority, the passage of a criminal code, a civil code,

procedure laws, as well as laws on enterprises, foreign investment, labor,

and environmental protection. 71 As William Alford observed:

The [Chinese] leadership’s principal objective in initiating and sup-

porting law reform has not been to foster a rule of law. Rather it has

been to legitimate the leadership’s own power while erecting the edi-

fice of technical guidelines believed necessary to facilitate economic re-

form and reassure anxious prospective foreign transferrers of sorely

needed capital and technology.72

Indeed, China’s legal system, developed under a planned economy

and wrecked by a decade of political turmoil during the Cultural Revo-

lution, was inadequate, outdated, and ill-suited for a transition economy.

Economic reform would have been inconceivable without reform-

ing the legal system. 73 Thus, the CCP’s need for survival through eco-

nomic reform overlapped with the practical necessities of legal reform.

Legal reform, however, as in the case of other major political and eco-

nomic reforms, can also produce spillover effects and unintended con-

sequences. Such reforms, in Alford’s words, can be a “double-edged

sword”-it may bolster the regime’s legitimacy and help gain investor

confidence, but it can also spark the political liberalization feared by the

regime. 74 This political dilemma provides the overall context for China’s

legal reform and limits the extent to which such reform can be achieved.

Nevertheless, the progress in legal reform since the end of the Mao

era has been unprecedented in Chinese history, as reflected in the

passage of a large number of new laws; the increasing use of the courts

to resolve economic disputes; social and state-society conflicts; the de-

velopment of a professional legal community; and improvements in

judicial procedures. Stanley Lubman captures both the achievements

and limitations of China’s legal reform in his assessment: “The accom-

plishments of China’s legal reformers have been impressive despite the

limitations set by policy on the role of law itself, the flux of China’s on-

going social and economic transformations since 1979, and the con- tinuing strength of traditional legal culture.”75

Specifically, the most important progress that China has made in

legal reform is threefold: “law has been made a major instrument of

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 67

governance, a legal framework for a marketizing economy has been

created, and ajudicial system has been constructed.”76 As a result, legal

reform has greatly increased the role of courts in adjudicating civil,

commercial, and administrative disputes. As indicated by the data on

the rapid growth of commercial, civil, and administrative litigation,

Chinese courts have assumed an indispensable role in resolving eco-

nomic, social, and, to a limited extent, political conflicts (Table 2.2).

A number of empirical studies on commercial and administrative liti-

gation show that, despite its flaws, China’s legal system is capable of

providing limited protection of property and personal rights. 77 In ad-

dition, China’s legal profession, including judges and lawyers, has ex-

panded rapidly during the reform era. The number of lawyers rose

from a few thousand in the early 1980s to more than 100,000 in 2002.

The number of judges nearly doubled from the late 1980s to the late

1990s. As measured by educational attainment, the qualifications of

the legal profession have risen dramatically as well. The percentage of

judges with a college or associate degree rose from seventeen in 1987

to forty in 2003. 78 Of the 100,000 lawyers in 2002,70 percent had under-

graduate degrees and higher and 30 percent had only dazhuan (equiv-

alent to an associate degree) or lower. The overall level of professional

legal qualifications remains relatively low, however, especially when

measured by Western standards. 79

But behind these numbers lies a different political reality. For all

the progress in reform, China’s legal system remains politically hobbled

by the ruling party’s restrictions. Legal reform was apparently losing

momentum in the late 1990s. For example, the growth of civil and

Table 2.2. Growth of Litigation, 1986-2002 (cases accepted by courts of first instance)

Year

1986 1990 1996 1999 2000 2002

Commercial

308,393 598,314

1,519,793 1,535,613 1,297,843

Civil

989,409 1,851,897 3,093,995 3,519,244 3,412,259 4,420,123a

Administrative

632 13,006 79,966 97,569 85,760 80,728

Sources: Zhongguo falu nianjian, various years. aIncluding both commercial and civil cases.

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

68 China’s Trapped Transition

administrative litigation slowed in the late 1990s, peaked by 1999, and

began to decrease afterward (Table 2.2). The total number of civil and

commercial cases fell from more than 5 million in 1999 to about

4.4 million in 2002, a 12 percent decline in three years. Administrative

litigation cases registered even more dramatic declines. Mter peaking

in 2001, with 100,921 cases filed, the number of administrative lawsuits

fell to about 80,000 in 2002, back to the level of 1996. Such broad and

large declines in litigation may be indicative of the poor performance

of the court system and the consequent erosion of the public’s confi-

dence in the courts’ ability to adjudicate justly.

Although there are no data available about the trial outcomes of civil

cases, the trend of administrative litigation suggests that the decline in

the number of lawsuits filed against the government may be directly re-

lated to the increasing difficulty with which plaintiffs were winning

these cases in courts, which in turn reflects the courts’ progovernment

bias. For example, plaintiffs suing the government had an effective

winning rate of 38.3 percent in 1993 (including favorable court judg-

ments and settlements). This rate rose to 41 percent in 1996, but fell to

32 percent in 1999. By 2002, the rate plummeted to 20.6 percent, half

the level reached in 1996.80 It is likely that the decreasing probability of

receiving judicial relief through the administrative litigation process

has discouraged many citizens from taking their cases to the courts.

The rapid growth of the legal profession has not led to the emergence

of a genuinely independent bar or a well-trained judiciary. The govern-

ment maintains tight restrictions on lawyers in their representation of

their clients. The Lawyers’ Law (1996) provides for inadequate protec-

tion of lawyers’ rights, leaving lawyers vulnerable to harassment and per-

secution by local officials. 81 According to the president of the Chinese

Lawyers Association, the number of incidents in which lawyers were

mistreated was large. Law enforcement officers frequently assaulted,

detained, and verbally abused lawyers. Many lawyers were wrongfully

convicted and sentenced to jail. Lawyers’ rights to defend their clients in

court were restricted. Some lawyers were ejected from courts without jus-

tification. But local governments, in most cases, refused to cooperate

with lawyers’ associations in investigating such cases of abuse. 82

Despite a massive effort to raise the qualifications of judges, the

overall level of professionalism of the judiciary is very low. For example,

60 percent of the judges in 2003 had not received a college or

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 69

college-equivalent education. 83 A large number of sittingjudges, many

of whom are former officers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ,

have dubious legal qualifications. For example, in one midsized city in

1998, of the 1,354judges in the city’s courts, 500 (37 percent) were for-

mer PLA officers, and 733 (more than half) were transferred from

other government agencies and presumably had received little formal

legal education. Only 87 had college degrees and 96 had associate de-

grees, and 364judges had a high school education or less. 84

Perhaps the most revealing evidence that the rule of law is fundamen-

tally incompatible with a one-party regime is the CCP’s steadfast refusal

to undertake the necessary reforms to correct the two following well-

known institutional and structural flaws in the Chinese legal system-

even though they have long been identified and numerous remedies

have been proposed. For example, in a study commissioned by the

Supreme People’s Court to amend the “People’s Court Organic Law,”

He Weifang and Zhang Ziming, two leading academics, detailed a long

list of the symptoms that manifested these flaws. What is remarkable

about the proposal by He and Zhang is that similar proposals had been

floated before but were never acted upon by the CCP.85 To the extent

that reforms are adopted to address the critical weaknesses in the legal

system, the measures implemented by the government tend to be

piecemeal and technical. They try to remedy the less controversial pro-

cedural flaws while avoiding the most sensitive political issues. 86

Politicization of the Courts and Lack ofJudicial Independence

As ajudicial institution, Chinese courts are heavily politicized and de-

prived of the independence crucial to their role as guardians ofjustice

and adjudicators of disputes. 87 The politicization of the courts is re-

flected in the control exercised by the CCP over the various aspects of

the courts’ operations. For example, each level of the CCP organization,

down to the county level, has a special political and legal committee

(zhengfa weiyuanhui) headed by a senior party official. The committee

directly makes decisions on important policies and issues related to

the courts and law enforcement. In many cases, this committee even

determines the outcomes of major court cases.

