P R E L I M I N A R Y F I N D I N G S A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

The Morey Unit Hostage Incident While there were no escapes or fatalities, the taking of hostages and the seizure of the tower reveal critical

– and correctable – flaws in Arizona’s prison system

IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS of Sunday, January 18,

2004, inmates Ricky K. Wassenaar, serving 26 years in prison,

and Steven J. Coy, serving a life sentence, attempted to escape

from the Morey Unit of the Lewis Prison Complex located near

Buckeye, Arizona, 50 miles southwest of Phoenix.

The Morey Unit, which opened in January 1999, is a

cellblock-style facility that houses 840 inmates (designed

capacity: 800). The unit houses a diverse population of Level 2,

3 and 4 inmates, including “protective segregation” inmates, i.e.,

those who are considered dangerous or in personal danger are

segregated from the general prison population. The protective

segregation population, and the number of inmates serving life

sentences (100), at Morey is the largest of any unit in Arizona’s

corrections system.

The two inmates subdued the two correctional officers on

duty and seized the unit’s tower triggering a 15-day standoff, the

longest prison hostage situation in the nation’s history.

An account of the hostage taking and the negotiations that

led to the inmates’ surrender and the safe release of both hostages

follows, along with a summary of findings and recommendations

aimed at preventing future crises and addressing significant

operational, administrative and fiscal issues related to the

Arizona Department of Corrections.

T H E H O S T A G E T A K I N G

At 2:30 a.m. on January 18, the 19 members of an inmate kitchen work crew at the Morey Unit were released from their housing units to report for duty at the Morey kitchen.

At approximately 3:15 a.m., the kitchen office was occupied by Correctional Officer Kenneth MARTIN and a female civilian kitchen employee.1 A member of the kitchen work crew, inmate Ricky K. Wassenaar, entered the kitchen office through the open door. Another inmate, Steven J. Coy, followed him in, positioning himself in the kitchen office doorway and blocking the only exit.

1

MARTIN was the only officer assigned on duty in the kitchen, consistent with facility operations and procedures.

Wassennar and Coy seize the kitchen

Wassenaar was armed with a “shank,” a homemade knife-like weapon. Wassenaar approached MARTIN, produced the shank,2 and told him that “this is an escape” and “I’ve got nothing to lose.” He ordered MARTIN to remove his uniform shirt (to which MARTIN’s Department of Corrections identification card was attached) and boots. After MARTIN complied, Wassenaar handcuffed MARTIN to a cage in the tool room inside the kitchen office. The other inmate, Coy, who also possessed a shank, brought the female worker into the tool room, ordered her to lie down on her stomach, and tied her hands and feet together with electrical wire.

With MARTIN and the female kitchen worker immobilized, Wassenaar and Coy left the tool room for a short time and then returned. Coy removed 2 The two inmates underwent a pat-down search by Correctional Officer John COOPER before they left their housing unit. However, they were not patted down, as required by post order, upon arriving at the kitchen. Further, at the time this report was prepared, it was not known whether or not the two inmates were escorted from their housing unit to the dining facility.

Morey Unit, Lewis Prison Complex, Buckeye, Arizona

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2

MARTIN’s pants and gave them to Wassenaar, who put on MARTIN’s uniform, boots and jacket and then shaved off his beard with an electric razor.3 Wassenaar asked MARTIN for the kitchen telephone number, and MARTIN complied.

Wassenaar went to the kitchen work area, where he advised the other inmate kitchen workers of his escape attempt and invited them to join him. When none of them, including the inmates working outside on the loading dock, accepted his invitation, he locked them in the kitchen dry storage area.

At about 4:15 a.m., an hour after he first entered the kitchen office, Wassenaar left the kitchen carrying a 30-inch stainless steel stirring paddle. Coy remained in the kitchen office. Wassenaar walked through the dining area and exited into the Morey Unit’s Red Yard, using MARTIN’s key to unlock the door. Shortly after Wassenaar left the kitchen area, inmate Coy sexually assaulted the female kitchen worker.

