Family Theories

An Introduction

Fifth Edition

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To our families.

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Family Theories An Introduction

Fifth Edition

James M. White The University of British Columbia

Todd F. Martin Trinity Western University

Kari Adamsons University of Connecticut

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Brief Contents

1. Foreword 2. Preface 3. Acknowledgments 4. Chapter 1 What Is a Theory? 5. Chapter 2 Classical Social Theories and Family Theories 6. Chapter 3 The Rational Choice and Social Exchange Framework 7. Chapter 4 The Symbolic Interaction Framework 8. Chapter 5 The Family Life Course Development Framework 9. Chapter 6 The Systems Framework

10. Chapter 7 The Conflict and Critical Theories Framework 11. Chapter 8 The Feminist Framework 12. Chapter 9 The Ecological Framework 13. Chapter 10 Theory Construction and Emerging Theories 14. Chapter 11 Epilogue 15. References 16. Index 17. About the Authors

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Detailed Contents

Foreword Preface Acknowledgments Chapter 1 What Is a Theory?

Architecture of a Scientific Theory Defining Theory Functions of Theory Theories About Families Evaluation of Theory Frameworks Study Questions

Chapter 2 Classical Social Theories and Family Theories Philosophies of Science Values in Science What Is an Explanation? Classical Social Theories A Brief History of Family Theory Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 3 The Rational Choice and Social Exchange Framework Intellectual Traditions Focus and Scope Assumptions Concepts Propositions Variations Empirical Applications Critiques and Discussion Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 4 The Symbolic Interaction Framework Intellectual Traditions Focus and Scope Assumptions Concepts Propositions Variations Empirical Applications Critiques and Discussion

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Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 5 The Family Life Course Development Framework Intellectual Traditions Focus and Scope Assumptions Concepts Propositions Variations Empirical Applications Critiques and Discussion Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 6 The Systems Framework Intellectual Traditions Focus and Scope Assumptions Concepts Propositions Variations Empirical Applications Critiques and Discussion Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 7 The Conflict and Critical Theories Framework Intellectual Traditions Focus and Scope Assumptions Concepts Propositions Variations Empirical Applications Critiques and Discussion Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 8 The Feminist Framework Intellectual Traditions Focus and Scope Assumptions Concepts Propositions Variations Empirical Applications Critiques and Discussion

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Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 9 The Ecological Framework Intellectual Traditions Focus and Scope Assumptions Concepts Propositions Variations Empirical Applications Critiques and Discussion Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 10 Theory Construction and Emerging Theories Stages of Theory Construction Methods of Theory Construction Strategies of Theory Construction Emerging Theories Conclusion Study Questions

Chapter 11 Epilogue Metatheory and Theory Development The Future of Family Theory Conclusion

References Index About the Authors

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Foreword

In 1973, a fellow graduate student at the University of Minnesota, Peter Torsiello, and I prepared a lengthy manuscript on theory construction and its application to families. These ideas remained dormant until 1990, when I teamed up with Dr. James White, who provided the necessary intellectual breadth and energy to attempt a textbook project. To the earlier theory construction ideas, we added coverage of the field’s then existing major theoretical frameworks. The result was the first edition of this book, published in 1996.

It always has been important to have stories about families, ways to understand, explain, and predict what happens in them. But scientific interest in family theories didn’t really develop until after World War II ended in 1945.

Research became more important for academic scholarship, and resources increasingly became available to develop and apply sophisticated methods of research. The problem was how to integrate rapidly expanding research findings to create a coherent body of knowledge. At first, conceptual frameworks and then theories provided a useful structure for the integration.

This book has preserved several useful themes across editions. One is the dual meaning of framework, both as a pre-theoretical set of concepts and assumptions, and as a set of similar theories. All editions also have attended to intellectual traditions, to major variations within theories, to specific topic applications, and to the personal lives of readers, as well as to each perspective’s limitations.

Along the way, the authors have taken on the difficult task of trying to effectively reach the needs of both beginning and advanced students. This remains a challenge.

Other themes have been constant across editions. Where families appear in a theory is important. Do we want to explain how families work or use something about families to explain how individuals or societies work? Families as groups relate to their members and to societies in various ways. Some theories about families are limited in their usefulness to relatively narrow topics, while other theories have broader application.

Changes across editions of this book also have been important. Four kinds of changes stand out. First, feedback from students and instructors has led to changes in emphasis and detail. Second, changing the mix of coauthors has added new voices and perspectives.

A third change across editions reflects changes in families themselves. While the last quarter century has witnessed fairly subtle family life changes in most respects, any shift in the central tendency or variability of family life raises new questions for theorists to address. While some theories are better able than others to explain changes in families, periods of rapid social change always pique interest in how to understand and explain them.

The fourth major contributor to changes across editions of this book has been innovations in theories and in theorizing. The picture here is mixed. Some theoretical frameworks have been elaborated and refined. Some

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have become marginalized, whether being empirically attacked or just ignored. One positive newer trend may be combining similar or even very different theories into a coherent whole.

Unfortunately, two aspects of family theorizing have not been particularly productive across the life span of this book.

First, a theory should be rejected if it fails to be logically and empirically supported in comparison with a rival theory. Family scientists have not designed and executed such critical tests. So the appeal of any specific theory has remained mostly a matter of subjective personal preference. We need more rigorous research on how popular each theory has been and why some have been more popular than others.

Second, applying and combining existing theories has been considerably more popular than creating new theories. While both combining and creating certainly can be desirable, there is no broadly acceptable standard for doing either well. Theorizing, and communication about methods of theorizing, eventually needs to be governed by acceptable scientific standards and routinely communicated in published reports.

The authors of this book care deeply about the future of family scholarship. Hopefully, readers will care as much.

David Klein

July 2018

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Preface

Successive editions of a popular book are more difficult undertakings than they may appear. While researching chapter topics on the web, we encountered wonderful PowerPoint slide shows and a variety of other teaching materials that instructors had produced. While we were impressed and heartened by this material, we were also cautioned that any new edition should have considerable continuity with past editions. At the same time, we realized how important it is, especially to students, that the material seems up to date. This too provided difficulties because there were many major theoretical contributions in the 1990s and earlier that were before our current cohort of undergraduates were born!

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Theoretical Frameworks Versus Applications

We have tried to first and foremost be guided by providing an accurate and coherent view of the theories in this book. We continue with the “frameworks” approach as what we regard as the best pedagogical tool for achieving this end. This point is worthy of some elaboration. Fine and Fincham (2013) have edited an excellent volume of issue-oriented applications of theory. They believe that students will be best served by learning theory as it is applied to these empirical topic areas such as work and family or acquiring gender. We would argue, however, that the framework approach that we use in this volume is more strongly recommended for several reasons:

1. The framework approach ties the current theory to the intellectual traditions and history that inform this particular theoretical avenue of thought. For example, there is little dispute that rational choice theory is tied to the intellectual wellsprings of utilitarianism in the 1800s and also to the hedonists (300 BCE) and the pre- Socratic sophists. This intellectual tradition is alive and well in economics, sociology, history, and many other disciplines. The arguments launched by these schools of rationalism also appear in jurisprudence, criminology, and political discussions. We think that students using Family Theories deserve an entrée to this world of ideas as both future scholars and researchers as well as future citizens trying to understand a very complex world.

2. Another reason we believe that the framework approach used in this book is superior to topic applications is that the student is exposed to the broad, general, and abstract concepts and propositions of the theories. The topics approach might expose students to only those propositions that are useful in understanding the particular phenomenon under consideration. The problem is that this may only give the student an incomplete picture of the theory. It may neglect the important assumptions of the theory and how the theory deals with different levels of analysis. For example, if we applied life course theory to individuals in a particular role (perhaps mothers), we would not have need to explain how this theory functions for cohorts or becomes institutionalized or deals with social change. Indeed, it is our hope that by introducing the more general propositions of the theory, we give the student a chance to see the internal logic and coherence of the theory. Applications of a theory are not applications of the entire theory to a phenomenon (since that would seldom be required) but only a limited “slice” of the theoretical pie.

3. The last argument we make in this regard is based on a much bigger difference between our pedagogical goals and those favoring an applied approach. One of the pedagogical goals we have for this book is to invite our students and readers into the world of ideas. Ideas have a life of their own. Certainly they can be applied to research, but they can also help you read the New York Times or assist you in thinking through arguments in a courtroom where you are a juror. Complex ideas such as the nature and origin of social norms, the limits of individual motivation, and even the nature of an explanation are beyond any applications approach. As we say in the last sentence of this book, we believe that entering the world of ideas has intrinsic benefits to the individual. We feel compelled to say that there are also extrinsic benefits to a society in producing a truly intellectual and educated group of young adults.

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Major Changes to This Edition

The two biggest changes to this edition are the retirement of David Klein as a coauthor and the addition of Kari Adamsons as one of the coauthors of this work. Dr. Adamsons has a marvelous background in many areas relevant to this book. She brings a wealth of teaching experience and academic research to our team.

It is of course a loss to have David Klein retire as an active participant in this enterprise. His years of involvement have left an indelible legacy to this book and family scholarship in general. He will be missed.

There have been several other major changes to this edition. The introductory Chapter 1 has become more focused, and students are briefly introduced to the notion of scientific facts. Chapter 2 has been radically changed to deal with classical social theories such as Weber and Durkheim as well as the themes from classical social theory that constantly emerge in the frameworks discussed in subsequent chapters. In addition, Chapter 2 deals with theoretical assumptions tied to philosophies of science and a brief history of the ways family theory has changed over the last 70 years.

We also added a newly revised Chapter 10 on theory construction and emerging theories. For a long time, we have wanted to capture more of the process dimension of theories to complement the product orientation that such books as this necessarily assume. This new chapter addresses this grievance, and we anticipate that students and instructors will welcome this change.

Certainly, there are a myriad of changes such as the updating of empirical applications and theoretical progress. One major change is the reintroduction of study questions. We have tried to keep a truly intellectual flavor to these questions while making them relevant to the current context of world affairs. There are other small changes too numerous to cite here. The overall structure of the chapters remains the same as in previous editions. We hope that students and instructors will continue to find this book simultaneously stimulating and approachable.

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Organization of the Book

The first chapter of this book provides a general introduction to the topic of family theory and theory in general. The second chapter deals more with philosophy of science issues and a brief history of family theory. The next seven chapters covering the theoretical frameworks are organized using the same headings. We now briefly examine the headings used to organize these chapters. Each theoretical framework is introduced by a brief fictional account or vignette about some aspect of family life. These accounts serve to focus the reader on the particular form of behavior and interaction that the theoretical framework is intended to explain.

The first subheading the reader encounters in these seven chapters is Intellectual Traditions. This section introduces the reader to a brief and nonexhaustive historical perspective on the ideas in the theoretical framework. This section should be especially valuable for assisting students to integrate this material with material they encounter in other courses in the social sciences and humanities.

The second subheading to be encountered is Focus and Scope Assumptions. All theories contain basic assumptions, but most important among these are the assumptions that set the boundaries for the theory. Each theoretical framework sets boundaries on explanations and, just as important, focuses on some particular elements or processes in families. Understanding the focus and scope of a theoretical framework assists in understanding the explanatory power of a theory.

The third subheading is Concepts. Concepts are the building blocks of any theory. In theories, concepts are used to provide meaning and to help classify phenomena. Meanings are provided by formal definitions. Classification is achieved by placing a particular act or event in the broader category of a concept. Concepts also assist explanation when they are used in propositions.

The fourth subheading is Propositions. In this section, a modest and nonexhaustive list of theoretical propositions gives the reader a simple idea of how explanation might proceed. The propositions are best understood as the way that a particular theory relates its concepts to each other. Explanation then is when an observation is covered by one of these propositions. This is the most abstract area of each chapter.

The fifth section is Variations. In this section, a small set of theoretical variations is discussed. These variations are selected to capture the range of differences that the theoretical framework may accommodate. We have attempted to include what we regard as the major variants, but there is certainly some room for debate. Instructors and students may, of course, add variants to their class discussions, and this would further enrich the understanding of the framework.