In terms of judicial appointments, the CCP’s organization depart-

ment would nominate candidates for the presidents and vice presidents

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

70 China’s Trapped Transition

of courts, often regardless of their judicial training or the lack thereof.

A former vice president of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), Wang

Huai’an, admitted that the CCP’s nomenclatural system (dang guan

ganbu) controls the appointment of key personnel in the court system.

In the case of the SPC, the members of the SPC party committee, who

are the most senior judge-officials of the court, are appointed and su-

pervised by the CCP Central Committee, and members of the party com-

mittee of provincial high courts are jointly supervised by the SPC party

committee and the provincial party committees. The members of the

party committees of intermediate courts are under the direct supervi-

sion of the party committees of the provincial high courts. The CCP’s

control of the most senior judicial appointments profoundly affects

how judgments are determined by the courts because, as Wang said,

“in the last fifty years, the system of giving the ultimate trial authority to

the presidents of the courts has remained basically unchanged.”88

Additionally, judicial independence is compromised by local gov-

ernments that wield enormous influence over the courts through their

control of judicial appointments and court finances. 89 Dependent on

the local governments for funding, services, and political support, Chi-

nese courts find it hard to try cases fairly where the economic and po-

litical interests of the local governments and officials are at stake. In

the most crucial respects, Chinese courts are run like other govern-

ment bureaucracies and follow a similar modus operandi. Administra-

tive ranking or seniority, not judicial qualifications and experience,

determine the hierarchical structure in the courts. For example, trial

committees, which have the ultimate authority in determining judg-

ments, are composed of individuals with the most senior administrative

ranks, rather than the best judicial qualifications. 90

Trials in courts are conducted like planned production drives. Typi-

cally, during the first half of the year, the pace of trials falls below aver-

age, leading to a backlog of untried cases. Backlogs force courts to try

cases in a typical “campaign style,” contributing to higher error rates.

In 1998, for example, 13 percent of the cases were tried in the first quarter (which includes the Spring Festival), 26 percent in the second,

25 percent in the third, and 30 percent in the fourth quarter. Mistakes

abound in the cases hastily tried at the end of the year. Of the eco-

nomic cases tried in December 1997, a third of the judgments were re- vised or ordered to be retried on appeal, a much higher percentage

than the cases tried in other quarters. 91 Similarly, the courts’ enforcement

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 71

of judgments is performed through campaign-style drives. Under the

direction of the SPC, Chinese courts often designate a certain period

for such campaigns to clear up backlogs ofunenforcedjudgments. 92

Inevitably, the politicization and administrative control of the courts

corruptsjudicial integrity.93 In public perception, the Chinesejudiciary

is one of the most corrupt government institutions. A survey of 12,000

people in ten provinces commissioned by the CCP’s Central Discipline

Inspection Commission in late 2003 found that the courts, along with

the police and the procuratorate, were considered among the five

most corrupt public institutions; 39 percent of the respondents said

corruption in these three institutions was “quite serious.”94 The Chi-

nese press frequently reports corruption scandals involving judges. In

Hubei province, from 2002 to mid-2003, ninety-one judges were charged

with corruption. The accused included one vice president of the

provincial high court, two presidents of the intermediate court, four

vice presidents of the intermediate court, and two presidents of the

basic-level court. In 2003 alone, 794 judges in the country were investi-

gated and punished (chachu) .95

Corruption by senior provincial judges was reported in many other

jurisdictions. The presidents of the provincial high courts in Guang-

dong and Hunan provinces were convicted of corruption in 2003 and

2004. In Heilongjiang, the president, a vice president of the provincial

high court, and the head of the provincial judicial department were

removed from office in late 2004 for corruption. In Hainan, a vice pres-

ident of the provincial high court, along with the head of the enforce-

ment department of the court, a vice president of an intermediate

court, and a president of a district court, were sentenced in 2004 to

longjail terms for corruption. 96

Fragmentation ofJudicial Authority

The control by the party and local governments of the judiciary has

contributed to the fragmentation ofjudicial authority and undermined

its effectiveness. In addition to the weakening of the judiciary as a re-

sult of the CCP’s control of judicial appointments, the enormous

power wielded by local governments over the judiciary undercuts the

courts’ authority. Because judicial jurisdictions and administrative ju-

risdictions completely overlap one another, the dominance of the ad-

ministrative authorities in effect creates what Chinese observers call

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

72 China’s Trapped Transition

judicial “independent kingdoms,” in which local political interests, in-

stead of national law, hold sway. Under these conditions, laws made by

the central government cannot be implemented or enforced, leading

to the widespread problem of “local protectionism”-the phenome-

non of local authorities providing political protection to local interests

in violation of national laws. Consequently, enforcement of court judg-

ments is extremely difficult when judicial authority is fragmented. 97

One study finds that, despite official rhetoric about strengthening the

legal system, court judgments became even more difficult to enforce in

the late 1990s. In some cases, court judgments could not be executed

without the explicit political backing from CCP officials. 98

To remedy the structural weaknesses caused by such a fragmentation

of judicial authority, Chinese scholars have offered several proposals

for institutional reform. These proposals include the establishment of

two separate judicial systems: a central system and a local system (simi-

lar to the American federal system); the formation of cross-regional

courts; and the use of the central government’s appropriations to fund

courts. 99 The government has adopted none of them, however. Such a

failure to implement crucial reforms led to a growing sense among

China’s legal community that the court system had become so dysfunc-

tional that more radical measures-or “major surgery,” to use a color-

ful phrase-would be required. loo

In summary, the dominance of the party-state over the judiciary is

the fundamental cause of the limitation of legal reform in China. The

CCP’s goals in allowing legal reform are tactical in nature: such reform

must serve the party’s overall strategy of maintaining its political mo-

nopoly through economic reform. Measures of legal reform must not

threaten its authority or the institutional structure upon which its po-

litical supremacy is based. As long as the CCP places its own political in-

terests above China’s need for the rule of law, legal reform will remain

confined to the tactical realm.

Village Elections

The emergence of village elections in rural China since the late 1980s

marks an important step toward democratization. Even though these

elections produce, technically, a self-governing civic organization, not a

local government, the advent of village elections has led some analysts

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 73

to praise them as an example of political liberalization In China. lol

Based on his field research in 1999, Lianjiang Li argued that such elec- tions politically empowered peasants and increased local political

accountability. 102 According to Kevin O’Brien, the introduction of elec-

tions into the villages would eventually lead to full citizenship status to

rural residents, who have been denied many of the rights enjoyed by ur-

ban residents. l03 Allen Choate, who oversaw the Asia Foundation’s

democracy-assistance program in China, believes that village elections

increased transparency in village governance and offered rural resi-

dents more choices of representation and avenues of appeal. l04 Some

Chinese social scientists hold similarly positive views of this democratic

experiment, arguing that such elections have contributed to rising po-

litical consciousness among the peasantry and broken the balance of

power in villages in favor of the villagers. l05

Other scholars, however, were skeptical about the democratizing im-

pact of village elections. Jean Oi and Scott Rozelle found in their study

of elections in thirty-two villages that the elections did little to change

the power balance and decision-making authority in these villages be-

cause the village communist party secretary retained political domi-

nance. l06 Based on his fieldwork in Hebei in 1997, Bjorn Alpermann concluded that township government and party organizations main-

tained dominant advantages while elected committees exercised only limited “self-administration.”107

In all likelihood, the diversity of socioeconomic conditions in China,

the unevenness with which local officials implement village elections,

and the dearth of reliable data make it almost impossible to assess the

role and impact of village elections in the expansion of democratiza-

tion in rural China. In this section, we will review the evolution of village

elections and focus on the most contentious, and unresolved, political

issues surrounding this limited democratic experiment.

