How have your personal schemata changed throughout your life?
The Cognitivist Movement
Prior to engaging in this discussion, read Chapter 2: The Emergence of Cognitive Research, from your text, watch the video, TEDTalks: Peter Doolittle—How Your “Working Memory” Makes Sense of the World (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site., and the Instructor Guidance.
For this discussion, you will be considering the variables that differentiate cognitivism from behaviorism and how this area of understanding ‘how we learn,’ affects our own ability to effectively acquire new knowledge and apply to our personal and professional goals.
As you have read this week, cognitivism is a theory that addresses the mind’s contribution to how we learn. The cognitive revolution (although considered by some as an overly stated fact) is suggested to have been a response to the behaviorist movement that rejected introspection (anti-mentalism), and controversially lead to, what some consider, a dissolvement of the behaviorist movement. Consider the following questions about cognitivism and discuss each, basing your posture on this week’s readings, your past experiences, and your past knowledge.
- Why is it suggested that cognitivists disagree with the behaviorist view that learning only occurs if there is an outward manifestation? What other notable differences do these two theories suggest?
- Do you agree with the cognitivist view that learning is a change in one’s schemata? (Support with citations.)
- How have your personal schemata changed throughout your life? (Could be about learning, but also about other domains such as love, honesty, hard work, loyalty, etc.)
- List an example of a schema that has changed, in your own knowledge development. involving the field of psychology.
- Based on cognitivism, what implications does it suggest is a potential concern for effectively processing information when cognitive load is not effectually considered?
- Do you recall a time where learning was difficult because there were too many components all at once? What strategy(ies) did you use to work through this situation?2
The Emergence of Cognitive Research
Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, you should be able to do the following:
· Explain the history of the cognitive revolution.
· Explain what information processing is and identify which factors are involved.
· Define schema development and explain its role in learning.
· Describe cognitive and concept mapping.
· Explain Bloom’s taxonomy and its applicability to the learning process.
Introduction
Have you ever
· wondered why you cannot remember something you learned an hour ago?
· chunked numbers together when memorizing a new phone number?
· witnessed a loved one’s memory loss?
· created a silly song to help you remember information for a test?
· thought you knew something well, only to find that you did not?
Cognitivism, the study of cognition, took the stage in the latter half of the 20th century and suggested a new way to think about learning. From this perspective, learning has successfully occurred when the learner’s schemata change based on newly acquired information (Ertmer & Newby, 1993). A schema, or schemata when plural, is a category of information, a representation or symbolic illustration that forms in the mind when an individual learns information or develops behaviors. For example, a child who has been around house kittens develops a schema in which an animal with four legs and a tail is called a cat. Thus, she may call the first dog she sees a cat; she has yet to form a schema about dogs and needs to modify her existing cat schema as she encounters more animals. Basically, in learning we tend to categorize information based on what we already know. Appropriately developed schemata support the processing of information for storage and retrieval. Inaccurately developed schemata can make learning new things less effective. In essence, information becomes our memories and affects our behaviors, including how we learn information. (To learn more about the brain’s role, check out Applying Skeptical Inquiry: The Ever-Changing Brain.)
Applying Skeptical Inquiry: The Ever-Changing Brain
Dr. Lara Boyd, the director of the Brain Behaviour Lab at the University of British Columbia, sheds an interesting light on the brain in her 2015 TEDx Talk, “After Watching This, Your Brain Will Not Be the Same.” Dr. Boyd is interested in how humans learn and the role the brain plays in this process. She notes that when individuals learn something new, whether it’s a fact or a skill, their brains change. This capability is known as neuroplasticity. Her presentation reveals that our understanding about the human brain is quickly advancing. She suggests innovative learning concepts that can help human beings become more effective learners. Visit https://youtu.be/LNHBMFCzznE to watch Dr. Boyd’s video.
Questions
1. How do Dr. Boyd’s suggestions support (or oppose) what you believe to be true about learning?
2. Dr. Boyd suggests that three changes occur in our brains and help support learning: chemical, structural, and functional. However, how do these affect persons who suffer from different types of brain damage (e.g., stroke)?