The sixth subheading is Empirical Applications. One or two examples are discussed, and the more general theoretical framework or one of its variations is used to explain and interpret an empirical research finding or small set of findings in a topical area. The principal goal here is to demonstrate how the theory interacts with research.

The seventh subheading is Critiques and Discussion. This section covers the major flaws or weaknesses of the

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framework. Our treatment is aimed at enhancing the student’s depth of understanding of the theory rather than to encourage rejection of the theory. A Conclusion section provides a brief synopsis of the major thrusts of the theory and our perspective on the theory. The Study Questions we have added can be used for study and class discussions.

The penultimate chapter of the book is an expansion of some of the ideas about theory as process that were suggested in the first chapter. The final chapter of the book, the Epilogue, presents a typology for analyzing and comparing the seven theoretical frameworks. This chapter also takes stock of where we are in the field and the directions we see for the future.

We hope that all of our readers—students, faculty, and researchers—are as profoundly influenced by the ideas in this book as we have been. We believe that your life will be enriched by these ideas and that good research and thinking about families requires good ideas.

James White, Todd Martin, and Kari Adamsons

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Acknowledgements

We express our gratitude to our students and numerous colleagues for their support and encouragement. We acknowledge the many people who have provided support, criticism, and encouragement for previous editions of this project.

We would like to express our deepest gratitude to the folks at Sage starting with Josh Perigo for his unwavering support for this project. Finally, we would like to thank our spouses and families for their continuing support over the years.

We would also like to thank the following reviewers for this fifth edition:

Diann Moorman, University of Georgia Mark A. Fine, University of North Carolina at Greensboro Katie Heiden-Rootes, Saint Louis University Michelle Sherwood, Eastern Illinois University Duane Alan Dowd, PhD, Central Washington University Ruth Miressi, Park University Richard N. Pitt, Vanderbilt University Lauren Dick, MS, Carthage College Dr. Stephanie Irby Coard, University of North Carolina at Greensboro

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Chapter 1 What Is a Theory?

“Bill, why do you think Rod and Michelle are getting divorced? There was no infidelity, and they have always seemed to be so good together.”

“Actually, Jill, I would have predicted it. Rod and Michelle were perfect together when they first got married, but over the past 2 years, they have gone in very different directions. Rod is totally absorbed with his job and all the travel that is required, but Michelle has become more bored with her job and has talked more about having kids. I think their goals as a couple are very far apart. Rod just wants a companion when he comes home tired from work and travels, and Michelle wants a family.”

Jill thought for a moment and then asked Bill, “So you think that a couple should share some common goals?”

Bill immediately responded, “Yes, and that way they can see the future of their relationship and where it is going.”

Jill faced Bill squarely and said, “That’s an interesting theory. What would it say about us?”

Bill has a theory about couple dynamics and longevity. Indeed, as we watch TV shows, read the paper, and attend classes, we are confronted with informal and partially formulated theories and theoretical propositions every day. Bill’s theory is that couples should have common goals. He believes that not having such goals is associated with couple dissolution. Certainly, marital and couple dissolution involve many other factors such as social support, economic well-being, intimacy, and so on. A fully developed theory of marital dissolution would have to include a wider set of concepts and processes than just the couple sharing goals. This example, however, shows how much of our everyday life and concerns actually involve theoretical propositions.

There are similarities in the way in which we develop and articulate theories in our everyday life and the way we do so in our professional life. Likewise, scientific theory bears similarities to our everyday theories, but seldom could these two be equated because the differences are distinct and important. In articulating our everyday theories, we often assume our definitions are shared by others rather than to consider beginning by defining our terms. For example, when Jill says “There was no infidelity” does she mean sexual infidelity or emotional infidelity? If it were sexual infidelity, does that mean only sexual intercourse or other forms of physical intimacy as well, such as kissing and holding hands? The foundation of Bill’s theory rests on the idea that couples who do not share goals will drift apart emotionally and physically. Since scientific theories are not on a case by case basis (scientific theories are nomothetic and general instead of individual case and idiographic), we would need some precision regarding such terms as infidelity, shared goals, and drifting apart. In our everyday theories, we seldom frame them so that they would include most couple relationships rather than the particular one we might be discussing.

Another important difference is that our everyday theories are often sloppy in regard to the logic of what we are saying. For example, Bill’s argument about sharing common goals so that a couple can envision their future may seem intuitively obvious for some people. The problem is that Bill’s propositions about sharing common goals and envisioning a future may need further specification. Certainly, children may represent a common longer term goal, but couple agreement on which wine to have with a meal may not be of the same degree. It would probably help if Bill added some proposition about the long-term and short-term goals, couple versus individual goals, and the overall salience or importance of goals to both rather than one

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individual. Scientific theories usually demand a more precise and structured logic so that propositions are linked into a coherent argument.

Yet another difference between our everyday theories and those of science is in the area of prediction. Bill says he could have predicted the breakup of Rod and Michelle, but this is clearly after the breakup has happened. This kind of explanation is called “after the fact,” or in Latin, ex post facto, explanation. The problem with such after the fact explanations is that they lack the defining ingredient of prediction in which the explanatory propositions yield a prediction that has not yet come to pass but will in a specified time come to pass. In other words, we expect scientific theories to yield before the fact, or a priori, explanations for an event. The weakness of explaining something after it has occurred is that there are an infinite number of other explanations that might also be true. Scientific methods are often designed to eliminate these other possible theories by using experimental designs and predicting from the theory before the event has occurred.

Now that we have seen how different our everyday theoretical musings are from scientific theories, we should also recall the similarities. We want all of our theories to be credible and plausible. We expect that our theories should make sense not just to ourselves but also to others. Since humans emerged from medieval times into the Renaissance and Enlightenment, the nature of facts and data changed dramatically. Before the Renaissance, facts were established by religious or political fiat. Gods and goblins were invoked to explain facts, and facts were construed so that these explanations could seem possible. Such explanations as the “gods are angry” or superstitions such as “garlic will keep demons away” were seen as equal to Copernican views of celestial mechanics. What slowly changed and brought us into the Enlightenment is the view that facts are methodological in design. This view suggest that when two persons have a disagreement about a fact such as does Earth orbit the Sun or does the Sun orbit Earth, the way to resolve this is not to imprison the nonbeliever or have them beheaded. Such resolutions to facts were quite common before the Enlightenment. There are many societies today that still revert to such tactics such as what the emperor or president says is a “fact.” But it was the emergence of facts as methodologically resolvable that was the hallmark of science and reason in the Enlightenment. Returning to the two views about Earth-Sun orbits, a methodology can be developed that will resolve one view as superior to another because it predicts and it explains other phenomena. Modernity has pursued this way of resolving disputes, and those that respect facts do so because any alternative claim can be subjected to the same methodological tests. Certainly, every discipline and science has more particular methods of argumentation, logic, and proof, but all facts rest on this methodological view. There is also no doubt that all of these methods become more refined over time, but such evolution and change is reason for celebrating human progress in regard to knowledge.

As we have already argued in the discussion of Bill’s theory about Rod and Michelle’s divorce, science and scientific theory would favor a more universal and methodological approach. It is probably the case that in areas such as love, relationships, marriage, and family where we all have experience and some biases, a methodological approach to our theories about such areas is of paramount importance. Universality keeps us from being too idiosyncratic, and logic, definitions, and well-specified relations ensure that there are ways of testing which theories might be more predictive and explain more. To understand how this is possible, we now turn to the way in which scientific theory is assembled.

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Architecture of a Scientific Theory

Attitudes that scientists have about theory depend on the philosophy of science that they endorse. We will deal with philosophical differences in the next chapter. Here, we assume the most conventional and probably the most popular perspective.

Box 1.1 What Is a Theory?

“A scientific theory might be likened to a complex spatial network: Its terms are represented by the knots, while the threads connecting the latter correspond, in part, to the definitions and, in part, to the fundamental and derivative hypotheses included in the theory. The whole system floats, as it were, above the plane of observation and is anchored to it by rules of interpretation. These might be viewed as strings, which are not part of the network but link certain points of the latter with specific places in the plane of observation. By virtue of those interpretive connections, the network can function as a scientific theory: From certain observational data, we may ascend, via an interpretive string, to some point in the theoretical network, thence proceed, via definitions and hypotheses, to other points, from which another interpretive string permits a descent to the plane of observation” (Hempel, 1952, p. 36).

“A theory is nothing—it is not a theory—unless it is an explanation. One may define properties and categories, and one still has no theory. One may state that there are relations between the properties, and one still has no theory. One may state that a change in one property will produce a definite change in another property, and one still has no theory. Not until one has properties, and propositions stating the relations between them, and the propositions form a deductive system—not until one has all three does one have a theory. Most of our arguments about theory would fall to the ground, if we first asked whether we had a theory to argue about” (Homans, 1964, p. 812).

“Deductive theory can be described briefly as an attempt to increase human understanding by providing explanations of why certain things occur. It provides this explanation by having a set of propositions and then deducing that, if these propositions are true, and if certain other conditions are met, certain specific and observable events occur. The more specific events are then ‘explained’ by the more general propositions that have been used as premises in deducing that the specific events occur. The explanation is only as valid as the propositions and logic that are used in the deduction, but one of the goals of science is to gradually eliminate invalid propositions and increase the number of useful, valid ones” (Burr, 1973, p. 3).

“Theorizing is the process of systematically formulating and organizing ideas to understand a particular phenomenon. A theory is the set of interconnected ideas that emerge from this process” (Doherty, Boss, LaRossa, Schumm, & Steinmetz, 1993, p. 20).

One useful way to understand theoretical arguments is to examine their basic components. We start with the idea that a theory is a systematic collection of concepts and relations. This is consistent with all four of the quotes in Box 1.1. Because there is an endless variety of ways to organize ideas, we will limit ourselves to the requirements for a scientific theory. Such theories contain systematically related propositions that are empirically testable (Rudner, 1966). Thus, there are several components that we need to discuss in further detail: (a) concepts, (b) relations between concepts, (c) propositions, (d) relations between propositions, and (e) connections between propositions and the empirical world of observed data. Before we look at each of these components, we must distinguish between ideas and data.

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Ideas and Data

Science is fundamentally concerned with ideas, data, and relationships between them. Theory exists in the realm of ideas. Research takes place in the realm of data. A science advances to the extent that its theories and its studies (i.e., its empirical research) are productive and mutually reinforcing. For knowledge to be scientific, scientists must explain empirical observations by ideas or theory. Theories explain by treating particular observations as examples of general principles or processes. For example, there may be certain conditions, such as first intercourse, that encourage dating couples to become more serious and less casual about their relationship. This would constitute a hypothesis or testable conceptual proposition if data have not yet been examined in this regard. If, however, we have a great deal of data suggesting that first intercourse has a specific effect on couples’ “probability of marriage,” then that general proposition is what we often regard as a scientific fact. So a scientific fact is a relation between two concepts or measurements that is replicated over time and shows stability.

The linkages between ideas and data can be organized in different ways. If research produces empirical generalizations, the data might inductively lead to the development of a new theory, or the data might be interpreted in terms of an existing theory. When the process goes from data to ideas, we think of it as being inductive. Sometimes, a researcher starts with an existing theory, derives expectations about the data (i.e., hypotheses), and then makes observations to see how well the data fit. When the process goes from ideas to data, we think of it as being deductive. Theoretical ideas in science are developed both inductively and deductively. In either case, the ideas and the data must fit together in a meaningful way for the theory to be judged adequate.

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Parts of a Theory

All scientific theories use the same basic building blocks. These building blocks are assumptions, concepts, relations, and propositions. The section below discusses each of these central ideas.