Villagers’ committees, averaging five to seven members who serve three-

year terms, first emerged as an administrative replacement of the pro-

duction brigade almost as soon as the agricultural decollectivization

began. With the dismantling of the people’s communes, alternative insti-

tutions of grassroots governance in rural areas were needed. Similar to

agricultural decollectivization, the movement toward self-government in

the villages began as a spontaneous response by the peasantry to the de-

terioration of local governance following the disappearance of the

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

74 China’s Trapped Transition

communes. The Chinese government tentatively endorsed this de-

mocratic experiment because the authorities believed that such self-

governing civic organizations would help maintain rural stability. The

strongest proponent for legalizing village elections was Peng Zhen,

chairman of the NPC’s Standing Committee and a political hardliner.

Peng was credited with the passage of the draft Organic Law on Village

Committees in 1987 and its initial implementation, despite the con-

servative backlash in the aftermath of the Tiananmen tragedy in

June 1989. 108

Judging by the speed of implementation, village elections appeared

to be a considerable success. Although only half the provinces had in-

stituted village elections by 1990, the experiment quickly gathered mo-

mentum. In the early 1990s, the Chinese government promoted the

use of “demonstration sites”-villages to which local officials were dis-

patched to develop and enforce proper election procedures. By the

late 1990s, more than three hundred counties (or 15 percent of the to-

tal in the country) were designated as “demonstration counties,” and

the number of villages as “demonstration sites” reached 164,000, about

18 percent of the total number of villages. 109 The effect of using “dem-

onstration sites” to improve village elections appeared to be limited,

however. In Wang Zhenyao’s view, the procedures for village elections

improved mostly as a result of pressures and initiatives from the peas-

antry. The popularization of competitive primaries (haixuan) was cred-

ited to village residents rather than to local officials. Indeed, when the

Organic Law was revised in 1998, many of the electoral procedures in-

vented and used by village residents were formally adopted and codified.

By the end of the 1990s, village elections had spread to nearly all

Chinese provinces. In several provinces that led the nation in the im-

plementation of village elections, four rounds of such elections had

been held between 1988 and 2000. In eighteen provinces, three rounds

had occurred. A survey conducted by Tianjian Shi in 2002 showed that

83 percent of the villagers polled reported elections in their villages

in 2002, compared with 76 percent in 1993. The voter turnout rate had

increased as well. In 1993, 63 percent of the respondents of a similar

poll said that they had voted in the village elections. In the 2002 poll,

69 percent had voted. llo In some parts of China, village elections seem

to have become more organized, and candidates are engaged in vari-

ous campaign activities to seek voters’ support. In Fujian, for example,

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 75

one study finds that 43 percent of the villagers reported that candidates

visited their homes; 37 percent said that candidates asked their relatives

for help with the campaign; 30 percent said that candidates called on

their clan leaders to rally support; and 24 percent reported that candi-

dates provided free meals to earn goodwill from the villagers. In ad-

dition, village elections offered opportunities for voters to pick the

candidates offering attractive policy choices. In Fujian, 25 percent of

the voters recalled that candidates pledged to improve village infra-

structure; 24 percent reported that candidates promised better eco-

nomic performance; 10 percent said that candidates vowed to investigate

corruption by their predecessors; and 7 percent reported that candi- dates campaigned on cutting or even abolishing taxes. llI

In evaluating the impact of village elections on rural democratiza-

tion, one of the most disputed issues is how competitive such elections

are. Given the political dominance of the CCP, the likelihood that the

party would permit genuinely competitive elections may be small. The

findings from various surveys and field research, however, show a

mixed picture. One indicator of competitiveness-whether elections

have a single candidate or multiple candidates for the chairmanship of

the villagers’ committee-appears to have improved. Shi reports that,

in 1993,53 percent of the villagers surveyed said that had multicandi-

date elections. In 2002,70 percent reported multicandidate elections. 1l2

But this measure may misrepresent the political reality in Chinese vil-

lages because the competitiveness of village elections depends not on

how many formal candidates appear on the ballot, but on how such

candidates are nominated.

Local party and township officials can manipulate the nomination

process to ensure that their preferred candidates win positions on the

villagers’ committees. Such manipulation is relatively easy to carry out

because, like primaries, only a small percentage of the village voters

normally attend nomination meetings. One study of forty villages in

Fujian in 2001 found that only 12 percent of villagers attended nomi-

nation meetings. 1l3 Indeed, Shi’s survey showed that in about a quarter

of the villages, the party, the township government, and the previous

villagers’ committees picked the members of the “village election lead-

ing group,” which organizes village elections and exerts decisive influ-

ence on the nomination process. Only about 43 percent of the villages

formed their village election leading groups through an election by the

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

76 China’s Trapped Transition

village assembly or villagers’ small groups, as required by the revised

Organic Law. Partly as a result of the influence of the party and local

governments, only 43 percent of the villages used haixuan, the most

democratic method of nomination, and 35 percent of villages used

methods deemed illegal under the Organic Law. ll4

Applying the most stringent standard of competitiveness, Shi finds

that only 11 percent of village elections held in China could meet all

four requirements. ll5 If the legal requirements stipulated by the Or-

ganic Law are applied, Shi argues that only 31 percent of the villages in

China are in compliance with the law. ll6 Case studies conducted by

other researchers offer additional confirmation that elections in many,

if not the majority, of villages do not follow proper procedures. A study

of forty villages in Jiangxi in 1999 found that in one county, only one in

five villages complied with the law, while in another county, one in two

complied. In the same study, 61 percent of the villagers reported that

the county and township “election guidance group” played the most

important role in the election process; 31 percent said that village

party secretaries wielded significant influence. The legally mandated

village election committees played only a negligible role, with 60 per-

cent of the villagers reporting that such committees had no influ-

ence. 117 The interference in the electoral process by the party and the

government contributed to the peasants’ disillusionment with village

elections. According to Xiao Tangbiao, while 79 percent of rural resi-

dents hoped to participate in real democratic elections, only 32 per-

cent thought that such elections would be held. More important, in

villages where elections were manipulated by local officials, elections

had no visible or significant impact on village governance. ll8

A study of thirty-four villages in Shaanxi province in 2000 by John

Kennedy reached similar conclusions. Of all the formal candidates,

only 35 percent were nominated by villagers, 21 percent were chosen

by the village party branches, and 26 percent were nominated by town-

ship governments. Kennedy also found that if open nominations,

or haixuan, were held, nonparty members would more likely win.