3. If the primary driver of change in your brain is your behavior, what is Dr. Boyd’s primary suggestion for increasing our success in learning?
This chapter will evaluate cognitivism’s beginnings and myths associated with its earliest days. It will also consider how the theory of cognitivism affects our understandings of information processing and cognitive mapping, which will effectively prepare us to better understand memory development (discussed in Chapter 3). Cognitivism, in essence, considers learning an active rather than a passive process. This framework also argues that learning is an integrated and constructive process. You can more successfully apply skeptical inquiry here and in later chapters by building your understanding of core features of cognitivism. This information will help you evaluate how emotions, human needs, culture, and previous experiences all can affect the process of learning. The embedded video clip provided next gives background information about the area of cognitive psychology that will help prime you for the upcoming discussions.
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· Knowledge Check
· Notebook
2.1 The Science of Cognition Takes Center Stage
The introduction of this book and Chapter 1 summarize the debate about whether cognitivism, as a psychological theory, was a reaction to behaviorism or whether it expanded upon behaviorism—a byproduct of increased understanding about the human brain. Regardless, conflict between the two schools of thought was inevitable, as the excerpts in this section from Watrin and Darwich (2012) describe. The authors’ discussions, which detail behaviorists’ reactions to the cognitive revolution and early stages of the cognitivist movement in the mid-1900s, can help to solidify and enhance our understanding of cognitivism and its implications. As with behaviorism, knowledge of a movement’s roots and history can help us better grasp the developments that follow.
Excerpts from “On Behaviorism in the Cognitive Revolution: Myth and Reactions”
By J. P. Watrin and R. Darwich
[. . .] During the development of behavior analysis, another movement was taking shape in American psychology. If behaviorism tried to dismiss the study of mental life, many efforts were being made to restore the mind as the so-called cognitive processes. That is what many called the “cognitive revolution” (e.g., Baars, 1986; Bruner, 1990; Gardner, 1985; Sperry, 1993). Roughly speaking, the revolution represented the rise of cognitivism, a movement that comprises not only cognitive psychology, but also the broader and interdisciplinary endeavor of cognitive science.
Wavebreakmedia Ltd/Wavebreak Media/Thinkstock
The rise of cognitivism is often described as a scientific revolution or the birth of a new mentalist approach.
It has been said that the cognitive revolution caused the replacement, decline, or even death of behaviorism, including behavior analysis (e.g., Baars, 1986; Friedenberg & Silverman, 2006; Gardner, 1985; Mandler, 2002; Sperry, 1993). Leahey (2000), for his part, talks about “the strange death of radical behaviorism” (p. 528), saying that its alleged end is a false belief. Roediger (2004) asks what happened to behaviorism and, after considering possible reasons for its decline, concludes that it is alive and well, especially in the Skinnerian tradition. Some go further and demonstrate that there was no revolution in the philosophical sense (e.g., Leahey, 1992; O’Donohue, Ferguson, & Naugle, 2003). Beyond mere speculation, there were also attempts to investigate the problem through empirical means. While some showed that behaviorism is still growing (Friman, Allen, Kerwin, & Larzelere, 1993; Wyatt, Hawkins, & Davis, 1986), others pointed out that it has been declining since the rise of cognitivism (Robins, Gosling, & Craik, 1999; Tracy, Robins, & Gosling, 2004).
As a result, the same history is told in very different ways. History, however, is a product of the selective interpretation of an historian. The facts never speak for themselves. As Carr (1987) said, “the facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context” (p. 11). In this case, the cognitive revolution is also a story about two schools whose paths cross. Each side stresses different facts. Both have their interests at stake, given that interpretations are conflicting or disputable.
Even so, some versions of history become usual or crystallized. That seems to be the case of the cognitive revolution, the story of a radical paradigm shift in which behaviorism was displaced in favor of cognitivism. Given the drama of its narrative, it probably sounds convincing to unwary ears. In becoming usual, however, the cognitivist story also made it difficult to equally consider other perspectives about the past. Its romance and simplicity may conceal significant implications to the image of behaviorism, at the same time that its popularity may have obscured behaviorist versions of the same facts. [. . .]