Assumptions are orienting constructs that are necessary for knowledge. For example, if we want to add numbers, we must make assumptions such as each number can be reduced to a primary unit (1) such that all 1s are of equal value. With that assumption, we can add 1 + 1 = 2 or 2 + 2 = (1 + 1) + (1 + 1). If we wish to have negative numbers or fractions, still other assumptions have to be made. In theory, we have to make assumptions as well. In social theory, these assumptions are often about primitive units such as persons. For example, many social theories assume that “persons” will act out of self-interest (e.g., conflict theories and rational choice theories). There are other theories that don’t make assumptions about individuals but about more macroscopic units, such as history or evolution, and individuals just act as instances of those forces. Every student of social theory should critically examine the foundational assumptions undergirding a theory. If you do not agree with the assumptions or have others to propose, the theory will turn out to look like a very different product.

Concepts are abstractions. A concept is not the thing; rather, it stands for the abstract class of things, ideas, or entities. Concepts are essential to theories because they enable us to organize experience. We do not invent a new concept every time we refer to a unique event. For example, we do not need a new term for marriage or a new meaning for the event called marriage every time a wedding takes place. Instead, we think of getting married in a more abstract way. We say that all weddings have certain defining properties. If we want to distinguish different kinds of weddings, we might establish categories. We could distinguish elopements from formal weddings and church weddings from civil wedding ceremonies. The categories remain abstractions, however, in that they all refer to occasions of a particular type, not to specific instances of weddings.

In science, the more explicit the definition for a concept, the better we can determine when it applies and when it does not apply. A scientific concept can mean only what a community of interacting scientists agrees that it means. Although scientists sometimes argue about the “proper” meaning of concepts, a theory tends to gain a footing in the scientific community once scholars settle on meanings for the time being. Many concepts in scientific theories refer to states of affairs with fairly stable properties. For example, we cannot have a coherent theory about the distribution of housework responsibilities if the meaning of housework changes every time we use this word.

Many but not all concepts can correspond to a set of empirical measures. A variable is any measure that can have two or more values, such as yes or no, strongly agree to strongly disagree, or even a range of values such as the Centigrade scale of temperature. For example, we may measure housework by hours of work within the house or by a specified set of tasks, such as doing laundry, toilet cleaning, and so on. Variables that might measure housework could be the hours a person spent doing the work, the economic value of the work, and so on.

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Relations play the role of verbs in a theory. To relate concepts to each other, we need connecting relations asserting how the concepts are related. All relations have properties (symmetry, reflexivity, and transitivity). So, for example, we could use the same concepts but with different relations, and the truth of the statement will change completely. The statement immediately below is true:

John is a relative of George. George is a relative of Bill. Therefore, John is a relative of Bill.

But the next statement below is false:

John is the father of George. George is the father of Bill. Therefore, John is the father of Bill.

In these two cases, one relation is transitive (is a relative of), and the other is not transitive (is the father of). This simple difference in the properties of relations makes all the difference in the validity of the final statement. Relations often can be formalized in simple terms such as greater than or less than, and definitions are signified by identity or equals. As we shall see shortly, this fact provides a key link between theory and research.

Propositions exist when a concept is linked in a meaningful way by a relation to another concept. So we could say that among dual-earner couples, the social class status of the husband is positively related to the amount of housework he performs. This would be a theoretical proposition. The first concept is social class status of the husband. The second concept is the amount of housework. The relation in this proposition says that the greater a husband’s social class status (relative to other husbands), the greater the husband’s amount of housework. This relation can be mathematically expressed (modeled) as a function:

Amount of housework = f (Social class status).

As we shall see shortly, our first approximation of this functional relation (f) between a husband’s social class status and amount of housework is usually a straight line with either a positive or negative slope. When a proposition asserts covariation between variables, the relation between concepts includes a sign (positive or negative), indicating that increases either occur together or go in opposite directions. When a relation asserts causal influence, the relation also makes clear which variable (independent) is influencing which other variable (dependent).

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Defining Theory

Earlier in this chapter, we defined a scientific theory as “a set of systematically related propositions that are empirically testable” (Rudner, 1966, p. 10). Now that we have the building blocks in place, we can discuss the meaning and implications of this definition in greater detail.

Systematically related propositions.

A theory usually comprises several propositions. Indeed, one proposition alone would not constitute a theory but would simply be a “conceptual hypothesis.” Not only must a theory have at least two propositions, but these two propositions must be also systematically linked by relations. The way we link one theoretical proposition to another is by logical form. Although there are many mathematical and logical systems at our disposal, we will use simple syllogisms to show what we mean by form and relations. Note that the mini theory below is used only for an example of logical form and should not be regarded as empirically adequate.

Imagine that we have two propositions, but they may at first appear unrelated. For example, from a set of propositions about the intergenerational transmission of social class, we find the following:

The greater the family of orientation’s values on education, the greater the son’s social class status.

If we combine this with our previously discussed proposition about amount of housework, we get a mini theory with two related propositions. Furthermore, we can deduce a third, new, and interesting proposition from these two.

The greater the family of orientation’s values on education, the greater the son’s social class status.

The greater the husband’s social class status, the greater the amount of housework performed.

Therefore, the greater the family of orientation’s values on education, the greater the amount of housework performed by the son (husband) in his family of procreation.

Now, the above mini theory is in the form of a syllogism. These deductive arguments are constructed so that if the first two propositions (called premises) are true, then the deduction (called the conclusion) is necessarily logically true (although not necessarily empirically true). It is much more important that if the conclusion is false, then we know that at least one or both of the premises are also false (falsification). These properties hold only if the correct form is followed. In regard to syllogisms, the correct form is that the middle term B (below) must appear at the end of the first premise and at the beginning of the second premise. This is called the rule of distributed middle.

A is a subset of B B is a subset of C

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Therefore, A is a subset of C.

Regardless of whether these ideas are in the correct form, what we want to know is if our theory as a whole is accurate. In logic, if we showed that our conclusion is true, that would not mean that the two premises are also true. Indeed, when we make such an assertion, it is called the “fallacy of affirming the consequent.” In reality, we have to work backward. What we try to do is to disprove our conclusion. If we show that our conclusion is false, then we also know that at least one of the premises is false. We get much greater intellectual power out of using this reverse logic (modus tollens). This is one of the major theoretical reasons we use the null hypothesis in testing our theories.

Empirically testable.

For a set of propositions to qualify as a scientific theory rather than religious or literary or political, it must be capable of being empirically tested. That does not mean that all our scientific theories have been empirically tested but that a theory that is not capable of being empirically tested is not a scientific theory. Now we turn to the question “What does it mean to say that a theory is capable of being empirically tested?”

The proposition in the conclusion of our mini theory used above can be used as an example. It states that the degree to which the husband’s family of orientation values education is related to the amount of housework the husband will perform. This concluding proposition will now become our research focus. When we decide to research a particular proposition, it becomes the conceptual hypothesis in addition to being the deduced conclusion of a theoretical argument.

The first thing we must do to research this conceptual hypothesis is to find ways to measure its components as variables. That means that we must find or develop measures for the first concept, husband’s family of orientation’s values on education, and the second concept, amount of housework performed. Finally, we must not forget that we must find a way to demonstrate (or operationalize) the relation between these concepts. We might operationalize or measure the family of orientation’s values on education by asking the husband several questions about his perception of his mother’s and father’s values about education and how much financial assistance they offered for his education. Both of these measures would have problems of validity and reliability because of faulty recall, halo effects, and so on. We might measure amount of housework by either the number of hours spent on various household tasks or the economic value of tasks performed by the husband. Both of these measures would have problems. Which tasks should we list? Would the husband inflate his estimate of the time spent? If we had the husband list the tasks and then assigned the economic value at the cost of a plumber for plumbing jobs, a babysitter for child care, and so on, would we find that this correlates poorly with the measure of amount of time spent on household chores? Indeed, there are always problems and questions regarding how accurately our empirical operationalizations measure our concepts in our conceptual hypothesis.

The last component of our conceptual hypothesis to be operationalized is the relation. As we indicated previously, we hypothesize that amount of housework is a function of family’s values on education. What is this function? In most social research, the first functional form that we test is that of a straight line. You may

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recall the slope-intercept formula for a straight line (y = b[x] + a). Indeed, this simple mathematical model is the basis for much of our analysis of relations in the social sciences. The formula for a straight line is a mathematical model, and it has a corresponding statistical model expressed in the formula (Y = a + b[X] + e). Basically, the application of the statistical formula in the analysis of the data allows us to examine the linear relation between amount of housework (Y) and the family’s values on education (X). The strength and direction (positive or negative) of that relation will be given by the regression (correlation) coefficient (b).

Once all the measures are in place, we have, in effect, two hypotheses. Our theoretical proposition represents the conceptual hypothesis, and our measures and the relation between them represent the measurement hypothesis. The architecture of the empirical test of a theory is portrayed in Figure 1.1.

Finally, if we were to conduct our study on husbands in dual-career couples, we would have to control for several variables that might account for the relationship, such as number of children, maid service, wife’s level of housework, and income level. After we analyze the results, we might find that there is no relationship between the variables we measured. If we can satisfy our critical colleagues that we have valid and reliable measures of the concepts and relations in the conceptual hypothesis, then we could conclude that the theoretical proposition is false. Because this is a deductive system (syllogism), we would also know that at least one of our premises is also wrong. As a result, it would be time either to recast and modify the theory significantly or even to discard it completely.

Figure 1.1 Conceptual and Measurement Hypotheses

On the other hand, what if our results are supportive of the conceptual hypothesis? If we can satisfy our colleagues regarding the validity and reliability of our measures and procedures, then we might want to say that the theory is true. However, as we said previously, this would be committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent. If the proposition seems to hold, it does not mean that the other propositions (premises) are true because it is logically possible to deduce the conclusion from several other sets of premises. We can never

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determine which possible set of premises might be true. As a result, science and theory achieve a great deal by disproving hypotheses and theoretical propositions rather than ever proving anything. All our scientific knowledge is tentatively held until we disprove it. Scientists are not true believers but skeptics.

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Functions of Theory

Scientific theories serve many purposes. Here, we emphasize how they contribute to understanding. It is widely recognized, however, that knowledge for its own sake is not the only worthwhile goal in life. We all want to do something with our knowledge. In our preceding example, if we had some confidence in our theory about housework, a young woman searching for a helpful mate might want to examine the educational values of the family of orientation of prospective spouses. More seriously, for those in one of the helping professions, theories about the family may provide knowledge to improve their services as therapists, program evaluators, or social policy advisers. For those who are political activists, agitators for modest or revolutionary causes or the reduction of major social problems or even staunch defenders of the world as it is or once was, theoretical knowledge about families can be put to fruitful use. Without meaning to diminish the importance of any of these practical uses of theories, we concentrate here on the ways in which theories contribute to the immediate goals of science.

1. Accumulation. Theories assist in the accumulation and organization of research findings. Much of the pursuit of knowledge involves the collection and analysis of empirical facts, filtered through the lenses of researchers. A body of empirical knowledge, however, is just a pile of findings. Theories tell us how to select and arrange research findings into meaningful groupings. If no existing theory is available for this purpose, new theories can be constructed from findings through a process of tentative generalization.

2. Precision. Theories articulate ideas in more carefully specified ways than everyday language allows. Thinking theoretically forces one to clarify what concepts and relations really mean and what they include and exclude. This precision facilitates communication so long as the communicators are trained in the language of science.

3. Guidance. Theories direct researchers to develop and test measurement hypotheses (i.e., empirical statements about what the data are expected to look like). Because theoretical ideas entail abstract, plausible, and tentative arguments, they must be checked against the empirical evidence for confidence in them to grow. Theories point to new kinds of relevant evidence for which findings do not currently exist. It is relatively easy to find or create evidence in support of a theory that one likes, however. Theories, therefore, also promote a critical spirit of inquiry. Efforts are made to refute theories, not just to support them. If a field contains two or more theories that yield incompatible hypotheses, it may be possible to design a study or a series of studies that help decide which theory is better.

4. Connectedness. Theories demonstrate how ideas are connected to each other and to other theories. Theories are systematic sets of ideas. The parts of a theory fit together in a coherent way. Knowing what the parts are and how they fit together helps distinguish one theory from other theories. This also helps us see what two or more theories share or how they could be connected or combined by bringing together elements of each.