The nomination process is therefore the most critical link in village

elections-the more open the nomination process, the more competi-

tive the elections. Official interference in the election process invari-

ably undermines the legitimacy of village elections because rural

residents are politically sophisticated enough to tell real elections from

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 77

phony ones. 1l9 The results of Hu Rong’s survey of 913 villagers in Fu-

jian in 2001 reinforced the findings reported by Shi, Xiao, and

Kennedy. Forty percent of the villagers reported that party and town-

ship governments nominated the candidates. 12o A different study of

elections in 231 villages in Fujian in 2000 showed that only about 53

percent of the sampled villages had complied with the electoral rules

laid out in the Organic Law. 121

Provincial data provide additional evidence that local ruling elites

have decisive influence in the nomination process. During the elec-

tions held in 1999 in Jilin, which is considered one of the pioneers in

implementing village elections, 49 percent of the members of the vil-

lage election committees were party members, and 13 percent were in-

cumbents. Sixty-nine percent of the election committee directors were

village party secretaries; 16 percent of the election committee directors

were incumbent chairmen of the villagers’ committees. Only 15 per-

cent of the election committee directors were ordinary villagers. 122

A study of the election results in 2000 in Fujian (another pioneer in vil-

lage elections) shows similar patterns: 92 percent of the village election

committees were headed by CCP village branch secretaries. 123 In

examining the election results in forty counties in Hunan in 1999,

one researcher found that 55 percent of the members of village elec-

tion committees were party members and 92 percent of the heads of

the election committees were village party chiefs. 124 The ability of the

party to control the election process is most likely the direct cause of

the dominance of the elected villagers’ committees by CCP members

(Table 2.3).

Another controversy surrounding village elections is whether they

have any substantive effects on local governance, especially on the

redistribution of power. Unfortunately, no systematic data are avail-

able to shed light on this question. Limited information appears to

suggest that under the Organic Law, elected villagers’ committees do

not have the power legally granted to them. 125 Local authorities, espe-

cially unelected township governments and village party branches, in-

fringe on the power of villagers’ committees through various means.

For example, township governments take away the power of villagers’

committees by assuming the accounting responsibility of villages and

by centralizing the budgeting and spending of all villages, thus making

villagers’ committees practically powerless in managing fiscal affairs. 126

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

78 China’s Trapped Transition

Table 2.3. Dominance of CCP Members in Villagers’ Committees

Elected VC Chairman Elected VC Members Year of is a CCP Member are CCP Members

Province Elections (percent) (percent)

Hunan 1999 76 N/A Fujian 2000 66 79 Guangdong 1999 N/A 77 Jilin 1999 70 50

Sources: Liu Xitang, “Hunansheng 1999 niandu 40 ge xian cunweihui xuanju shuju fenxi baogao”; Wu Miao, “Cunweihui xuanju zhiliang de lianghua fenxi: Yi Fujiansheng 9 shi 2000 niandu cunweihui huanjie xuanju tongji shuju weijiju”; Cao Ying, ‘Jilinsheng cunweihui xuanju shuju fenxi baogao”; Liu Hong, “Tuijing cunmin zizhi yujiaqiangjiceng dangzuzhi jianshe de guanxi” (The Relationship between Promoting Villagers’ Self-government and Strengthening the Building of the Party at the Grassroots Level), Neibu canyue (Internal Reference), 28 (2001): 11-20.

They can, albeit illegally, remove elected village officials. In Qiangjiang

city in Hubei, an investigation by Yao Lifa, a maverick deputy to the

municipal People’s Congress, found that of the 329 villagers’ com-

mittee chairmen elected in September 1999, 187 (57 percent) had

been illegally dismissed by township governments in the subsequent

years before they served out their full terms. In addition, 432 vice

chairmen and villagers’ committee members had been illegally re-

moved from office in the same period. All the replacements were

illegally appointed by the party and local governments. Such illegal

removal of elected officials was reported in 269 of the 329 villages

within the city’s jurisdiction, suggesting that the practice was wide-

spread. 127

Similar incidents were reported in Shandong. In March 2001, fifty-

seven elected villagers’ committee officials in four townships in Shan-

dong collectively resigned because the village party committees and

township governments did not transfer any power to the elected offi-

cials. A year after they were elected, the officials were not able to con-

trol the village budget or the official seals. They were also subject to

arbitrary dismissals by the party and township officials. 128

Elected villagers’ committees often find their power curtailed by

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 79

the presence of the CCP branches in the same villages. The tense rela-

tionship between the villagers’ committees and the CCP branches has

been widely reported in the Chinese press and studied by scholars. In

a study of five hundred villages in Hunan, two researchers affiliated

with the provincial CCP party school reported that in 40 percent of

the villages surveyed, the elected villagers’ committees were totally

powerless, and the village party committees held all the power. The re-

lationship between the party committee and villagers’ committee was

considered cooperative in only 40 percent of the villages. 129 Another

survey in 1999 of 2,600 rural residents in four counties (two in Anhui

and two in Heilongjiang) indicated that local government officials and

party organizations were perceived as more powerful than the newly

elected villagers’ committees. 13o

Despite the mixed impact of village elections on rural democrati-

zation, the advent of grassroots democracy in the countryside has en-

couraged small-scale experiments in democratization in urban areas.

In 1999, the Ministry of Civil Affairs selected twenty-six cities for experi-

ments in electing urban residents’ committees, which are, like villagers’

committees, civic groups responsible for providing local services. Ex-

perimental elections of urban residents’ committees began in June

1996 in Shenyang and were allowed in Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing,

Hangzhou, Wuhan, Hefei, Xi’an, and several other large cities in 2000. 131

The CCP, however, appeared to have drawn the line on how far it

would allow such grassroots democratic experiments to spread. As a

result, it blocked elections above the village level. Except for the atten-

tion devoted to a few occasional minor experiments in township elec-

tions, the government-controlled media did not have much discussion

or debate on the desirability or feasibility of township, let alone county-

level, elections. It seems that nearly all the experiments in introducing

township elections in various forms were initiatives of local officials.

The most well-known experiment, a direct competitive election for the

township mayor of Buyun in Sichuan, was pushed by a local reformist

county official inJanuary 1999. Although the election, considered fair

by observers, installed the official candidate, it caused a political furor

around the country because no Chinese law permitted direct elections

of township mayors. The election was subsequently declared illegal,

even though the elected mayor was allowed to remain in office. Notably,

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

80 China’s Trapped Transition

while the government used legal technicalities to prohibit the holding

of township elections, it has made no attempt to pass a new law to ad-

dress the legal hurdles to such elections.

Consequently, a few politically sanctioned township elections were

confined to a mixture of open primaries and indirect elections so as

to comply with the law. Reform-minded local officials used such insti-

tutional innovations to skirt the party’s ban on direct elections of town-

ship mayors. Technically, these innovations allow local residents to

recommend nominees for township mayors through a relatively com-

petitive vote. Then the local party organization and People’s Congress

select the nominee who wins the largest number of “recommendation

votes.”132 Dapeng township, in Shenzhen, conducted such an experiment

in 1999. First, township voters recommended candidates who met the criteria

set by the local party organization. Then, the five top vote-getters gave

campaign speeches at a voters’ meeting. Afterward, voters elected one

of the five as the formal candidate for the township mayor. These two

ballots functioned as popular votes, but had no legal standing or bind-

ing power. Finally, the township party organization reviewed the final

candidate and nominated him to the township People’s Congress for

confirmation. 133 A similar method was used by Buyun township in

2002. 134 In 2004, seven townships in Shiping County, Yunnan province, also used a similar method to elect their mayors. It is worth noting that

none of these initiatives received the explicit endorsement of the

CCP’s central leadership. Local reformers took on considerable per-

sonal political risks for pushing electoral reforms. For example, a town-

ship CCP secretary in a township in Chongqing was suspended for

trying to hold a competitive mayoral election. 135

There is doubt whether such hybrid procedures really advance

democracy in the rural areas. Melanie Manion argues that various elec-

toral experiments at the township level were designed to align voter

preferences with those of the local party committees. On the one hand,

since ordinary people’s choices were limited by the party’s own prefer-

ences for particular candidates, their ability to influence the electoral

outcome was limited. On the other hand, the adoption of such a device

would enhance the party’s own legitimacy at the local level because

its own candidates would appear to have received popular endorse-

ment. 136

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China?