From this confrontation, it is expected that rhetorical strategies in storytelling become evident. It is not a question of who is right or wrong, neither of which approach is better or worse, but rather of what each side tells and how they tell the same history. [. . .]
The Nature and Target of the Cognitivist Movement
There is no consensus about the nature of the cognitivist movement. It is usually understood as a scientific revolution . . . implying that psychology had undergone a paradigm shift (e.g., Baars, 1986; Palermo, 1971; see also Kuhn, 1970). Some, however, argue that it was rather a counterrevolution, because it was a response to an earlier “behaviorist revolution” (e.g., Friedenberg & Silverman, 2006; Miller, 2003). There is also controversy over the adequacy of the term “revolution,” given that there were no cataclysmic events, leaders, or radicalisms (Mandler, 2002, 2007). Despite the disagreement, “revolution” still seems to be the most common label, having widespread use in literature (see, e.g., Baars, 1986; Bruner, 1990; Gardner, 1985; Sperry, 1993).
In any case, the cognitivist movement is usually depicted in terms of its conflictive relationship with behaviorism, including the Skinnerian tradition. Mandler (2002) even defines a revolution with such a relation, stating that
the well-documented cognitive “revolution” was, to a large extent, an evolving return to attitudes and trends that were present before the advent of behaviorism and that were alive and well outside of the United States, where behaviorism had not developed any coherent support. (p. 339)
The revolution was thus the birth of a new mentalistic approach, which developed in parallel to an antimentalistic tradition, that is, behaviorism itself. It was, in a sense, natural that some reciprocal opposition to behaviorism appeared. Bruner (1990), however, says that “it was not a revolution against behaviorism with the aim of transforming behaviorism into a better way of pursuing psychology by adding a little mentalism to it” (p. 2), but he soon concludes, “I think it should be clear to you by now that we were not out to ‘reform’ behaviorism, but to replace it” [emphasis added] (p. 3). Certainly, someone who wants to replace behaviorism does not support it—or, at least, has a better proposal. [. . .]
Reactions From the Behaviorist Side
[. . .] On the behaviorist side, behavior analysis was still flourishing when the events of the so-called cognitive revolution took place. Because the cognitivist historiography is critical of behaviorism, it was unlikely that behavior analysts would not react. And they did. The reactions here presented were written not only by behavior analysts but also by other scholars interested in the quarrel. In some sense, they would favor this alternative story.
For behavior analysts, cognition is behavior and, as such, a legitimate subject matter to their science (see, e.g., Palmer, 2003). Cognitivism, for its part, was soon qualified as a new form of mentalism, being thus opposed to the behavior-analytic standpoint. Reactions to cognitivism seem to have increased from the 1970s onward, simultaneously to the growing awareness of a cognitive revolution and to charges of behaviorism’s decline. It would begin a tense and ambiguous relationship between behavior analysis and the study of cognition.
Skinner addressed the cognitivist issue in many of his texts (e.g., Skinner, 1977, 1985, 1987, 1990). His criticism revolved around central features of the cognitivist program, such as the explanatory role of cognitive processes, the importance of rules in explaining behavior, the computer metaphor, and contributions from brain and computer sciences. At some times, the author also charged cognitivism of being an ineffective approach, saying, for instance, that “the appeal to cognitive states and processes is a diversion which could well be responsible for much of our failure to solve our problems” (Skinner, 1977, p. 10). Given the limited number of references in Skinner’s work, it is sometimes difficult to determine which version(s) of cognitivism he criticized. Indeed, the same case made against the cognitivist historiography could be made against Skinner. Cognitivism comprised very different developments and theoretical positions that eventually became interrelated (Greenwood, 1999). Still, Skinner’s work seems to suggest the illusion of a generic and unified cognitivism.