Wassenaar seizes the tower

At about 4:20 a.m., Wassenaar approached the Red Yard gate area that surrounds the 20-foot tower and pressed the access buzzer in the intercom box at the gate. Upstairs in the tower were Correctional Officers Jason N. AUCH and Jane DOE.4 AUCH looked at the monitor and, seeing what he believed to be a fellow correctional officer, buzzed the gate open, allowing Wassenaar to enter the tower area. Wassenaar then approached the lower tower door, which, like the entrance gate, was also locked and remotely controlled by AUCH. AUCH buzzed the door open.5

AUCH went to the stairs to meet his presumed colleague. Wassenaar kept his head down as he climbed the stairs. As he neared the top he looked up, and AUCH realized that he did not recognize the individual approaching him. Before AUCH could react, Wassenaar struck him with the stirring paddle, fracturing AUCH’s orbital bone and temporarily incapacitating him.

Unarmed, Officer DOE attacked Wassenaar, who overpowered DOE and cuffed her hands behind her. Wassenaar forced DOE and Auch to tell him where the

3 The razor belonged to Wassenaar. At the time this report was prepared, it was not determined how the razor made its way into the kitchen.

4 “Jane Doe” is a fictitious name used to protect the female officer’s identity.

5 The post order for the tower (PO 051) did not require positive identification procedures.

weapons were, how to operate them, and how to operate the control panel. Wassenaar then ordered AUCH to the lower part of the tower.6

Coy remains in the kitchen

At about 4:45 a.m., with the escape attempt still unknown to Morey Unit authorities, Correctional Officer Robert D. CORNETT arrived in the kitchen to relieve MARTIN, 45 minutes ahead of CORNETT’s scheduled 5:30 a.m. shift. It struck him as odd that food was on the counters but he did not see any inmate kitchen workers. He saw Coy standing by the “food trap,” a pass-through that is used to slide trays between the kitchen and the dining area. Coy’s head was in the trap, and he seemed to be talking with someone. CORNETT and Coy had a brief conversation, and CORNETT walked past Coy toward the kitchen office. As CORNETT made his way up the ramp to the kitchen office, Coy approached him from behind, pressed a shank against CORNETT’s waist and ordered CORNETT to keep going. CORNETT did so.

Entering the tool room, CORNETT saw the bound female worker face down on the floor and MARTIN handcuffed to the front of the tool rack. Coy took away CORNETT’s handcuffs and radio, handcuffed CORNETT to the right side of the tool rack, and went to the dining area. A few minutes later, the kitchen phone rang. Coy returned, picked up the receiver, said, “CO II Martin,” and hung up. (It is possible that Wassenaar placed the call from the tower.)

A few minutes later, a call came in on MARTIN’s radio from Correctional Officer Coy C. KELLEY,

6 Tower personnel have access to weapons (an AR-15 assault rifle, a 12-gauge shotgun, and a 37mm launcher), but the weapons were neither loaded nor readily available to the officers.

The Lewis Prison Complex. The 800-bed Morey Unit (circled) opened in January 1999.

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3

checking on MARTIN’s welfare. Coy held the radio to MARTIN’s mouth and, complying with Coy’s instruction, MARTIN responded by saying “Code Four” (indicating “situation normal”).

KELLEY also radioed the tower requesting clearance to move inmates across the yard. DOE, following Wassenaar’s orders, advised KELLEY that the yard was not clear, effectively denying KELLEY’s request.

Officer observes “horseplay”

Nevertheless, at about 4:50 a.m., Correctional Officers KELLEY and Elizabeth M. DEBAUGH escorted inmates Jack R. Hudson, Jr., and Michael Sifford from Building Two to early recreation and chow. Their route took them past the tower where Wassenaar held his two captives.

As the officers and inmates walked past the tower on the Blue Yard side of the “spline” (a protected walkway) that separates the two yards, KELLEY looked in the window at the base of the tower. The lights were out, and KELLEY saw two correctional officers wrestling or engaged in what he later termed “horseplay.” In fact, what he unknowingly witnessed was Officer AUCH lying handcuffed on the floor of the lower tower.

KELLEY later told investigators that he tried to get into the Blue Yard tower gate but that the gate was not operational, and that he tried to contact the officers in the tower via the speaker box. KELLEY and DEBAUGH proceeded toward the kitchen (Hudson had already continued to the dining area, and Sifford, who did not wish to eat, went directly to his job in the recreational area.).