Illiberal Adaptation

81

The survival of the CCP regime does not solely depend on its ability to

deliver satisfactory economic growth. An authoritarian regime govern-

ing a fast-changing society faces two choices. One is to adopt a strategy of

liberal adaptation. This addresses the rising tensions between an authori-

tarian regime and an increasingly pluralist society through political re-

forms that may strengthen the rule of law; establish institutional checks

and balances; gradually expand political participation; and permit more

space for civil society. Theoretically, an authoritarian regime that has

adopted a strategy of liberal adaptation should have less of a need for re-

pression and co-optation because the ruling elites can rely on newly ac-

quired democratic legitimacy to secure their social support. But for a

regime that has opted for only the most restrictive forms of political lib-

eralization, illiberal adaptation is a far more attractive strategy for political

survival. Instead of favoring far-reaching institutional reforms to restruc-

ture regime-society relations, authoritarian regimes that choose illiberal

adaptation maximize their control of the state’s repressive apparatus and

growing economic resources to develop, refine, and implement more

subtle and effective means of maintaining political control. Applied skill-

fully, this strategy can help an authoritarian regime to divide, weaken,

and contain the social forces that may threaten its political dominance.

In the Chinese context, the CCP’s strategy of illiberal adaptation

consists of strictly limited political reform, selective repression, improved

technical capacities for dealing with social unrest and emerging tech-

nological challenges, and co-optation of new social elites.

Selective Repression

A key feature of a developmental autocracy, as compared with a totali-

tarian regime, is the selective use of repression. Whereas totalitarian

regimes are defined by the indiscriminate use of mass terror in their

exercise of power, developmental autocracies tend to be more selective

and discriminating in the repression of their political opponents. In-

deed, the measurable decline in political repression usually marks the

transition from a totalitarian regime to an authoritarian one in general,

and to a developmental autocracy in particular. 137 In theory, the re-

placement of mass terror by selective repression is not hard to explain.

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

82 China’s Trapped Transition

Mass terror is politically and economically costly. Even the most brutal

totalitarian regimes-such as the former Soviet Union under Stalin and

China during Mao’s Cultural Revolution-cannot sustain the reign of

mass terror indefinitely.

For developmental autocracies, a strategy of selective repression offers

more advantages. It enables the rulers to focus only on those political

opponents who are determined to challenge their political monopoly,

while allowing those tolerant of the regime’s rule a sufficient degree of

personal and property security. Domestically, such a strategy alienates

fewer people and may even help isolate and weaken the regime’s op-

ponents. Selective repression is also less frightening to foreign and do-

mestic investors than mass terror. Although human rights concerns do

not always dictate investment decisions, there appears to be a limit to

private investors’ tolerance of brutality. Historically, few totalitarian

regimes have been successful in attracting foreign or domestic private

investment because such regimes cannot provide any credible commit-

ment to the personal and property security of the investors.

In the case of China, selective repression replaced mass terror as

soon as Deng’s economic reforms began. The post-Mao regime imme-

diately ended class struggle, greatly curtailed the scope of repression,

and politically rehabilitated millions who had suffered brutally under

Mao’s rule. The level of repression fell dramatically, as measured by the

number of political prisoners. 138 The post-Mao regime’s use of selective

repression grew increasingly sophisticated as well, especially in the

1990s. Instead of simply brutalizing its opponents through incarcera-

tion or worse, the state security apparatus has skillfully employed a

wide range of tactics to intimidate, control, and neutralize key political

activists. Many leading dissidents were offered a stark choice: either ex-

ile or long prison terms. Many, such as Wei Jingsheng, Wang Juntao,

and Wang Dan, were forced into exile in the United States. This tactic

has successfully decapitated China’s fledgling dissident movement and

even allowed China’s government to deflect international criticisms of

its human rights practices by timing the release and exile of key dissi-

dents to important events, such as the annual U.N. Human Rights

Commission meeting in Geneva and visits to China by Western leaders.

To prevent the emergence of organized opposition, the security appa-

ratus has also established an extensive network of informants, especially

on university campuses and research institutes. These informers receive

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 83

monthly stipends in exchange for reporting campus political activities to

the secret police. In its annual report for 2001, the provincial public se-

curity department of Jiangxi disclosed that it recruited sixty-five infor-

mants (qingbao xinxi lianluoyuan) in fifty SOEs and nonprofit institutions,

as well as in fifteen institutions of higher education and “cultural units.”

These informants collected 256 pieces of information and enabled the

authorities effectively to deal with a dozen “unexpected incidents.”139

Containing Social Unrest

The skillful application of selective repression can also be seen in the

regime’s handling of the growing social unrest in the countryside and

urban areas. In the 1990s, as the number of collective protests in-

creased rapidly as the result of layoffs at bankrupt SOEs and rural tax

revolts, the public security apparatus developed and employed effec-

tive methods to contain these protests, preventing them from precipi-

tating a political chain reaction and causing greater instability. The

most remarkable fact about the tens of thousands of large-scale collec-

tive protests that occurred in the 1990s was that none of them, includ-

ing those that attracted tens of thousands of participants, mushroomed

into a sustained antiregime social movement or lasted for more than a

few days. The security apparatus’s sophisticated methods, which ranged

from crowd control to removing leadership, were in large part respon-

sible for containing the effects of growing social unrest. 140 An official

directive issued by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) explicitly de-

manded that the security forces should emphasize timely intervention

through intelligence gathering, crowd control, and containment as the

main tactics in dealing with collective protests. 141 An article published

in the official MPS magazine in 2002 details the following methods

used in containing social protest:

1. A clear division of labor: police units are assigned distinct

tasks and functions, such as intelligence collection, traffic

control, site security, propaganda and videotaping, arrest,

interrogation, and backup.

2. Intelligence collection and analysis: the police recruit

activists, establish an extensive network of informers, and

gather intelligence.

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

84 China’s Trapped Transition

3. Preventive action: the police are placed on high alert during

high-risk periods. Rural collective protest takes place mostly in

the fall, when peasants are forced to pay taxes, or in the sum-

mer rainy season, when peasants are recruited to fight floods.

In the cities, social protest occurs during SOE restructuring,

bankruptcy, or forcible removal of urban residents from their

housing while political protest becomes more frequent on

“sensitive dates.”

4. Identification of protest leaders: security officials investigate

the protest activities on site, through photos, videotaping, or

voice recording, to identify protest leaders and key activists.

5. Ending strikes: the police should arrest the leaders and

activists and remove them from the protest site. The timing

of the arrest is critical-arrests must take place only after most

protest participants are physically tired and when there are

fewer onlookers.