5. Interpretation. Theories help make sense of how the phenomena they cover operate. There are at least two aspects of sensibleness in interpretation. One is essentially descriptive: A theory should enable a good description of the subject matter with which it is concerned. This does not necessarily mean that the theory

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must fit our intuitive judgments of the way things work. In fact, a theory may challenge many intuitions or commonsense views of the world. Rather, to enable us to describe a subject, a theory provides a plausible picture of structures or processes that we can accept as reasonable given the assumptions in the theory. The other feature of interpretation is that theories evoke or promote stories about the way things work. If we can visualize concrete or even general scenarios of how things work, the theory is providing an interpretation.

6. Prediction. Theories point to what will or can happen in the future. If a theory helps us understand what has happened in the past or is happening now, this is, of course, desirable. To continue to be useful, however, a theory must contain propositions equally applicable to future events and experiences. This does not mean that any theory accurately foretells the future, only that it should make some relevant propositions regarding future outcomes. If we know what a theory predicts, this can contribute to the guidance function mentioned earlier. If a theory predicts something that is subject to human intervention and alteration, future actions may invalidate the theory. Normally, however, a theory is expected to hold up in the future to the extent that its predictions are confirmed. Even if predictions are not confirmed, the theory may be basically correct, and only the conditions under which it works may require revision.

7. Explanation. Theories provide answers to why and how questions. As the quotes in Box 1.1 from Burr (1973) and Homans (1964) suggest, explanation is often considered the single most important function of a theory. Because explanation is so central to the functioning of theories and because it has a variety of different meanings, we need to address this topic in more detail. Without theories, we cannot determine why and how things happen the way they do. In our everyday lives, we may be satisfied by saying that one specific event, say, a divorce between two friends, happened because of one or more other events that took place before the divorce. Such reasoning captures some of what goes into a scientific explanation, but it overlooks the most important aspect. Scientific theories explain by relying on deductive arguments. Specific events and the connections between them must be derived from more general statements for us to say that the events and the connections between them have been explained.

Explanation is provided by a general statement (sometimes called a “covering law”) that includes (or covers) the specific instance we want to explain. So, for example, if you drop this book and it falls to the floor, we could ask you to explain why it fell. You would simply cite the law of gravity as explaining why the book fell. This is to say that the particular phenomenon is part of a generally understood pattern we call gravity. Now, this is not to say that, in reality, our understanding of gravity is simple; indeed, it involves complex theories of electromagnetism, mass, space, and time. But the law derived from these complex theories covers the specific phenomenon of the falling book. Thus, to explain why someone got divorced (a particular instance) would be to provide the general theoretical propositions (covering laws) explaining divorce.

It is crucial to remember that although functions or goals such as those we have listed represent ideals, this is no guarantee that a particular theory will fulfill such ideals. In fact, we can use the seven listed functions as standards against which to measure the performance of a theory at any stage of its development. A theory may perform well in some respects but less well in others. Determining such facts helps us decide where our energies need to be directed to improve the theories that we have or invent better ones.

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Theories About Families

Ideas about human families can come from many sources, including scientific disciplines concerned with the study of entities that are not families, as well as personal experiences with our own families. No potential source should be dismissed, although we should be aware that those sources selected likely will affect key features of the theory that emerges. Most of the family theories that exist today draw on ideas from external sources. Family theories are not insulated sets of ideas, and family theorists do not merely talk to each other about family ideas.

For a theory to be about families, there must be at least one family concept in the theory. We cannot decide what a family concept is, however, unless we first decide what a family is. Indeed, foundational assumptions are often definitions of such important terms. Therefore, let us begin by thinking of a family as a social group. We need to identify the distinguishing features of this group. Following are some of the major ways that families differ from such groups as associations of coworkers and networks of close friends.

1. Families last for a considerably longer period of time than do most other social groups.

Of course, some relationships in families are not enduring. Marriages can be broken by divorce or death fairly soon after they are formed. Yet we normally think of our own families as lasting throughout our lifetimes. We actually are born into a family that already exists. Our parents remain parents even after we become adults. We add members to the family when we marry and become parents. Our siblings remain siblings throughout our lifetimes. Although it is possible for coworkers and close friends to maintain relationships for long periods of time, families are the only groups that virtually require lifetime membership, even though some members are added and subtracted along the way. Belonging to a family is involuntary in the sense that we do not choose which parents are going to give birth to us. Other groups tend to be much more voluntary, in that we have some choice about joining them in the first place.

2. Families are intergenerational.

Through the act of giving birth, families include people who are related as parents and children. If elders live long enough, we have ties to grandparents and maybe even to great-grandparents and great-great- grandparents. At some point, we ordinarily have living members of both older and younger generations, and we may eventually become grandparents or great-grandparents ourselves. Other kinds of groups may include people with fairly large age differences, but families are the only groups that virtually guarantee this.

The fact that the human infant at birth is a helpless creature and cannot approach self-sufficiency for almost 20 years means that the intergenerational bond is particularly crucial to human survival. Every child needs some sort of caretaker and caregiver, whether it is a biological parent, an adoptive or foster parent, or somebody else who takes the responsibility for providing nurturance during the early years of life. It is no accident that our image of family includes an intergenerational component.

3. Families contain both biological and affinal (e.g., legal, common law) relationships between members.

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It is the biological act of birth that creates the fundamental family tie. This act also means that we share at least some inherited characteristics or proclivities with family members who are directly or indirectly related to us by birth. At least until humans perfect the cloning of adults, and perhaps even then, the process of becoming a person will be based to some degree on biology. Families are in the business of producing and sustaining persons and personhood. Even though work groups or friendship groups may sometimes contain biologically related members, such groups tend to have other purposes.

There is also a social side to this process of creating persons. No society leaves the biological act of birth or the rearing of children to chance. Personhood is achieved through a process of socialization. That socialization is subject to secular and religious rules about how the process should be carried out. Pursuant to these rules, family members have rights and obligations that tend to be codified in both laws and informal agreements.

Aside from adoption, the major legal provision about families concerns marriage. We may not think of a marriage in itself as constituting a family, but we recognize marital relationships as part of families. Some families are conjugal, in that they contain one or more marriages. It might even be argued that if humans didn’t have families, they wouldn’t need marriages, although families may often function well without marriage. In any case, marriage itself involves rights and obligations under the law, and it also creates family ties in law. Some of our family members join and leave the group either because of our own marriages and divorces or because of the marriages and divorces of other family members.

Other kinds of groups are subject to regulation by laws (e.g., contracts) and informal agreements, of course. Such regulations may exclude as well as include people in work and friendship groups, and they govern proper conduct within such groups. What such groups do not have, however, are relationships anything quite like, for example, cousins or aunts and nephews, which arise because our mother’s sister is married.

4. The biological (and affinal) aspect of families links them to a larger kinship organization.

It follows from what we already have said that families are not just small groups of closely related individuals who live together or interact on a frequent basis. Families extend outward to include anybody sufficiently related to us by blood, marriage, or adoption. This kinship group may have the identifiable boundaries of a clan, or it may be loosely organized and diffuse. Everybody stops counting distant relatives as family members at some point along the periphery. Nevertheless, the ties of kinship create the potential for lineages and collateral (i.e., within-generation) family relationships that can become quite extensive. Through kinship, families are tied to history, tradition, and multiple generations of group members. In some societies, these kinship groups are major features of the social, cultural, political, and economic landscape. Work and friendship groups tend to be much more temporally and spatially encapsulated.

To answer the questions in Box 1.2, we likely will find ourselves asking other questions. Do we visualize the people listed in each example as all being part of one family, or do they belong to two or more different families? Are the listed persons the only ones in the family, or could there also be others (i.e., is this a whole family or just part of one)? Should we think of these persons as members of an actual family, or are they a family in either a symbolic sense or in the way they function in their relationships? Are we thinking of how

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common or uncommon a grouping is in a particular society, either in frequency or in what is expected as normal, natural, and acceptable by law or custom? And are both affinal and consanguineous relationships identified as family relationships?

Box 1.2 Which of These Is a Family?

A husband and wife and their offspring A single woman and her three young children A 52-year-old woman and her adoptive mother A man, his daughter, and the daughter’s son An 84-year-old widow and her dog, Fido A man and all his ancestors back to Adam and Eve The 1979 World Champion Pittsburgh Pirates (theme song: “We Are Family”) Three adult sisters living together Two lesbians in an intimate relationship and their children from a previous marriage of one woman and a previous relationship of the other woman with a male friend Two children, their divorced parents, the current spouses of their divorced parents, and the children from previous marriages of their stepparents A child, his stepfather, and the stepfather’s wife subsequent to his divorce from the child’s mother Two adult male cousins living together A 77-year-old man and his lifelong best friend A childless husband and wife who live 1,000 miles apart A widow and her former husband’s grandfather’s sister’s granddaughter A divorced man, his girlfriend, and her child Both sets of parents of a deceased married couple A married couple, one son and his wife, and the latter couple’s children, all living together Six adults and their 12 young children, all living together in a communal fashion

We could discuss additional arguments about the distinctive features of families as groups. For example, we could draw attention to certain qualities of social interaction that are commonly found in families but not elsewhere. One of these is that family members supposedly care about one another as whole persons (cf. Beutler, Burr, Bahr, & Herrin, 1989). Whichever criteria are considered, however, the distinctiveness of family groups tends to be only a matter of degree. Nonfamily groups, such as networks of friends or coworkers, usually have some family properties but fewer of these properties or in less obvious amounts.

It also is worth noting that we can conceptualize the family not only as a concrete group or social organization but also as a social institution. As an institution, family includes all the beliefs and practices of and about all the families in a particular society or geopolitical context. It also includes the ways in which different families are connected to each other and to other social institutions. For example, in most modern and well-developed societies, families tend to have a private character, each one walled or fenced off from other families and from public view much of the time. There also are expected and experienced linkages between families and schools, families and the workplace, families and governments, families and the mass media, and so on. Because members of families often share economic resources and collaborate in both productive labor and the consumption of resources, it is also useful to consider families as being involved in a society’s system of social stratification. Thus, some families have more wealth, power, and status than do other families.

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With an idea of the meaning of family, we can begin to envision what counts as a family concept. Some of these concepts describe the composition, or size and configuration, of family membership. Some describe the structures and processes of interaction that take place between family members. Some describe the ways that families relate to their environments. Some describe the whole family as a group, the family as an institution, or the nature of the ties between two or more members within the family group.

We believe that for a theory about human relationships to be a family theory, one or more ideas (concepts or variables) about families must be included in the theory. The family idea may appear in either or both of two places: (a) as part of the explanation (e.g., parental discipline helps explain juvenile delinquency), (b) as the phenomenon to be explained (e.g., the state of the economy in a country helps explain the divorce rate in that country), or (c) both (e.g., marital communication styles help explain marital satisfaction).

Thus, we can distinguish two general kinds of family theories, those that are “about the family” or explaining how families work (b and c above) and those that consider family ideas to be useful explanations (a and c above). Of course, a wide variety of ideas, some familial and some not, may be needed in combination to adequately explain family life (e.g., marital affection plus the economy influence the odds of divorcing). Likewise, the forces that help explain family life may also help explain other things (e.g., the state of the economy may influence stock prices as well as the divorce rate). When assessing the family theories of others, or when creating one yourself, it helps to locate where the family ideas are, or at least where you think they belong.

Theorists can adopt narrow, intermediate, or broad definitions of what constitutes a family, why they exist, and what they do. Because families have changed historically, and likely will change in the future, we favor an inclusive definition of family, not because of personal preferences but because we advocate improving our theoretical understanding of family diversity and change.

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Evaluation of Theory

While there is no one acceptable way to evaluate a particular theory or to compare the merits and shortcomings of two or more theories, it is very helpful to be able make judgments about the quality of the theories that exist. We have tried to be very cautious here about making final judgments about the adequacy of any theory, but members of the scientific community do look to certain standards for discriminating between theories as they exist at a given point in time.