KELLEY and DEBAUGH entered the dining facility at 4:53 a.m. Hudson placed his personal items on one of the tables and went to the food trap. Hudson knocked on the door of the food trap, and when no food appeared KELLEY and DEBAUGH also knocked. The officers then tried to radio MARTIN, telling him to open the kitchen door. There was no response.

At approximately 4:54 a.m. KELLEY again knocked on the food trap and DEBAUGH sat at the first table in the chow hall. After no response at the food trap, KELLEY joined DEBAUGH at the first table. Inmate Coy opened the food trap and said something that sounded like, “Heidi, Heidi, Ho.” KELLEY told Inmate Coy he needed to talk to MARTIN. Inmate Coy said, “Alright,” and closed the trap. KELLEY told DEBAUGH he believed he saw something through the tower

window and did not feel right about it. DEBAUGH attempted to contact the tower via her radio and received no response. After waiting a few minutes, KELLEY radioed MARTIN again and received no response.

* * * * *

The chase from the dining facility

Five minutes after arriving at the dining facility, KELLEY and DEBAUGH, who were standing just outside the kitchen door, heard the rattle of keys from the other side of the door.

At approximately 4:59 a.m., CORNETT opened the kitchen door at the direction of Inmate Coy, who was standing behind CORNETT. CORNETT believed he was opening the kitchen door for Inmate Thunderhorse but found KELLEY and DEBAUGH instead. Officer CORNETT later stated that he decided to try to get away from Inmate Coy to get help for the other staff in the kitchen.

CORNETT ran into the dining area past KELLEY and DEBAUGH, yelling “Call IMS, call IMS.” (An “Incident Management System” report alerts staff of a situation requiring attention.) Coy followed and pinned KELLEY against a wall. When KELLEY tried to jerk the shank from Coy’s hand, Coy slashed KELLEY’s face with the shank and pushed him to the floor.

Coy then followed CORNETT, who fled through the exit door onto the Blue Yard. DEBAUGH radioed an alert on her radio advising that an officer was down and an inmate was chasing another officer on the yard. Her report activated the unit’s IMS. KELLEY and DEBAUGH then pursued Coy.7

The chase took them near the tower, to a point close to the blue gate entrance to the tower area, where Coy was stopped by several officers responding to DEBAUGH’s IMS. Coy threatened the officers with his shank. The officers ordered Coy to drop his weapon and lie on the ground. After initially refusing to comply with their orders, Coy finally lay down with his arms spread, but he did not release the shank. As the officers approached him, he got back to his feet and again swung his shank at the officers. A couple of

7 Immediately after DeBaugh issued the IMS, a male voice on the radio replied, “Negative, negative, negative.” It is possible that the voice belonged to Wassenaar, trying to discourage responses to the IMS. Whether it was Wassenaar or a correctional officer, the “negative” response may have contributed to the belief among some officers that the IMS was a drill instead of an actual alert .

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4

corrections officers attempted to subdue Coy with pepper spray, but, it was ineffective.

Wassenaar foils Coy’s capture

Before the officers could take further action, Wassenaar, standing 20 to 25 feet away behind the blue gate near the base of the tower, fired through the blue gate an undetermined number of rounds (most estimates ranged from nine to ten) from an AR-15 rifle toward JONES and the other officers. Seeing what appeared to be a uniformed correctional officer holding the rifle, JONES asked the shooter whom he was firing at. Wassenaar shouted, “You, (expletive).” JONES directed all officers to clear the yard. Coy, standing alone in the yard, went to the Blue tower gate, from where Wassenaar let him into the tower. Wassenaar and Coy were now in control of the tower and of their hostages, AUCH and DOE. Shortly after entering the tower, Coy sexually assaulted Officer DOE.

In all, Wassenaar fired approximately 14 rifle rounds during the early stage of the incident – approximately nine from the lower tower and at least five from the upper tower. While it may seem remarkable that Wassenaar’s shots, from relatively close range, failed to hit any human targets, it is likely that firing through the gate restricted his ability to effectively aim the weapon.