6. Quick follow-up action: the police must make decisions on

detainees within twenty-four hours of the arrests. Only a few

leaders and activists will be punished, while ordinary protest

participants should be educated and released. 142

In addition to its proven record in containing social unrest, the

Chinese government has managed to suppress other sources of chal-

lenge to its rule. The best example was the crackdown on the quasi-

religious group Falun Gong, from 1999 to 2000. Although shocked by

Falun Gong’s surprise April 1999 siege of Zhongnanhai, the CCP’s

leadership compound in Beijing, the party resorted, for the first time

since 1989, to a massive campaign of repression against this group,

which was arguably the most organized social movement that had

emerged during the reform era. Within two years, the government had

effectively destroyed Falun Gong. 143

Responding to the Information Revolution

By far the CCP’s most successful effort of adaptation was the contain-

men t of the threat posed by the advent of the information revolution in

the 1990s. With the emergence of the Internet and its rapid spread in-

side China, many observers assumed that closed authoritarian regimes

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 85

such as China would find it no longer possible to control the flow of in-

formation. 144 One study demonstrated that the arrival of the Internet

had a positive impact on the emergence of civil society in China. 145 By

mobilizing its security resources, imposing stringent regulations, jailing

dissidents, and harnessing new technologies, however, the Chinese gov-

ernment succeeded in minimizing the political impact of the Internet

while using the Internet to improve certain aspects of routine adminis-

trative functions, such as e-government. 146

The CCP has received high marks in addressing the threat of the

Internet. “Through measures ranging from blunt punitive actions to

the subtle manipulation of the private sector, the Chinese state has

been largely successful to date in guiding the broad political impact

of Internet use … the state is effectively controlling the overarching

political impact of the Internet.”147 Another study of the Chinese gov-

ernment’s campaign against the use of the Internet by Chinese dissi-

dent groups reached a similar conclusion. The government combined

low-tech solutions-the use of informers, human surveillance, and reg-

ulations-with high-tech ones-the use of software to block Web sites

and e-mail messages, the hacking of foreign sites hosting dissident pub-

lications, and web patrol. As a result, “no credible challenges to the

regime exist despite the introduction of massive amounts of modern

telecommunications infrastructure,” even though the regime’s ability

to subdue the information revolution remains doubtful in the long

term. 148

Reports in the Chinese media, as well as MPS publications, also pro-

vide useful revelations of the extensive efforts undertaken by the Chi-

nese government to assert its control over the Internet-and over the

activities of more than 80 million Chinese Internet users, as of 2003. 149

The Chinese government recognized early on the serious political

threat posed by the introduction of the Internet. In an internal docu-

ment issued in October 2000, the MPS bluntly warned:

Because the Internet can hold large amounts of information, transmit

it quickly, and extend its coverage broadly, it has the characteristics of a

high degree of openness and interconnectedness. The West is using the

Internet as a means of political expansion, ideological penetration, and

cultural aggression … Our enemies inside and outside our borders

have set up forums, Web sites, and home pages on the Internet and

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

86 China’s Trapped Transition

spread a large quantity of reactionary articles. They conduct reactionary

propaganda, instigation, and penetration activities … They use the

Internet to establish illegal groups and parties, recruit members, main-

tain secret contacts, and instigate incidents … Our struggle against hostile

forces and elements on the Internet will be long term and complicated.

Strengthening the secure management of information networks …

and maintaining the political stability of our society have become im-

portant and urgent tasks for the public security apparatus. I50

The MPS established its Bureau for Supervising the Security of Pub-

lic Information Networks (BSSPIN) (gonggong xinxi wangluo anquan jian-

cha ju) in 2000. The missions of this new division were to “monitor and control the net-based activities of hostile organizations and individuals

in and outside Chinese borders; timely report various information and

trends regarding social and political stability; strengthen Internet pa-

trol; [and] closely watch developments on the Internet.” The directive

instructed:

[A]fter reactionary Web sites and harmful content are discovered,

Internet monitors must work with other relevant authorities and take

effective measures to block, filter, and clean up [such contents] …

In order to strengthen our control of the net, [we] must establish se-

cret forces and Internet liaison officers on some important Web sites

and the networks of important institutions. They can supply the public

security organs intelligence and technical support in the struggle on

the Internet … Any public or media reporting of the means of detect-

ing [subversive activities] and controlling the Internet is to be strictly

prohibited. I51

According to the directive, the Internet police must “step up the

screening of domestic Web sites and home pages, conduct secure man-

agement of personal home pages, electronic bulletin boards, and free

e-mail accounts, and collect information on important Web sites in and

outside China.”152 The total size of the BSSPIN, or the “Internet Divi-

sion,” is not known, but one foreign press story quoted a figure of

30,000. 153 The division’s own reports indicate that it has taken aggres- sive actions since it was established. FromJuly to September 2000, the Internet Division of the Beijing Public Security Bureau conducted a

sweep of the city’s Internet cafes and closed down forty illegal ones. In

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 87

2002, the division checked 740,000 individual home pages, shut down

or censored a hundred of them, and blocked the Web sites run by

Falun Gong. I54

The same office claimed that it conducted a census of Internet

providers and users in 2002 and collected extensive data on them.

More important, the office disclosed that it organized seventeen “train-

ing classes,” which graduated 3,100 “Internet security personnel” (xinxi

wangluo anquanyuan). Among the trainees, 189 came from Internet

service providers, 410 were from Internet content providers, and 2,129

were sent by Internet cafe operators. The annual report of the Beijing

Public Security Bureau also claimed that its Internet Division con-

ducted a surprise spot-check of the nine largest news Web sites in Bei-

jing on the sensitive date ofJune 4, 2002 (the Tiananmen anniversary).

It found “harmful links” and “loopholes” on sina.com, Beijing-online,

and netease.com and penalized the sites. Most intriguingly, the same

annual report said that the Internet Division participated in a nation-

wide exercise “to deal with emergencies involving the Internet.” This

exercise was organized by the MPS, in collaboration with the Propa-

ganda Department, telecom service providers, and regulators of major

Web sites. The objective of this exercise was to see how various author-

ities could purge “harmful information” from major Web sites. Accord-

ing to the report, during the exercise, the police were able to locate the

majority of “harmful information” within one hour and deal with

it within two hours. In less than nineteen hours, the Beijing police

successfully completed the exercise, twenty-nine hours ahead of the

forty-eight-hour deadline. This disclosure indicates that the Chinese

government has apparently developed an emergency plan and organi-

zational capabilities to make sure that the Internet will not be used

against the regime at times of national crisis. I55

Besides using such labor-intensive methods, Chinese authorities

adopted regulatory and technological tools as well. In 2000, the MPS

ordered that all Chinese computing networks connected with the

outside world must notify the ministry and file a record. I56 Another di-

rective issued by the MPS in 2000 showed that the ministry was estab-

lishing a nationwide Internet surveillance system. It mandated that a

network of control nodes at the provincial levels be built quickly so that

an MPS-centered system of information surveillance and control could

soon cover all provinces and municipalities. I57 In 2002, a government

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

88 China’s Trapped Transition

regulation required that all users of Internet cafes must register their

government-issued IDs with cafe operators.

In its attempt to control the Internet, the MPS enlisted Chinese

Internet firms to enforce its rules. According to a manager for sina.com,

one of the most popular Web sites in China, the firm would “report

illegal and unhealthy information to relevant authorities.” In 2002,

more than 130 Web sites signed a code of conduct, pledging to work

against the dissemination of “information harmful to state security and

social stability.” To gain a technological upper hand, the MPS also is-

sued detailed technical standards for Web software. Internet filter soft-

ware developed in China must comply with these standards. In 2003 in

Liaoning province, the local Internet police developed and installed

surveillance software on the computers in all six hundred Internet cafes

inJingzhou city. To access the Internet from the computers equipped

with this special surveillance software, users must show their official ID

card to purchase a prepaid card. The software has a filter function that

blocks access to banned sites and automatically alerts police when the

user visits banned sites. In the city’s Internet police station, one com-

puter monitors more than 20,000 terminals in the city’s Internet cafes.