Table 1.1 lists and defines in descending order of importance the 13 most frequently endorsed criteria, from a longer list of 32 criteria, based on a survey of a diverse group of more than 100 family scientists (Klein, 1994). Although there will always be some disagreement over the salience or importance that the various evaluative criteria receive, the following includes most of the criteria that have been used in recent times for the evaluation of theory and the relative weights used by scholars. We believe that even the systematic application of the first three or four of these criteria to the frameworks and theories in this book will assist the reader in developing his or her critical capacity in regard to family theory.

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Frameworks

In light of the current situation, a precaution is in order as we prepare to explore in some detail nine of the currently important theoretical frameworks in the family studies. Our own map of the alternatives is not the only possible one, nor is it necessarily complete and otherwise adequate. In 1950, only the functional and symbolic interactional perspectives, among the theories we cover, would likely have been widely recognized. Until the mid-1960s, two other perspectives that we do not cover as distinctive were commonly identified (institutional and situational). By this time, the developmental perspective had gained recognition, but several others were either widely rejected or absorbed into other points of view. When Nye and Berardo (1966/1981) attempted to comprehensively cover conceptual frameworks at the end of this period, they even added six more, each roughly representing an academic discipline (i.e., anthropology, psychoanalysis, social psychology, economics, legal studies, and Western Christian studies).

Table 1.1 Criteria for Evaluating Family Theories Table 1.1 Criteria for Evaluating Family Theories

1 Internal consistency: A theory does not contain logically contradictory assertions.

2 (Tie with 3) Clarity or explicitness: The ideas in a theory are expressed in such a way that they are unambiguous. They are defined and explicated where necessary.

3 Explanatory power: A theory explains well what it is intended to explain.

4 Coherence: The key ideas in a theory are integrated or interconnected, and loose ends are avoided.

5 (Tie with 6) Understanding: A theory provides a comprehensible sense of the whole phenomenon being examined.

6 Empirical fit: A large portion of the tests of a theory have been confirmatory or at least have not been interpreted as disconfirming.

7 Testability: It is possible for a theory to be empirically supported or refuted.

8 Heuristic value: A theory has generated or can generate considerable research and intellectual curiosity (including a large number of empirical studies, as well as much debate or controversy).

9 Groundedness: A theory has been built up from detailed information about events and processes observable in the world.

10 Contextualization: A theory gives serious consideration to the social and historical contexts affecting or affected by its key ideas.

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11 Interpretive sensitivity: A theory reflects the experiences practiced and felt by the social units to which it is applied.

12 (Tie with 13) Predictive power: A theory can successfully predict phenomena that have occurred since it was formulated.

13 Practical utility: A theory can be readily applied to social problems, policies, and programs of action (i.e., it is useful for teaching, therapy, political action, or some combination of these).

Source: Klein (1994).

When Broderick (1971) reviewed the theoretical developments of the 1960s, he saw several new possibilities. Of these, the exchange and systems perspectives have continued to thrive, and they are represented in our following chapters. By the end of the 1970s, a similar review by Holman and Burr (1980) added conflict, behavioral, ecological, and phenomenological perspectives as being of at least secondary importance. Of these, we give major attention only to the conflict and ecological perspectives. When Nye and Berardo (1966/1981) reissued their 1966 book, they added exchange, systems, and conflict theories in their introduction, as well as “social individualism” and “transactional analysis,” neither of which seem to have progressed thereafter. Finally, the most recent comprehensive treatment includes more than a dozen chapters on distinct theoretical perspectives (Boss, Doherty, LaRossa, Schumm, & Steinmetz, 1993), with the notable addition of feminist theory.

A fruitful typology of theories is only partially in the eye of the beholder. Some threads seem to be common to the various alternative classifications, and some reflect historical changes in the field regarding the popularity and promise of the alternatives. Nevertheless, each mapping of the territory is at least somewhat dependent on the purposes and viewpoint of the author. In our case, we aim for relative simplicity to meet the needs of readers. We capitalize on the existing complexity mainly by covering some of the varying and more recent emphases within the broader traditions.

We use an organizational concept throughout this book: that of theoretical framework. What we mean by theoretical framework is that there exists in each scientific field a core of theoretical assumptions and propositions. We do not simply refer to these as theories, because although they are theories, they also are sufficiently general to have given rise to a number of theoretical variants. In this one sense, these theoretical frameworks are like families, with the core theory providing sufficient richness for the development of offspring.

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Study Questions 1. What is a fact? 2. Why and how do scientific facts change? 3. Can you construct a theory without making assumptions? 4. Why do scientific theories want to be logical? (Hint: Do illogical arguments offer an appealing explanation; for instance, “he was

in this room and the room next door at the same time”?) 5. Can a theory explain but not predict, or predict but not explain? (Hint: Think of a prediction model based on past behaviors but

not having any discussion on why something happens.) 6. In this book, what is a framework?

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Chapter 2 Classical Social Theories and Family Theories

Matt and Sarah were arguing about why Amanda and Drew broke up. Matt argued that they never had “chemistry” from the beginning, and so they lacked the “glue” to stay together. Sarah disagreed. She maintained that Amanda was very “romantic” and that Drew was simply too practical and mundane. As they both argued their perspectives, Sarah suddenly said, “Wait a minute! Matt, our argument is not about Amanda and Drew but about larger assumptions. You think that relationships are basically driven by biological forces, whereas I think relationships are formed by compatible personalities.”

What Sarah has noticed about the argument is that our explanations of relationships, or anything else for that matter, are founded on assumptions. In the first chapter, we discussed “assumptions as a basic construct in the architecture of theories.” Behind every explanatory theory of why or how something happens is a set of assumptions about the nature of causation and the processes that produce the outcomes we wish to explain. This chapter explores the nature of some of these assumptions captured as “philosophies” and how these assumptions have been expressed over the history of theories about families.

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Philosophies of Science

The term philosophy can refer to two different things. On the one hand, a philosophy might refer to the values and way of thinking of a person. We might say that someone who likes to shop is a materialist, meaning that he or she values material objects. The other meaning of philosophy refers to the academic discipline of philosophy. Both meanings are important in understanding the emergence and growth of family theories and frameworks, but for the moment, we focus on the importance and relevance of academic philosophy, especially the academic philosophy of science, for scientific theories.

The methods of philosophy are logic and other forms of discursive reasoning. In general, philosophers do not use the empirical methods of science to establish the credibility of their ideas. Some philosophers, known as philosophers of science, examine the principles by which scientists work through reconstructing the logic of scientific processes. Whereas sociologists of science systematically study the behaviors and thoughts of scientists and the social organization of the sciences, philosophers of science explore what science should or could be like in terms of abstract ideas. There are several ways in which this philosophical study is important.

The discipline of philosophy was historically prior to the scientific disciplines. The ancient Greek philosophers and oriental philosophers had many creative ideas about human affairs and the workings of the natural world. It was out of the Enlightenment philosophy of the 18th and 19th centuries that the modern sciences in the Western world were born. During this period, it was common for individual scholars to be both philosopher and scientist at the same time or to easily shift back and forth between the two. It was only during the 19th and 20th centuries that the various scientific disciplines branched into special fields to which a person could devote an entire career.

The historical legacy of philosophy as a precedent to the sciences has meant that philosophy, as a formal discipline, has influenced all sciences. Many of the influences have been indirect. The so-called physical sciences, such as physics and chemistry, emerged first. Between 1850 and 1900, the philosophical principles embedded in these earlier sciences spilled over into the biological sciences, such as botany and zoology, and the social sciences, such as psychology and sociology. During the 20th century, family studies emerged as a subspecialty within several of the social sciences. Now, in the early 21st century, some scholars think of family studies as a distinct field with an interdisciplinary character or even as a unique discipline in its own right.

In philosophy, as in other academic disciplines, new ideas are constantly being proposed and debated. A particular philosophy of science may be popular at a given moment, but later it may be challenged and some other philosophy may take its place at or near the top of the heap. Scientists, including family scientists, frequently turn to the literature produced by philosophers to see what the current issues are. When scientists need to justify the basic principles guiding their search for answers to important questions, they sometimes seek guidance from philosophers of science or from other philosophers.

It is now often asserted that there are different, if not rival, philosophies of science. This is apparent in professional philosophy itself and, more important for this book, among family scholars as well. The

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philosophies we adopt influence the way we conduct our scientific practice, including the theories we create and our attitudes toward the theories of others. We sketch below a few of the central philosophical views that may help distinguish family theorists and other family scholars from one another.

Key elements of three philosophies of science appear in Box 2.1. We have called these positivistic, interpretive, and critical philosophies of science (e.g., Neuman, 1994). We do not claim that these are the only three alternatives in family science. Indeed, we discuss other alternatives such as feminism and postmodernism in subsequent chapters. At this juncture, we present Box 2.1 to illustrate the nature of philosophical assertions.

The divergence from positivism can be traced to two major influences. First, a group of philosophers working in Vienna in the early part of the 20th century argued that knowledge claims are either true or false and that the job of scientists is to verify the true claims. Another philosopher, Sir Karl Popper, disputed this view. Popper (1959) argued that empirical knowledge claims could be shown to be false but that there is no way to prove them to be true. Popper’s position has become influential among not only philosophers but also practicing social scientists. Whether or not family scholars have read Popper, his ideas have indirectly influenced family theorizing, helping usher in what is sometimes called a postpositive era in the philosophy of social science (Thomas & Wilcox, 1987).

The second major influence was a work by historian and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn (1962/1998) titled The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn launched many important arguments (see White, 2004), and among these was the interpretation that science did not proceed on the basis of rational evidence and the elimination of competing hypotheses as much as it proceeded by the political processes similar to any other social organization. Successful theories were seen as developed by winning adherents rather than careful proof and investigation. The effect of this interpretation was to undermine the credibility of positivistic science and to put forth a relativistic position that “truth” is decided by whoever holds power.

Relativistic positions have seldom been popular in the philosophy of science because they fly in the face of facts such as the usefulness of scientific knowledge, medical science, and technology. Indeed, the major reactions against relativism have come from pragmatists (e.g., Peirce, Rorty, & Haack) who hold that although knowledge is social, it nonetheless is guided by principals that set standards for what we regard as acceptable evidence, whether it be in a court of law or in a scientific laboratory. While the pragmatist position does not admit absolute truth, it maintains a far less relativistic position regarding scientific knowledge than many interpretivist and critical theorist positions (see Box 2.1). Today, most family scholars would probably fall into this perspective, which might be described as pragmatic positivism.

Box 2.1 Three Philosophies of Science Applied to Family Theories

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Positivist View View of knowledge: There are accepted methods that differentiate more adequate claims about families from those that are less adequate. Although the older versions of positivism would have claimed access to objectivity, most current formulations argue a less absolute position in terms of truth and objectivity (see White, 2004).

Goals of family theory: Explanation and prediction of family phenomena and events

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Interpretive View View of knowledge: All knowledge is gained by interpreting the meanings that family members assign to an event or behavior. Truth is relative to each actor’s meanings and the context in which these meanings occur. Interpretive knowledge tends to be relativistic and reflexive.

Goals of family theory: Understanding, empathy

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Critical View View of knowledge: Truth is imposed by those who control the power to shape knowledge. There is a plurality of theories, but the theories that acquire truth status are those that support and maintain the prevailing power system. Knowledge is always defined by those in power to serve their purposes.

Goals of family theory: Emancipation and empowerment of oppressed social groups

Source: Adapted from Neuman, 1994.

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Values in Science

One of the key reasons that positivistic science emerged historically as a way of thinking and working that is somewhat different from the arts, religion, and politics was concern about the distortions in knowledge along with considerable human suffering that seem to result when reasonableness, fairness, and facts are devalued. Science is not without its faults, just as no individual human being or social organization is faultless. The value neutrality sometimes advocated by scientific positivists is similar in at least some ways to value tolerance or respect for value diversity. But this is a matter of degree, and the value-relevant and value-laden positions of the critical and interpretive perspectives (see Box 2.1) may push the ideals of tolerance and diversity to an extreme point of complete relativism.