As the other officers withdrew to the Administration building, KELLEY, DEBAUGH, JONES and Sgt. Andrew J. KNEIDEL ran to the dining facility, locked the outer door and went to the kitchen. KNEIDEL found MARTIN and the female worker in the kitchen office. The officers also found and performed a head count of the inmates who had been locked in the dry storage area. All officers and inmates were removed from the dining facility by the Tactical Support Unit.

At the Administration building, JONES went into the Deputy Warden’s conference room and started to account for his staff. Two officers were missing: AUCH and DOE.

D O C R E S P O N S E

Captain Michael FORBECK was conducting perimeter checks at the Lewis Complex when he heard the shots fired by Wassenaar. After being briefed on the situation, FORBECK believed there was a risk of the two inmates rushing the Administration area, armed

with weapons stored in the tower, in an attempt to escape. He organized a defense of the Administration area, with shotguns loaded with birdshot. He also contacted the other Lewis units; ordered a Complex- wide shutdown; ordered Tactical Support Unit (TSU) assistance for the Morey Unit; and notified the Buckeye Police Department, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and the local fire department.

At 5:25 a.m. on January 18, approximately 25 minutes after DEBAUGH issued her IMS from the Morey dining facility, Department of Corrections (DOC) Southern Regional Operations Director MEG SAVAGE received a page from the Lewis Complex, advising her of a serious, unspecified inmate disturbance. Within the hour:

The duty officer at the Lewis Complex was advised of the hostage situation, as was DOC Division Director Jeff HOOD, who, in turn, notified Lewis Complex Warden William GASPAR.

The DOC Tactical Support Unit (TSU), based at Perryville, was activated and placed on standby.

DOC contacted the Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) to request the assignment of hostage negotiators.

Shortly after 6:30 a.m., Dennis Burke, Chief of Staff to Governor Janet Napolitano, was notified of the incident. He in turn notified the Governor and other key staff members. DOC Director Dora SCHRIRO, who was out of state at the time of the incident, returned to Arizona and arrived at the Command Center at 11:30 a.m. The Command Center had been established earlier in the morning at DOC headquarters in Phoenix.

The DOC Inmate Management System (IMS) policy establishes a command structure to respond to critical incidents. The incident is managed locally by the on-site Incident Commander (IC) and, depending on the seriousness of the situation, also from Central Office by the agency Incident Commander. During the Morey hostage situation, three command centers were established: two on-site command centers (one to manage the events occurring in the tower and another to manage the day-to-day complex operation, complex perimeter security, and coordinate tactical maneuvers occurring at the Lewis Complex Rast Unit), in addition to the agency command center.

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5

At the Lewis Complex, by 7:45 a.m. TSU snipers were positioned on buildings surrounding the tower, and DPS hostage negotiators, operating under DOC authority, and a DPS SWAT team were on site. A Command Post was set up in the Warden’s conference room. (By the time the incident was resolved, a total of 30 negotiators had been deployed – 10 of whom actually conducted negotiations – from DPS, DOC, the Phoenix, Tempe and Glendale police departments, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and the FBI.)

Over 16 law enforcement agencies provided support and assistance during the course of the incident:

DPS deployed over 230 officers, with a core element during the incident of about 75 detectives and officers and surveillance specialists.

The Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office provided over 100 field force personnel.

The FBI assigned approximately 100 personnel.

One FBI commander noted that at any given time at Lewis there was over 300 years of experience in seeking negotiated and/or tactical solutions.

From the moment they were deployed, the tactical teams were authorized to utilize their use-of-force policies.

Timeline. The following summary chronology and timeline of the 15 days of the hostage situation contains approximate times, and the panel will continue to examine the various accounts and will supplement any significant discrepancies as they are discovered.

Sunday, January 18 7:00 a.m. Wassenaar phones Captain BARBARA

SAVAGE, Morey Unit Chief of Security, to advise her that AUCH has a head injury and needs medical attention. Wassenaar wants to trade AUCH for a lieutenant or sergeant. SAVAGE refuses. Wassenaar demands a helicopter and a pizza. He also warns that if either of the inmates is killed, the other will kill the hostage officers.

8:05 a.m. A DPS negotiator makes phone contact with Wassenaar. The call lasts seven minutes.