Liaoning’s provincial Internet police chief revealed that all 7,000 Inter-

net cafes in the province had this surveillance software installed. Since

more than 40 percent of Internet users in the province accessed the

Web from Internet cafes, this technology allows the authorities to mon-

itor many users. According to press reports, this system was to be in-

stalled in the Internet cafes throughout China in 2004. 158

Co-optation

The co-optation of social elites by the CCP, a logical complement to

selective repression, has proved to be highly successful in shoring up

the CCP’s base of support, particularly after the suppression of the pro-

democracy movement in 1989. 159 Some observers even characterized

the CCP’s strategy of co-optation as one of building a state-corporatist

regime. 160 The implementation of this strategy was facilitated by the

party’s continual control of critical economic resources, as a result of

partial economic reforms, and instruments of patronage, such as ap-

pointments, promotions, and professional and financial rewards, and

by the increasing quantities of such resources available to the party as

a result of economic growth.

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China?

The Co-optation of the Intelligentsia

89

The CCP had a contentious relationship with the intelligentsia in the

1980s. Dominated by the liberals, the Chinese intelligentsia in the 1980s

constantly challenged the CCP’s authority and demanded political re-

forms. The CCP responded with periodic crackdowns, such as the

antispiritual pollution campaign in 1983-1984 and the campaign

against bourgeois liberalization following the student demonstrations

at the end of 1986 and beginning of 1987. In the aftermath of the

Tiananmen crackdown, the regime gradually adjusted its policy toward

the intelligentsia. This strategic modification became more evident

in the 1990s as the CCP accelerated economic liberalization. Fortuitously,

the CCP’s strategic adjustment occurred at a time when the majority of

Chinese intellectuals were moderating their demands. The tragic set-

back of Tiananmen and the turmoil following the collapse of commu-

nism in the former Soviet bloc undermined the rationale for the

continuation of a confrontational approach. With the purge of liberal

leaders such as Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili at the top of the CCP hierar-

chy, the incarceration of many student leaders and activists, and the ex-

ile of the leaders of the Tiananmen movement, the intelligentsia had

lost their strongest advocates, allies, and leaders. At the same time, the

dramatic economic liberalization the regime took after Deng’s south-

ern tour in 1992 seemed to kindle the hope that economic reform

would create more favorable conditions for political reform.

Taking advantage of these adverse circumstances for the Chinese in-

telligentsia, the CCP launched a systematic campaign of co-optation to

recruit loyalists from among the intellectuals and professionals. This

campaign mixed the traditional (and most likely ineffective) tools,

such as ideological indoctrination, and the more sophisticated ones,

such as salary increases, recruitment, cultivation, promotion, and spe-

cial rewards. Published official documents indicate that the party be-

gan a concerted campaign to expand recruitment and give the party

more patronage power on college campuses in the early 1990s. Ajoint

directive issued in August 1993 by the CCP’s Central Organization De-

partment (COD), the Central Propaganda Department, and the State

Education Commission delineated two specific tasks for party organiza-

tions in universities.

First, they were to recruit a group of outstanding cadres under the

age of 45 into college administrations. The directive mandated that each

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

90 China’s Trapped Transition

college and university must have at least one to two such cadres. The

implicit goal of this recruitment and promotion drive was to create av-

enues of political advancement for the intellectuals on college cam-

puses, which were a hotbed of liberal ferment in the 1980s. To give the

party more patronage power, the directive instructed that the party

committees in universities would have decision-making power on the

university’s annual work plan, appointment and dismissal of cadres in

departments, the promotion of academics, budgeting, and major capi-

tal projects. To make administrative and political appointments more

attractive, the directive granted new perks to these appointees. For ex-

ample, party and administrative cadres on college campuses would get

opportunities to study abroad, teach, and conduct research.

Second, the directive urged that special efforts be made to recruit

outstanding undergraduates and graduate students for filling adminis-

trative and political positions at the universities where they study after

graduation. The students were to be mentored to become full-time party

and administrative officials and awarded full academic ranks. Their

housing allocation, pay, subsidies, and other benefits were to be kept in

line with their academic peers. This call was repeated in 1995. 161 Offi-

cial reports from the Beijing Higher Education Bureau provided evi-

dence that this campaign was fully implemented. For example, in 1994,

Beijing’s colleges and universities recruited six hundred “red and ex-

pert” young “reserve cadres” who would be groomed for positions of

responsibility. This was accompanied by a simultaneous drive to recruit

new CCP members from college students. In 1994, the CCP admitted

6,665 new members on Beijing’s college campuses, about 87 percent of

them college students. 162

The drive to expand the CCP’s support among the intelligentsia was

not restricted to college campuses. The CCP’s innovative scheme of

identifying “reserve cadres” (houbei ganbu) boosted the hopes of career

advancement for tens of thousands of aspiring young professionals and

well-educated individuals. It tied their prospects with their support for

the party-even though what the party did was merely to designate them

as the most promising candidates for future promotions. The campaign

to recruit more reserve cadres intensified in the mid-1990s. In 1995,

the CCP Central Committee issued a special circular, “Zhonggong

zhongyang guanyu zhuajin peiyang xuanba youxiu nianqing ganbu de

tongzhi” (CCP Central Committee Announcement on Intensifying the

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 91

Training and Selection of Outstanding Young Cadres), to expand the

program. As a result, a large number of individuals were designated as

reserve cadres. In Sichuan, fifty individuals were picked as reserve

cadres for provincial-level positions and an additional five hundred

were selected for the various provincial departments. 163 In Hubei, the

number of reserve cadres was set at twice the number of available offi-

cial positions. For those selected as reserve cadres for provincial-level

positions, the age limit was fifty. Those groomed for prefect-level posi-

tions had to be younger than forty-five. And the age-limit for county-

level positions was forty. Without actually expanding the size of the

bureaucracy, the CCP managed to double the coverage of its patronage

with this scheme. 164

Although it is impossible to assess the durability of the party’s success

in enticing the intelligensia’s younger generation into its ranks, the

drive apparently delivered some short-term success. According to a

magazine survey of 1,532 college students in Beijing in May 2003,

62 percent said that they wished to join the CCP. But the same survey

also showed that about 60 percent said that they would work for a pri-

vate or foreign firm after graduation, and only 20 percent would work

for a government agency or SOE. This mixed evidence suggests that

what motivates younger professionals and aspiring college graduates to

join the party is not ideological devotion, but promises of good careers

and material benefits. 165 Judged by official figures, nevertheless, it is

hard to deny that the party’s efforts to recruit highly educated mem-

bers appeared to have had a significant impact on the composition of

the party. By 1999, nearly 20 percent of the CCP members claimed to

have received college or college-equivalent education, almost six times

the national average. 166

Another successful instrument of co-optation was the granting of

professional honors, recognitions, and perks by the government to a

select group of senior scholars and professionals. The party controlled

the selection and determination of the winners of these honors and

perks. The criteria for the awardees were often explicitly political. A

typical example was a program to pick outstanding social scientists. In

April 1997, the State Education Commission issued a circular on

“training outstanding social science talents for the new century.” Un-

der this program, the government would award such titles to thirty aca-

demics each year for five years. Among the listed qualifications were

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

92 China’s Trapped Transition

“high political caliber, support for the CCP, love of the socialist mother-

land, outstanding academic achievements, and under 45.” Most awardees were scholars in higher education institutions. The heads of the govern-

ment’s bureau of higher education would be the judges for the selection

process. The winners would receive 100,000 yuan each in research sup- port. 167 There were other similar administratively granted awards and

perks for the intelligentsia. For example, as of 2004, 5,206 individuals were recognized as “middle-aged and young experts who have made out-

standing contributions” (an honor that came with unspecified material

benefits). Nationwide, 145,000 experts, or about 8 percent of the senior professionals, were receiving special government stipends in 2004. 168