Writing several decades ago about science as a vocation, sociologist Max Weber made some interesting comments:

Today one usually speaks of science as free of presuppositions. Is there such a thing? All scientific work presupposes that the rules of logic and method are valid. Science further presupposes that what is yielded by scientific work is important in the sense that it is worth being known. In this, obviously, are contained all our problems. For this presupposition cannot be proved by scientific means. It can only be interpreted with reference to its ultimate meaning, which we must reject or accept according to our ultimate position toward life. (quoted in Gerth & Mills, 1946, p. 143)

More recently, Christensen (1964) provided an analysis of the value issue in family science. His assessment was quite Weberian. Christensen advocated neither the rejection nor the espousal of nonscientific values by theorists and other scientists. Rather, he advocated the identification and separation of nonscientific values from scientific values. Indeed, the values of positivistic science are, for the most part, methodological. That is, positivism values knowledge that can be empirically replicated, knowledge that has distinct observable components, and knowledge that is more general and law-like than an individual case or instance. This may continue to be the most common view among family scientists, but it is not the only view. Those perspectives that do not distinguish methodological rules for separating more from less adequate knowledge claims end up with only a set of beliefs often called ideology.

The notion of ideology has three major meanings: (a) a set of beliefs; (b) the systematic study of a set of beliefs, their nature, and their origin; and (c) visionary speculation, often about ideals and with an action agenda for achieving the ideals. There is no question that systems of belief about families can be part of a family theory or that carefully studying those beliefs might improve a family theory. There is also no doubt that beliefs about family science can affect family theories. Even visionary speculation has creative potential for theories. Our caution is only that ideologies among family scholars that are philosophical or political may be usefully connected with a particular family theory, but they are not within or constitutive of the theory itself. So, if a scientific theory argues that X causes Y, the truth of this does not depend on whether we like or dislike X or Y. The theory may suggest how to change Y if the direction of change is consistent with our values and

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ideology, but scientific theory should be equally useful for someone with exactly the opposite values and ideology.

As citizens and professionals, we may want to help someone or eradicate a certain type of behavior such as bullying or date rape based on our moral values. These values may motivate social scientists to study certain areas rather than others. When it comes to taking action, however, professionals are constrained by the code of ethics of their profession and the common legal understanding that professionals are not liable as long as they follow the best practices of their profession. For almost all professions, best practices are defined as following actions informed and justified by scientific findings. From social work to medicine, best practices entail evidence-based practice where evidence is defined scientifically. For professional interventions, therefore, the importance of relatively objective and reliable scientific findings is a critical part of helping others or changing the world. It is important to note that data that are twisted to fit particular values would not be useful for evidence-based practice and would fail to meet scientific standards of reliability and validity.

To summarize, philosophical ideas establish principles that help frame the ways that family theories and other aspects of scholarship are created and used. Philosophical ideas are themselves foundations for scholarship, but they cannot be scientifically proven true or false. In many ways, scholars either consciously or unconsciously adopt a particular philosophical stance in regard to research by the way they do their research. Those who attempt not to use their research as a vehicle for their own values, the values of their religion, or their political values would be clearly identified as positivist. Although those holding interpretive and critical philosophies have criticized this perspective, the positivist approach remains the hallmark of scientific work and scholarly accountability. Indeed, the public expects family scientists to present their research findings independent from their religious and political beliefs. In science, it is expected that any research finding can be replicated by other researchers regardless of whether they have the same or different political and religious beliefs. This is as close as we may be able to get to scientific “objectivity.”

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What Is an Explanation?

We have stated that our explanations of relationships, families, or anything else for that matter are founded on assumptions. In the previous section, we argued that some of the assumptions we make are guided or misguided by the epistemologies we assume, and these were summarized as the positivist view, the interpretive view, and the critical view. In this section, we take a slightly different approach to the issue about the assumptions we make. Pragmatism would suggest that the assumptions we make would be formed by the goal or purpose we have in mind. In the pragmatic tradition, we argue that family scholarship and research are trying to produce knowledge and explanation. The assumptions we make should, therefore, be useful in moving us toward our goal of producing knowledge and acquiring explanations.

Of course, this raises the obvious question of what we mean by knowledge and explanation. One of us (White, 2013) has argued that historically knowledge has been characterized as being true and factual. Such a characterization of knowledge throws us into philosophical debates about the nature of truth and the nature of reality. To avoid these debates, one might focus on the nature of scientific knowledge rather than the more generic and vernacular meanings of knowledge. Scientific knowledge is knowledge that is acquired by using the scientific method.

The more specialized approach to knowledge as established by the scientific method is not without its own special problems and somewhat flies in the face of the common vernacular definition. First, science is largely based on disconfirmation of hypotheses, and as such, any fact or truth can be viewed only as tentative rather than everlasting. Second, the scientific method, as a criterion for scientific knowledge, is less than clear. In fact, scientific methods are diverse. Archaeology uses naturalistic field methods that are distinct from the laboratory experiments of cellular biologists yet no less scientific. Indeed, over the history of science, the appropriate methods are principally defined by whatever criteria are accepted by the community of scientists in each field in each time period (see Kuhn, 1962/1998; Hellemans & Bunch, 1988). So what makes scientific knowledge scientific is not completely clear.

The sociologist Robert Merton (1973) argues that there are a set of values that underlie the methods of scientists. Following Merton, Allchin (1998) and later White (2004) argue that these values are epistemic rather than teleological values. Teleological values focus on a final end or purpose such as the “betterment of humans.” Epistemic values are values about the principles that guide our acquisition of knowledge. These authors argue that scientific knowledge is knowledge that is acquired by methods that reflect values on honesty, skepticism, universalism, open communication, and evidence. All these values are represented in various historical periods, whether it be in the work of scientists such as Copernicus, Newton, Einstein, or Crick and Watson. In any one historical period, the community of scientists defines scientific methods based on these values.

Although the inclusion of epistemic values might help clarify what scientific knowledge is, the questions regarding knowledge and explanation remain. White (2013) claims that given the “universalistic” values of science, knowledge is something we tentatively hold that has the capacity to generalize across time periods and

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contexts. For example, the theory of gravitational forces in contemporary physics is one such type of knowledge. It must be kept in mind that such knowledge is always being modified and changed depending on research and lacks the stability of other forms of knowledge such as religious truths. Religious truths require beliefs, but scientific knowledge requires evidence.

It is perhaps easier to understand the universalistic criterion in science if we briefly examine “scientific explanation.” Most of the discussions about scientific explanation focus on the argument made by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) commonly known as the “covering law” model of scientific explanation. The covering law model supposes that an explanation of a given phenomenon is a deduction from premises composed of at least one general law-like statement and specific conditions. For example, if you were to hold this book above the ground and drop it, the explanation would be provided by the general laws of gravity plus the specific mass of the book and the mass of Earth and any other relevant conditions such as air pressure, wind velocity, and so on. Indeed in this perspective, an explanation is a logical explanation of a phenomenon that has occurred and that the explanation was able to predict.

Salmon (1984) has been one of the major critics of the covering law model, arguing instead for a causal model of explanation. The causal model of scientific explanation works well for some areas of science such as chemistry and physics but less well for more descriptive sciences such as natural history, biology, and archaeology. In addition, the deterministic thinking in the causal model is somewhat at odds with contemporary thinking about multiple causality and equifinality as it is with stochastic and probabilistic models. It can also be effectively argued that causal explanations are simply a specific form of the more general covering law model. The law-like statement in the covering law is simply replaced with a general causal statement. So in effect, we now have a fair degree of consensus as to what a scientific explanation entails.

Returning to the pragmatic position, what then would be the assumptions that would move us toward the goal of acquiring scientific knowledge and explanation? First, the epistemic values of honesty, skepticism, open communication, universalism, and evidence would be a foundation for our knowledge. Second, we are focused on acquiring information that is sufficiently general so as to allow us to construct explanations as either covering laws or causal models. Not all the theories we cover in this book are necessarily at the same stage of development. Some theories are very close to offering us covering law or causal models, whereas others are still progressing from using metaphors in order to explain. Most of the theories in this book would agree with the epistemic values that underlie scientific knowledge and increasingly secular knowledge in the 21st century.

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Classical Social Theories

Classical social theory can be traced back to the pre-Socratic philosophers of Greece and the moralistic philosophers of China, such as Confucius. Much of the most relevant classical theory is from the period of early Modernism (1800–1900). It was during this time that scientific methods moved from the empirical inductionism of Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum (1620) to a more deductive approach strongly influenced by Isaac Newton’s Philosopiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687). Whereas Bacon advocated that science should observe, record, and generalize from empirical events, Newton’s method emphasized the importance of rational thought and mathematics in creating laws from which we could explain events. Although as we shall see, there is even today a strong inductionist influence in the social sciences (e.g., phenomenology, grounded theory), most of the social sciences focus on the Newtonian approach that is more deductive. Today when we say theory is inductive, we mean that it attempts to reach generalized laws or regularities by observing particulars. Deduction on the other hand usually means that we generate laws by thought and then generate hypotheses from our theory for testing our thinking against empirical data. Clearly, these two approaches can be used in very compatible ways, and many scholars today would see theoretical methods as a mixture of these two.

What is important for us is to understand that during the period of early Modernism, theories were formed using either one or both of these approaches. We now turn to an examination of some of the most influential of these social theories. As we shall see, these theories have formed the broad strokes of the contemporary social theories and family theories that you study today. These classical theories tended not to focus on the family but instead viewed family as just like other social groups. Certainly, this changed in the 20th century, and we shall see this change as we get to contemporary iterations of theory.

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Marx and the Sweep of History

Most students are familiar with the work of Karl Marx once he and Engels were contracted to write the Communist Manifesto pamphlet (1848; The Communist Manifesto book was written later, 1867/1971). Certainly, the political pamphlet inflamed sensitivities of Victorians and established Marx and Engels as ideological socialists. However, Marx’s academic writing (often with F. Engels) encompassed historiography (The German Ideology, 1845/1932), historical political analysis (The Eighteenth Brumaire, 1852/1963) and, later, political economy (Capital, vol.1, 1867/1992). Although political scientists and economists might see Marx’s contributions to social thought in a different perspective, we emphasize Marx’s contribution to macroscopic historiography. This contribution is evident in early writings such as The German Ideology but is also well documented in Marx’s influence on Engel’s The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State (1884/1946) published after Marx’s death.

In terms of historiography, Marx is well known for the concept of dialectical materialism. This concept was clearly derived from the philosophy of history identified with G. W. F. Hegel and known as German idealism or absolute idealism. While Hegel argued that a dialectic of ideas explains political and economic history, Marx turns this on its head and argues that it is not ideas that drive the world but our relation to physical material. His dialectic incorporated two such relations: owning or controlling the means of production or laboring for those that own or control. For Marx, all of history could be explained by these two relations.

It was only after Marx’s death that Engels applied this Marxian dialectic to the family in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884/1946). It is in this book that the original dialectic is envisioned as being between the sexes. Although early ethnographies of hunter-gather groups led to somewhat erroneous conclusions regarding which sex, male or female, controlled the means of production, this work’s breadth and vision contributed significantly to contemporary theories in both the Feminist and Conflict Frameworks. In addition, Marx’s work remains a significant influence on contemporary economic theories (see Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 2014).

The overall effect on contemporary theory goes far beyond any particular concept. The Marxian vision is one in which the power and sweep of history is responsible for outcomes rather than individuals or groups. Indeed, individuals are at the mercy of forces greater than themselves or even their country. Historical period and the dialectical forces of history are causal. Even though we need not use dialectical materialism as an explanation, we can see this perspective—that history is a macroforce—in perspectives such as environmental theory (climate change), inevitability of social conflicts (Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 1996/2007), and evolutionary ecology (e.g., Chapter 9). The basic idea that humans are being swept along by forces larger than themselves is basic to such approaches.