8:20 a.m. Wassenaar demands that he receive handcuff keys and that he be allowed to talk to Warden Gaspar and Governor Napolitano. He repeats his demand for a helicopter.

8:20-11:20 a.m. Negotiators have various conversations with Wassenaar, in which he backs off from his demand for a helicopter, demands an AM/FM radio, describes the hostages’ injuries, and allows officers to speak briefly to one hostage.

11:19 a.m. Negotiators on the phone with Wassenaar play a tape-recorded message from his sister, pleading for him to end the situation peacefully.

11:38 a.m. Negotiators share with Wassenaar the plan to deliver a handcuff key in exchange for bullets.

12:36 p.m. Wassenaar demands to talk to a television news crew.

12:30-5:30 p.m. Various phone conversations occur between negotiators and Wassenaar.

5:25 p.m. A DPS robot delivers an AM/FM radio to the inmates.

Throughout the day, the Special Operations Unit of the Arizona Department of Public Safety developed a series of detailed, comprehensive tactical resolutions of the hostage situation, based on a variety of scenarios.

Evening: Negotiations continue on conditions for delivering a key to the inmates.

Monday, January 19

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

6:52 a.m. DPS robot delivers a radio battery for the two-way radio already in the tower, plus one handcuff key, a radio charger, and cookies.

7:52 a.m. Inmates return the handcuff key along with three shotgun shells and non-lethal rubber ball rounds used for crowd control.

1:08 p.m. DPS robot delivers cigarettes, hygiene supplies, bottled water and styrofoam cups.

1:18 p.m. Inmates turn in wooden, non-lethal projectiles.

3:00 p.m. At the Command Center, Governor Napolitano and key staff members receive their daily briefing from DOC Director SCHRIRO, key DOC staff and interagency personnel (Governor’s daily briefing) along with periodic phone updates throughout the day and night.

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6

Tuesday, January 20

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

12:30 p.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

1:22-1:38 p.m. DPS robot delivers one handcuff key, bottled water, soap, coffee and cigarettes. In return, inmates allow negotiators to visually confirm the correctional officers being held.

9:51 p.m. DPS robot delivers cheeseburgers, french fries, soft drinks, cigarettes and coffee. In return, inmates turn in numerous types of prescription drugs, two hand-made shanks, a canister of Mace and a cartridge for a 37mm firearm.

11:00 p.m. A health and welfare check is conducted with hostages via two-way radio.

Wednesday, January 21

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

8:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

12:20 p.m. DPS robot delivers Tylenol and three small cups. In return, inmates return two pepper spray gas canisters.

12:22 p.m. Inmates fire pepper spray gas into the yard after they discover that a nearby fence had been cut.

7:29 p.m. Negotiators receive voice confirmation of the alertness of both hostages.

Thursday, January 22

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

9:30 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

10:29 a.m. Wassenaar asks to speak to a television reporter, answering questions the reporter would fax to him.

12:15 p.m. Negotiators give inmates Interstate Compact letters from other states to review.

3:20 p.m. Both correctional officers appear briefly on the roof, allowing for a visual welfare inspection.

9:30 p.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

Friday, January 23

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

9:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

4:50 p.m. Wassenaar demands to speak to a reporter on live radio.

8:45 p.m. Negotiators discuss with Wassenaar the terms of releasing one correctional officer.

Saturday, January 24

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

10:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

3:15 p.m. DPS robot delivers roast beef, dried beans, summer sausages, tortillas, potato chips, soft drinks, cheese, tuna, mayonnaise, and candy bars. This represents half of the food the inmates requested. The other half would be delivered after the safe release of an officer.

3:20 p.m. First hostage release. The inmates release Correctional Officer AUCH from the tower (negotiators had made several overtures to the inmates to release Officer Doe first). He is examined by medical personnel and interviewed by TSU members before being transported by ground ambulance and helicopter to Good Samaritan Hospital in Phoenix. AUCH was treated for injuries, including an orbital fracture that required surgery. He was also interviewed at the hospital by members of the DOC Criminal Investigation Unit, who were gathering information to support the eventual criminal referral against the two inmates.