Nevertheless, reactions from other behavior analysts would be more specific. Many of them were responses to particular questions or charges against behaviorism, assuming a critical tone in general. Some took the shape of book reviews. In reviewing Mackenzie’s (1977) account on the decline of behaviorism, Zuriff (1979), for example, asserted that it was a paradox to review such a book in the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, a healthy behaviorist journal. Morgan and Buskist (1990), for their part, charged Baars’s (1986) account on the cognitive revolution of misrepresenting behaviorism but noted that “there is much in the cognitive literature that, upon close inspection, cannot easily be differentiated from the experimental concerns of behavior analysis” (p. 199). In his review of Gardner’s (1985) book, Shimp (1989) also pointed out the misrepresentation of behavior analysis and of behaviorism in general, asserting that “behavior analysts may occasionally need to control an urge to fling the book down and dismiss it” (p. 163). Salzinger (1973) started a review of Neisser’s (1967) book with a more conciliatory tone, saying that “the research in cognitive psychology is certainly interesting, on the whole well executed, and very challenging. It is well within the scope of a behavioristic approach. It merely awaits more attention from behaviorists” (p. 369). Still, he also criticized the cognitivist approach, ending in the best Skinnerian fashion: “Are theories of cognition necessary?” (p. 377).
Among the reactions, there were also works that analyzed the cognitive revolution itself, dismissing it in the philosophical sense (e.g., Leahey, 1992; O’Donohue et al., 2003). In those cases, the cognitivist movement was found to be incompatible with key models of scientific revolution (e.g., Kuhn, 1970; Laudan, 1977). Other works dealt with related misconceptions about behaviorism. Amsel (1992), for example, noted that the behaviorism attacked by cognitivists is a caricature from Watsonian and Skinnerian behaviorisms. Some have tried to dismiss the alleged death or decline of behaviorism by empirical means. They showed that, in the period of the cognitive revolution, references to Skinner increased (Thyer, 1991) and that professional associations and publications devoted to behaviorism were both multiplying (Wyatt et al., 1986). It is noteworthy that cognitivists were not alone in misrepresenting behaviorism (see, e.g., Todd & Morris, 1983), but it is not rare to find behaviorist rebuttals to cognitivist allegations.
In their effort to react, behavior analysts have shown that cognitivism and its portrayal of behaviorism did not go unnoticed. The cognitivist issue became so significant that, during the late 1970s, there was an increase in the use of cognitive keywords in the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, one of the main behavior-analytic outlets (Morris, Higgins, & Bickel, 1982). The importance of the theme also became evident with a special issue of that journal about cognition and behavior analysis in 1989. Their editors did not hesitate to say “Cognition and behavior analysis have a continuing, close, and perhaps difficult, relationship” (White, McCarthy, & Fantino, 1989, p. 197). [. . .]
Cognitivism as an Alternative, Not a Replacement
The story of the cognitive revolution seems successful in fostering the cognitivist movement and developing its historical identity. It left, however, several questions unsolved when it speaks of “behaviorism.” That term is ambiguous and its use disputable. It was a behaviorism that only the cognitivists knew. In the same vein, one might argue against the meaning of “cognitivism,” because it was not a unified tradition. Indeed, this review criticized a “cognitivist historiography,” but the notion of such historiography only became possible when those authors assumed a generic cognitivism as a common ground to construct their story. The very historiography that once celebrated a “cognitive revolution” also favors a distorted notion of the cognitivist tradition. It is based on the idea that cognitivism was, in some sense, a unified and revolutionary movement, capable of resisting and displacing behaviorism. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine an alternative story, in which someone resorts to that same generic cognitivism to describe its rise and fall. As seen in Skinner’s work, that sort of story could well be told by a behaviorist—and, perhaps, it already exists (see, e.g., Overskeid, 2008).
Both behaviorism and cognitivism designate very heterogeneous sets of positions. In the quarrel between cognitivists and behavior analysts, it is clear that not all of them took part in the issue or subscribed to the perspectives here presented. Some have even argued in defense of the opposite side (e.g., Roediger, 2004). Behaviorism and cognitivism can be deceptive terms. In the history of psychology, they can help to understand large trends over periods of time. Nonetheless, they are abstractions. They are not real entities, capable of dominating a discipline that is not even unified. They may not reflect a single, conscious, or concerted effort of a scientific and professional group. They are intended to reflect general features, sometimes overlooking the diversity of interests, positions, and practices. The issue of the cognitive revolution illustrates the dangers of reifying such concepts, of taking an abstract construct as a concrete entity. [. . .]