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Durkheim’s Norms and Social Change

Emile Durkheim is certainly one of the most influential early contributors to social analysis. His works include The Rules of Sociological Method (1895), Division of Labour in Society (1893), and Suicide (1897). His perspective is that the study of social groups and societies is based on what he called “social facts.” A social fact is composed of the norms, beliefs, and values held by the collective, external to an individual, that have coercive power over the individual. For example, if it is a hot day and you would like to take off your clothes, you are constrained by the social norms of others, depending on whether you are at a nudist camp or a downtown shopping center. Durkheim argued that these elements (social facts) could contribute to integration and social solidarity or to disorganization and dysfunction. In his classic work on suicide, Durkheim argued that societies with low integration and social cohesion were more likely to have higher rates of suicide. The major contributions of Durkheim are diverse. He demonstrated that societies could be studied scientifically as advocated earlier by his colleague Comte. He founded the institutional approach with the idea of social facts. Finally, Durkheim is often credited as an early champion of functionalism.

Although Durkheim’s contributions are many, we focus on one major contribution that has been important for the development of social theory of the family. This is the concept of norms. This concept has been interpreted by many theorists as explaining patterns of family formation and structure. This concept is applied to rule-governed patterns of behavior within families (e.g., bedtime) and external to any one family (e.g., societal laws about child abuse and spanking). The social psychological dimension of this concept is often identified as “expectations,” whereas the institutional dimension is often called informal and formal norms. In both of these senses, norms are the social expectations for behavior in a social group, organization, or society.

Durkheim also discussed situations where norms break down and become vague or ambiguous as social disorganization for groups and anomie (or lack of guidance) for individuals. While recognizing that social disorganization brings difficulties for social groups and individuals, Durkheim also argues that social change comes about by such disorganization and the resulting reorganization of social groups. Certainly, this is relevant to the increasing diversity of family forms we find in society today. Many critics see this increasing diversity as a sign of social breakdown and disorganization. However, it seems clear from the scientific research on cohabitation that this newer stage of mate selection has become accepted and expected in much of the world. Such an argument owes a great deal to Durkheim’s early efforts.

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Weber’s Methodological Individualism and the Protestant Ethic

Max Weber is well known as an advocate of interpretive approaches to understanding social behavior. This means that while Durkheim and Comte were advocating scientific procedures for explanation, Weber was advocating understanding, or verstehen. This approach emphasized contextual interpretation of symbols and meanings. This was a familiar approach during this historical period and had been used for some time by religious scholars as the hermeneutics or contextual interpretation of religious texts. It is not surprising that Weber’s most famous work deals with religion, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (1904), and that he also wrote separate books on the religions of China, India, and Judaism. At the same time, Weber was trained in jurisprudence as well as economics and contributed to our understanding of the ongoing process of rationalization and bureaucratization of societies in such works as Economy and Society (1978/1922).

Throughout Weber’s work, there is a strong methodological commitment to understanding how individuals behave by understanding beliefs and values within the historical context. This devotion to methodological individualism can be seen as a form of reductionism except that Weber also strongly argued for macro-level forces. It is in his 1904 work that this is perhaps most clear. Weber argues that capitalism would not have developed if it were not for the particular soteriology, or salvational ethics, that developed among early Protestant sects. Especially important is the need to establish one’s elect status by economic success, while not being able to enjoy or show off that wealth in any way (no dancing, only plain clothes, etc.). As a result, profit was reinvested as capital rather than enjoyed. The comparative method that Weber preferred was used to show that capitalism developed only where such a salvational ethics existed and his studies of the religions of China and India and Judaism were used to demonstrate his thesis.

Although we could argue about the accuracy of his thesis, the methodology of contextual interpretation is well demonstrated in this work. Not only does Weber identify macro-level religious beliefs but he shows also that when those religious beliefs are incorporated in the individual, particular individual economic behavior (investing) results. This economic behavior reinforces the macro-level religion and provides funds (tithing) for the further success of the religion. So Weber successfully ties individual behavior with aggregated macro-level outcomes. As a result, Weber’s insistence on the individual as the basis for causal interpretation in the social sciences seems plausible.

Weber`s methodological individualism and religious studies are important to interpretive approaches to the family and the relation between family and society. Although Weber was not the only early social scientist to discuss problems with levels of analysis, he may well have been the most committed to keeping these individual levels and the macro level of social organizations distinct from one another. Today, Weber’s work is a clear example of interpretive understanding mixed with positivism.

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Spencer and Parsons Functional Social Systems

The basic ideas of functional explanation have been around for centuries. Every time we ask how something works instead of why something exists, we are asking for a functional explanation. Indeed, a key to understanding this theory is its concern with how the social world is constructed. Despite the long history of this tradition, we believe that the clearest progenitor of the 20th-century versions of the functionalist framework in the biological and social sciences is the evolutionary theories (Darwin, 1880) that developed during the middle of the 19th century and were incorporated into the work of Herbert Spencer on biology (1864), psychology (1855) and sociology (1874). Although functionalist thinking preceded Spencer, prior explanations had been limited. With the advent of evolutionary theory, it became plausible to expand functional arguments to explain not only why a set of functions developed but also how they might end. This dynamic argument became available through the concepts of adaptation and selection. Now scholars could talk about functions that were adaptive because they survived and dysfunctions were “selected” out of the population. Indeed, this meant that the original how question addressed by functional arguments moved increasingly close to also providing an explanation as to why a given structure exists. That is to say, a structure exists because it has been part of a functional system that has successfully adapted to the environment.

Early social theorists such as Spencer (1820–1903) and Durkheim (1858–1917) recognized how organic functionalism might be used to explain various social institutions and behaviors. For example, the family could be seen as supplying various functions such as reproduction to the larger social whole. Indeed, it was Durkheim (Lamanna, 2002) who believed that the parts of the social system had to be understood as functioning for the whole.

Although Spencer was among the first to adopt functionalist explanations, they were quickly followed by social and cultural anthropologists pursuing explanation of why and how different cultural traditions exist in various social systems. Among the leaders of the functionalist framework were two anthropologists who were to have a lasting effect on the logic of functionalism: A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942). Radcliffe-Brown’s contribution to functionalism was to make it relative to the environment in which the society must adapt. He argued that a structure developed to serve a particular system within the parameters of an environment and its demands. Hence, Radcliffe-Brown moved functionalism to a much broader and more evolutionary perspective where social and cultural variation might be incorporated (Turner, 1991, p. 43). Malinowski (1944, cited in Martindale, 1960) really added the dimension of levels of social systems, and this was to prove to be integral to many of the major theoretical works such as Talcott Parsons’s (see Martindale, 1960, and Turner, 1991).

Much of the scholarly world principally identifies functionalism with the enormous body of theoretical work produced by Talcott Parsons (1902–1979). Parsons’s perspective on the family is best understood within the architecture of his larger theory of social systems. Parsons divided up the social world into three systems. The cultural system is composed of shared symbols and meanings. The social system is composed of organized social groups and institutions. Finally, the personality system is composed of the species generic types of personalities. For Parsons, much of the personality system was drawn from Freudian psychoanalysis. The

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great bulk of Parsons’s thinking was devoted to the social system. His work on family, however, also encompassed the socialization processes needed for the social system and the ways in which the integration of adult individuals into the group or social system maintained the institutional social system (see Parsons & Bales, 1955; Turner, 1991, p. 61).

Parsons (1937, 1951) argued that every social system needed to achieve a state of order or system equilibrium. Subsystems such as institutions functioned to assist in achieving this system order. He posited four “functional imperatives” that all systems require: adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latency (or maintenance of morale and motivation). This system of functions is commonly referred to by the acronym A-G-I-L. Every system must have subsystems that function for the adaptation of the system. Every system must satisfy the goals of the system and must integrate its members. Finally, every system must ensure that motivation for action (latency) remains above a certain level.

Parsons’s major work on the family resides in his essays in the Parsons and Bales (1955) book on the family. Parsons suggests

that the basic and irreducible functions of the family are two: the primary socialization of children so that they can truly become members of the society into which they have been born; second, the stabilization of the adult personalities of the population of the society. (pp. 16–17)

Parsons’s view was that these two functions were intimately related because a child could be socialized into a society only if the society were institutionalized and organized into expected role structures and adults received stability from such role structures. Although Parsons (1954) had previously argued that industrialization and urbanization had caused the erosion of extended kinship for the American family, he nonetheless is emphatic that the family is still a strong and stable institution capable of performing these two basic functions.

Critics of Parsons, such as Robert Merton, argued that his grand theory was too ambitious for the current state of the social sciences (Merton, 1968, p. 6). Others such as William Goode embraced functionalism and extended it to the international evolution of family structure. Goode’s work (1959) expanded Parsons’s notion that the American family was losing its extended kinship as a result of the effects of industrialization and urbanization. Goode extended this argument by noting that as children became an economic liability as societies moved from agrarian to industrial economies, the married couple would increasingly be the focus of family life. This movement was further in evidence in modern societies by the rise of romantic love and voluntary mate selection, and the overwhelming emphasis on marriage rather than children. Thus, as family functions changed, the structure of the family changed. Goode’s extension provided a middle range theory of family change that remains popular.

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Metaphors From Classical Theory

Many students might ask why we bother with classical theory. Examining our intellectual past provides us with understanding that is less trapped by our own historical period and political climate. For the purpose of this book, we are indebted to the broad analyses of theories and ideas discussed by Lillegard (2003) and subsequently by White (2004). The analyses here are different in focus.

Our discussion of classical theory brings out several somewhat confusing ideas. For example, we might ask if social causation is really dependent on what is going on in macroeconomics or historical events (Marx), or do individual choices and personalities have some causal efficacy (Weber). We do not pretend to resolve such big picture questions at this juncture, but we can identify some significant themes or metaphors that might provide useful heuristics for understanding theories.

1. Macro-Level Explanations. Certainly, those explanations that argue for the efficacy of historical forces, whether ideas (Hegel) or material (Marx), would belong in this group. There are other theories that may or may not belong here such as evolutionary theories, social class theories, and conflict theories. For example, some feminist theorists might see sex as a social class (Firestone, 1970), whereas others might see it as more of a purely social construction (de Beauvoir, 1953). Macro-level explanations see individuals and groups as being driven by powers outside their control and sometimes even unknown to them. The clearest example of this is the view from sociobiology that although you think and act, you are really driven to get your genes to the next generation.

2. Normative-Conformity and Deviance. One of the major ways sociologists explain the social world is by the existence and power of social rules or norms, both informal and formal. You do not always wear clothes because of the temperature but wear clothing because it is appropriate. Likewise, social change comes about only when a significant number of people deviate from an existing social norm thus creating a new norm. Certainly, socialization dependent theories, such as symbolic interaction (Mead, 1934) use norms as a major conceptual tool. However, normative explanations are often found as a part of functional theory (Durkheim, 1897) in some important forms of rational choice theory (Coleman, 1990). In addition, norms are a significant component of Parsonian functionalism. Hence, we can expect this type of conceptualization to surface in many theories.

3. Individual Motivation. Although focusing on individual motivation is often seen as either a form of psychological reductionism or a form of the “great human” theory of history, it appears in many theories. Weber’s methodological individualism proposes that any macro-level social force should be explainable at the level of the individual. Such a view suggests that individual values, beliefs, and cognitions are important for an explanation to make sense. Furthermore, Weber’s view suggests that theorists need to pay attention to how they will move from individual causation up to macro-level events (levels of analysis problem). Some of the theorists who have encountered this problem are exchange theorists (Homans, 1961), rational choice theorists (Coleman 1990), and economic theorists (Adam Smith, 1776).

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4. Social Systems and Functions. There is little doubt that functional explanations are popular in the social sciences, but these explanations have become more sophisticated as they became united in the “system” approach in the later work of Parsons and with advent of system thinking from cybernetic and information theories. The simple way of viewing functional theory is through the “organic” analogy (the heart pumps blood for the circulatory system). However, contemporary systems approaches are much more complex and may focus on functional relations within a state, changes of state by a system, and dynamics of systems. Certainly, we see such approaches in individual level neurological theories, family stress theories (Boss, 1988), family resiliency theories (McCubbin & Patterson, 1983), and ecological theories (Hawley, 1986).