3:38 p.m. SWAT team members deliver second half of the food request: cheeseburgers, french fries, pizzas, cigarettes, and cheese.

7:15 p.m. Negotiators hear the voice of Correctional Officer DOE voice during a conversation with Coy, confirming her alertness.

Sunday, January 25

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

Family members of one inmate arrive in Arizona to serve as

third-party intermediaries.

10:00 a.m. At the Command Center, Governor Napolitano and key staff members receive their daily briefing from DOC Director SCHRIRO, key DOC staff and interagency personnel.

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7

Monday, January 26

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

10:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

Tuesday, January 27

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

10:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

5:05-5:10 p.m. SWAT team members deliver towels, blankets and washcloths. In return, inmates move DOE to the observation deck, making her visible to negotiators for a welfare check.

5:32 p.m. Wassenaar asks to be interviewed on radio as a term of his release, as confirmation that the State will make good on the terms.

Wednesday, January 28

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue on and off

throughout the day.

Family members of the other inmate arrive in Arizona to

assist in negotiations.

9:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

12:28 p.m. SWAT team members deliver hygiene products for the inmates and DOE in return for a health and welfare check of DOE.

2:21 p.m. Negotiators hear DOE in the background of a phone call with Wassenaar, confirming her alertness.

Thursday, January 29

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

9:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

3:40 p.m. SWAT team members deliver cinnamon rolls, tortillas and cigarettes, in return for a health and welfare check of DOE conducted by a paramedic.

10:00 p.m. Governor and key staff meet with Director SCHRIRO and key DOC staff regarding the progress of negotiations, including a demand by Wassenaar to be interviewed on radio. The Governor recommends that the radio interview of Wassenaar not be played live without an agreement by the inmates to surrender and release Officer Doe safely.

Friday, January 30

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

10:00 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

3:36 p.m. SWAT team members deliver cinnamon rolls, Pedialite, Gatorade and cigarettes, in return for a health and welfare check of DOE.

7:16 p.m. DOE is interviewed by a physician for a health and welfare check.

Saturday, January 31

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue from time to

time throughout the day.

10:00 a.m. Key staff to the Governor receive the daily briefing at the Command Center from Director SCHRIRO and key Corrections staff and interagency personnel.

3:56 p.m. SWAT team members deliver an onion, bread and Gatorade.

5:22 p.m. Wassenaar appears on the observation deck holding a shotgun backwards in his right hand.

7:17 p.m. DOE is interviewed via phone by a physician for a health and welfare update.

8:08 p.m. SWAT team members deliver tuna, Pedialite and cigarettes.

Sunday, February 1 9:20 a.m. A third-party intermediary, an uncle of

inmate Coy, is on the phone.

10:04 a.m. Wassenaar identifies the negotiator with whom he wants to deal and discusses surrender demands. Additional demands are made once the designated negotiator is on site.

10:14 a.m. DOE’s voice is heard; she says that she is “fine.”

11:04 a.m. Cigarettes are delivered to inmates.

11:29 a.m. Inmates make demands:

Turn on power for bathroom access.

Wassenaar: talk to his sister.

Coy: hear a tape of his ex-wife.

Property in van

Paperwork confirming no DOC or county custody for future court proceedings

Clothing

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8

Steak, beer and pizza

11:52 a.m. Governor Napolitano arrives at Central Command.

12:35 p.m. Negotiators play a tape of Coy’s ex-wife.

12:51 p.m. DOE is observed on the roof of the tower with Wassenaar. She does not leave hatch area.

1:26 p.m. Call with Wassenaar’s sister.

2:04 p.m. Wassenaar calls to say that the power is not turned on, there will be no contact with DOE, and he will have additional demands in 24 hours. If, by that time, the power is not turned on and the additional demands are not met, there will be no contact for 48 hours, and he will have additional demands.

2:39 p.m. The power is switched on.

2:46 p.m. Wassenaar fires 37mm multiple baton rounds (non-lethal).

2:57 p.m. Wassenaar reports no power.

3:13 p.m. Two inmate uniforms, including underwear, socks and shoes, and copies of revised paperwork are delivered to the inmates. Wassenaar states that he may have disabled the power in the tower. Steaks, baked potatoes, beer and soft drinks are delivered to the tower.