Besides recruiting and co-opting individual social elites, the party

also tried to co-opt new social organizations. In 1998, the COD and the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued a joint document, “Guanyu zai shehui

tuanti zhong jianli dang zuzhi youguan wenti de tongzhi” (A Circular

on the Issue of Establishing Party Organizations Inside Civic Groups). To

implement this program, Shanghai’s party organization established

party cells in NGOs and increased the party’s penetration and influ-

ence in NGOs. The party also set up liaison offices in neighborhood

committees. These offices received money from local governments and

became the framework upon which civic groups could be built. The

party placed 11,000 members in the three nominally private business groups, Shanghai Geti Laodongzhe Xiehui (Individual Entrepreneurs

Association) and Shanghai Siying Qiye Xiehui (Association of Private Firms).169

The Co-optation of Private Entrepreneurs

The emergence of private entrepreneurs was initially viewed by the

CCP with ambivalence, ifnot suspicion. In 1995, for example, a deputy minister of the COD publicly affirmed the party’s official policy of not

admitting private entrepreneurs into the party, even though some of

them had been recruited by local officials. 170 Until Jiang Zemin pro-

mulgated his theory of the “Three Represents” and made the ideolog-

ical case for recruiting private entrepreneurs into the party in 2001, the political status of private entrepreneurs remained in limbo. 171 But it

would be a mistake to conclude, from an apparently inconsistent offi-

cial policy, that the party had done nothing to turn the emerging pri-

vate entrepreneurs into their supporters. The party tried to control

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 93

this group of new social elites both through organizational penetration

and individual recruitment.

The party’s efforts to establish CCP cells in private firms were largely

unsuccessful. 172 But the party’s other efforts yielded, by comparison,

more results. For example, Bruce Dickson’s research on the party’s

attempts to reach out to business groups formed by private entrepre-

neurs showed that the CCP had established extensive links with busi-

ness groups, such as Gongshanglian (The Industrial and Commercial

Federation) to which nearly 80 percent of the owners of private firms

belonged in 2002. 173 Although the official ban against admitting pri-

vate entrepreneurs into the party was not formally lifted until 2001,

the party not only made no attempt to expel those CCP members who

had become private entrepreneurs, but also appeared to have carried

out a systematic plan to recruit private entrepreneurs into the People’s

Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

(CPPCC).

From 1997 to 2002, more than 9,000 private businessmen were se-

lected to be delegates to local people’s congresses at and above the

county level. More than 32,000 were appointed to CPPCCs above the

county level. 174 A survey of 3,635 private entrepreneurs in 2002 showed

that 35 percent were members of the CPPCC at various levels. Surpris-

ingly, 30 percent were party members, about six times the percentage

in the general population. This represented more than a doubling

of the percentage of private entrepreneurs who were CCP members

in 1993. The rapid increase in the number of private entrepreneurs

who were also CCP members, however, was not the result of a massive

recruitment campaign.

Indeed, the survey revealed that only a tiny minority-5.6 percent-

of private entrepreneurs joined the CCP after they had set up their

businesses. Jiang’s famous speech onJuly 1, 2001, in which he implic-

itly called for the recruitment of private entrepreneurs, appeared to

have had no immediate impact on admitting private businessmen into

the party. Only 0.5 percent of the private entrepreneurs in the sample

had joined the CCP after the speech. This showed that nearly all the

private entrepreneurs were already CCP members before they became

owners of private firms. The privatization ofSOEs appeared to be more

responsible for the growth of private entrepreneurs inside the CCP

than the party’s organizational recruitment. Indeed, of the 3,635 firms

surveyed, 837 were former SOEs and collectively owned enterprises.

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

94 China’s Trapped Transition

Of these privatized firms, about half (422) were now owned by CCP

members who were either party officials or well-connected CCP mem-

bers who were able to gain control of these firms during the privatiza-

tion process. The result of the survey implies that roughly half the

privatized firms may have ended up in the control of CCP members. 175

Given the CCP’s dominant influence over the economy, it is rational

for China’s private entrepreneurs to maintain friendly ties with the

regime. Many private entrepreneurs continue to depend on the gov-

ernment for favors, and close ties with the government can open up

access to new business opportunities and capital. For example, the

richest private entrepreneur in Xinjiang, Sun Guangxin, the president

of Guanghui Enterprises, has received government support in market-

ing natural gas and developing real estate. His firm hired local party

officials, one of whom happened to be the head of a government office

that issued permits to demolish old buildings. Guanghui was exempted

from paying local taxes on the land it used. 176 Another private entrepre-

neur in Henan, Zhou Wenchang, who gained control of a former state-

owned bus assembly plant through insider privatization, had excellent

connections with the local government. He used local police and

courts to j ail a business rival and kidnap debtors to enforce payment. 177

To be sure, Chinese private entrepreneurs have not embraced the

party wholeheartedly. Even though their policy preferences and politi-

cal beliefs appear to be conservative and resemble those of the party

elites, as Dickson’s research shows, it may be premature to declare the

party’s strategy of co-opting China’s new capitalists an unqualified suc-

cess. 178 In all likelihood, China’s new capitalists’ support for the CCP is

contingent upon the party’s ability to provide favors and protect their

privileges and property. The limitations of private entrepreneurs’ sup-

port for the party are apparent in how they respond to the CCP’s ef-

forts of individual co-optation and organizational penetration. As a

group, Chinese private entrepreneurs were more willing to be co-opted

as individuals, as shown by their increasing membership in the people’s

congresses and the CPPCC. They apparently do not object to tight links

between the party and the business groups they belong to. But they are

more ambivalent on taking the initiative to join the party. Although

party members who have become private entrepreneurs choose to

maintain their party membership, only a small number of non-CCP

private entrepreneurs appeared to have joined the party on their own.

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost

Democratizing China? 95

Politically, such ambivalence makes sense. For those who were CCP

members before they were private entrepreneurs, quitting the CCP

would be unnecessarily risky because that step would signal disloyalty

and could have negative political repercussions. Private entrepreneurs

who are not CCP members, however, may see no additional advantages

in entering the party because membership would come with burdensome

chores and responsibilities. But private entrepreneurs, CCP members

or not, seem to have drawn a firm line on the issue of allowing the party

to establish its cells inside their private firms. The party’s inability to ex-

tend its organizational presence into private firms shows that private

entrepreneurs remain wary about having such a presence because it

may not only interfere with their business operations, but also threaten

the security of their property rights.

The history of post-Mao political reform can be better explained by a

choice-based, and not structure-based, perspective on democratization.

Documentary evidence suggests that senior Chinese leaders such as

Deng were irreconcilably opposed to the idea of withdrawing from

power and allowing genuine political contestation and participation.

Their conception of political reform was narrowly and instrumentally

defined-the only political reform that will be permitted should serve

the needs of helping the CCP remain in power and further the party’s

goal of economic modernization. In contrast, political reform as un-

derstood by the liberals within the CCP comes much closer to a plan of

democratization and institutional pluralism. However, the liberals’ fall

from power after the tragedy in June 1989 meant that such a plan would

not be implemented. Consequently, the major institutional reforms of

the political system that began in the 1980s stagnated in the 1990s. De-

spite their promise and potential, the strengthening of the legislative

branch, legal reform, and grassroots self-government have produced

only negligible effects on democratizing the Chinese political system.

Most important, this chapter demonstrates that an authoritarian ruling

party like the CCP, if determined to defend its political monopoly, does

have the means and adaptive skills to confront its new challenges and

contain the threats posed by rapid economic modernization and social

change. Under these circumstances, democratic changes can occur

only at a much slower pace than economic development and depend

more on the initiatives of societal forces than on elite initiatives.

Co py ri gh t @ 20 06 . Ha rv ar d Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 4/5/2018 1:38 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition Account: s8331415.main.ehost