These four themes emerge and reemerge throughout this book. The themes provide a way for you to compare and contrast these theories as well as understand them. These themes are not exclusive of other newer concepts that are emerging in the study of the family such as levels of analysis and the role of history in explaining who we are and who our family is.

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A Brief History of Family Theory

Each theory in family science has its own historical legacy, as we discuss further in subsequent chapters. Our focus here is on major themes and examples of how family theory has been important to scholarship throughout history. We refer to several useful accounts of this history and recommend them for greater depth of coverage.

Adams and Steinmetz (1993) surveyed contributions of the classics, which encompass ideas up to the 20th century. Early philosophers were often interested in prescribing ways of living, according to their own values. Adams and Steinmetz called attention to this infusion of ideology, and they noted that it sometimes was accompanied by efforts to describe families in more dispassionate ways. Only scattered references to family life per se are contained in the classical works, with little resemblance to the kind of scientific explanation we have now come to expect of scholarship.

Much of the early work centered on attempts to find the origins of marriage as an institution and to trace its evolution as societies moved toward a more modern form (Adams & Steinmetz, 1993, pp. 76–78). Some scholars searched for the ultimate purposes of marriage or the family. Some saw progress or at least the adaptation of family life to changing social circumstances. Some lamented the declining importance of the family, especially as industrialization and urbanization gripped the Western world in the 19th century. Adams and Steinmetz (1993, p. 86) conclude that the closest these social philosophers came to a real theory was a model of parental socialization that resulted in positive outcomes for children and the meeting of needs for both generations when parents became elderly. For the most part, however—whether obvious or subtle— ideology in the classics, Adams and Steinmetz (1993) found, is seldom totally absent, although its presence makes a theory neither right nor wrong (p. 93).

Howard (1981) examined the history of U.S. family sociology from 1865 to 1940. He also noted the early emphasis on evolutionary thinking, as well as the interest of “moral reformers,” in doing something about the problems families seemed to be facing because of the Industrial Revolution. Howard considered the period between 1890 and 1920 a progressive era. Even as moral reformers and charity workers expanded their initiatives, the idea that families could adapt to changing environments became popular. An emphasis on the psychosocial interior of family life took hold, and educational programs to foster the socialization of children seemed promising. If families were sometimes struggling and disorganized, it was because they were caught between two conflicting value systems, one emphasizing traditional images of the family and the other based on the requirements of the modern democratic and capitalistic state.

The years 1920 to 1940 constitute the latest period Howard described in detail. In these years, the key theme in family scholarship shifted from ecology to interaction among family members, with the goal of personal adjustment. In 1924, the American Sociological Society (now the American Sociological Association) established its Family Section, and at about the same time, Ernest Groves developed the first systematic college course in family life education at Boston University. Howard also noted as a countertheme during this period a renewed emphasis on the institutional level of analysis, with studies of families in a community

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context and attention to cultural diversity on a broader scale. In a chapter published in Howard’s book, van Leeuwen (1981) noted that European family scholars remain more interested in the institutional, or macroscopic and historical, levels. On both continents, however, the norm developed that family scholars should refrain from moral and political evaluations as they increasingly relied on empirical data collected through fieldwork (van Leeuwen, 1981, p. 133).

Reflecting on much of the same body of work mentioned above, Christensen (1964) concluded that systematic theory building in the family field did not begin until about 1950. Concepts and rough orientations were taking shape in the first half of the century, along with a growing industry of empirical research, but without formalized explanations meeting the requirements of propositional theory. Although not highlighted in any of these historical accounts, an upswing in scholarly interest about families within many academic disciplines appeared before 1950, with contributions by sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, home economists, and social workers, among others. Yet Christensen’s designation of 1950 as a turning point seems to be basically correct. An inspection of the International Bibliography of Research in Marriage and the Family, 1900–1964 (Aldous & Hill, 1967) shows that of almost 4,000 entries before 1950, only 7 contain theory or a cognate term in their titles. Of the 12,000 entries for the 1950 to 1964 period, 93 entries contain such terms. By comparison, for the 2-year period from 1991 to 1993, 264 of 7,600 entries in a subsequent inventory (Touliatos, 1994) pertain to family theory. Interestingly, the largest proportion of theoretical works before and during the 1950s dealt with courtship and mate selection. This was the first topic to receive systematic and cumulative theoretical treatment.

Aside from the increasing attention to family theory in the scholarship of the field since 1950, the last half of the century can be subdivided into three stages, each with its own set of themes.

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Conceptual Frameworks: 1950–1966

The single most prominent theme in family theorizing during the 1950s and early 1960s was an emphasis on identifying conceptual frameworks. This emphasis is evidenced by a series of works devoted to the topic (Christensen, 1964; Hill, 1951; Hill & Hansen, 1960; Nye & Berardo, 1966/1981). The number and character of the particular frameworks varied, but the basic idea remained the same. As research on family life accumulated, most analysts attempted to give explanations for their findings. The explanations often were narrowly focused, and it was difficult to see how various studies fit together. The attempt to identify frameworks was a search for underlying principles that might help in the construction of general theories for the field. It was not claimed that such theories already existed nor was it often assumed that a single integrated theory would be practical. Rather, the idea was that by comparing the currently fragmented works with respect to the concepts and assumptions they used, scholars might be able to work toward the building of family theories in a more coordinated way.

Christensen (1964) captured the spirit of this period well in the closing remarks of his introductory essay in the Handbook of Marriage and the Family:

As has been said several times, there is urgent need for better theory. Critics of family research have described it as being amateurish, trivial, scattered, often sterile, and sometimes moralistic. . . . There is still need for correcting what Goode (1959, p. 186) spoke of as a hornet’s nest of conceptual and terminological problems. There is still need to isolate and then integrate, insofar as seems feasible, the theoretical frameworks which can guide the discipline. And there is still need to find and then specify the relationships among empirical generalizations in order to constitute true theory. (pp. 29– 30)

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Formal Theory Construction: 1967–1979

A change in tone characterized the next several years of work on family theory. Following Hill’s (1966) address after receiving the first Burgess Award for a career of scholarly achievement in the family field, attention turned toward methods of deductively and inductively creating theories, using a clearly delineated propositional format. Many examples of this type of work emerged. Nye and his colleagues presented a propositional theory of family stability (Nye, White, & Frideres, 1969), followed by a propositional theory of age at marriage (Bartz & Nye, 1970). Goode and his colleagues published a massive volume listing hundreds of propositions relevant to scores of family topics (Goode, Hopkins, & McClure, 1971).

The most important works of this period, however, were those spearheaded by Burr (Burr, 1973; Burr, Hill, Nye, & Reiss, 1979, Vols. 1 & 2). In his 1973 volume, Burr applied the principles of deductive, propositional theory building provided by philosophers and sociologists to 11 topical areas of research. In the first volume of Burr, Hill et al. (1979), Burr and his colleagues applied the same procedure to twice as many areas, involving experts in those areas as chapter authors. In Volume 2, Burr, Hill et al. (1979) focused on five general theories that were not substantively limited. The editors noted that the second volume was not comprehensive in its coverage of general theories, and they acknowledged difficulties in linking the two volumes. Inductively integrating materials from the first volume proved difficult because of the lack of semantic equivalence across domains, the complexity of models in the first volume, and the lack of a way to bridge macro- and micro-level propositions (Burr, Hill et al., 1979, Vol. 2, pp. xii–xiv).

Organizational developments within the National Council of Family Relations (NCFR) also were important during this period. In his Burgess address, Hill (1966) had called for the creation of a Theory Section to parallel the existing Research Section. Although his initiative was defeated, by the late 1960s NCFR had created the joint Research and Theory Section that continues today. Hill did not relent in his effort to give visibility to theorizing as a major professional activity, however. With the help of Nye and others, he created the Workshop on Theory Construction, which began with meetings at the NCFR annual conference site just before the regular NCFR conference. The workshop served as a training ground for both students and more advanced family scholars, allowing them to nurture and demonstrate their talents in theory building. In 1975, the name of the workshop was expanded to Theory Construction and Research Methodology. This workshop also survives today. In its first 24 years, more than 560 papers were presented, and more than 730 participants appeared on its programs. It is interesting that both the section and the workshop evolved to combine theoretical and research interests. This symbolizes the extent to which family scholars see the two enterprises as fundamentally connected.

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Pluralism: 1980–1999

The publication of the two edited volumes by Burr and colleagues (Burr, Hill et al., 1979) seems to represent the high-water mark, if not the culmination, of the theory construction movement. The pluralism of the most recent decades has several possible interpretations. It can be seen as a continuation of the quantitative growth of contributions by scholarly participants in family theory and research. It can also be taken to be a furthering of fragmented and specialized interests. Or it can be viewed as a new respect and tolerance for diverse philosophies, theories and theory building methods, and research strategies.

Doherty, Boss, LaRossa, Schumm, and Steinmetz (1993) provide a cogent summary of nine main trends, although they give these developments somewhat more recent origins than we would. We excerpted their list from a more detailed discussion:

1. The impact of feminist and ethnic minority theories and perspectives 2. The realization that family forms have changed dramatically 3. The trend toward greater professional (multidisciplinary) inclusiveness 4. The trend toward more theoretical and methodological diversity 5. The trend toward more concern with language and meaning 6. The movement toward more constructivist and contextual approaches 7. An increased concern with ethics, values, and religion 8. A breakdown of the dichotomy between the private and public spheres of family life and between family

social science and family interventions 9. Greater recognition by family scholars of the contextual limits of family theory and research knowledge

(pp. 15–17)

To be sure, Doherty et al. (1993) see challenges posed by, and potential problems with, these emergent developments, but their basic posture is laudatory and optimistic. Nonetheless, any idealistic hope on the part of some leaders in the field that we would eventually converge around one grand theoretical scheme to explain everything about families has now been completely dashed and discarded. What we see is the continuing proliferation of theories, the eclectic combination of elements from different theories, and variations and transformations within existing theories. It is as common now, if not more common than ever before, for theorizing to be narrowly focused on particular topics and issues. Countless mini theories, middle-range theories, and models of mostly causal processes, all closely linked to Hempel’s (1952) plane of observation, characterize the literature, particularly in professional journals and in the proceedings of conferences and workshops.

The other main trend in recent years has been a vigorous questioning of the philosophical foundations in the field (cf. Osmond, 1987; Thomas & Wilcox, 1987). The result has been a turn toward interpretive and critical philosophies (see Box 2.1) and away from at least some elements of the positivistic philosophy (see Cheal, 1991; White, 2004). It is important to remember, however, that the entire scholarly community does not move in unison in any one direction. Some theorists attempt to blend and integrate, whereas others find one

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philosophy or even one theory compelling and the others inadequate.

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Science in the Post-Postmodern Era: 2000–Present

The current scene is a curious and shifting mixture of consensus and conflict over theories and theory-building methods. Yet we believe that there might be some glimpses of the direction we are headed. Certainly, the Sourcebook of Family Theory and Research (Bengtson, Acock, Allen, Dilworth-Anderson, & Klein, 2005) still showed much of the pluralism and confusion from the previous era. Although the 2005 Sourcebook shows the diversity of theoretical thinking in family studies, we are less sure that it is representative of the theory we see in first-tier journals in our area. Furthermore, theoretical entries do not follow the more rigorous and formal format and discussions in Bengtson and Allen’s 1993 Sourcebook and the 1979 two-volume Burr, Hill et al. Contemporary Theories. Even though there seemed to be little consensus on the evaluation of theories or the role of values in theory, several chapters in the Bengtson et al. (2005) Sourcebook offered either theoretical or methodological advances. The overall tone, however, was continued diversity and tolerance for a multitude of ways of thinking that many scholars from previous decades might not have wanted to accommodate as “scientific progress.”