3:39 p.m. DOC Director SCHRIRO gives the Governor a status report.

3:41 p.m. A key is delivered to the inmates to allow them inmates to access the first floor to use the bathroom and to clear obstacles and traps to facilitate opening the door and the exit of the inmates and hostage.

3:47-4:18 p.m. The key is determined to be unusable, and a second key is delivered.

4:25 p.m. Coy is seen at the hatch.

4:39 p.m. Governor Napolitano calls for an update.

5:16 p.m. Contact is initiated to discuss specifics of the surrender process. Coy says to call back.

5:19 p.m. Governor returns to Central Command.

5:31 p.m. Contact is initiated to discuss specifics of the surrender process. Coy says to call back.

5:45 p.m. Contact is initiated to discuss specifics of the surrender process. Coy says to call back.

5:52 p.m. Wassenaar calls. There is discussion about the specifics of exiting the tower.

6:17 p.m. Wassenaar appears on the roof in an orange uniform, signifying that the door is clear for opening by the tactical team.

6:20 p.m. The tactical team approaches the tower, opens the door and props it open with a sandbag. The team then retreats approximately 10 yards.

6:25 p.m. Hostage situation comes to an end. Wassenaar walks out with his hands up. He complies with the order to turn around and lay on the ground and is restrained. DOE exits the tower next; she is recovered by a tactical team and removed to the Administration building and an awaiting ambulance. Coy exits the tower and is taken into custody and restrained.

6:32-7:08 p.m. DOE is examined and treated in the ambulance. She is then flown by helicopter to Good Samaritan Hospital in Phoenix, where she is treated for injuries sustained during the hostage incident, interviewed by DOC Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU) investigators, and reunited with her family.

6:51 p.m. Governor Napolitano and Director SCHRIRO depart the Lewis Complex for Good Samaritan Hospital.

7:34 p.m. Wassenaar and Coy are taken to the Morey Unit’s Blue side visitation strip area/non- contact visitation area, where they are photographed by DOC CIU investigators, strip- searched by Bureau of Prison (BOP) personnel, and provided with BOP jumpsuits. Their clothing and other evidence seized from the inmates are placed in containers and maintained by a CIU special investigator.

Medical staff check the inmates’ vital signs prior to transportation to the federal corrections institution in Phoenix, where they are isolated from each other.

Wassenaar and Coy are served with search warrants for personal characteristics by a DOC criminal investigator. The search warrant is executed by SANE (Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner) staff from Scottsdale Health Care, who collect the sexual assault protocol as directed by the search warrant.

Wassenaar and Coy are advised of their Miranda rights. Wassenaar invokes his right to counsel, and Coy declines to be questioned.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 

 

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9

Governor Napolitano’s February 10, 2004, action plan for investigating the incident at the Morey Unit included the appointment of an Administrative Review Panel made up of law enforcement and corrections professionals to: (a) reconstruct the sequence of events leading up to the inmates’ seizure of the Morey Unit tower, (b) identify issues that directly or indirectly contributed to the incident or could give rise to similar incidents, and (c) recommend practices to improve security and staff safety.

The Administrative Review Panel was comprised of:

ROBERTO VILLASEÑOR, Assistant Chief, Tucson Police Department;

JOHN PHELPS, Deputy Director, Arizona Office of Homeland Security; and

MICHAEL SMARIK, Division Director, Support Services, Arizona Department of Corrections.

The Administrative Review Panel consulted with the following subject matter experts throughout the review process: Lt. John Stamatopoulos, SWAT and Bomb Commander, Tucson Police Department; Thomas McHugh, Administrator, Criminal Investigations Bureau, Arizona Department of Corrections; and Greg Lauchner, Administrator, Special Services Bureau, Arizona Department of Corrections.

Many of that panel’s recommendations are incorporated into this section, and the Blue Ribbon Panel acknowledges, with deep gratitude, the painstaking and professional manner in which the Administrative Review Panel fulfilled its mission.

Contents. This preliminary report’s findings and 68 recommendations are presented in an order that parallels the chronology of the attempted escape and hostage taking. The issues discussed are: